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THE HAUNTED UNIVERSITY: ACADEMIC SUBJECTIVITY IN THE TIME OF 
COMMUNICATIVE CAPITALISM 
SUMMARY 
 
In the last thirty years there have been significant changes in the governmentality and culture of 
higher education in the UK; concurrently, day-to-day practice has been transformed by 
networked computers. This political and technical double-act may be understood as a specific 
articulation of what Jodi Dean has termed communicative capitalism (2010, p.2-9).  
This thesis investigates how such political and technocultural changes condition the subjectivity 
of academic staff across a range of academic activities and contexts. The theoretical model I 
develop draws notably on a combination of the psychoanalytic theory of Freud and Lacan, using 
Freud’s conception of the ‘uncanny’ (1919) and Althusser’s theory of ideology (1970), to 
consider how the academic subject of technoculture is constituted by the particular domain of 
communicative capitalism I term the Haunted University.  
To develop this argument the thesis firstly establishes the ‘nature’ of the contemporary 
university – distinguishing it from earlier models and earlier moments of reform. This is 
developed using cultural history sources and theoretical work from social, cultural and critical 
higher education studies. Secondly, I use a series of cultural studies methods to identify and 
explore elements of the new university formation. These include the selection and analysis of 
relevant digital materials (e.g. academic homepages and blogs) and small qualitative surveys of 
academic staff. Thirdly, the broadly Lacanian thrust of my argument is developed through 
leveraging theoretical work from the fields of cultural studies, philosophy, critical labour studies 
and higher education policy.  
I conclude that the series of developments and changes enacted by communicative capitalism 
has tended to transform academic subjectivity, bringing about what may be a permanent change 
in the ontology and epistemology of the academy. However, despite neoliberalism’s attempt to 
foreclose discursive dissent, there are resistances to its project. 
My original contribution to knowledge is to theorise how and why the shift in academic 
subjectivity is being enacted, demonstrating how the technocultural, neoliberal university is 
beginning to haunt the academy not only from the outside, but from the inside, too.  
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SECTION I - CRITICAL INQUIRY 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
1.1 Preface - spies of the Haunted University 
Gilles Deleuze posits the idea that we are moving from the Discipline society defined 
by Michel Foucault (1975), where the institution of the university involves enclosure 
within the campus, the seminar room and the lecture theatre, to a Control society 
(Deleuze, 1992). Here the university becomes corporate and is ‘a spirit, a gas’ that is not 
limited to the campus but is with us everywhere on our mobile devices (Deleuze, 1992, 
p.4).  
 
As Andrejevic demonstrates, our world of networked computers and social media 
encourages us to comply actively with our own surveillance and the surveillance of 
others in the workplace (2007). This type of workplace surveillance is an eerie legacy of 
F. W. Taylor’s ‘Scientific Management’ theories, which underpin the modern 
production line or fast-food restaurant. Based on close monitoring of every task an 
employee carried out, Taylorism takes the view that all emotion can be factored out of 
the workplace experience – be that boredom, frustration or pleasure (Andrejevic, 2007). 
A denial of the normal everyday human emotional dimension which colours the 
university workplace (and is a necessary part of the desire to learn) Taylorism 
substitutes instead the corporate idea that it must operate like an affect-free, relentless, 
robotic machine. This neurotic institutional illusion affects all aspects of the everyday; 
university, teaching, research and academic administration are all haunted by 
phenomenal levels of audit, producing the fantasy university of bureaucracy, of metrics, 
of the neoliberal ideology that contributes to my term the ‘Haunted University’.  
 
Freud’s concept of the Unheimlich, or uncanny, provides a rich set of metaphors for 
thinking about the university. That a rationalist domain of learning and knowledge 
production might be possessed of a more shadowy and less rational (though, ostensibly, 
in its reductive obsession with ‘efficiency’, über-rational) dimension is not surprising. 
The uncanny is, after all, the Enlightenment’s dark side, irrupting with the birth of 
science and haunting modernity from within (Dolar, 1991, p.7). The technologising of 
the everyday folds in the second element of the uncanny that creates the Haunted 
University – we become both subjects of technology and of neoliberalism.  
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1.2 Formulating my research question 
My interest in this topic stems from my experience in higher education (HE). For over 
20 years, from the early 1990s, I worked in a number of universities in both academic 
and academic-related roles where I managed the development of online and distance-
learning initiatives. As an online/distance-learning specialist I worked with groups of 
academic and technical staff to set up online courses; my engagement with other 
academic staff in a variety of universities, both old and new, and with the national and 
international learning technology (sometimes called ‘e-learning’) research community 
raised questions for me that I have sought to answer in this project.  
Over the years of debate and discussion at conferences, and the day-to-day contact with 
academics who were using – or not using - online learning, there emerged, for me, for 
an unspoken facet to educational technology: that for academic staff, it’s an area of 
powerful emotional engagement. There are some academic staff who become highly 
enthusiastic, excited, even obsessed about the technologies. But it’s much more 
common for dislike and mistrust to be expressed and it’s become familiar in universities 
for people to characterise this in terms of neurosis, referring to themselves or others as 
technophobes. The term ‘Luddite’1 has also become frequently and pejoratively bandied 
about to describe academic staff who don’t want to use the technologies.  
In ‘management-speak’ (and I was, for some years, an academic manager – a conflicted 
role for many of us, as Andrew Sparkes (2007) explores) this technological 
disengagement among academic staff was perceived as ‘change-resistant’ and 
problematic. Successive funding council initiatives were aimed at persuading staff to 
embrace the technologies (Jisc, 2010a). But I was intrigued and puzzled by the strength 
of the emotion I was seeing, in different disciplines and different universities, and which 
my learning technology colleagues were informally reporting in other institutions. It 
seemed out of proportion to something as mundane as computer use and it surprised me 
that highly intelligent people reacted so irrationally. It seemed to me that the 
                                                          
1
 The Luddites were groups of 19
th
-century weavers who took direct action against the property of 
factory owners. The term has become used contemporaneously to refer to those who are opposed to 
technology but, in fact, the historical Luddites were skilled technologists and there is no evidence of any 
hostility to machinery on their part. ‘Wrecking was simply a technique’ of ‘collective bargaining’ 
(Hobsbawn, 1952, p.59), to enable weavers to influence how the technologies would be used, 
particularly with regard to pay and conditions of work (Hobsbawn, 1952). 
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technologies must appear to exercise some kind of threat or to stand in for something 
other than themselves and I wanted to find out more.  
I should mention that whilst the emotional reaction of colleagues was a ‘given’ in the 
educational technology community, I could not find any research where this was treated 
seriously, as a valid response and investigated as such. Research that addressed issues of 
why academic staff didn’t want to use new technologies tended to take the perspective 
that such engagement was an a priori ‘good’ and that staff should be encouraged to 
mend their ways, update their skills and conquer their fears (e.g. Salmon, 2013, pp.xiv-
xvii; Sharpe et al, 2006, pp.77-8; King and Boyatt, 2014). Which, to be fair, is what the 
research funding encouraged us to do
2
. But I wanted to investigate what this generalised 
fear – or, more rarely, fanaticism – was about, in a way that enabled me to have critical 
distance from it.  
Historically, universities played a pivotal role in the development of the internet, so 
digital technology is an area that has long been important in the world of academia. But 
apart from the extensive literatures on e-learning, the relationship of academia to 
computer culture is surprisingly under-researched. 
I wanted to take an overview of the landscape of higher education and the role of 
technoculture within it and theorise how that impacted on academics as subjects; I 
planned to use examples of how academic staff represent themselves or are represented 
digitally, to inform this. I also intended to carry out surveys for one area of my study, 
the experience of using (or not using) technologies for teaching. I felt this would add 
texture to the study and chose this area because it is the one where there is the greatest 
level of awareness among staff that technologies are impacting them and so where they 
might be more likely to have considered, varied and complex perspectives.  
To this end, I employed the methodology of theoretical analysis, in the sense of 
selection and discussion of theoretical and descriptive material, and I applied these 
selected theories to the context of academic subjectivity. I used them to theorise my 
findings from the narrative analysis of relevant digital materials I performed and from 
the two qualitative surveys of academic staff I carried out. I discuss methodology in 
more detail in Chapter 2. 
                                                          
2
 See Jisc (2010a) for examples of e-learning project funding.  
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Initially in my project I looked only at what the technologies meant for the academic 
subject. As I began to understand more about how they produced the subject I realised I 
also needed to take into account the culture of universities and the political economy of 
higher education, as these had a close relationship with the use of technologies. 
Although the issue of subjectivity invited a psychoanalytical theoretical perspective and 
this was where I began, the work on culture and politics led me to include other 
theoretical perspectives. 
1.3 The research question 
As a result of the above enquiry, I developed the following research question: How is 
the academic subject constituted by the culture and practices of the neoliberal, 
technocultural, university?  
My study, whilst focusing on this very specific area, is interdisciplinary. To construct 
my field of study I combine two over-arching theoretical approaches. The first is 
Jacques Lacan’s re-imagining of Freudian psychoanalysis and the second is a materialist 
perspective, in particular Louis Althusser’s work on ideology. These perspectives 
inform and enhance each other, Lacanian psychoanalysis mitigating the reductivism that 
can limit materialism and materialism providing a means by which psychoanalysis can 
be culturally and historically anchored, rather than presenting as a universal paradigm. 
This is similar to Anne McClintock’s proposal of ‘a situated psychoanalysis — a 
culturally contextualized psychoanalysis that is simultaneously a psychoanalytically 
informed history’ (McClintock, 1995, locs.1561-1562). 
 
This ‘psychoanalytic materialist’ approach provides me with a way of thinking about 
the psychoanalytic and political production of subjectivity in the context of the 
university. I also draw to a lesser extent on some of the work of other philosophers, 
such as Gilles Deleuze, Guy Debord, Judith Butler and Jacques Derrida, where relevant. 
 
The particular meaning of the term ‘neoliberalism’ I employ in this work is neatly 
summarised by Jeremy Gilbert: 
neoliberalism, from the moment of its inception, advocates a programme of 
deliberate intervention by government in order to encourage particular types of 
entrepreneurial, competitive and commercial behaviour in its citizens, ultimately 
arguing for the management of populations with the aim of cultivating the type 
16  
 
 
of individualistic, competitive, acquisitive and entrepreneurial behaviour which 
the liberal tradition has historically assumed to be the natural condition of 
civilised humanity, undistorted by government intervention 
Gilbert (2013, p.9). 
 
For UK higher education this is far from an abstract concept. The government of 
Margaret Thatcher, elected in 1979, set an agenda for re-engineering universities to fit 
in with their neoliberal worldview, an agenda that continues today, long after the life of 
that government, or indeed of Thatcher herself (Tight, p.76). As Roger Burrows 
demonstrates, in universities this involves setting up a ‘simulated’ market, ‘through the 
introduction of audit and the introduction of various forms of metrics that enable 
systematic comparisons between individuals, departments and institutions’ (Burrows, 
2012, p.357).  
 
So this thesis is an account of the newly developing academic subject. This is the person 
who emerges in the variously reconfigured places and spaces, culture and practices of 
the neoliberal, technocultural university. 
 
1.4 The literatures 
1.4.1 Literature on psychoanalysis 
The thinking of Freud underpins my work. Most significantly and explicitly I have 
drawn on his writings on Das Unheimlich or the Uncanny (1919) to think about the 
university as a space of the uncanny. Lacan’s ‘return to Freud’ and theorising of 
Freudian psychoanalysis from a post-structuralist perspective also forms a key part my 
overarching perspective in theorising academic subjectivity. Additionally, Lacan does 
write explicitly about the university, both in a literal and metaphorical way (1969-70) 
and it’s possible to extrapolate, from Lacan’s theory of the mirror phase, that the mirror 
is the first technology which produces us as subjects. 
Most literature on technoculture and psychoanalysis is from a psychoanalytic materialist 
perspective, as I discuss below in 1.3.4. There are a (relatively small) number of other 
works that don’t set out to take into account the political implications of computational 
culture, such as Andre Nusselder’s Interface fantasy: a Lacanian cyborg ontology 
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(2009); whilst I have taken such works into account I have not drawn from them 
extensively. 
Whilst the body of work on Lacanian psychoanalysis is a significant one, there is no 
part of it that explicitly address academic subjectivity in a technocultural university 
context. 
 
1.4.2 Literature on materialism  
Louis Althusser’s work on ideology (1970) is an overarching concept in my thesis. I 
have also drawn on George Lukacs’ work on reification and at times, directly from the 
texts of Karl Marx, whose work Althusser and Lukacs amplify and develop. 
With the 21
st
 century return to Marx in critical thinking, a number of commentators in 
the areas of technoculture and/or labour studies, for example, Manuel Castells, Zigmunt 
Bauman, Andrew Ross, Tiziana Terranova, Jodi Dean and Christian Fuchs are 
leveraging Marxist approaches to think about labour or culture in the time of the (post) 
internet. I draw on their work, but what distinguishes my study from other materialist 
analyses of technology is my leveraging of psychoanalysis and my concentration on the 
specific area of academic subjectivity. 
 
1.4.3 Literature on technoculture 
There is a significant body of work that provides an analysis of contemporary 
technoculture and is located broadly in the area of media and cultural studies. Some 
examples are the analyses of internet culture by Mark Poster (2001), Evgeny Morozov 
(2013) and Eli Pariser (2011); Sherry Turkle’s3 writings on the way in which we are 
conditioned by our use of games and social media (1995; 2011); Mark Andrejevic’s 
work on social media and surveillance culture (2007); and the theorising of internet 
labour studies by Andrew Ross (2009; 2013) and Tiziana Terranova (2004) among 
others. There are also areas which abut, but have a less direct relation to my work, such 
                                                          
3
 Although Turkle’s background is in Lacanian psychoanalysis this isn’t really the perspective from which 
she writes about the internet, so I have included her in this section rather than under psychoanalysis. 
However she does work from a perspective that foregrounds the idea of self as conditioned by 
technologies, so it would be possible to make an argument for including her work under psychoanalysis, 
although I have chosen not to so in this case. 
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as the work of Gary Hall, and others, on open access publishing and the gift economy 
(Hall, 2008; 2012) and similarly work on open access educational resources and 
software (see Downes, 2011). 
 
These approaches concentrate on different aspects of technoculture and take a broadly 
and sometimes explicitly materialist approach. They have informed my thinking but 
they do not generally take a psychoanalytic approach or consider implications for the 
academic subject as my work does (though see Gary Hall’s #MySubjectification, 2013). 
 
1.4.4 Psychoanalytic materialist literature on technology  
There is a body of work that considers technology from a psychoanalytic materialist 
perspective. I have drawn particularly on the work of the four most significant, in my 
view, writers on this area: Zizek, Dean, Kittler and Hayles. 
 
Slavoj Zizek has theorised the connection between psychoanalysis and Althusserean 
ideology and has produced some work in how the internet shapes subjectivity (see Zizek 
1997; 1998). Jodi Dean takes Zizek’s initial work much further in terms of technology 
and subjectivity, connecting it up with the use of blogs and social networking (Dean 
2002; 2010). Dean employs a psychoanalytic materialist approach to theorise the 
concept of communicative capitalism. By this she means: 
contemporary communications media capture their users in intensive and 
extensive networks of enjoyment, production and surveillance … Just as 
industrial capitalism relies on the exploitation of labor so does communicative 
capitalism rely on the exploitation of communication.  
(Dean, 2010, p.4) 
 
This is an important framing concept in my study. The way in which neoliberalism 
leverages technology has also been called ‘digital capitalism’ (e.g. Andrejevic, 2002) or 
‘computational capitalism’(e.g. Berry, 2014). I have chosen to use the term 
communicative capitalism for my context rather than digital or computational capitalism 
because of the emphasis it places on the exploitation of human desire and drives by 
these communicative networks. But when I use the term communicative capitalism, I 
want to emphasise that this is a digital and computational concept, too. 
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Friedrich Kittler also uses Lacan to theorise the production of technology and 
subjectivity and develop his work on medium theory, as has N. Katherine Hayles’ work 
on the technology of the self which, sharing an interest in medium theory with Kittler, 
also draws on Lacan (Kittler, 1986; 1997; Hayles 1993; 2005; 2006).  
 
These four theorists write about technology and philosophy in a range of ways and I 
have leveraged their thinking to theorise subjectivity in my context of the contemporary 
university, although none of them directly address the issue of the academic subject. 
 
1.4.5 Literature on the university 
The literatures on the university fall into a number of categories. Firstly there are 
historical studies, such as the seminal works by Robert Anderson (2006) and Malcolm 
Tight (2009), which I have drawn on in Section II to consider the historical background 
to the contemporary university. I have used these sources, as well as some primary 20
th
-
century sources, to think about discourses of the university and how they frame 
academic subjectivity.  
 
Secondly, there are approaches such as work by Stefan Collini (2012a), Mary Evans 
(2004), Andrew McGettigan (2013), Alex Callinicos (2006) and Roger Brown and 
Helen Carasso (2013) which critique the contemporary UK neoliberal university as a 
meaningful institution. This body of work has many implications for academic staff, but 
in general it addresses higher education policy and its effects rather than focusing on the 
academic subject, and in general it only touches on technology, if touches on it at all, as 
part of the university machine. Similarly, works such as Bill Readings’ seminal 
University in Ruins (1996) and the work of Henri Giroux (2007; 2013) provide a critical 
analysis of the Canadian and US university system, as Ruth Barcan (2013) does for the 
Australian context.  
 
Thirdly there is a small but growing body of work on critical academic labour studies, 
such as that by Ros Gill (2010; 2014) and Sue Clegg (2008), Andrew Sparkes (2007) 
and Roger Burrows (2012), in the UK. This is more developed in Canada and the US 
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where there is a journal of scholar activism, Workplace
4
. Some of Giroux’s work comes 
into this category, as well, as do aspects of Barcan’s work. 
 
In discussing why this is not a widely researched area, Gill says:  
despite academics’ much vaunted interest in reflexivity there has been a marked 
reluctance to turn our gaze upon our own working conditions … there has been a 
relative silence on academics as workers – particularly in the UK 
(Gill, 2014, p.12)  
 
In analysing ‘the relationship between economic and political shifts, transformations in 
work, and psychosocial experiences’ of academics Gill insists that ‘this is not an 
exercise in self-indulgence or narcissism’ (Gill, 2010, p.229). Perhaps the latter point, or 
the need to state it, holds the key to why so little work has been done on the experience 
of UK academics (particularly when work on the student experience could fill libraries). 
In the current climate of HE no one wants to risk the accusation of being ‘inward-
looking’ when they are enjoined to be all about public engagement, or of focusing on 
the ‘ivory tower’ when they ought to be eagerly courting the world outside the 
university walls (insofar as there are walls any more) that some call real. 
 
Most of this body of literature take a perspective that theorises from the standpoint of 
academic identities rather than using the concept of subjectivity, as my work does. 
Consequently it considers technology as something organised outside the self rather 
than a means by which self is constituted, as my perspective does. Some thinking in this 
area sees technology as threatening the employment of teachers by substituting for them 
(see Lorenz (2012, p.605), Bartlett (2002), or Giroux (2007)), a viewpoint I critique in 
Chapter 7.  
 
1.4.6 My contribution 
My original contribution to knowledge is to forge a perspective that weaves together 
technocultural theory, psychoanalytic materialism, critical academic labour studies and 
higher education policy studies to theorise the computational turn of the neoliberal 
                                                          
4
 Workplace is an open-access journal available at http://ojs.library.ubc.ca/index.php/workplace 
(accessed 15 November 2014). 
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university and the way it produces academic subjects. Using viewpoints from different 
disciplines to reflect back on and inform each other, as I have done, provides a 
perspective on academic subjectivity that has not, hitherto, been available in any of 
these disciplines. 
 
As a research area it is what Kingsley Amis’ hapless academic, Lucky Jim might have 
called a ‘strangely neglected topic’ (Amis, 1954, loc.309), as there has not, to date, been 
any significant work from my theoretical perspective on this specific area. I would 
contend that what my work produces is a new vantage point from which to view higher 
education and the changes that are being made to it. A body of literature is beginning to 
grow up about academic staff in neoliberal times and my work adds a technocultural 
and psychoanalytic dimension to this field of critical labour studies in the UK higher 
education context. 
 
1.5 Outline of chapters 
Section I – Critical inquiry sets out what my research and this thesis aims to do and 
why and how this is achieved.  
In Chapter 1 – Introduction provides a general overview of my research and 
this thesis, situating it in the context of the literatures. 
In Chapter 2 – Methodology I discuss the research methods I used and the 
ethical issues I took into consideration. 
 
Section II – Scholarly transformations: ideas of the university past and present sets 
the stage by discussing how we got to where we are in terms of what it is to be an 
academic by considering the changing historical ideas of the UK university and the way 
in which this produces academic subjectivity. This section provides background and 
context for the work. 
In Chapter 3 – The ghost of universities past and the spirit of universities 
present I look back at the history of UK universities until the end of the 20th 
century with particular regard to public debates about the function and purpose 
of the university. I then go on to discuss the most recent stage of university 
transformation and consider the implications of this for our current conception 
of higher education. 
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Section III – Configuring the self considers how technologies of selfhood operate on 
the academic subject. 
Chapter 4 – Armour for my phantoms: academic homepages and blogs 
explores the way in which subjectivity is produced by academic homepages and 
blogs. 
Chapter 5 – I beset me: doubles, ghosts and other troubling electronic selves 
considers how sites created outside the agency of the academic subject produce 
digital doubles which also condition subjectivity. 
Chapter 6 – The body (not) in the library: space, time, embodiment 
considers how neoliberal technoculture inscribes itself onto the embodied self. 
 
Section IV – Academic labour addresses questions of subjectivity in relation to some of 
the main areas of academic work – teaching, administration and research. 
In Chapter 7 – Phantom objects on unhomely ground: teaching in the 
Haunted University I discuss how university teaching is impacted by neoliberal 
technoculture. 
Chapter 8 – The purloined email considers how email correspondence 
produces academics as subjects. 
Chapter 9 – An irradiation of the soul: research and the mediated academic 
analyses how the re-casting of research in the neoliberal university 
fundamentally affects subjectivity. 
 
Section V – Conclusion 
In Chapter 10 – Re-engineering academia I sum up my conclusions and the 
contribution my study makes. 
 
1.6 Boundaries/limitations 
I have limited my work in this thesis to the UK higher education context. However, as 
the neoliberal political agenda has cast its net widely, some of what I have to say may 
be relevant outside Britain in countries that have undergone similar re-invention of HE. 
My frame of reference and examples, however, are from the UK. 
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At the time of writing there are 161 higher education institutions in the UK (UUK, 
2014). Different types of university – old, new, Oxbridge, plate glass, Russell group, 
redbrick, vocational, campus and metropolitan, federal and unitary – all have different 
cultures. In addition to this, different academic disciplines are culturally varied, and the 
various different roles academic staff may have, from zero-hours contract lecturer, to 
professor, to vocational practitioner and teacher to academic manager and much in 
between, are all very disparate. Academics may be female or male, of varying ages, 
ethnicities, sexual orientations, class backgrounds; they may or may not be disabled or 
have carer responsibilities. How, then, to interrogate the notion of an ‘academic subject’ 
in such a heterogeneous environment? I’m not proposing that my considerations of 
academic subjectivity apply exactingly to every academic, whatever their role, in every 
institution in the UK. However, the changes that have been applied to UK higher 
education are the same changes nationally (albeit with some regional variation) and 
have affected all institutions. What I’m doing in this thesis is drawing out broad 
similarities and general patterns in the way these changes appear to be impacting on 
subjectivity, based on varied accounts, narratives, scholarly work and public debates 
about academic life, and understood through the theoretical lens I have developed.  
 
My notion of an academic subject is, then an abstracted one. I have purposely avoided 
addressing issues of gender as, indeed I have issues of ethnicity, or any form of socio-
cultural identity marker. This isn’t to say that gender inequality isn’t a critically 
important issue in the academy as the most cursory of glances at academic employment 
statistics demonstrates. Questions about the gendered culture of the academy and even 
of the academic subject position (see Barcan, 2013, chap. 5) are important and 
fascinating ones but they are not the ones I seek to address in this work. Rather I am 
sketching out a theoretical, abstracted space of academic identity and the academic body 
and analysing how it is acted on by the changing idea and practices of the university. 
 
Feminist scholar, Adrian Rich, proposes that we should never speak about ‘the body’ 
because it is too grand a claim, and instead use only the personal, more visceral term 
‘my body’ (Rich, 2002). I am choosing not to follow Rich’s proposal in my discussion 
of the academic body. This is because my purpose in proposing this unmarked 
theoretical space is to attempt to focus on some of the commonalities that academic 
subjects may share whatever their social identities, whilst remaining cognisant that 
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individual academics are marked by difference. I would hope that this enables readers to 
have the freedom to read into this text the specificities of their own context. 
 
However, remaining aware of the social marking of individuals, by gender difference in 
particular, I have at times in this thesis referred to discourses of gender. Some examples 
are in Chapter 4, both when analysing academic blogs and self-narrative and in my 
discussion of the gaze; and in Chapter 7 when I consider the way in which the body of 
the hysteric is represented. 
 
There are many people who work and study in UK universities other than academics. 
Changes to higher education organisation and funding affects everyone in universities: 
students, caterers, IT staff, librarians, gardeners, administrators, cleaners and estates 
workers among others. In this work, however, I am considering only the situation of 
academic staff. 
 
I’d like to be clear that although, in this thesis, I conduct a critical analysis of the 
implications of neoliberal audit culture in universities, I’m not proposing that blame for 
this bureaucratisation of HE lies with those staff, academic, academic-related and 
administrative, who are obliged to enact audit culture as part of their employment. 
Everyone who works in a university is implicated within the web of audit culture and 
few are in a position to affect this meaningfully. Similarly, although I critique the 
commodification of HE and the invention of a ‘customer’ role for students, I do not 
consider students to be at fault in this. A commitment to the university as a public 
project is not the sole property of the academy; I’ve not had to look too far to see this 
demonstrated by the 2013 Sussex joint student and staff protests over planned 
outsourcing of catering and estates services (Ratcliffe, 2013). 
 
1.7 Uncanny subjects of neoliberalism 
I’m not alone in finding the contemporary university a haunted space. Over ten years 
ago Nicholas Royle declared that ‘the University is, increasingly, a ghostly institution. It 
is haunted … by a sense of its relationship to itself and its own past’, an institution 
where ‘teaching is judged by a sort of spectral, invisible … body of authorities’ and 
research ‘is subject to the eerie power and disquieting effects’ of the Research 
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Assessment Exercise, ‘a ghostly mechanism that insinuates itself into all academic 
writing’ (Royle, 2003, p.54). Andrew Sparkes, in his work on the effect of audit culture 
in UK universities, is ‘inspired by partial happenings, fragmented memories, echoes of 
conversations, whispers in corridors, fleeting glimpses of myriad reflections seen 
through broken glass’ (Sparkes, 2007, p.521), and Ruth Barcan sets the tone of her book 
Academic Life and Labour in the New University when she opens with the words ‘when 
I am at work, silent, sinister faces glare down at me’, going on to describe the ‘scary 
workplace presences’ of ‘sandstone gargoyles, chimeras and dragons perched on the 
roof of a university quadrangle’ (Barcan, 2013, loc.46-8).  
 
Because university managerialism closes down the space for dissent in a way that is 
almost beyond rationalist argument (Lorenz, 2012, pp.607-10) and because academics, 
by definition, are ‘individualised, responsibled, self-managing and monitoring’(Gill, 
2014, p.13), a strange effect occurs. In the topsy-turvy universe of the Haunted 
University, when institutional neurosis masquerades as logical normality, the resulting 
affective response from academic staff is not only sometimes painful, in the form of 
anxiety, fear, guilt and shame, but also disallowed and rendered secret by the collision 
of cultures which produce it, amplifying the horror of the haunting (Gill, 2014; Sparkes, 
2012). The work of critical academic labour studies begins to break the (eerie) silence 
of the Haunted University and what follows is my attempt to add to these voices. 
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2 Chapter 2 – Research Methodology 
 
2.1 Theoretical Approach and Methodology 
This is an interdisciplinary piece of research making use of methodologies associated 
with the disciplines of media and cultural studies. There are four aspects to this: 
 
1. I employed the methodology of theoretical analysis, in the sense of selection and 
discussion of theoretical and descriptive material. The overarching theoretical 
approach I selected for this project was a combination of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis and a materialist perspective, in particular Louis Althusser’s 
work on ideology. As I discussed in more detail in the previous chapter, this 
‘psychoanalytic materialist’ approach provided me with a way of 
conceptualising the psychoanalytic and political production of subjectivity in the 
context of the technological university.  
 
2. Secondly, I carried out desk research to establish a historical background for 
locating the academic subject. I connected this with my own engagement with 
universities over the 20+ years that I worked in them to produce a reading of 
higher education informed by historical, political, cultural and personal factors.  
 
3. Thirdly, I carried out 3 small scale studies of relevant digital materials. These 
comprised academic blogs and homepages; a variety of academic (and other) 
sites produced by a search on my own name; and an analysis of academic email 
exchanges.  
 
4. Fourthly, I carried out 2 qualitative surveys of academic staff using interviews 
and questionnaires. 
 
I then applied the psychoanalytic materialist approach developed in (1.) , above, to the 
context of academic subjectivity and used it to theorise my findings from the historical 
context (2.); from the study I performed of the digital material (3.); and from the two 
qualitative surveys of academic staff I carried out (4.).  
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2.2 Period of the research 
This work was carried out between 2005 and 2014
5
. Whilst my theoretical perspective 
developed throughout this period, taking account of changes in the technocultural and 
political environment, the capturing of my qualitative and textual material is marked by 
the period I accessed or elicited it, as follows. 
 
 For the first qualitative study interviews were carried out between December 
2006 – February 2007. 
 The study of email was performed in 2007. 
 For the second qualitative survey the launch meeting, questionnaire distribution 
and completion and online commentary were completed in 2008. 
 My study of academic blogs and homepages was performed in 2009 
 The capturing of sites produced by searches on my own name was carried out in 
2010 
 
Therefore, some of this thesis I present as an historical account of, for example, the way 
in which the academic blogs of 2009 speak about subjectivity and some of it is more 
recent, having more contemporary currency. I make it clear at the start of each relevant 
chapter where that chapter stands in relation to the historical timeline of my project. 
 
2.3 Ethical issues 
Because this study in part uses human subjects and texts belonging to human subjects, 
the ethical considerations regarding permissions and anonymity outlined below were 
observed. In this I followed the Association of Internet Researchers ethics guidelines, 
particularly the overarching guideline, which asks ‘does the connection between one’s 
online data and his or her physical person enable psychological, economic, or physical, 
harm?’ (AoIR, 2012, p.7).  
 
                                                          
5 There is an intermission of 2 years between Autumn 2010 and Autumn 2012 when I suspended 
studies. 
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Additionally, because some of the subjects were, like me, members of staff at Kingston 
University and because I am a student at Sussex University, I submitted my project to 
the research ethics committees of both Kingston and Sussex and obtained clearance. 
 
2.4 Methods for each element of the research 
2.4.1 Blogs and home pages 
I conducted a search for academic blogs across a broad range of universities. I tried to 
find blogs that were from differing types of university from different disciplines and 
where staff occupied different academic roles. At this time, however, there was quite a 
narrow range of disciplines where academic staff had significant personal pages or 
blogs. There is, therefore, a bias towards computer science, educational technology and 
disciplines which involve publishing, such as media studies and creative writing. I 
concentrated only on professional academic blogs and homepages where individuals 
wrote under their own names and provided a verifiable link to their university role.  
 
I selected sites belonging to 6 members of academic staff and I also used the university 
profile page of 3 of these staff by way of contrast to their personal sites and blogs. I 
chose sites which tell, in differing ways stories of self and academic life and which 
performatively constitute subjectivity. I then performed a detailed reading of these sites. 
(Please see Appendix A for more detail of the sites selected). 
 
 
All the blogs and personal homepages that I wanted to use for my work were, by 
definition, located in the public domain. There are varying perspectives among internet 
researchers about whether agreement to use such material needs to be sought from the 
authors of such publications. Some take the approach that consent from participants is 
not necessary if material is publicly available (Hookway, 2008, p.105); others take the 
view that material is written in a context of privacy even though public available, so 
consent should be obtained (Elgesem, 2002). As it would not have been appropriate to 
anonymise the type of pages I needed to use, I took the approach, informed by Elizabeth 
Bassett and Kate O’Riordan’s work on authorship and mediated textuality in internet 
research (Bassett & O’Riordan, 2002) that to situate such texts within the context of 
another text where they are subject to analysis changes the meaning of such blogs. As 
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the blogs are essentially personal in nature I decided the appropriate ethical approach 
was to seek the owners’ approval for their use in the context of my study. I contacted 
the blog and personal homepage authors by email and all kindly agreed to participate.  
 
2.4.2 My ‘doubles’ 
I performed a Google search on my own name (‘Cate Thomas’, rather than ‘Catherine 
Thomas’) and harvested the sites which referred to me.  
 
I observed patterns in the sort of sites produced and performed close readings of the 
sites and also read the digital texts against each other to demonstrate how the 
intermediation producing a range of meanings. 
 
(See Appendix B for more detail of the sites selected.) 
 
2.4.3 Emails 
From the not insubstantial number of emails that appeared in my university inbox every 
day I selected chains of email text between staff where the content was not sensitive or 
controversial; where individual identities would not be obvious when the texts were 
anonymised; which were not from and did not personally discuss structurally vulnerable 
individuals (such as students or patients). I picked emails where, whilst the content was 
banal, the enacting of the mail spoke meaningfully about the issues I was researching, 
with varying kinds of performances and changes of meaning as the mails travelled 
around the circuit. 
  
All emails were anonymised, with pseudonyms replacing the actual names of 
individuals. 
 
2.4.4 Interviews with course leaders  
These interviews took place in a large Faculty (approx 200 academic staff and 5000 
students) located jointly across two Universities, one a post-92 institution and the other 
an older medical school.  
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Course directors were invited, via email, to participate and were given the option to 
invite appropriate staff in from their course teams to attend the interview with them. A 
suitable date, time and location were agreed. The interview schedule was semi-
structured to ensure a degree of consistency. 
 
The attitudes, experiences and perceptions of staff in the area of e-learning were sought, 
based on their experience of using the institutional VLE, Blackboard. In broad terms the 
themes that were explored included staff perceptions of e-learning based upon current 
use, attitudes to e-learning and perceived challenges it produced. 
 
Validity of the data collected was confirmed by a verbal summary at the end of the 
interview and by asking participants to review transcribed interviews for accuracy. 
 
All contributions from the participants were anonymised.  
 
(See Appendix C for more detail of this study.) 
 
2.4.5 Survey of staff trialling an educational social networking environment. 
A learning environment was developed using opensource social networking 
technologies. This was piloted with a group of volunteer academic staff from across the 
university. 
 
Appropriate staff across the university in all faculties, such as associate deans for 
learning and teaching and learning and teaching co-ordinators, were contacted. They 
were asked if they or any of their colleagues would like to participate in the study. 
 
Eighteen University staff, from a wide range of differing subject areas, participated in 
the study which involved taking part in an initial face-to-face workshop then using the 
environment in a structured way for a pilot over the period of a month. Participants 
were then asked to complete questionnaires about their experience of the environment. 
They were also offered the option of articulating their views within the body of the 
environment itself, during the trial, in blogs, wikis, discussion forums, messaging, posts 
on colleagues comment walls and other spaces.  
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All participants used the environment. Thirteen participants returned completed 
questionnaires and five commented about their experience in the body of the 
environment (two of whom also completed questionnaires). 
 
All contributions from the participants were anonymised.  
 
(See Appendix D for more detail of this study.) 
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SECTION II – SCHOLARLY 
TRANSFORMATIONS: IDEAS OF 
THE UNIVERSITY, PAST AND 
PRESENT 
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Introduction to Section II 
 
Preamble 
‘Deep, radical and urgent transformation is required in higher education,’ announces a 
recent report from the Institute of Public Policy Research (Barber et al., 2013).6 For 
those of us who think we’ve seen little else in the sector over the past few decades, this 
is somewhat disheartening. But it’s useful to remember, in the face of such clarion calls 
for reform, that British universities have been transforming themselves, willingly or 
unwillingly, for centuries.  
 
In this section I will briefly outline the history of these deep and radical transformations. 
In particular, I will consider these changes in relation to public debates about the 
function and purpose of the university. I will look at the way such debates form part of 
an overarching discourse about the nature of the university and its relationship to the 
social, cultural, economic and political fabric of Britain. I will then go on to analyse and 
discuss in more detail the most recent stage of university transformation and consider 
the implications of this for our present ideas of the university. My approach places 
emphasis on what universities are seen to be, or to be for, within public discourse. That 
is to say, the role they occupy ideologically.  
 
This section, then, provides the background and context which informs my later, closer, 
discussions of how academic subjectivity is produced within and by the digital aspects 
of higher education.  
 
Approach 
Historians have used varying models of developmental stages to define the history of 
universities. For example, Ringer (1979) employs the idea of the early, high and late 
                                                          
6
 I’ll return to this report by Sir Michael Barber, Tony Blair’s education adviser, Dearing and Browne 
Committee member, international educational ‘deliverology’ specialist and now a senior executive at 
Pearson Education (Wilby, 2011). It captures the zeitgeist of pro-market thinking about higher education 
policy and on the day of its release in March 2013 the report enjoyed a significant level of national 
media coverage.  
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industrial stages, with the high stage starting around 1860 and the late at about 1930; 
Kaeble (1981) identifies similar periods as charitable, competitive and welfare; and 
Anderson (2006) considers both these staging concepts and includes more recent 
observations of mass education and the relationship between state and market in higher 
education. 
 
Building on these approaches, for the purposes of my enquiry I will use a five-stage 
model of the historical periods. The first stage, religious and elitist establishments, takes 
us up to the end of the 18
th
 century; the second period, modernist metropolitan 
developments, continues until the end of the Second World War, when stage three, post-
war welfare state growth continues the story. Stage four begins in 1979, charting the era 
of massification and the knowledge economy, and the final stage, personalisation and 
privatisation, starts just before the turn of the century.  
 
Flowing through these five phases, I propose three discourses about the idea of the 
University: the discourse of privilege and elites; the discourse of progress and the 
public good; and the discourse of commodification and private advantage. These map 
partly but not entirely onto the historical periods, sometimes re-emerging in periods 
with different dominant discourses, as I will demonstrate. 
 
In the table below I have linked each stage with the discourse that dominates at the time. 
It is not without irony that I use simple, somewhat reductionist tabulation to try and grip 
slippery and complex concepts. It’s entirely in keeping with current dominant views of 
how ideas about higher education should be communicated, though not, I hope, at all in 
keeping with the framing philosophy of my project. But it may prove useful as a visual 
reference point for the reader, as is has for me, in keeping track of the conjunction of the 
different discourses and historical periods under discussion. 
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  DISCOURSES 
 A B C 
 Privilege and 
elites 
Progress and 
the public 
good 
Commodification 
and private 
advantage 
S
T
A
G
E
S
 
1 
Religious and elitist 
establishments 
C12th - 1800 
X 
  
2 
Modernist 
metropolitan 
developments 1800-
1945 
 
X  
3 
Post-war welfare 
state growth 
1945-1979 
 
X  
4 
Massification and 
the knowledge 
economy 1979-1997 
 
 X 
5 
Personalisation and 
privatisation  
1997- present 
 
 X 
 
Fig. 1 Stages and discourses of the university 
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The spectre of the Haunted University 
In the period under discussion in this section, universities are seen in many different 
ways: organisations with a key role for maintaining religion’s ideological grip, when 
their role was clerical training; mechanisms by which the ruling class are inculcated 
with a shared worldview; institutions responsible for ‘raising the intellectual tone of 
society … cultivating the public mind,’ as Newman puts it; centres of culture and 
knowledge creation in the Humboldtian ideal; vocational institutions where engineers, 
doctors and lawyers are trained; modernist beacons which challenge existing ‘maps of 
learning’; and competitive, commercial enterprises, defined by the language of the 
market.  
 
The most recent reinvention of universities as commercial organisations providing ‘a 
product with a price tag’ (QAA, 2013) becomes ideologically feasible because of the 
perceived decline of the authority of grand narratives and the way in which this makes it 
difficult for universities to continue to justify themselves in those kind of high 
modernist terms.  
 
Another way of looking at this, and one that I find highly productive, is to begin to 
explore this shift in a Lacanian register. Here the erosion of authority can be viewed as 
the decline of the big Other, (see Zizek, 1999, p.336), a concept I will explore in the 
following chapters. Put together, these changes wrought by late modernity create the 
highly surveilled, hyper-technological space, a locus of institutional neurosis and 
individual alienation which I conceive of as the Haunted University.  
 
The uncanny is not a new dimension for universities, which have always been liminal 
spaces. They are of the city but not part of it. They are of the locale but national, of the 
country but international. Seeing them through the lens of Jacques Derrida’s punning 
concept of ‘Hauntology’7, they are defined by what they are not and present when they 
are not present (1994, p.202). They are a space to learn and a space to think and 
research. A space in which, by learning and thinking, people emerge changed. 
Universities are both home to students and staff, and heimlich, but also workplaces, 
                                                          
7
 A pun on ontology 
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places we leave to go home. For academic staff the cellular office8 can be a home-like, 
personalised, book-filled space, where people visit; but also, as workers, it is a site of 
alienation. Homely and not homely, heimlich and unheimlich. We never finally leave 
the universities where we have studied or worked. They mark and define us, omniscient 
guardians or alma maters.  
 
Universities behave in unexpected and unanticipated ways because of their very nature; 
the Faustian bargain that society makes with a university is something to which many 
commentators refer (Fuller, 2009, loc.276; Anderson, 2006, loc.241 ; Collini, 2012, 
p.7). Whether in thrall to Mephistopheles or shading into diabolic themselves, 
universities have more than a hint of otherness about them. Non-conforming, they look 
inwards in order to look outwards. They are of society but not of it, distancing 
themselves to analyse, discuss and study it.  
 
The space of universities has always been consciously staged. Rothblatt argues that it is 
‘a species of theatre, with its own conventions, ceremonies and pageantries’ (1997, 
p.97) which employs ritual to give educational experience ‘unique significance and 
value’ (ibid., p.95). Part of the enchantment of this staging lies in the widespread use of 
gothic and neo-gothic architecture for university buildings. The hallowed cloisters and 
famously dreaming spires of Oxford and Cambridge’s medieval gothic architecture 
imparts a mysticism in the very fabric of the buildings (Rothblatt, 1997, p.98). This 
romanticism, arising in relation to the actual architectures and day-to-day experiences in 
a very few, elite universities, nonetheless helps to exert a mythic fascination around the 
idea of a university in Britain. Oxbridge colleges are portrayed repeatedly in film and 
TV, so their appearance seems familiar (even though most people will never visit them) 
and forms part of a mythic notion about the space of the university.9 However, the re-
imagined gothic and other retrospective forms of the nineteenth century universities also 
feed into the staging of uncanniness around universities. And even the plate-glass 
institutions, from the black towers of Essex to the Ziggurats and Escher-like walkways 
                                                          
8
 In line with corporate culture some universities have moved towards large, cubicled, shared office 
space (see Kunz et al., 2012); I explore notions of academic space in Chapter 7. 
9
 Terry Pratchett’s global bestsellng novels about the ‘Unseen University’ (a play on Boyle’s ‘Invisible 
College’) are a recognisible lampoon of an Oxbridge college. The Oxbridge myth is so strong in the public 
mind that the satirical elements of it are easily understood by readers, nationally and internationally 
(Pratchett, 2009). 
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of East Anglia, with their brutalist concrete and steel architecture, are haunted by the 
ghost of the disappointed high modernist hopes, what Mark Fisher calls ‘nostalgia’ for 
the ‘spectres of lost futures’(Fisher, 2014, loc.479), and form poignant, discordant and 
oddly beautiful landscapes. Newer universities are a palimpsest of all the different eras 
and functions that have made them: lofty, gothic, red-brick Victorian working men’s 
colleges, warrens of decaying 1970s pre-stressed concrete hopefulness, tatty portacabins 
and iconic city locations, next door to the Tower of London, Madame Tussauds or the 
Royal Observatory. All of them – those offering direct access to the enchanted places 
and those referring to them, or connecting more precariously, are spaces in which to 
seek a changed self, spaces to get lost in, spaces of transition. 
 
Today these uncanny elements of the university are overlaid with a new and more 
sinister kind of haunting. That of neoliberalism, which works in new ways and takes 
new forms. 
 
The time and space of the university is altered by ‘business-ification’ and by 
technoculture. A technologised work environment changes the space of the university; it 
is no longer just a geographic campus, increasingly it is everywhere. There is an attempt 
to accelerate university time making it less like academic time – self-organised and 
compartmentalised according to esoteric grids, unique calendars and ritual – and more 
like compressed commercial time (Showalter, 2005, p.9-10; Giroux, 2007, p.121-2). 
Degrees are fast-tracked and the busy-ness of universities compromises the ability to ‘be 
still and think’,10 replacing it with ‘login and communicate’. Mobile technology means 
that staff, as well as devices, are ‘always on’, compressing non-work time (Giroux, 
2007, p.124). These changes in space and time, arising as attempts are made to make the 
university more like a company – a knowledge corporation – are in tension with, the 
nature of the organisation as it has evolved. They are grafted onto existing university 
culture and the mis-matched, hybridised result produces surreal and uncanny effects,11 
as Laurie Taylor highlights on a weekly basis in his Times Higher Education 
‘University of Poppleton’ satire.  
 
                                                          
10
 The motto of the University of Sussex. 
11
 I once attended an academic staff development session which opened with the trainer asking us what 
zodiac sign we were. The stunned silence that fell was -  certainly uncanny. 
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All of this affects the academic staff who work in our universities at a profound level 
and they, of course, are the subject of this thesis. This section historicises both our UK 
university structure and culture and changing ideas of the university; it thus provides 
context for following chapters, where I interrogate the way in which academic 
subjectivity is impacted by, produced within, shaped by and co-shapes, the Haunted 
University.  
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3 Chapter 3 – The ghost of universities past and the spirit of 
universities present 
 
3.1 The discourse of privilege and elites 
This discourse sees university education as training for an elite role in society and is in 
keeping with a feudal or semi-feudal social formation. Whilst the social, political and 
religious upheavals over the 600 years outlined below resulted in changes to the 
universities, the discourse of privilege has proved tenacious. With the move to capitalist 
forms of production, the sons of the rising capitalist class joined the aristocracy as the 
beneficiaries of the discourse, which was not meaningfully threatened until the 19
th
 
century.  
 
3.1.1 Stage 1: Religious and elitist establishments, 12th century - 1800 
Our current university system dates back to the end of the 12
th
 and beginning of the 13
th
 
century when the medieval institutions of Oxford and Cambridge originally provided 
ecclesiastical training for prospective church ministers. The institutions had a degree of 
autonomy and attempted to create a space for themselves between the church and state 
(Anderson, 2006, loc.91).  
 
In medieval England the universities’ student base comprised the sons of ‘middling 
classes’, that is to say, well-to-do farmers and yeomen; and in the 14th and 15th centuries 
their remit expanded to train lawyers and state administrators. It was the end of the 16
th
 
century when the class complexion of Oxbridge began to change as the sons12 of the 
aristocracy and other landed classes started to be sent to the universities. They were 
seen as a way of preparing them for a life of governance or appropriately networked 
idleness and giving them a veneer of cultural refinement. During this period the 
vocational nature of the universities was eroded (apart from clerical training) in favour 
of a more general, liberal ‘gentleman’s education’. Landowners and priests sharing an 
education gave them a common frame of reference; thus society ensured social stability 
                                                          
12
 Women were not admitted to university during this period. They were first allowed to attend 
designated colleges at Oxbridge from the late 19
th
 century, but Oxford did not award degrees to women 
until 1920 and Cambridge until 1947 (University of London External System, 2013). 
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as the gentleman priest was the moral arbiter of the rural poor, and could encourage 
compliance with the semi-feudal social order (ibid., loc.448). 
 
By the 1730s around 2.5% of the male age cohort was educated at university or at their 
legal equivalent, Inns of Court (Stone, 1975, p.57). After this, numbers declined and did 
not get back to the same kind of level until the 20
th
 century.  
 
The institutions were residential, fostering the idea of belonging to an elite community. 
College tutorials were central to the teaching method, and from the 16
th
 century 
academic staff had a pastoral role in relation to students. Gradually the public school 
notion of ‘character development’ of students became more pervasive (Collini, 2012a, 
p.28). Academic staff of the Universities had always been ordained ministers and from 
the 15
th
 century onwards the teaching of students – by priests – became a salaried 
activity. As the official state religion of England was changed by Henry VIII, so was the 
religion of the universities and from the Reformation onwards only Anglicans could 
work or study at Oxbridge until these rules were relaxed in the 19
th
 century. 
Furthermore, it was not until the 19
th
 century that it became acceptable for academic 
staff to be anything other than celibate13 clerics (Anderson, 2006, loc.858). 
 
The ancient Scottish universities, St Andrews, Glasgow, Aberdeen and Edinburgh, set 
up in the 15
th
 and 16
th
 centuries, differed from Oxford and Cambridge in that they had a 
greater emphasis on the professions and were more meritocratic – and so sat a little less 
easily in the discourse of privilege. They were a model of which the later metropolitan 
university developments in England took account. 
 
Oxbridge fee levels were exclusively high. Rothblatt describes tuition fees that were, 
even in the 19
th
 century, equal to a third of the income of a middle-class London family 
(Rothblatt, 1997, p.352). There had always been a small number of scholarships for less 
well-off boys, and there was significant competition for these, although increasingly 
                                                          
13
 The tradition of celibacy continued into the 20
th
 century partly because living at college during term 
time was not easily compatible with married life. Dorothy L. Sayers’ novel Gaudy Night paints an 
intriguing picture of a mid-1930s Oxford women’s college, based on Somerville College which Sayers 
attended. Here staff reject procreation and relationships with men for a ‘blue-stocking’ life of 
scholarship – as social expectations demanded that a choice must be made (Sayers, 1936; Showalter, 
2005). 
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they were hijacked by the exclusive public schools (Anderson, 2006, loc.199). Thomas 
Hardy’s Jude the Obscure provides a painful account of a 19th-century working-class 
man’s desperate and doomed attempts at ‘accumulating [the] money and knowledge’ 
necessary to gain access to an Oxford college (Hardy, 1895, loc.1235). Although Jude’s 
main barrier to the hallowed halls of ‘Christminster’ is economic (as, indeed, was 
Hardy’s (Hardy, 1928, p.28-35 ), critically he also lacks the cultural capital needed to 
know how to study (Hardy, 1895, loc.417) or even to find out what pathways into 
university might exist, as ‘he made no inquiries into details of procedure. Picking up 
general notions from casual acquaintance’ (ibid., loc.1234-5). Such issues remain 
pertinent today in debates about fair access to higher education.  
 
The main criterion for entrance to Oxbridge, apart from the ability to pay the fees, was a 
grasp of the classics, which were taught intensively largely only at the public schools.  
Relationships between these schools and Oxbridge, often relationships between specific 
schools and colleges, which date from their founding, worked against any possibility of 
broadening access to the universities. For example, until 1865 only old Etonians were 
admitted to King’s College, Cambridge (Anderson, 2006, loc.108) and whilst such 
formal restrictions may have been removed, the cultural and historical connections 
continue.  
 
During the 19
th
 century there was an influx of the sons of the new industrial and 
manufacturing bourgeoisie into these schools, which were the main gatekeepers of 
Oxbridge entry and thus into the universities. Although the two universities were 
significantly reformed in the 19
th
 century due largely to the influence of the new 
capitalist class, the students continued to inhabit an aristocratic culture into which the 
sons of the bourgeoisie were largely assimilated rather than altering it (Anderson, 1995, 
pp. 31-41). 
 
These institutions, by creating a shared culture for the British ruling class, have 
provided a common frame of reference for that class, whatever their background, which 
has contributed to social stability – or the maintenance of the socio-economic status 
quo, depending on your perspective. Because many of the literary elite have attended 
the ancient universities, the mythologising of Oxbridge culture by their graduates in 
memoirs, biography and novels (Carter, 1990) and also in film and television creates a 
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kind of circular self-perpetuating cultural hegemony14. Even an avowedly working-class 
writer like Val McDermid reminisces about college days spent toasting teacakes on an 
open fire whilst listening to Bach – a vision of Oxford life that wouldn’t be out of place 
in an Evelyn Waugh novel (McDermid, 2013). The attractions and presumably the 
rewards of assimilation have not gone away. 
 
The institutions themselves continue to have a central role in a discourse of elite 
education for a privileged class, although the formal rationale for Oxbridge participation 
moved in the 20
th 
century to meritocratic ability rather than hereditary wealth or status. 
The role played by Oxford and Cambridge have changed surprisingly little; at the time 
of writing two thirds of the Cabinet are (mainly public-school educated) Oxbridge 
products (Burn-Murdoch, 2012).  
 
But at the start of the 19
th
 century, attempts to change the world of the university were 
afoot; the model of the university as a place where aristocratic young men were 
inducted into a liberal education by celibate clerics was about to alter – for good. 
 
3.2 The discourse of progress and the public good 
This discourse sees education as necessary to improve society. Emerging as a result of 
the industrial revolution, it views strata of the social order as not necessarily fixed by 
birth. It takes the view that it should be possible for individuals with appropriate ability 
to obtain some social mobility through education. This benefits not just the individuals 
and their families, according to this discourse, but also wider society and so is a 
desirable public good. 
 
3.2.1 Stage 2: Modernist metropolitan developments, 1800-1945 
Public debates about the nature and purpose of universities had been underway for some 
time but became more insistent in the 19
th
 century, leading to Oxbridge reforms and the 
founding of new, metropolitan universities. Elements of these discussions continue to 
have resonance for current debates about higher education, as I will demonstrate. 
                                                          
14
 See Carter’s Ancient cultures of conceit: British university fiction in the post-war years for a detailed 
discussion of how novels set in Oxbridge colleges reinforce and celebrate a conservative notion of this 
world and its cultural centrality and dominance.  
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The main reasons for unrest about the existing higher education provision at the start of 
the 19
th
 century were: that emerging new forms of (particularly scientific) knowledge 
began to challenge the orthodoxy of a traditional classical education; that the growth of 
professionalism created a need for expertise; that a secular or non-Anglican education 
was demanded; and that education as an aspect of class privilege began to appear 
inadequate for the rapid social and economic change of the time and incompatible with 
Victorian ideas about the virtues of meritocratic competition (Anderson, 2006, loc. 
1177-2001). 
 
It was for these reasons that a broad-based coalition of reformers – Dissenters, Jews, 
free-thinkers, Whigs, political radicals, Utilitarians and others – founded ‘that godless 
college in Gower Street’ (Hibbert et al., 2008, p.958), the University of London – later 
University College London (UCL). The Utilitarian voice was important in the national 
educational debates of the time; influenced by the work of Jeremy Bentham
15
, this 
approach saw it as vital that universities ‘served the general interest’ and ‘provided 
happiness for the greatest number’ (Rothblatt, 1997, p.6). This was radical in that it 
presented a challenge to the traditional elitism of universities that served only the 
interest of the few. However, it also saw education as having a demonstrably practical 
value, viewing it as furnishing for ‘empty mind spaces’ (Rothblatt, 1997, p.363), an 
approach that brought it into conflict with humanistic free-thinkers such as Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge and Matthew Arnold. 
 
Established in 1828, the University of London was non-residential, something which 
alarmed critics who saw the institution as abandoning students to the temptations of the 
metropolis (Rothblatt, 1997, p.368). Practically, this meant that students could live at 
home rather than incurring residential fees thus lowering the cost of university 
education. Course fees, too, were charged at around a third of the cost of Oxbridge and 
so could be afforded by ‘our middling rich classes’ (Herneshaw, 1929), the children of 
                                                          
15
 The myth that UCL was founded by Bentham has grown up partly because of the Henry Tonks UCL 
library mural depicting Bentham’s participation in the planning of the building and partly because of 
Bentham’s famous ‘auto-icon’ (his preserved skeleton, dressed in his clothes, topped with a waxwork 
head) which is displayed in the main building at UCL. Although ‘Bentham played no direct part in the 
establishment of UCL, he still deserves to be considered as its spiritual father. Many of the founders … 
held him in high esteem, and their project embodied many of his ideas on education and society’ (UCL, 
1999 - 2014). 
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shopkeepers, clerks and small businessmen. The University was intended to be 
vocational in nature, offered part-time as well as full-time courses and used the teaching 
medium of large lectures to which female, as well as male, students were admitted 
(Rothblatt, 1997, p.352). 
 
The concept of the new university was reviled from two contemporary standpoints. 
Establishment Anglican Tories deplored its secular and reforming nature, and moved 
quickly to establish an alternative, in 1829, in the shape of King’s College London. But 
more radical voices such as, notably, Coleridge, saw it as commercial and mechanistic, 
a ‘lecture bazaar’. Coleridge took the view, in On the constitution of Church and State 
according to the idea of each that the purpose of a university was to preserve the 
nation’s cultural legacy and supplement it, providing historical continuum. He saw it as 
a cultural standard-bearer in a world distorted by commerce and industrialisation on one 
hand and philosophies such as utilitarianism on the other (Coleridge, 1829).  
 
John Henry Newman’s approach, expressed in his 1853 classic The idea of the 
university defined and illustrated, accords with Coleridge’s earlier view. Newman says 
that the university ‘aims at raising the intellectual tone of society, at cultivating the 
public mind’, and speaks warmly of the character-building nature of the institutions 
where a student develops ‘a clear conscious view of his own opinions and judgments, a 
truth in developing them, an eloquence in expressing them’, and learns ‘to see things as 
they are’. Newman was unenthusiastic about what he perceived as a ‘parsimonious 
admeasurement of studies to some definite future object’ which he saw as implicit in 
vocational education (Newman, 1853, loc.2550-86).  
 
Later in the 19
th
 century Matthew Arnold, in a similar vein, defends humanistic culture 
from ‘philistines’ and ‘barbarians’(Arnold, 1869). The open discussion between Arnold 
and ‘Darwin’s bulldog’ (Lyons, 1999), scientist Thomas Huxley during the 1860s -
1880s, about the purpose of higher education, inherits elements from the 
Benthamite/Coleridge divide. Huxley, in his Mason College16 Founder’s Day Address 
of 1880 finds it unsupportable that:  
 
                                                          
16
 Mason College was a science college which later became the University of Birmingham.  
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the man who has learned Latin and Greek, however little, is educated; 
while he who is versed in other branches of knowledge, however 
deeply, is a more or less respectable specialist, not admissible into 
cultured caste. The stamp of the educated man, the university degree, 
is not for him.  
(Huxley, 1880, p. 14) 
 
Arnold responded, in his Rede lecture at Cambridge in 1882, with a defence of the 
classics. He said that whilst we may well be descended from an ape, as Huxley believes, 
this ape ‘carried hidden in his nature, apparently, something destined to develop into a 
necessity for humane letters ... our ancestor carried in his nature, also, a necessity for 
Greek’ (Arnold, 1882). This is not to say that their debate was actually about the 
classics as such, but rather that the classics, in the above quotes, become a stand-in for 
culture and the arts in general. Huxley and Arnold both expanded on their discussion in 
Royal Academy speeches and other fora and substance of their debate, as it unfolded, 
was widely reported and commented on in publications such as The Times and The 
World (Roos, 1977). 
 
The debate between the Arts and Science has never really gone away; in particular, it re-
emerges in the mid-20
th
 century with the C. P. Snow/F. R. Leavis controversy and has 
particularly re-emerged during the Massification period, as I will explore later. But this 
debate is more complex and nuanced than it may seem on the surface. In the late 19
th
-
century context, Huxley argued for the value of scientific knowledge as an important 
aspect of culture, whereas Arnold and was passionately against what he saw as 
mechanistic vocational university education. It’s common to see this revenant argument 
as being only a debate between Arts and Science, but this is only partly true; both the 
Arts and Science viewpoints encompass a range of perspectives. Importantly, I would 
argue, the debate is affected by how Arts or Science are culturally positioned at any 
given time. Arnold was championing an approach which saw ‘bad’ education as 
brainwashing the masses (Arnold, 1869, loc.844) and good education as making ‘an 
intelligent being more intelligent’ (ibid., loc.519). He rails against having faith in 
technology – which he felt lacked a concern with the experience of humans – not 
surprisingly, in a century where its application produced wealth for a few and misery for 
many. Arnold takes the view that what is ‘main and pre-eminent’ in the Arts is ‘the 
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noble aspiration to leave the world better and happier than we found it – motives 
eminently such as are called social’ (Arnold, 1869, loc.524-5). Huxley (who was in 
private life a friend of Arnold), was one of the leading proponents of science and 
technology as intellectual disciplines in an era where scientists faced a battle with 
religious orthodoxy to get their ideas accepted. Furthermore scientists had to contend 
with traditionalist snobbery which belittled scientific knowledge as valid university 
study. The ditty:  
He gets a degree in making jam 
At Liverpool and Birmingham 
 
was touted about at Oxford in the late 19
th
 century, and Punch, The Westminster Gazette 
and The Pall Mall Gazetteer all ridiculed Birmingham’s (as Mason College later 
became) courses in their pages, the latter denigrating the degrees as study of ‘Tariff and 
Value’ (University of Birmingham, 2013). 
 
So the standpoints of Huxley and Arnold speak about a specific historical juncture as 
much as they speak about Science and Arts. I’ll return to this debate as it re-emerges at 
later times with different meanings. Importantly, discourses about technology continue 
to go and in hand with discussions about what a university is or should be. In this 
respect, for much of the 20
th
 century and after, I would argue that technology replaces 
religion in these public discourses about education. 
 
Linked in with the pro-Science educational approach was the new perspective, brought 
to public attention at this time by MP and scientist Lyon Playfair17, that university 
education should improve the nation’s scientific know-how in order to make Britain 
internationally competitive (Anderson, 2006, loc.1190). This approach has been re-
visited since this period, to the extent that in the early 21
st
 century it has become 
naturalised for us, assuming the status of self-evident truth whose ideological nature is 
masked. But even if we accept the (dubious) premise that it is desirable for the country 
in which we live to be richer than other countries and even if we accept the (contestable) 
idea that this can be achieved by companies harnessing science and technology to that 
end, it is still unclear what the role of universities is supposed to be in this. Universities 
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 Interestingly to us, at a time of critical international debates about military ethics, Playfair is mainly 
known for his advocacy of the use of chemical weaponry against Russia in the Crimean war – an 
approach that was vetoed at the time as unethical warfare. 
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can and do produce qualified science graduates and carry out, insofar as funding 
permits, science and technology research. What they can’t do is influence the behaviour 
of companies – only government and industry18 itself can do that. However, the 
viewpoint Playfair championed in the late 19
th
 century has never disappeared and re-
emerges with significant force in the 1980s, as I will discuss later in this chapter. 
 
As I discuss in more detail in Chapter 9, although our contemporary model is one which 
involves universities carrying out both research and teaching, until the mid to late 19
th
 
century most research in both Arts and Sciences in the UK was done outside 
universities; the Humboltian model, introduced from Germany at this time, united the 
idea of a unity of research and teaching in higher education, which continues to be the 
conceptual approach used in the UK (Collini, 2012a, p.23-5). 
 
In the latter part of the 19
th
 century, civic universities were founded in the northern 
industrial towns of England, created with local backing to teach more practical subjects. 
They, also, weren’t residential, charged fees affordable to the middling classes and like 
London, admitted women as students. What we see in the 19
th
 century, with 
industrialisation, is cities becoming much larger and much more important to Britain, 
economically and culturally (Rothblatt, 1997, pp. 267-8). Both London and the northern 
universities were created to meet the needs of the populace, the local economy and the 
socio-cultural fabric of the urban nexus.  
 
Colleges such as the Mechanics Institutes were also founded in cities throughout the late 
19
th
 century and some of these began to offer external University of London degrees in 
the early 20
th
 century, as did other local colleges; most of them eventually became 
subsumed into polytechnics or universities, along with institutions which offered 
teacher training, art and crafts development or local specific technical education, such as 
maritime or mining engineering (Kelly, 1971). 
 
Mechanics Institutes were originally radical organisations founded for working-class 
men, but they soon transformed into politically orthodox organisations serving only the 
                                                          
18
 The private sector itself initiates and funds a significant amount (currently 1.1% of the UK GDP) of 
science and technology research, for its own commercial ends, either seperately or in partnership with 
universities (UKRCs, 2014). 
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needs of the lower middle classes (Royle, 1971, p.305). Friedrich Engels, in The 
condition of the working class in England in 1844, argues that the Institutes became 
appropriated and neutralised by the bourgeoisie; under bourgeois control they taught 
only science that technocrats needed their industrial workers to know and equipped 
workers with the ‘means of making inventions’ to profit the capitalist. The education 
became ‘tame, flabby, subservient to the ruling politics and religion’ and as the 
Institutes became less relevant to workers they deserted them for more radical 
alternatives (Engels,1845, loc.3868-77). These radical alternatives, a kind of ‘shadow 
university’ exist, in a way, as a subversive ‘other’ to formal universities. Kelly traces a 
line of this kind of radical education back to the Dissenters of the Middle Ages (Kelly, 
1970). This ‘other’ university irrupts in the 19th century with a range of formal and 
informal agencies such as working men’s colleges, churches, extension courses, the co-
operative movement, the original Mechanics Institutes and the Workers Education 
Association (see Harrison, 2013, pp. 249-99) and, as I’ll discuss later, 20th- and 21st-
century counter cultural initiatives. Such agencies and approaches represent an 
alternative narrative and concept of what constitutes university education. 
 
Both the London universities and their northern counterparts, however, began to be 
influenced by ‘Oxbridge drift’ within decades of their establishment. That is to say, 
whilst institutions were founded to provide a very different type of education to 
Oxbridge, with every successive wave of new universities there is a ‘drift’ back to the 
Oxbridge model. Arts subjects began to be offered in institutions that were originally 
vocational and universities which started out as local and non-residential developed a 
national focus, built halls, and encouraged students to engage in university community. 
Some have seen this as an effect of Oxbridge-educated academics teaching at newer 
institutions and influencing the curriculum (Anderson, 2006, loc.1404) or have viewed 
the drift as being partly due to snobbery (Collini, 2012a, p.28). It is possible that the 
pull of Oxbridge’s cultural hegemony, as I discussed earlier, is partly responsible for the 
changes. Whatever the cause, the Oxbridge drift phenomenon that started in the 19
th
 
century continued throughout the 20
th
 century with every successive wave of new 
universities and shows no sign of abating. 
 
The movement towards a national approach was driven at least partly by academic 
focus. As the professionalised role became inclusive of research in the 19
th
 century so 
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the network of which individual academics were part stretches out nationally and 
internationally. Being part of a national and international scholarly network became and 
remains vital for academic staff. It enabled them to keep current with developments 
their subject area and to form effective research partnerships, but it gave them a loyalty 
to their discipline, rather than necessarily to their locale. So universities inevitably and 
necessarily become, at least in part, national and even international, organisations 
(Anderson, 2006, loc.1994-54). 
 
Towards the end of the 19
th
 and the beginning of the 20
th
 century, the second tranche of 
national universities and university colleges were established and embedded. They 
formed important landmarks in their locales and perhaps in an attempt to gain 
acceptance through linking with tradition, most of them employed a retrospective 
architecture in their buildings. Leeds used French Renaissance ornamentation; French 
gothic was the style at Nottingham; Newcastle used Elizabethan-style architecture; 
Manchester, muted gothic; and Liverpool decorated gothic, while Byzantine was used at 
Birmingham (Lowe, 1986, cited by Rothblatt, 1997, p.98). So despite their ‘newness’ of 
educational focus, from their inception the architecture references older institutions, 
cultures and forms of knowledge. 
 
Universities, from their inception, were funded through fees and through a range of 
benefactory, civic and local authority arrangements, but in 1889 the general grant to 
English university colleges began, and by 1914 about half the funding for all UK 
universities (excepting Oxford and Cambridge) came from the State (Anderson, 2006, 
loc.1548). This development is something both Arnold and Coleridge had both, 
effectively, argued for earlier, as both thought State funding necessary to protect the 
nation’s culture. 
 
After the First World War the administration of the grant was taken over by the 
University Grants Committee (UGC), who had an exceedingly light touch when it came 
to inspecting the institutions it was funding, taking the view that ‘the greatest service a 
university can render to the nation is to remain true to itself’ (Shinn,1986, p.128). A 
perspective that must seem highly appealing to today’s vice-chancellors. 
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Until the 20
th
 century students were largely expected to fund themselves, although 
towards the latter part on the 19
th
 century they were paying less than half the actual cost 
of their degrees in their fee payments (Searle, 2004, p.630). There were scholarships, 
locally or through private patronage, but they usually covered only part of the expense 
of full-time study. Throughout the first two decades of the 20
th
 century a series of acts 
resulted in the setting up and growth of a State and Local Authority grant system. By 
the 1930s half the students at civic universities held some type of scholarship or grant 
(Kelly, 1981, p.182), and while the acquiring of scholarships was somewhat random 
and patchy throughout the UK, they did create some social mobility (Dyhouse, 2007). 
Two notable examples of this were former prime ministers Edward Heath and Harold 
Wilson, who were enabled to move from provincial grammar schools to Oxford in the 
1930s by means of local county grants. This had an impact on ideas of meritocracy, 
with the notion of the poor but clever scholarship boy (or, less often, girl) beginning to 
emerge. This was popularised in the 1950s by Richard Hoggart’s autobiographical 
account of his experience as a scholarship boy at Leeds in the 1930s (Hoggart, 1957), 
and gained ground with increased levels of social mobility through higher education in 
the 1960s. 
 
So discourses about education, by the eve of the Second World War, had been impacted 
by modernist notions of education for the public good; higher education no longer took 
place exclusively in the cloisters of Oxford and Cambridge but became part of the fabric 
of the metropolitan world; and the metaphor of the ‘ladder of opportunity’ was 
popularly used to describe social mobility which benefits both the individual and a 
society that requires an increase in its educated members (Anderson,2006, loc.1453). 
Despite the founding of new universities participation rates at this point were still low, 
at about 2% of the male and female age cohort (Collini, 2012a, p.29).  
 
3.2.2 Stage 3: Post-war welfare state growth, 1945-1979 
When the electorate of post-war Britain swept Clement Attlee’s Labour party, with its 
promise of a planned economy and welfare state growth, to power, part of this growth 
was to be in educational provision. The 1951 Conservative government opted to 
continue with the reforms Labour had begun; the ‘baby boom’ population growth of the 
1940s and 1950s created a need for additional university places (even before the 
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Robbins reform of the grant system) and work began on these in the 1950s, with eight 
new institutions opening their doors to students in the early 1960s: Sussex, York, East 
Anglia, Essex, Lancaster, Kent, Warwick and Aston.19  
 
These new universities were built from scratch as campus-based academic villages. 
Modernist in architectural design and equally radical in their course design, the 
pedagogic approaches were encoded into the build of the campuses – for example, they 
tended to have large numbers of small teaching rooms, reflecting an intention to use 
seminar based approaches to learning (Warwick, 2009). Some of this was inspired by 
the persistent pull of the Oxbridge model of residential communities and tutorial-based 
study; in fact, the first of the seven, Sussex, was nicknamed ‘Balliol by the Sea’ by the 
Times (Tapper and Palfreyman, 2010, p.61). But there was a radical re-working of this, 
what the early Sussex Vice-Chancellor, Asa Briggs, called a ‘re-drawing [of] the map of 
learning’ – with a stress on interdisciplinary combinations of Arts and Sciences subjects 
(Smith, 2001). The defiantly modern concrete and glass buildings of these institutions, 
what Malcolm Bradbury describes as their ‘fighting modern style’ (1975), speak about 
their departure from the architectural nostalgia of 19
th
-century universities and is a 
visual reminder of their place within the modernist project. The academic and novelist 
A. S. Byatt describes them as ‘“shiny, white and new,” because “in those days 
universities were intensely hopeful”’ (Edemariam, 2004). The new universities, as icons 
of their time, benefitted from substantial publicity and gained a place in the public 
imagination. Bradbury speaks about their ‘radical aroma, the sense of educational 
freshness that the colour supplements and professional journals found’ (Bradbury,1975, 
p.46) in them, and David Lodge, who was a lecturer at Birmingham, as well as a 
novelist, speaks of a civic redbrick institution as ‘having competed strenuously for fifty 
years with two universities chiefly valued for being old it was … rudely overtaken in 
popularity and prestige by a batch of universities chiefly valued for being new’ (Lodge, 
1975, p.14). 
 
As well as these new universities, a number of colleges20 were granted the Royal 
Charter which transformed them into universities in the 1960s, and 30 polytechnics 
                                                          
19
 Keele University is sometimes grouped in here, although it actually started as a college in 1949 and 
gained university status in 1962. 
20
 Namely Bath, Bradford, Brunel, City, Heriot-Watt, Keele, Loughborough, Salford, Stirling, 
Strathclyde, Surrey and Ulster. 
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were either created or re-configured out of existing colleges21 (Dearlove, 1998, p.113). 
The polytechnics awarded degrees through a central body, and had a distinctly 
vocational academic focus.  
 
Hand in hand with these developments came, in 1963, the committee report which has 
lent its name to this educational era, the Robbins Report. This declared that, in order 
that the UK shouldn’t fall behind other countries, specifically the US and the USSR, 
higher education places ‘should be available to all who were qualified for them by 
ability and attainment’. A national system of student grants was put in place so that this 
principle could be enacted in reality and by 1970 the participation rate had grown to 
8.4%, with 236,000 students studying at universities and 204,000 at polytechnics (Times 
Higher Education, 2013a). Whilst the beneficiaries of university education were largely 
the sons and daughters of the middle classes, some working-class children made it to 
university and many more to polytechnic, with the support of the grant (Anderson, 
2006, loc.2486).  
 
In the decades after the war, there was an increasingly dominant view, in public 
discourse, that technology and scientific progress were the key to a successful, forward-
looking future for the nation. This set itself up in opposition to what Harold Wilson 
described as ‘an Edwardian Establishment mentality’ which had not grasped that ‘we 
are living in the jet age’ (Jenkins, 1964). The Guardian of the day described the 
opposing viewpoints as ‘an outdated Conservative Britain ruled from the grouse moors 
or a modern Socialist Britain, ruled with technical skill based on equality of 
opportunity’(Jenkins, 1964). Wilson himself encapsulates the perspective in his famous 
‘White Heat of Technology’ election speech of 1963 when he says ‘we are redefining 
and we are restating our socialism in terms of the scientific revolution’ (Wilson,1963), 
folding in technological innovation with labour policies in opposition to a perceived 
entrenched Establishment anti-technocratism. Interestingly, elements of this approach 
are re-animated by Margaret Thatcher and Keith Joseph 20 years later, from a different 
political perspective and with different results. And, significantly, it was in this ‘White 
Heat of Technology’ period that the Science and Arts public debate re-erupted, with the 
exchange between C. P. Snow and F. R. Leavis.  
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 The term polytechnic had been used for some London institutions from the late 19
th
 century, but this 
was on a much smaller local scale than the 1960s re-launching of the polytechnic. 
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In his 1959 Cambridge Rede lecture, The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution, 
Snow took the view that Science education had not enjoyed the prestige or funding of 
Arts education; with an echo of the 19
th
 century Playfair approach, he saw Science 
education as needing to be promoted to ensure Britain’s international competitiveness. 
There’s an underlying implication here that education is carried out for economic 
reasons – to create prosperity for the nation22 – rather than an Arnoldian approach of 
intellectually transforming the self and the society which one inhabits or Newman’s 
idea of enriching the public mind. Snow’s lecture was subsequently published and 
widely debated nationally and internationally (Collini, 2013a). The most significant 
response to it was Leavis’ passionate counter-attack in his 1962 Richmond lecture at 
Downing College, Cambridge, published in The Spectator. Leavis saw Snow as a 
‘technologico-Benthamite’ who regarded all aspects of human life and experience as 
measureable and manageable. Academics, Leavis said, are seen by Snow in an arid 
light, their role being drained of any motivating purpose (Collini, 2012b, loc.363), their 
world one of ‘unrelieved and cultureless banality’ (Leavis, 1962, loc.836). The 
vehemence of Leavis’ response provoked a horrified response from commentators. The 
critic Lionel Trilling declared that ‘there can be no two opinions about the tone in which 
Dr Leavis deals with Sir Charles. It is a bad tone, an impermissible tone’ and Thomas 
Huxley’s grandson, Aldous, described it as ‘violent and ill-mannered (Collini, 2013a, 
loc.34-40). As Collini says, the ‘two cultures controversy’ became ‘big news in the 
1960s’ to the extent that ‘the phrase itself may seem to have entered the bloodstream of 
modern culture’ (Collini, 2013a, loc.61). In 1964 Harold Wilson invited Snow to 
become Minister for Technology, so the controversy appears to have done no damage to 
Snow’s profile, at least in governmental eyes. 
 
The attempt to avoid two cultures was one of the reasons behind some of the 
progressive approaches to the curriculum that the new universities adopted. But the 
Open University (OU), which was planned in the 1960s, had an even more radical 
remit. It was specifically intended to provide for working-class and mature learners 
what the plate-glass universities had for the children of the middle classes – but at a 
distance. Its mission was 'to promote the educational well-being of the community 
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 An implication that is also present in Robbins’ justification of the grant on the grounds of international 
competition 
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generally' (OU, 2014a). It had an open admissions policy and, as the ‘University of the 
Air’, a dedicated BBC production unit. This reflected its radically innovative approach 
to the practical mechanisms for teaching and learning which relied on using various 
technologies for distance teaching. 
 
Until this point23 teaching and learning in UK universities had been largely conducted 
by varying combinations of teaching methods: large lectures; smaller group discussions 
in seminars; lab sessions and other forms of practical small group teaching; and much 
smaller, sometimes one-to-one, tutorials. The emphasis of these varied depending on the 
institution but face-to-face, real-time learning mechanisms were the norm. The OU re-
thought this concept, developing approaches that focused on leveraging technologies to 
free education from temporal and geographic constraints. Lectures were broadcast on 
BBC TV and radio. Science students were provided with home experimentation kits. 
Audio and later video tapes were pressed into the service of education. It was Wilson’s 
white heat of technology applied to education and wedded to a social mission. The 
legacy of this is significant; today, with over a quarter of a million students, most of 
whom are mature learners, the OU has become the largest university in the UK (OU, 
2014b). Moreover its focus on the mechanisms, technologies and economies of scale of 
education were to have significance for the whole of HE once the internet became 
widely accessible. The new OU model created two kinds of academic role. One is the 
role played by full time ‘lecturing’ staff, based at the OU head office, the Milton 
Keynes ‘campus’. These academics designed courses, wrote course materials (and, very 
occasionally, recorded lectures) and carried out research. Throughout Britain a network 
of part-time OU academics fulfilled the role of associate lecturer, leading fortnightly 
group tutorials and giving academic and pastoral support to students (Tait, 2003; OU, 
2014c).  
 
The post-war expansion of education may seem, with historical hindsight, to be an 
important success story in many ways, but at the time it was not without its detractors. 
Iain McCloud, later Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer, famously called the idea 
of the OU ‘a load of blithering nonsense’ in 1969 and its grant was cut severely when 
                                                          
23
 The University of London had a distance learning ‘External System’ from 1858 but at that time it 
mainly provided a curriculum and examinations, rather than distance teaching as such. Distance learning 
is usually dated from 1844 when Isaac Pitman introduced his first postal correspondence course, but the 
OU’s project was on a different scale (Tait, 2003). 
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the Conservatives came to power in 1970 (OU, 2014d). The whole project of 
broadening access to education came under criticism from the Right; five educational 
‘Black Papers’, pamphlets named to echo Government white papers, published between 
1969 and 1977 by Brian Cox and Anthony Dyson, the editors of the Critical Quarterly, 
gave voice to such criticisms. The papers attempted to influence government policy and 
as such were a rallying point for Conservative opposition to educational changes. They 
created significant debate – for example, the Secretary of State for Education Edward 
Short spoke out against the first papers at the 1969 National Union of Teachers 
conference (‘The Blackest Day’, 2005) which led to the third paper, Goodbye Mr Short, 
being named after him. The authors of the Black Paper essays included Conservative 
MPs, academics and authors, the most prominent being Kingsley Amis who contributed 
to three of the papers. Amis’ view that universities were ‘already taking almost 
everyone who can read and write’ (Anderson, 2006, loc.2620) and that expansion was 
resulting in a lowering of standards – ‘more has meant worse’ (Linden, 2011) – was a 
common criticism of the changes (Radical Education Forum, 2012; Linden 2011; 
Anderson, 2006).  
 
Dyson also co-opts Matthew Arnold onto to the Conservative side of the debate in a 
1969 Critical Quarterly editorial ‘Culture and Anarchy: 1869;1969’. He asserts that ‘if 
Arnold were to return in 1969 … he would be horrified to discover anarchy subverting 
the temple of culture itself’ and asks ‘what would he make of the Jacobinism rampant in 
our educational theory, or of the spectacle of universities becoming the new home of the 
mob?’ (Dyson, 1969, p.3). 
 
The counter-cultural student protest movements to which Dyson refers represented a 
different kind of detraction from the new educational order. The educational ‘radical 
utopianism’ of the movements (Field, 2001, p.4) drew on ideas which saw formal 
education as repressive and controlling, as argued by Illich in the classic (anti-) 
educational text, De-schooling Society (1971). A. S. Byatt’s fictional new University of 
North Yorkshire also has a shadow ‘Anti-University,’ which declares ‘Syllabus is 
oppression … Teaching is exploitation … You need not be led by the nose’ (2002, 
p.79). Even Lodge’s more sedate students at redbrick Rummidge University stage a sit-
in where they discuss ‘What is the role of the University … What is the social 
justification of university education?’ (1975, p.163). This irruption of alternative 
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approaches to education, was, as Field observes, ‘the educational expression of radical 
social movements aiming at transforming the wider structures of capitalism’ and it is 
also an intellectual descendent, albeit much altered, of the 19
th
-century working-class 
self-education discussed earlier – the ‘other’ university. Academic staff are inevitably 
implicated in this, too. Bradbury’s eponymous History Man, Sociology Lecturer 
Howard Kirk, moves from the position of saying, cheerfully, of the new University of 
Watermouth, ‘I think this is a place I can work with,’ to, quite as cheerfully, ‘I think this 
is place I can work against’ in the space of a year (1975, pp. 48-9). The two positions 
are not mutually exclusive for a radical academic. Levidow points out that although 
universities represent the needs of the state and labour markets, ‘often spaces are created 
for alternative pedagogies and critical citizenship’ (2002, p.227). Mindful of the 
contradictions inherent in encouraging freedom of thought within what Althusser (1970) 
would describe as an agency of the ideological state apparatus, Terry Eagleton wryly 
points out that the only logical role for radical academics of this era was ‘to have sat at 
the back of their own classes and barracked’ (2001, p.20).24  
 
The contradictions of engagement with counter-culture apart, the role of academic staff 
engaged with the new projects was one that combined traditional academic agency, 
including freedom to carry out research, with a mission to shape radical educational 
futures. The UGC, maintaining their light touch, gave the design of the approaches and 
curricula of the new institutions over to academics, who were, to a great extent, creators 
and owners of this brave new world of education (Anderson, 2006, loc.2472).  
 
3.3 The discourse of commodification and private advantage 
In this approach the rationale for higher education moves from the public to the private 
sphere, with the emphasis on the personal advantage that can be obtained for the 
individual by educating themselves. Education comes to be seen less as a process by 
which one changes or develops one’s own thinking and more as a commodity that can 
be bought, like any other commodity available in a capitalist economy. Along with this, 
the role of the academic changes. Alan Bennett’s play The History Boys sums this up 
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 This political radicalism within universities was of course international at this point in history. It has 
been pointed to as part of the post-war growth in the internationalisation of HE; in fact, this was the 
second wave of internationalistion, the first being beween the medieval period and the end of the 17
th
 
century (Knight and de Wit, 1995). 
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neatly. It contrasts the teacher, Hector, for whom knowledge itself has intrinsic 
importance, with the way in which the school is commodifying learning, because of the 
pressure of league tables. The latter is exemplified by the approach of the new teacher, 
Irwin, who sees knowledge acquisition as merely a means to an end (Bennett, 2004). 
 
3.3.1 Stage 4: Massification and marketisation 1979-1997 
Student numbers increased year on year from the early 1960s with the result that by the 
1970s the rising cost of higher education began to be an issue for the government. How 
a society funds higher education when planned expansion has succeeded in creating a 
mass demand for university places is a complex problem, and a range of approaches 
have been taken to this in other countries. In the UK the Conservative government 
which came to power in 1979, led by Margaret Thatcher, had a simple, doctrinaire 
answer. It attacked universities as it attacked all the other post-war welfare state 
reforms; in 1981 university funding was reduced by 11% overall (Collini, 2012a, p.33). 
And this was just the beginning. In total, between 1977 and 1997 there was an average 
funding reduction of 40% per student (Anderson, 2006, loc.3015). Along with the 
withdrawal of funds to the sector came attempts at culture change fuelled – or justified – 
by overarching criticisms about what universities were doing. Or not doing. 
 
First of all came Education Minister Keith Joseph’s re-animation of the Arts–Science 
debate. American historian Martin Weiner was influential in Conservative party 
thinking, particularly with Thatcher and Joseph. In his book English culture and the 
decline of the industrial spirit, 1850-198025, Weiner attacks the British ruling class for 
historically and persistently valorising the culture of the country house and a classical 
public school education over entrepreneurial, commercial and industrial middle-class 
‘Victorian’ values – an approach which was seen as ‘trickling down’ to other sections of 
society. Although Weiner barely mentions universities, his viewpoint became folded 
into a strand of Thatcherite thinking about higher education, which saw it as a bastion of 
gentlemanly, anti-technocratic high culture. This may have some valid links back to the 
way in which the aristocratic culture of Oxbridge tended to incorporate the sons of 
manufacturers in the 19
th
 century but it was at odds with the fact that student enrolments 
                                                          
25
 Keith Joseph is purported to have given a copy of this book to every cabinet minister and advised all 
the civil servants in his department to read it (The Economist, 2010). 
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were significantly greater in Science in the early 1980s than they were in Humanities 
and Social Science. The rhetoric that universities were failing the country because 
technological progress and entrepreneurial spark were being obstructed by an overly 
refined cultural agenda was not a new one. It has echoes of 19
th
-century Benthamite 
educational approaches: William Waldegrave, Thatcher’s Under-Secretary of State for 
Education and Science, declared that ‘a strong utilitarian wind is blowing through HE 
… This is a chill wind for some of the less well-founded liberal arts and social studies 
departments’ (Waldegrave, 1982). The rhetoric also harks back to elements of C. P. 
Snow’s perspective and continues to have resonance today.  
 
The neoliberal strategy for dealing with real or imagined public sector shortcomings 
was (and continues to be, albeit with a greater degree of subtlety) to privatise. The gas, 
electricity, water, telecommunications, coal and steel industries were all taken out of 
public ownership during the Thatcher administration. The Conservative party had 
shown enthusiasm for the private University of Buckingham which was opened by 
Margaret Thatcher in 1976, but directly privatising higher education would have been a 
risky strategy to take with voters. The approach that was taken, then, was to reduce 
funding, massify, introduce lower-cost models and competition, thus gradually creating 
conditions for privatisation.26 The extension of degree-granting powers and university 
status to polytechnics by the 1992 Further and Higher Education Act was an aspect of 
this. Polytechnics had previously been administered by Local Authorities and this move 
also took educational power out of Local Authority hands as part of the Conservative 
drive to centralisation. The UGC was abolished and all universities, old and new, were 
now overseen by the Higher Education Funding Councils for England, Scotland and 
Wales (HEFCE, SHEFC and HEFCW, respectively). Academic tenure had already been 
eliminated in 1988 and another significant consequence of the 1992 Act was to muddy 
the terms and conditions of service for academic staff (because former polytechnic staff 
lecturers and university lecturers were on different kinds of contracts) gradually driving 
these down over the ensuing years (Court, 1997). 
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 Elements of this approach were taken in the long, slow privatisation of the Royal Mail and a similiar 
approach is being used gradually to take the NHS out of public ownership. Or as an article in the 
UNESCO Courier in 2000 put it ‘Along with healthcare, education is the last fortress to be stormed. A 
broad market-oriented reform of the public service of education is underway’ (Levidow, 2002, p.227). 
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Audit culture seems so much an integral part of university life today that it is surprising 
to remember that it only really dates from the mid-1980s. With the 1981 cuts, the UGC 
began to play a more interventionist role and when the Jarratt Committee, led by an 
industrialist, was set up to look into university efficiency in 1985 it recommended 
significant change (Tight, 2009, p.137). Chiefly, it proposed a move away from self-
governing communities of scholars to top-down management structures where 
‘universities were corporate organisations’ and ‘academic involvement in governance’ 
was a barrier to corporate decision-making (Dearlove, 1998, p.115). The paper, which 
was long on business rhetoric and short on real understanding of the nature of academic 
work (Scott, 1986; Anderson, 2006, loc. 3042), precipitated a change of culture in 
universities. It threatened that ‘universities need to show that they are making the 
appropriate adjustments to their outlook and priorities … it is only if they provide these 
assurances that the universities can expect to receive support on the scale required’ 
(Jarratt, 1985, p.31). Coupled with the newly interventionist UGC (whose powers the 
report strengthened),
27
 this kind of financial and performance compliance could be 
enforced (Ryan, 1998). It also marks the beginning of commercial discourse being more 
widely used in and about universities, in a way that quickly became so naturalised and 
dominant that by 2000 they provided dark material for Stefan Collini’s satirical HiEdBiz 
pieces on BBC Radio 3 in February and March of that year (reproduced 2012a, pp.132-
46).  
 
In 1985 the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) was introduced by the UGC. It was a 
vastly administratively complex mechanism that sought to ‘measure’ amounts of 
research carried out by individuals and departments and allocate funding accordingly. It 
encouraged competition between departments in universities and affected the nature and 
type of research that was consequently carried out, as research needed to be 
appropriately ‘reportable’ in order to be fundable.28 It also fostered the idea within the 
academic community that teaching and research are discrete activities. 
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See particularly 5,2 (d) of the report recommendations: ‘within the next twelve months, the UGC 
should agree with each university a programme for implementing the recommendations in this Report … 
and should take progress into account when allocating grants’ (Jarratt, 1985, p.35).  
28
 See Fuller (2006) p.152 for a discussion of how ‘adaptive preference formation’ means that 
researchers come to prefer the kind of research that is more easily funded, thus ultimately distorting the 
landscape of knowledge – i.e. it affects which knowledge gets created, and which doesn’t. Giroux (2007) 
p.113 makes a similar point about reliance on private sector funding for research and the resulting 
effect on knowledge. 
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After both the 1991 Higher Education: A New Framework White Paper and the 1992 
Further and Higher Education Act letters of guidance from the Secretary of State for 
Education to the Funding Councils made it clear that resource allocation for research 
would increase in its selectivity via the next RAE, that undergraduate numbers would 
increase, and that there would be quality audit of institutions and of quality assessment 
of teaching (Haywood et al., 1998, p.8). 
  
These developments signalled the Government’s intention to embark upon a 
process of rapid expansion of the UK higher education sector. This expansion 
was to take place against a declining unit of resource and within a culture of 
public accountability for quality.  
(Haywood et al., 1998, p.8) 
 
The 1991 White Paper and the 1992 Act also paved the way for the Higher Education 
Statistics Agency (HESA) to be created in 1993 (HESA, 2013a). This new body was to 
collect and disseminate huge, complex amounts of data from universities about students, 
staff and finance. One result of this was that large and complex data collection activities 
had now to be carried out by university staff, both academic and administrative, on a 
routine basis. Another was that as a result of the HESA data availability, various 
companies began to compile league tables of comparative university rankings. 
 
The Labour government that came to power in 1997 continued the expansion of the 
sector, albeit for ostensibly different motives. It mobilised a rhetoric which combined 
two factors. The first was the nationalistic approach that emphasised Britain’s need to 
compete with other countries in its percentage of graduates, an approach which has 
echoes of earlier concerns about Britain’s international position. Here it was more 
heavily and frequently stressed and Tony Blair’s government, making reference to a 
globalisation agenda
29
 and combining this with a target of 50% cohort participation in 
HE by 2010. ‘An ambitious goal – because we are ambitious for Britain,’ as Blair said 
in his famous ‘education, education, education,’ 2001 election speech (The Guardian, 
2001). Implied in this 50% target is the increased participation of working-class learners 
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 See Clegg et al. (2003) for a critique of the New Labour globalisation agenda in relation to higher 
education. 
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in higher education – ‘widening access’ as it came to be known. This approach might 
seem to echo the radical post-war approach to the sector – except that the liberal 
rhetoric wasn’t matched by any increase in overall funding for universities. Financial 
resources continued to be allocated on a per capita basis (funding ‘follows the student’, 
as the jargon of the time has it) adding financial pressure to the political injunction to 
expand at a phenomenal rate (Deem, 2004, p.109). This was felt particularly at the new 
‘post-92’ universities, which had to provide additional intensive support for students 
who entered the system with low A-level grades. 
 
The net effect of these changes on student numbers, added to the effect of the post-war 
project and 1980s expansion, is staggering. In 1961 there were just over 100,000 
university students and in 2013 there were 2.25 million, an increase of something in the 
region of 2000% in just over 50 years (Bolton, 2012; HESA , 2013b). 
 
It was in 1997 that the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) was formed to audit 
university teaching (HEFCE, 2013a). It’s included in this section rather than the later 
‘personalisation’ section partly because it was planned under the pre-1997 Conservative 
administration and partly because it fits more meaningfully into the massification 
period. Its Teaching Quality Assessment (TQA) used definitions of quality based on a 
Fordist reduction of education to a set of skills, competencies and measurable outcomes 
rather than on the idea of learning in a spirit of enquiry that may produce unexpected 
findings – what Power calls ‘shallow rituals of verification at the expense of other forms 
of organisational intelligence’ (Power, 1997, p.123). Compliance with the TQA affected 
the way courses were designed as well as the way they were taught. The reductionist 
nature of the TQA was not only demeaning and demoralising for academic staff but it 
encouraged a submissive conformity to a set of externally imposed rules and 
discouraged more creative approaches to teaching and learning. Hodson and Thomas 
observe, in the few years after the creation of the Agency, that the tension between the 
top-down externally generated QAA compliance and more traditionally pro-active 
academic culture ‘is leading to the alienation or at least the passive submission of staff’ 
(2003, p.381). It now required significant resourcefulness and imagination on the part of 
academic staff to design courses that conformed to TQA guidelines but enabled student 
and teacher to pursue academically rigorous and fruitful enquiries. Commentators have 
noted ‘a gulf between policy as laid down by a small group of senior managers 
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responding to external pressures and actual practice as experienced within academic 
departments’ (Hodson and Thomas, 2003, p.381) leading to ‘an institutional culture that 
is in danger of alienating academic staff to the detriment of the system as a whole’(ibid., 
p.375). The political effect of audit, as Ryan (1998) argues, is that whilst ‘appearing to 
secure the ends of justice and economy’ it actually reconstructs ‘institutions away from 
collegiality towards … upward accountability’ (p.20). The TQA regulations also meant 
that large numbers of administrators had to be appointed to deal with the amount of 
paperwork it generated and that managerial roles had to be created to police academic 
staff in their course design, teaching and assessment of students. 
 
Whilst there had been considerable pressure under successive Conservative 
governments for universities to move closer to commerce, both in terms of research 
activity and by making the curriculum more ‘vocational’30 there had been little in the 
way of funding to encourage such a shift. The Blair administration introduced a ‘carrot’ 
approach, offering financial incentives for universities to participate in what were 
increasingly called ‘third stream’ business engagement activities. This began with the 
Higher Education Reach Out to Business and Community initiative in 1998, which 
awarded £62 million in funding for the 2000-03 period, to the more recent Higher 
Education Innovation Fund (HEIF) support. This awarded £238 million for the 2006-08 
period and at the time of writing was still active (HEFCE, 2013b).  
 
Hand in hand with third-stream research came the widespread application of the 
political concept of ‘employability’. Boltanski and Chiapello define this as ‘the personal 
capital that everyone must manage’ (2005, p.93) and go on to dissect how employment 
becomes, within what Bauman would call the ‘fluidity’ of late modernism (2010), not 
an effect of labour demand, but a matter of personal ‘employability’ which individuals 
must address in order to find work. 31 The roots of this date back to the 1980s 
(Chertkovskaya, 2013) although it is under the later New Labour government that the 
idea became embedded and naturalised. Universities became gradually co-opted into the 
concept of grafting employment-related skills onto degree-level study, partly through 
the intervention of the QAA. By 2002, Levidow observes that ‘Higher Education has 
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 The 1987 White Paper Higher education meeting the challenge saw turning out appropriately skilled 
graduates for UK industry as the central role of universities (Lockett et al., 2013) 
31
 See also Chertkovskaya (2013) for a discussion of how the concept of employability has been 
‘naturalised’ among university students. 
64  
 
 
become … synonymous with training for employability’ (p.228). Increasingly this also 
meant educating students to be more ‘enterprising’, or as the QAA website puts it, 
developing ways in which‘students can be encouraged to develop an entrepreneurial 
mindset, and related skills’ (QAA, 2013).  
 
All of these interventions have been attempts, whether stated or implicit, to change the 
culture of universities, as commentators such as Collini (2012a), Anderson (2006), 
Ryan (1998) and Scott (1997) have observed. Some of this is directly financial and is 
about encouraging academics to find private-sector sources of research funding. But 
much of it is not aimed at funding per se; rather it is about the injection of neoliberal 
ideology into the heart of university work and life. Stefan Collini and Peter Scott, 
among others, continue to dissect the rapid twists and turns of this ideological battle for 
‘ownership’ of the university landscape in their ongoing London Review of Books and 
Guardian commentaries (see, for example, Collini’s 2010 analyses of the Browne 
Review) and the 2011 HE White Paper (Collini, 2011) and Scott’s monthly Guardian 
Education column). What’s at stake is a struggle for the soul of what university research 
and education actually ‘is’, or should be.  
 
During the ‘massification’ years the overall picture of employment in Britain has 
changed. Fewer people are employed in manufacturing and more in what has come to 
be known as the ‘knowledge economy’, a term popularised by Drucker32 (1969, p.247). 
His concept of the knowledge worker moved into widespread use during and after the 
massification decades (it’s one of the underpinning concepts in Blunkett’s 2000 
Greenwich speech, for example). The idea of the academic knowledge worker in 
relation to a technocultural landscape is particularly pertinent and I will be exploring 
this in later chapters. For now, it important to say that the role of the academic has 
always been one of knowledge worker who creates (and as Fuller puts it, creatively 
destroys (2009, loc.592)) knowledge capital. In the 1980s and 1990s, universities 
became, then, a strange, alienating combination of knowledge economy activities 
married with traditional academic activities and top-down management approaches and 
audit regimes injected into existing practices of academic self-regulation. This produces 
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 Drucker attributes the term to F. W. Taylor, the father of ‘scientific management’ principles. 
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a shifting, contradictory and confusing workplace culture for academic staff, affecting 
the underlying sense of academic identity, as well as undermining the professional role. 
 
An important change during the massification years has been the increased use of 
technology in universities. This is accompanied by an increase in the use of the 
discourse of technology, which goes hand in hand with the discourse of business as part 
of the ‘modernisation’ of the academy – the ‘technologisation of discourse’ (Fairclough, 
1992, p.141). As I mentioned in Chapter 1, universities had a central involvement in the 
original creation of the internet; and, like Frankenstein’s invention, the universities’ 
creation has returned in unexpected - and not always wholly welcome - ways.  
 
The technologies widely in use in universities are general information and 
communication technologies and specific software for teaching, learning and research. 
From around the late 1980s to the early 1990s these gradually became the norm in all 
aspects of university life. The Joint academic network (Janet), which provided the 
physical network for information and communication technologies (ICTs) was 
established in 1984 and became available to UK universities over the next few years; it 
was later upgraded to SuperJanet (Janet, 2014). This meant universities had relatively 
early and robust internet access, needed for email and other communication 
technologies, web access and specific research purposes, such as shared databases and 
number-crunching tools; it is the Janet group which also established and maintain the 
ac.uk domain naming system (Reid, 2007).33 So Janet network access provided the 
underlying technical foundation for the technologisation of universities.  
 
From the late 1980s or early 1990s personal computers started to become the norm in 
academic and administrative offices; computer rooms, once used only by computer 
science students, from this point, begin to be built for general student use.
34
 From this 
period all features of the day-to-day administration of universities, from booking rooms 
to logging, manipulating and retrieving all student data have been carried out using vast, 
university-wide database systems (Selwyn, 2007, pp.87-8). This level of data collection 
has been demanded by the imposition of the audit culture I discussed earlier. 
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 This group was later folded into the Jisc, whose role I discuss in Chapter 7. 
34
 More recently these have become superseded by ‘bring your own device’ approaches, see Curtis, 
2012. 
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The adoption of Janet meant that email became used for much of the everyday internal 
communication between university staff and between staff and students. The fabric and 
space of teaching and learning began to alter in this period. Lecture notes began to be 
generated on computer and PowerPoint slides replaced transparencies as the norm for 
visual aids in lectures. Virtual learning environments (VLEs) such as Blackboard and 
WebCT began to be used, on an increasingly routine basis; teaching resources – such as 
the newly computerised lecture notes and slides – were often made available to students 
(Selwyn, 2007, p.88-9). This economy still exists alongside the use of social media and 
other ‘personalised’ technologies which have begun to be used in the personalisation 
and privatisation stage, as I will touch on in later in this chapter. 
 
This use of technologies broadly matches general societal use of ICTs. In universities, 
as in many workplaces, technologies begin to get pressed into the service of the 
neoliberal project, with managers assuming the scales of economy in the use of online 
teaching and learning may mean that fewer teachers are needed (Selwyn, 2007, p. 87). 
Giroux discusses how this idea has, more recently, been made flesh in an example of a 
private college in the US context, although he does point out that it’s only ‘one 
possibility’ of the future use of technologies (Giroux, 2007, pp.118-20). 
 
The rise of technology has always been firmly linked in with the modernist project.  
Assisted, ironically, by the pervasive use of technologies35 during the massification 
stage, what happens ideologically here is that the rational modernist project of earlier 
stages is seen as threatened. The grand narratives of high modernism are called into 
question and universities can no longer be easily justified by a call to higher cultural 
aims or to scientific truth, as they could earlier in the century, because this has no clear 
or easy space in public discourse. In late modernity, a space of meaning becomes held 
open which the next phase, the discourse of privatisation and commodification, moves 
in to fill. 
 
For academic staff the massification stage is an era of phenomenal change, whatever the 
nature of the institution in which they work. Increased student numbers result in 
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 I discuss at some length in later chapters the relationship between technoculture and late modernity. 
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significantly changed student/staff ratios (SSRs) at most institutions, averaging out at 
published changes of 8.5:1 in 1972 to 17:1 by 2010 (Court, 2012, pp.2-3) 36. The 
increase in workload created by this growth in student numbers added to the burden 
implied by the audit of teaching and research all lead to a significantly increased amount 
of everyday work and a much lower degree of personal autonomy. It is a very different 
overall picture of academic life to the decades after the war. 
 
3.3.2 Stage 5: Privatisation and personalisation, 1997-present 
The discourse of commodification and private advantage continues into the next stage, 
which starts in the last years of the 20th century with the Dearing Report, Higher 
Education and the Learning Society (Dearing, 1997). The massification of higher 
education opened the door for both economic and personal privatisation, as successive 
moves by government established and then gradually increased the amount of financial 
contributions made by students.  
 
The 1997 Dearing report was the largest review of higher education since Robbins, and 
resulted in tuition fees of £1000 being charged to students for the first time since the 
Robbins era reforms. In addition, the small existing maintenance grants were 
transformed into student loans. 
 
The 2004 Higher Education Act then tripled the fees charged to students, putting them 
up to £3000 per year for most institutions, rising to £3375 by 2011/12 (Brown and 
Carasso, 2013, loc.317) Most recently, the 2010 Browne review, Securing a Sustainable 
Future for Higher Education, provided the new coalition government with the rationale 
which underpinned the almost complete withdrawal from universities of the block grant 
for undergraduate teaching. In 2010 the Coalition announced that £3 billion would be 
cut from the block grant by 2014/15 and that most undergraduate teaching would be 
unfunded, with some monies reserved for ‘strategically important and vulnerable 
subjects’ such as laboratory sciences and mathematics. From 2012 universities have 
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 The main thrust of Court’s argument is that although individual institutional SSRs are widely reported 
as benchmarks, the formula used to calculate them makes them very inaccurate. Indeed, as SSRs are 
included in league tables, universities are given every reason to make them appear as attractive as 
possible, within the shaky boundaries permitted by the HESA formula. 
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been funded, year on year, partly by student contributions of up to £9000 per year, via 
the publicly funded Student Loans Company (McGettigan, 2013, loc.184). 
 
This sudden acceleration in the project of marketisation has a number of profound and 
transformational consequences, which I will now go on to explore. They are: firstly, the 
impact on/for students; secondly, the enabling of private-sector providers; and thirdly, 
the effect on the identity of universities and their staff. 
 
Before I look at these in more detail it’s important to note that although I am mainly 
discussing the changes in the funding of teaching at this point (the implications of 
research funding changes being discussed in detail in Chapter 9), during this period 
there were critical changes to research funding, both to the Research Councils and the 
Funding Councils. Government funding was reduced in real terms, in a direct way, but 
also cut indirectly, through the use of the Full Economic Costing (FEC) model which is 
an application of Transparent Approach to Costing (TRAC)
37
 metrics. Science and 
Technology research continues to receive around ten times the state funding allocated to 
Arts and Humanities; in addition, the small amount (£312 million in 2008/9) of UK 
private-sector funding which is available to universities is largely in the sciences (BIS, 
2010, p.17; RIN, 2010, p.3). From 2010 the UK government made it clear that funding 
would only be available for Arts research that was ‘applied’, worked with science and 
technology researchers and showed evidence of ‘economic impact’ (BIS, 2010, p.22). It 
listed the six areas of Arts and Humanities funding as: 
 communities and big society;  
 civic values and active citizenship, including ethics in public life;  
 creative and digital economy;  
 cultural heritage;  
 language-based disciplines;  
 interdisciplinary collaborations with a range of STEM subjects. 
(BIS, 2010, p.22) 
 
What this constitutes, effectively, is an attempt to re-engineer arts and humanities 
researchers, to make them more ‘like’ scientists. Or like the BIS idea of scientists.  
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 Put crudely, TRAC and FEC are part of an enormous data-gathering exercise which attempts to 
separate the way that academic teaching-time and research-time are funded. The consequence of this is 
that the Research Councils have had to increase the percentage contribution they provide of the costs of 
any project they fund; in effect, this means that they can fund fewer projects (RIN, 2010; Gilbert, 2008). 
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3.3.2.1 Students in the age of personalisation and privatisation 
Student ‘choices will shape the landscape of higher education,’ predicted the former 
CEO of BP, John Browne, in the 2010 review of higher education (Browne, 2010, p.4). 
In 2013 Sir Michael Barber tells us that ‘the student consumer is king’ in his report An 
avalanche is coming: higher education and the revolution ahead’, to which I referred at 
the opening of this section (p.33). Barber was formerly education advisor to Tony Blair 
– New Labour’s introduction of audit culture and targets in schools was his brainchild – 
and he was a committee member for both the Dearing and Browne reviews (Wilby, 
2011). Like Lord Browne he advises the public sector whilst pursuing private sector 
interests – in Barber’s case, as chief education advisor to the Pearson Group.38  
 
I mention the biographical provenance of the above quotes to be clear about the drivers 
acting on such viewpoints. It’s all about marketisation. Sentiments such as those behind 
these quotes are now sweeping through the higher education sector and students, who 
from 2012 have been paying up to £9000 a year in fees, are encouraged by such 
approaches to see themselves as consumers. In fact universities are still largely being 
funded by the public purse, partly by the £2 billion a year that hasn’t yet been cut from 
the grant, partly by research grants, partly by the legacy capital assets both in estate
39
 
and in human capital and partly from the Student Loan Company, from which 85% of 
students receive funding (McGettigan 2013, loc.783) and which is underwritten by the 
state (Brown and Carasso, 2013; Collini, 2013b, p.12-14). As Collini says, ‘there is no 
genuine market here’ (ibid., p.12). 
 
Students are encouraged to see themselves as consumers, but they are not, as there is no 
market. They pay back their loans gradually, over decades, through the payroll system, 
once they are in work and earning more than £21,000. If they pay them back at all. By 
April 2014 the default rate had reached 45%, very near the 48.6% ‘threshold at which 
… the government will lose more money than it would have saved by keeping the old 
£3000 tuition fee system’ (Mason and Malik, 2014). So what has changed from a 
student’s perspective is that they will now, effectively, pay a graduate tax. A move from 
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 Concerns have been raised about the ethics of the significant influence that Pearson, the world’s 
largest education multi-national, is having on public education policy (Mansell, 2012). 
39
 As estate assets depreciate and need to be renewed this may have implications for fees.  
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elite to mass higher education has a cost which has to be financed somehow and this 
would have been one strategy. It could have been effected without withdrawing funding 
from universities, to give to the Student Loan Company, who give it to students who 
then give it to universities. But it wasn’t.  
 
Because the (largely) public monies used to pay tuition fees travel through this circuit, 
they are perceived by students, their families, and indeed within public discourse as 
private monies – a ‘loan’, like a bank loan. And, crucially, once received they become 
the graduate’s private, personal debt to the Student Loan Company and they may, in 
future, be sold off to private finance companies
40
 (Collini, 2013b, pp.11-14). Like Poe’s 
purloined letter (which I discuss later in this thesis) as the fees travel around the circuit, 
they transform meaning, changing the relationship and the identity of the actors 
involved; they make students into debtors and service purchasers; universities into 
service providers; and the state into something that looks like a loan shark.41 Couching 
public finance in terms which discursively transform it into private finance – and then 
transforming it in actuality – is an ideological conjuring trick, carried out in a way that 
makes it appear that universities ‘are malls and students are consumers’ (Giroux, 
2013a). And this, as Collini argues, mobilises the rhetoric of free choice for student 
customers in a higher education market as a kind of figleaf for what’s actually 
happening. Which is, as McGettigan points out, the deliberate destabilising of 
universities ‘prior to the entrance and expansion of the alternative providers’ 
(McGettigan, 2013, loc.1762).  
 
In tandem with the increase in what appears to be direct charging of fees to students, the 
National Student Survey (NSS) has gathered data about student views of their education 
since 2005, which contributes significantly to university league tables. This has fed into 
institutional obsessions with ‘the student experience’ as institutions attempt to improve 
their widely reported NSS ratings. The awareness by staff that final year students’ 
grading of their course, department and institution are going to be publicly available 
inevitably affects student–staff interaction and functions as yet another form of audit. 
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Some of the student loanbook has already been sold off; £890m of pre-1998 student loans was sold to 
a debt management consortium in 2013 (BBC, 2013). 
41
 As Collini points out, the student contracts with the loan company permit the company to change its 
terms at a future date (2013b, p.13). 
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As staff at the University of the Arts rather poignantly say of the NSS: ‘it haunts us’ 
(Sabri and Waring, 2011). 
 
So in a world where students appear to be paying a significant part of the cost of their 
courses directly and where their feelings about their education are annually harvested, 
the concept of degree-level education shifts within public discourse. It moves from 
being part of the modernist notion of creating an educated populace as part of a re-
shaping of the world for the collective good, to being increasingly viewed as wholly 
private concern, undertaken for personal advantage. It’s telling that government 
responsibility for universities was moved into the new Business, Innovation and Skills 
department in this period.42 Dearing began to bridge the gap between the Thatcher and 
Blair years with a rhetoric that spoke about both ‘individual benefit’ obtained by 
educating oneself for the ‘knowledge economy’, and education as a form of ‘personal 
development’ for ‘lifelong learners’. The vocabulary shifts a gear into the newspeak of 
new-age capitalism, in line with Giddens’ Third Way ideas of self-responsiblisation – in 
this case, the reflexive self-identity of the learner (Giddens, 1991, 121-132).  
 
Sixteen years on, what remains of Dearing’s idea of lifelong learning is a changed 
landscape of employment where job-roles disappear and employees are obliged to re-
train to find work repeatedly throughout their careers. These are folded up neatly into 
the dubious concept of employability which is the ‘new psychological contract’ that 
‘responsiblises’ individuals for their own ability to find employment rather than seeing 
labour demand as an effect of markets (Chertkovskaya, 2013; Boltanski and Chiapello, 
2010, p. 93-5). Because employability is conceived of as ‘personal capital that everyone 
must manage, comprising the total set of skills people can mobilize’ (Boltanski and 
Chiapello, 2010, p.93) it becomes something that universities must
43
 develop in students 
(Chertkovskaya, 2013; QAA, 2013). Dearing’s notion of education as personal 
development, a concept that has come to privilege pop-psychology notions of ‘personal 
growth’ over more theory-based approaches to educational development (such as 
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 The department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) was formed in June 2009 ‘to build Britain’s 
capabilities to compete in the global economy’. Universities had previously been part of the Department 
for Innovation, Universities and Science (BIS, 2009).  
43
 ‘Employability’ is part of the Key Informations Set (KIS) that universities are obliged to provide for 
publication on Unistats, the student/consumer university comparison site; see 
https://unistats.direct.gov.uk/ 
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Giroux’s (2013b) re-working of Paulo Freire’s ‘critical pedagogy’) has morphed into 
the idea, with much populist purchase, of students being entrepreneurs of their own 
futures. With the introduction of directly charged fees, education-as-commodity, 
purchasable for private advantage, has also triumphed. By burdening young people with 
a lifetime of debt, the political class has now transformed them into, as Browne and 
Barber tell us, consumers of education (Giroux, 2013a, p.12). The obsession with 
ensuring ‘student satisfaction’ which will then be reported via the NSS helps to feed this 
consumer identity.  
 
The ‘student experience’ has become a sacrosanct and unquestionable notion in 
universities, but the whole concept of students as a customers who can meaningfully 
and objectively report on their education is, of course, deeply flawed. As Collini points 
out, ‘a “satisfied” student is nigh-on ineducable’(2012, p.185) as the desire to learn 
requires a degree of curiosity which is not borne out of bland contentment; even 
Dearing hints that education is a process of changing and developing the self which 
‘theorize[s] matters of self and social agency’ (Giroux, 2011, loc.64), and ‘draws 
attention to the ways in which knowledge, power, desire, and experience are produced 
… particularly as these bear on the formation of the multiple and ever-contradictory 
versions of the “self” and its relationship to the larger society’(Giroux, 2011 loc.74-7). 
So, as a learner, this involves questioning one’s own existing viewpoints and being 
pushed outside an attitudinal comfort zone. Often, as the individual undergoing change, 
they cannot make a clear judgement of the process during the third year of their degree. 
It may take a year or several years to fully appreciate it. Collini describes this as a ‘post-
experience good’, that is to say that the full understanding of the benefits of higher 
education may only be discovered at a later date (2013b, p.11) and Furedi argues that 
assessing the quality of an academic experience can take some years (2009). And, 
naturally, students will have varied, conflicting and changeable thoughts about what 
they are ‘experiencing’ about their education, at a formative, demanding period in their 
lives. Trying to sum this up as a set of simplified questions is pointless, mechanistic and 
demeaning to all involved (Furedi, 2009).  
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The NSS becomes as part of a cycle of audit. Its phases are: 
 
Harvest Opinions 
(students fill in the form) 
 
Compare and Compete 
(departments’ and institutions’ ratings are compared with each other) 
 
Publicise 
 (marketing departments mediatise the ratings they view as positive) 
 
Commodify 
 (ratings are used to commodify institutions in league tables) 
 
Fig. 2 Cycle of audit 
 
This harvest-compare-publicise-commodify cycle purports to be about raising standards 
whilst being only about the act of completing the cycle itself. As Furedi argues, ‘how 
students feel about their university has been turned into an instrument for auditing the 
quality of institutions of higher education’ (Furedi, 2009) and involves a ‘risk that data 
will substitute for judgement’(Scott, 2014). It is audit dressed up as democracy and as 
Ryan, applying Michael Power’s work on audit to higher education, argues, the 
functionality of this kind of audit ‘is that it constructs political power while appearing to 
secure the ends of justice and economy’ and that it is an ‘audit system that constructs 
auditability’. In fact, institutional anxieties over the student satisfaction element of 
league tables (‘it haunts us’) can result in changes to courses or institutional practices,44 
that may be detrimental to the actual quality of education (Child, 2011). The institution 
haunted by this late modern ‘audit of feeling’ cycle is a very different one to the post-
war organisation, enthused with high modernist optimism. 
 
Together with this concept of the student as consumer comes the invention of the notion 
of the student entrepreneur (QAA, 2012). This is an extension of the employability 
concept discussed earlier, where the student is ‘entrepreneur of their own career’ 
(Barber et al., 2013, p.65), with responsibility for ‘creating jobs for themselves and 
others’ (ibid., p.10). This pro-active role is in some ways in contradiction with the 
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Because students’ rating of their own ‘experience’ may be based on many other aspects of their time 
at university other than teaching (Scott, 2014) one thing that has happened in the US example is that 
money is poured into making student services – accommodation, sports facilities, restaurants and bars – 
more luxurious rather than spending resources on teaching, as former provost of Columbia University, 
Jonathan Cole, among others, observes (Cole, 2010; Hotson, 2011; Scott, 2014). 
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passive identity of student as consumer. There is also tension, in the neoliberal 
reinvention of studenthood, between the private self who consumes education and the 
role of universities in the production of the public self – the critical, informed citizen 
necessitated by democracy (Giroux, 2013a).  
 
The effect on the higher education landscape of the funding changes for the 161 higher 
education institutions in the UK is to intensify the fragmentation of the sector. 
Increasingly there is separation of universities into those which are research intensive 
and those which concentrate largely on teaching (Humes, 2009), as represented by the 
different mission groups: the Russell Group is the most vocal mission group for 
research-led institutions; and Million+ the highest-profile post-92 University group.45 
With accelerating sectoral fragmentation, Barber predicts that elite universities who 
‘attract the stars of the academic firmament … and the world’s most talented students’ 
will use their ‘global brand’ to expand by certifying courses that they franchise out to 
‘mass university’ teaching institutions (Barber et al., 2013, p.56-7). He predicts that as a 
consequence of this, ‘many middle-to-low-tier universities will have to disband’ (ibid., 
p.57). Another possibility in Barber's imagined future is Liberal Arts subjects being 
available to students who can afford the fees of expensive ‘niche universities’, taught by 
staff who are ‘global stars’, whereas those who can’t opt for vocational training at a 
local institute. It may be tempting to write off Barber’s vision as neoliberal fantasy, but 
it is inevitable that the discourse of privilege becomes re-inscribed as a result of 
privatisation. A. C. Grayling’s New College of the Humanities, which he founded in 
2011, is a recent example of this. It offers a private tutorial college model for those who 
can afford its fee level, running at £17,640 for the 2014/15 academic year.  
 
Participation in higher education became redefined, at least in theory, in the latter half 
of the 20
th
 century as meritocratic rather than as an effect of class background. How far 
both exam results and offers of university places are now, in reality, an effect of social, 
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 There are currently two other mission groups, the University Alliance and GuildHE. Until November 
2013 a third, the 1994 Group, existed. The role of the groups varies, but their function is largely 
corporate branding and govermental lobbying. Scott argues that they are divisive in that they encourage 
sectoral fragmentation, and reinforce the British class system (Scott, 2013). Both Scott and Humes see 
them as reducing universities to a ‘brand’ and Humes argues that the tribalism they encourage allows 
government to ‘divide and rule’ the sector (Humes, 2010). Malcolm McVicar, Vice-Chancellor of the 
University of Central Lancashire, says ‘the mission groups reflect the divisions that exist and might be 
exacerbating them,’ adding that in the face of funding cuts they are like ‘turkeys fighting over who will 
get it at Christmas’ (THE, 2009). 
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cultural and economic capital is arguable. Terry Eagleton, a Cambridge don in the 
1970s, describes his college as being ‘full of rugger buggers … and upper class louts’ 
(Eagleton, 2001, p.136). Although access to Oxbridge is, ostensibly, now through merit, 
a 2011 report showed that between them, five schools (including Westminster, Eton and 
St Paul’s) sent more students to Oxbridge over three years than 2,000 schools and 
colleges across Britain, differences that ‘cannot be attributed solely to the schools’ 
average A-level results’ (Sutton Trust,46 2011).  
 
Moreover the discourse of privilege, which never completely disappeared, is likely to 
re-irrupt, in a more virulent form, if – or when – the current fee cap is removed and 
Oxford and Cambridge, in particular, are able to charge fee levels commensurate with 
their ‘global brand[s]’. The Vice-Chancellor of Oxford, Andrew Hamilton, used his 
2013 annual oration to argue that to enable Oxford to break even fees must rise to 
£16,000. He also looked forward to a higher education economic landscape with 
‘different universities charging significantly different amounts’ (Hamilton, 2013). That 
is to say, fee deregulation. How that squares with ‘attracting the world’s most talented 
students’ may become something of a moot point for those institutions, which would 
logically become ‘enclaves for the international rich’ (Anderson, 2006, loc.3501). 
Oxford’s head of admission received significant press coverage shortly after the VC’s 
fee statement by announcing at a recent Sutton Trust summit that ‘his role was to weed 
out “thick and rich” applicants’ who may have been admitted a generation ago (Sutton 
Trust, 2013). Speaking at the same summit Michael Barber addressed this issue of how 
poorer students would be able to afford significantly increased Oxbridge fees by 
suggesting that ‘government capital money’ should be used to create ‘endowment funds 
that would get you towards a proper system of needs-blind admission’(Times Higher 
Education, 2013b). He gives this idea a somewhat contradictory twist, by then going on 
to suggest that funds from future privatisation could be used for this (ibid.). 
I mentioned in my discussion of massification in the previous chapter that technology 
became pervasive in the day-to-day life in the university during this period. The 
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 The Sutton Trust is a pressure group that aims ‘to improve social mobility through education’ (Sutton 
Trust, undated). 
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omnipresence of technology is critical in the stage of ‘privatisation and personalisation’, 
particularly to the concept of studenthood.  
 
Mediatised culture valorises the privately personalised, turning it into the norm for the 
online world (see, for example, Crary, 2013; Morozov 2013). For example, I expect my 
user accounts to ‘know’ me so well that they tailor their input to my desires: my 
Amazon profile will tell me what I want to buy and my Facebook profile will tell me 
whom I want to friend (see Pariser, 2011; Andrejevic, 2007). Similarly online 
education, which grew up in the massification years, is now expected to provide a 
personalised educational experience to learners in a global educational marketplace. 
Learners in most institutions will have their own online space, which connects up to 
their timetables, online resources, email and other accounts personal to them and will 
receive messages from various parts of the organisation about anything from their fee 
payments to module reading lists. And in common with the whole discourse and the 
practices of personalisation which feel completely private and intimate, personal student 
areas are, of course, the very opposite. They enable the university to track and monitor 
everything a student does online; early 20
th
 century commentary on the university 
described them as a digital equivalent of a Benthamite panopticon (Land and Bayne, 
2004, p.165) but drawing on Andrejevic’s more recent idea of the ‘participatory 
panopticon’ (Andrejevic, 2007, p.239) university surveillance can be read in terms of a 
more modulated and dispersed system of control ‘that will continuously change from 
one moment to another’(Deleuze, 1992, p.4). 
 
3.3.2.2 The incursion of the private sector 
A crucial aspect of the marketisation of higher education is that that it becomes more 
possible for private providers to enter the sector. This is facilitated both by direct fee 
payments and by the increase in sectoral fragmentation. These factors serve to open up a 
space for private providers to compete as teaching organisations and recent years have 
seen the beginnings of companies such as BPP, Kaplan, INTO, Greenwich School of 
Management and Pearson move into the arena (McGettigan, 2013). 
 
The introduction of a student loan system means that student loans can be paid from the 
public purse to these private companies. In 2012 the amount paid to such companies 
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exceeded £100m and looks set to increase year on year47(Collini, 2013b, p.3). Private 
sector market consultants The Parthenon Group describe the higher education sector as 
a ‘treasure island’ (McGettigan, 2013, loc.1855). 
 
Their business models tend to involve employing staff on teaching-only contracts. 
Typically, there is no provision for scholarly activities in staff contracts, salaries are 
low, leave short and the organisations are non-unionised (Times Higher Education, 
2008a; UCUa, 2008; Lipsett, 2008a). All this is a recipe for lower-quality educational 
provision than universities provide and a consequent driving down of educational 
standards, as historian Howard Hotson demonstrates in his comparison of UK public-
sector higher education with the US model
48
 (Hotson, 2011). 
 
3.3.2.3 The idea of the personal and private university: institutional and staff 
identities 
What has changed, then, in the post-Browne idea of a university is that instead of it 
being viewed as a public service and a social good, it is now increasingly seen as a 
market where educational consumer goods are of benefit primarily to the private 
individual. In this model universities are reduced to service providers (Brown and 
Carasso, 2013, loc.327-8; Collini, 2012a, p.1).  
 
There have been attempts to challenge the hegemony of the market culture. The four 
principal university unions, the University and College Union (UCU), Unison, Unite 
and the National Union of Students (NUS) all take an anti-privatisation stance and have 
supported local action against privatisation (UCU (undated); Unison (2014); Unite 
2012, p.3; NUS (2014) p.17-19). Another challenge comes from a somewhat different 
constituency with the establishment, in 2012, of the Council for the Defence of British 
Universities (CDBU). This membership organisation, founded by a group of academic 
leaders and other intellectuals from the worlds of Science and Arts, opposes pressure to 
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 McGettigan details how John Nash, who has contributed over £200,000 to Conservative Party coffers 
and was invited by Chancellor George Osborne to advise on higher education reform, is also one of the 
founder of the Sovereign company. Sovereign owns Greenwich School of Management, which has, to 
date, received a quarter of student loan monies that have been diverted to the private sector 
(McGettigan, 2013, loc.1865). Nash was granted a peerage in January 20013 and is government 
spokesman on education in the House of Lords (McGettigan, 2013).  
48
 Interestingly, Hotson demonstrates that even judging the two systems in terms of neoliberalism’s own 
discourse, the ‘value for money’ provided by public-sector higher education is much greater (Hotson, 
2011). 
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make higher education ‘serve short-term, primarily pragmatic, and narrowly 
commercial ends’ and sees the ‘instrumentalisation of knowledge’ and the ‘privatisation 
of education’ as ‘an enclosure of the epistemic commons’ (CDBU, 2013). The more 
grassroots Campaign for the Public University is made up of UK academics and 
graduate students and shares similar aims to the CDBU (Campaign for the Public 
University, 2014) and there are other campaigning groups,
49
 such as the National 
Campaign Against Fees and Cuts (NCAFC, 2014).  
 
There has been, in recent years, an emergence of scholarly defences of education, many 
of which I have drawn on in this chapter. For example, Stefan Collini’s What are 
Universities For? (2012) puts a compelling argument for the inherent worth of 
intellectual enquiry, as do his regular London Review of Books essays (see Collini, 
2010; 2011; 2013b); both Andrew McGettigan’s financial analysis and critique of 
marketising education The Great University Gamble and Roger Brown and Helen 
Carasso’s critical dissection of higher education policy Everything for Sale? The 
Marketisation of UK Education call some of the underpinning assumptions of 
marketisation into question. Work such as Ruth Barcan’s and Ros Gill’s writings on the 
damage to the academy in human terms have also been significant; such work also 
speaks about resistance to the neoliberal project on a personal level, by academics in the 
day-to-day. (Gill, 2010; 2014; Barcan, 2013).  
 
The public debate has begun to appear in the broadsheets; it is not a discussion that has 
a simple left/right divide, as coverage of the CDBU in the traditionally right-of-centre 
Telegraph demonstrates. One piece, entitled ‘The Brains Go into Battle’ (Bragg, 2013) 
speaks of how ‘the clarion came out from All Souls’ to save our universities and ‘take 
these islands into another great chapter in our story’; it employs notions of elites and 
nationalism in the fight against instrumentalist hijacking of the concept of the university 
(see also another Telegraph article by one of the founder members, Gordon Campbell, 
(2012)). The defence of higher education may involve some very broad-based liaisons. 
 
The change for university staff in the post-Dearing years is significant. The increase of 
university audit has meant growth in numbers of the administrative staff necessary to 
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 See http://publicuniversity.org.uk/other-campaigns/ for a list of other campaigns against HE 
privatisation, some of which are based around disciplines or clusters of disciplines. 
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service this; for the past ten years there have been more non-academic than academic 
staff employed in UK universities. In 2012 the figures were 197,000 non-academic to 
180, 000 academic staff. The increasing imposition of a managerial culture means that 
there has been a growth in both the number and the power of managers in academic and 
non-academic areas (Ginsberg, 2011). Even traditionally academic management roles 
are increasingly filled by senior staff from outside the university sector (Giroux, 2007, 
p.106; Lipsett, 2008b; Hall, 2013, p.90) and senior executive posts have increasingly 
commanded higher and higher salaries (Hopwood, 2013). 
 
The nature of academic work has always been, in a sense, entrepreneurial. Only ‘highly 
motivated self-starters’ who can ‘think outside the box’ (as commercial recruitment 
jargon would put it) and who have enthusiasm amounting to obsession for their subject 
area become academics. But during this privatisation period, certain kinds of 
entrepreneurial abilities, such as the ability to form links with organisations outside the 
sector, to raise funds from commercial ventures or to engage in populist profile-raising 
become more valued, or certainly more identified. As early as 1993, Fairclough 
observed a discursive ‘reconstruction of the professional identities of academics on a 
more entrepreneurial (self-promotional) basis’ (p.157) and this has increased in the last 
20 years.
50
 But, mirroring the student consumer/entrepreneur contradiction, the 
academic, now recognised as knowledge entrepreneur, is highly regulated, audited and 
policed in a way that no proto-Richard Branson or Mark Zuckerberg would be 
comfortable with. A combination of managerialism, audit of teaching, constant 
measuration to provide metrics for TRAC, FEC and KIS, ‘customer’ pressure and 
output-driven research assessment (transmuting from the RAE to the Research 
Excellence Framework51 from 2010 ) does not describe an ideal entrepreneurial 
environment for ‘creative knowledge work’ (Deem 2004, p.111). This picture contrasts 
starkly with the high degree of academic autonomy of the post-war decades – when the 
idea of academic entrepreneurs didn’t exist.  
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 The US and Canada have gone further down this road. See, for example, Academic branding: your 
online presence by design, a resource from a Canada which encourages academics to increase their 
‘digital footprint’; which quotes a survey showing ‘55% of faculty use social media for self-promotion’ 
leaving the remaining 45% ‘underbranded or misbranded’ (Matrix, 2014, slide 7-9). 
51
 I discuss the implications of the Research Excellence Framework in Chapter 9. 
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Many academic staff are in an environment where student expectations of ‘service’ 
increase as they are moved into the passive role of consumers, but under-funding means 
student/staff ratios don’t improve, creating significant pressures. Occupational stress 
levels, already 25% higher than in the general population, measurably increased in 
academic staff between 2008 and 2012 (Grove, 2012).  
 
The language of commerce permeates all aspects of academic life in the contemporary 
university, redefining what it is to be a teacher and researcher – or innovative 
knowledge professional (Collini, 2012, pp.94-6). This hegemonic reinvention of the 
core work of university life makes it hard to defend any activity that does not turn a 
profit and the language and culture of commerce has a concrete effect on the way 
universities work. For example, research initiatives are now usually expected, by 
institution and funder, to use ‘industry standard’ project management methodologies. 
These have limited flexibility, as they assume that all activities in the area of inquiry are 
knowable in advance. But scholarly research, by its very nature, often uncovers 
unexpected findings which have a knock-on effect on the activities to be undertaken. 
Concepts such as intellectual uncertainty, the unknowable and unpredictable 
consequences are not easily expressed in the representational universe of Gantt charts, 
milestones and workstreams and so they become un-representable. As Dearlove argues, 
‘research is a creative craft activity that does not lend itself to bureaucratic 
management’(1998, p.118).  
 
Along with the resistance of academic commentators in public debates on the 
marketisation of higher education, there have also developed, in recent times, a range of 
‘free university’ type initiatives, which question the idea of how education is, should be 
or could be organised (see for example: the Free University of Brighton, 2013; The 
Guardian, 2013; The Provisional University, 2014). Another aspect of this is 
development of open access publishing models which make peer reviewed scholarly 
journals and sometimes books, freely available to anyone with an internet connection 
(see Hall, 2008; Suber, 2012). These type of initiatives exist both within and outside 
universities and some commentators see the work of individuals, groups and 
organisations as constituting part of a Deleuze and Guattarian ‘rhizomic’ (un)structured 
movement (see Rolfe, 2014, p.3).  
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An overall way of conceptualising the whole panoply of resistance initiatives is as a re-
irruption of the discourse of progress and the public good in the troubled contemporary 
landscape of UK higher education.  
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SECTION III – CONFIGURING THE 
SELF 
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4 Chapter 4 – Armour for my phantoms: academic homepages and 
blogs 
 
4.1 Preface 
The original selection and close reading of academic blogs for this chapter was carried 
out in 2009, when it was first drafted. The blogs and homepages, therefore, bear the 
stamp of the time in which they were created, as does the selection of them. Although 
academic blogging was becoming more widespread in the US at this time (see Saper, 
2006
52
 for an earlier account of this) in the UK it was less common. By 2014, however, 
many more academic staff in a range of disciplines have their own professional blogs 
and home pages. They are used in a variety of ways, demonstrating how increasingly 
media-aware academic staff have become over the intervening five years. Guardian 
contributor, Lucy Williams describes how, as a PhD student in 2013, she used her blog 
to share and discuss her research with others – as do the subjects in my 2009 examples 
of blogs. However, Williams also contends that ‘in the face of a changing academy, 
university staff and students alike are acknowledging the necessity of raising awareness 
of their research, and promoting its merits, outside higher education’ (Williams, 2013), 
a strand of thought about research that is less prevalent in my 2009 examples, and one 
I’ll return to later in this thesis.  
As well as being used to share and discuss research, academic blogs, by 2014, are also 
being widely used in a range of disciplines for teaching, learning and assessment (see 
Deng and Huen, 2012) and, of course, for providing social and political commentary; 
see, for example, sociologists John Holmwood and Gurminder Bhambras’ Campaign 
for the Public University blog (CPU, 2014) which supports the pressure group I referred 
to in the last chapter.  
Much, therefore, has changed, in a short time, in academic blogging. This chapter, 
however, captures a sample of academic blogs and homepages at a particular historical 
moment and is intended be seen as commentary on the academic blogs and homepages 
of that particular moment. 
 
                                                          
52
 Craig Saper, in what is thought to be the first work on academic blogs (Kirkup, 2010) noted the 
beginning of a rise of more informal US Faculty blogs back in 2006 
84  
 
 
4.2 Approach 
In this chapter I will consider how the academic subject inscribes themselves on what I 
term ‘the digital Symbolic’. By this I mean that aspect of the Lacanian Symbolic order 
that is represented by the digital. I discuss the Symbolic as part of the Lacanian triad 
later in this chapter, but, the digital Symbolic, can be thought of, in relation to my 
context, as, for example the semiotics of web pages or the signification systems that 
have developed around blogging. I will be mobilising psychoanalytic theory to produce 
a reading of how academic homepages and blogs and other such sites can be understood 
both as ways of creating and playing with meaning and also as inscribing a sense of 
selfhood on the academic subject. I argue that they both produce a space of conformity 
whilst resisting easy or imposed conceptions of subjectivity. 
 
In order to engage with the range and scope of academic homepages and blogs then 
being produced, I examined a range of such sites produced by academic staff working in 
UK universities; I then selected the professional blogs or personal sites of six academics 
and performed a detailed reading of these (see Chapter 2 for more detail of how I 
surveyed the sites and Appendix A for a full list of sites). My original intention was to 
analyse sites from across a range of subject disciplines. However, in only quite a narrow 
range of subjects did academic staff have significant personal pages or blogs at the time 
I conducted this work, so there is a bias towards computer science, educational 
technology and disciplines which involve publishing, such as media studies and creative 
writing. I chose sites that formed a varied selection, particularly in the kind of academic 
roles that the individuals occupied and that spoke about the selves their creators wanted 
to inscribe in differing ways that were sometimes intriguing, sometimes compelling, at 
times both serious and playful, but always mindful of the complexities of performing 
the academic self on the digital stage.  
 
Such pages may be hosted on the university servers, on local school, faculty or 
department servers, or outside the university completely. These homepages can usually 
be accessed via the individual academic’s university profile page53 but may be accessed 
from elsewhere, for example by performing a google search on the person’s name. 
Sometimes these academic homepages are webpages which do not use blog technology; 
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 See the next chapter for a definition of profile pages. 
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sometimes they link up with the academic staff member’s blog; sometimes they are, 
themselves, blogs; and sometimes they contain blogs. Four of the sites under discussion 
use blog technology in some way.  
 
I am distinguishing academic home pages from their profile pages. Profile pages are 
standard pages generated by the university that provide publicly accessible basic 
information about academic staff. These are largely created by someone in the 
institution other than the member of academic staff themselves and form the ‘official’ 
institutional representation of self. I will be considering profile pages in the next chapter 
but in this chapter I am looking specifically at personal homepages and blogs that the 
individual academic has created themselves. 
 
Academic staff tend to have personal homepages, in addition to their basic university 
profile page, for a number of reasons. They may want to provide significantly more 
detail about their work either for colleagues, students or for the general reader, than the 
constraints of the university page make possible; they may wish to utilise technologies 
and design that are not permissible on the university website; they may wish to create a 
sense of an independent identity which isn’t purely linked to the university where they 
are currently employed. Ken Hyland, writing about the tension between individuality 
and conformity in academic homepages contends that ‘the university homepage is 
constructed entirely on the institution’s terms, requiring the subject to conform to its 
norms and implicitly subscribe to its corporate ideologies’(Hyland, 2012,p.320).  
A theoretical body of work has been developed on homepages (see for example Cheung, 
2004 or Bruns, 2013) and particularly on blogging. Theoretical approaches to blogging 
range from examples such as Jill Walker Rettberg’s discussion of blogs as socio-
cultural products with an emphasis on citizen journalism and issues of self-narrative 
(Walker Rettberg, 2014a), to Geert Lovink’s 2008 Zero comments, a political analysis 
of blog culture with a stress on media activism, to Jodi Dean’s psychoanalytic 
materialist analysis of blog culture (Dean 2010). The kind of blogging that is referred to 
in the broad range of theory, however, differs from the type of professional academic 
blogs and homepages of 2009 which I am considering. These are, generally, not 
presented in the highly personal diary mode and are a long way from the model of blog 
culture characterised by Dean as ‘react and forward, but don’t by any means think’ 
(2010. p. 3). On the contrary, thinking or eliciting thought in others, is central to their 
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project. This makes aspects of the more general work on blogging not easily applicable 
to academic blogs, so although I use this work in this chapter I do so selectively.  
 
The small body of work on professional academic blogging often refers largely to the 
US academy (for example Saper, 2006; Paz Dennen, 2009), or explores issues other 
than subjectivity, but nevertheless some aspects of the US based work and some of the 
more general academic blog and homepage work has relevance to my argument. Rory 
Ewins’ early work in the UK on the role of blogs in academic identity (Ewins, 2005), to 
which I will refer later and Gill Kirkup’s review of the way blogs impact on academic 
practice are both particularly relevant. Kirkup’s contention that academic blogging is 
providing ‘a new genre’ (2010, p.83) of academic production may, indeed, prove to be 
true as an enactment of dana boyd’s earlier prediction that ‘this medium has and will 
continue to shift the communicative and social assumptions that ground everyday life’ 
(boyd, 2006, para.59).  
 
Before I turn to my first example of an academic homepage I want to pause to talk 
about the slightly discomforting position I find myself occupying when re-producing 
and discussing the sites of colleagues in other universities. Although none of my 
subjects have objected to their pages being highlighted in this way, the voyeuristic 
position this puts me in is a little uncomfortable. I’m aware that these sites belong to 
actual people, most of whom I have never and will never meet, individuals who are 
subject to all the pressures and anxieties of the Haunted University which I am writing 
about in this study. So, whilst I am writing about the psychoanalytic Imaginary in 
relation to these sites, I’m aware that there are real people who devised them. What I’m 
not doing in this chapter is making psychoanalytic statements about those actual people, 
but about the symbolic performances they have created. These might be about self, but 
they are not self. They are a form of fiction, and it is this fiction I am analysing, not the 
creators of it. 
 
When I refer to colleagues’ publications in this thesis I use the standard convention of 
using their surname. This would seem a little odd when looking at their blogs, so I will 
instead be using their first names. 
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My first example of a site is Gary Hall’s personal homepage (Fig.3). Gary is a media 
theorist whose work is in the arena of new media technologies and cultural studies. He 
is a professor of media at Coventry University, and his personal homepage is outside the 
Coventry site at www.garyhall.info. 
 
 
 
http://www.garyhall.info/  
Fig. 3 Gary Hall’s personal homepage 
 
Gary’s site uses bright, contemporary colour and styling which can be easily changed 
and updated. It’s unlikely that the corporate design protocols of a university would 
permit this kind of individuality of styling on a website that was hosted by them and 
went out under their banner. By way of contrast, Gary Hall’s staff profile page at 
Coventry, as shown below (Fig. 4), is much more subdued and conservative in its 
styling, like many university pages. 
 
This use of design is a way of signalling one’s own identity as someone with an 
awareness of changes in contemporary digital culture and styling. Additionally, an 
important thrust of Gary’s work is the academic gift economy and the importance of 
breaking the hegemony of publishing houses (Hall, 2010); his personal homepage 
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performs this by linking to full versions of many of his own pieces of published work, 
something not all universities would be comfortable sanctioning on their own 
institutional site because of nervousness about copyright implications. In this way, 
having a homesite is an enactment of a kind of intellectual freedom of thought.
54
 
 
 
http://www.coventry.ac.uk/cu/schoolofartanddesign/mediaandcommunication/staff/a/4644 
Fig. 4 Gary Hall’s university homepage 
 
4.3 A note on the available technologies 
What I’m terming academic personal web pages, as opposed to blogs, are pages which 
are designed just to be read and to link to other sites. Blog technologies have become 
increasingly freely available to be used instead of or with more ‘traditional’ web pages. 
The term ‘blog’ is a shortened form of web-log, and a blog is designed to use a diary 
format, or ‘log’.55 Blogging began in the mid- to late 1990s, but didn’t become 
‘massified’ until the 21st century (Lovink, 2008, loc.125-7). In the UK, the BBC, for 
example, launched its blog in 2006; so when I surveyed these blogs in 2009, this was 
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 It also permits for a degree of intellectual freedom which might not be comfortable for a corporate 
institution. For example, David Colquhoun, a Professor of Pharmocology at UCL, was asked to remove 
his blog, which criticises alternative medicine, from his university’s server as a result of complaints about 
it. His DC’s improbable Science page is now hosted by an external service (See 
http://www.dcscience.net/) 
55
 It is possible to use freely available blog technologies and not utilise the journal format; in this case 
the site looks, to the user, like a standard website. 
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still a fairly early point in their use in the British context (Wilson, 2006). Blog software 
automatically puts journal entries in chronological order, with new entries at the top, 
and automatically archives entries after a certain number of posts or period of time. If 
the blog owner permits it, readers can add to entries by posting their own comment. 
Other readers, or the blog owner themselves, can then comment on comments, and in 
this way discussions can evolve. Blogs usually have sidebars for lists of links to other 
blogs or webpages, and, in some cases for recent microblogs.
56
 Blogs also generally 
have an RSS feed, which means that viewers can choose to get regular updates from 
blogs to their own website (which may, itself, be a blog), either just to read themselves, 
or to share with others.  
 
So the advent of blogs began to encourage a different kind of reading and usage of the 
web than was assumed with standard web pages.
57
 They permit readers to enter into a 
public or private dialogue with the blogger and with other readers. They allow users to 
easily add feeds from the blog so that they can always watch what is happening on a 
blog. They also encourage readers to view other blogs and sites, by linking into them in 
a themed way, which creates a specific frame of reference for the linking, and so creates 
meaning through the intertextual nature of the reference.  
 
4.4 Writing the self 
As the technology encourages blog keeping to be in the form of diaries, it is interesting 
to consider Carl Schmitt’s 1918 fantasy about ‘Buribunkian’ diary keepers, Die 
Buribunkian,
58
 in relation to blogs. This is partially reproduced by Friedrich Kittler in 
his discussion, in his book Gramophone, film, typewriter, of the significance of the 
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 Microblogging is blogging with very short messages, often by using a mobile phone or other handheld 
device; Twitter is an example of microblogging technology. 
57
 I’m not concerned here about how the web pages the user sees are produced, i.e. whether they are 
static HTML pages or whether they are dynamically created. My concern is what the user can do with 
them, so the term ‘standard web pages’ can refer to static or ‘created on the fly’ pages. 
58
 It is interesting to note that these prophetic utterances about blogging come from someone whose 
legal philosophy provided part of the theoretical underpinnings of Nazism and who was himself a 
lifelong adherent of right-wing totalitarianism. Both the literal opposition to blogging by totalitarian 
states (as it enables freely available publication of information about the state within and beyond its 
borders) and the way in which the self-disclosure of personal information on the internet permits a 
more metaphorical kind of totalitarian surveillance (see Bassett, 2007) suggest that for the totalitarian 
worldview, there is a lot at stake in blogging – sufficient for it to be imagined, 80 years before it was 
technologically available, by Hitler’s legal philosopher. Significantly, Schmitt’s philosophical contribution 
to the Nazi party concerned auctoritas, or authority, a key and highly contested concept in the online 
world. 
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typewriter in the history of inscription (1986, pp.231-42), where Kittler uses it to argue 
that we are produced by media technologies (ibid., p. 231). In Schmitt’s prescient, if 
dystopian, work he envisions a situation where the widespread use of typewriter 
technology produces a world of ‘Buribunks’, people compelled to keep diaries 
recording all the minutiae of their lives. These accounts are collated daily by central 
authorities and meticulously cross referenced, in Esperanto, so that they can be 
internationally available. Readings from diaries, exchange of photos, film and theatre 
productions, as well as conferences and journal publications all flow from these 
Buribunkian activities (Schmitt, 1918, reproduced in Kittler, 1986, p.238-9). What 
Schmitt envisages is uncannily similar to the way blogging and other social media can 
be currently used, in broad terms, as a socially imposed ‘identity circus’ (Lovink, 2008, 
loc.548) where ‘people’s experience of themselves as subjects is configured in terms of 
accessibility, visibility, being known’ (Dean, 2002, p.114). Whilst Schmitt exhibits 
ironic disdain for the Buribunkian world, he does see it ultimately as an attempt to 
outfox history ‘by writing it while it writes us’ (reproduced in Kittler, 1986, p.242). 
Although Kittler uses the Buribunkian world to argue that our ‘automated 
Buribunkology’ creates ‘a modern loop of endless replication’ (Kittler, 1986, p.231; 
p.244) nevertheless Schmitt’s understanding of our desire to inscribe ourselves on the 
technology is compelling. One of the attractions of crafting a homepage, of whatever 
type, is the sense that it provides the subject with a degree of agency in this way. Sherry 
Turkle describes the process of creating such a page in a way that echoes Schmitt: 
One constructs a home page by composing or ‘pasting’ on it words, images 
and sound, and by making connections between it and other sites on the 
Internet or the Web ... People link their home pages to pages about such 
things as music, paintings, television shows, cities, books, photographs, 
comic strips and fashion models.  
(Turkle, 1995, p. 258) 
 
So, a subject can, at some level, write their own history – as it writes them in that they 
can choose their content, layout and style. For the academic subject, this operates in 
opposition to the technologising of the university I discussed in the previous chapter, 
and their consequent interpolation as a subject of computer culture. But even in the case 
of the ‘personal’ home pages, how much agency does the subject really have? 
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An academic’s own homepage is about displaying credentials, presenting oneself to the 
university and the world. This is summed up by one academic as ‘the site developed (by 
me) to promote my career’ (Brabazon, 2007, p.18). But such self-publicity is fast 
becoming a professional necessity. There are resonances of Schmidt’s Buribunkian 
world, where anyone who stops writing a diary puts themselves ‘outside of all 
discourse’ and is punished by professional demotion, eventually sinking to a level 
where ‘they disappear ... as if swallowed by the earth, nobody knows them anymore, 
nobody mentions them ... they are neither seen nor heard’ (Schmitt, in Kittler, 1986, 
p.240). So, although there is a sense in which being author of their own site may appear 
to furnish the subject with agency, the overall economy of presence within which they 
operate is one which does not easily permit silence or absence, even in relation to what 
might once be seen as the private activities of the self because ‘without publicity the 
subject of technoculture doesn’t know if it exists at all’ (Dean, 2002, p.114). 
 
Another way of considering the ambiguous nature of the personal page is that, for the 
subject, it appears to present an opportunity for performative self-inscription in the 
realm of a digital Symbolic. But by committing their selfhood to text they are self-
consciously performing themselves as a written subject. Their subjectivity becomes 
textually constituted; the important part of what they are as academic subjects becomes 
that which exists in the realm of the digital Symbolic, and their conception they have 
had of an embodied self changes place with the technologically inscribed self, its 
importance being both diminished and also re-framed and re-imagined by the textually 
constituted self. In that sense the online self also becomes incorporated, in Judith 
Butler’s sense of the term, into the body, encrypting itself into the facticity of the body 
(Butler, 1990 pp. 91-5). 
 
When writing about the construction of self, Sarup draws on Foucault’s concept of the 
production of discourse when she discusses self-narrative as a discursive product: 
 
When we talk about our identity and our life story, we include some things and 
exclude others, we stress some things and subordinate others … The stories we 
tell are often re-shaped in/for the public sphere. And then, when these narratives 
are in the public sphere, they shape us  
(Sarup,1996, pp.16-18) 
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So, according to Sarup, a blog or homepage reflects back on the subject who created it, 
and shapes the subject. Even though, or perhaps particularly because, this other, 
electronic self, composed of narrative and code, is created by the purposeful action 
subject themselves.  
 
Self-narrative for the public domain is always challenging for the subject. As soon as 
they construct their page, they are committing themselves; they have created a version 
of themselves that may never change. And one that is immortal. The ‘I’ that they 
imagine themselves to be is a text written in water, but the digital self they have 
produced is a text written in marble. However, paradoxically, the inscription of the 
subject within the digital Symbolic is also subject to replication and change at its very 
moment of creation (Hayles, 2005, p. 100). A digital webpage is easily copied by 
others, changed, uploaded elsewhere for the world to see, in a few clicks or taps. 
Derrida’s argument that whereas typed documents exhibit the scars and traces of 
changes made to them, electronic documents conceal any alterations made to them, is 
also relevant (Derrida, 2001, p.24); not only can versions of the subject’s electronic 
inscription be changed by others, but it will not necessarily be evident that these 
changes have been made.  
 
So, to summarise, once my Frankenstein’s monster-self, cobbled together from text, 
photos, links and graphic art, this alternate self, made of code, is given life on the 
electronic page, a number of things happen. Firstly, it re-writes me, as it becomes 
incorporated into what I am. Secondly, it commits me, for an uncertain length of time, 
to a certain version of myself which I may not subscribe to tomorrow. Thirdly, and 
paradoxically, it is always and permanently subject to change, from its very moment of 
inscription, by unknowable others. It is out of my control. Fourthly, digital persistence 
means that it is – unlike me – immortal, at least in concept, so the versions of self which 
I may no longer, or may never have subscribed to, will live forever and may become me 
on my death.  
 
But it is a fifth point about the digital self that I now wish to go on to consider. This is 
that I look at it and it looks back at me. But, to paraphrase Lacan, it never looks back at 
me from the place where I see it (Lacan, 1973, p.103). It looks back at me with the 
disconcerting gaze of the double. 
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Because, when I look at this self-constructed doppelganger, one of the things I’m doing 
is looking in a mirror, of my own making. And this brings Freud’s ideas about 
Narcissism (Freud, 1914; 1917; Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988, pp.255-7) and Lacan’s 
concept of the mirror phase, articulated in his paper ‘The mirror stage as formative of 
the I function’ (1949) into play. 
 
Before I embark on a discussion of these ideas, it’s important to mention, in relation to 
them, another account of the double, that of Kittler’s in his short essay ‘Romanticism – 
psychoanalysis – film: a history of the double’, reproduced in English in his 1997 
collection of essays Literature, media, information systems (pp.85-100). Kittler gives a 
psychoanalytic reading of the double from 19
th
 century German Romantic poetry and 
prose through to its re-imagining in the medium of film. His contention is that cinema 
has opened a world of doubles up to a mass audience (1997, p.96). I refer to Kittler’s 
work in my reading of the digital double, as my contention is that his filmic double now 
has an even wider (and more personalised) realm than film, now that it populates the 
internet. 
 
4.5 Narcissism and the mirror stage 
Freud’s paradigm of the psychoanalytic triad and Lacan’s re-interpretation of this is a 
set of concepts that underpin the whole of this thesis, as well as this chapter. They are 
dealt with precisely as they are interrogated or used to interrogate the specific situation 
of subjectivity explored, but I will pause now to outline them. 
 
Freud’s concept of the psychical apparatus of the ego, the superego and the id, 
developed and changed over a long period, between the late 19
th
 century and the first 
two decades of the 20
th
 century (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988, pp.130-8) and published 
in 1923 as ‘The ego and the id’, can be briefly defined as follows. The id is the element 
of a subject’s psychological apparatus that acts on instinctual impulse and often seeks 
pleasure; the superego is the self-observing conscience, the controlling, policing part of 
the subject’s mind which disciplines the unruly id and tries to keep it in check; and the 
ego mediates between the two psychological forces, becoming the part of the mind that 
produces a stable sense of self (Freud, 1923).  
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In Freud’s concept of narcissism, the ego takes itself as love object, rather than turning 
its attention to an external love object (Freud, 1914, pp. 88-90). In order for the subject 
to be so amorously captivated by themselves, they have to have a sense of their own 
image. Lacan builds on this, exploring further Freud’s metaphor of Narcissus, the figure 
in Greek mythology who was so taken by his own beauty that he fell in love with his 
reflection in a pool. Ovid’s myth ends badly for Narcissus, as he pines away and dies 
because he cannot bear to leave the image he sees in the mirrored surface of the pool. So 
the double destroys the subject.
59
 
 
Lacan builds on Freud’s thinking to create a triad of the Imaginary, the Symbolic and 
the Real. This is best explicated in terms of his conception of how a child attains 
subjectivity, in le stade du miroir. Lacan sees this period of infant development, which 
can be translated as ‘mirror phase’ or ‘looking-glass stage’, as the place where the infant 
enters into the realm of Symbolic, the space of language (Lacan, 1949, pp.94-81). 
Before this the child has existed in the Real, and has not had consciousness of 
themselves as an autonomous subject. In the Real, they experience themselves as 
undifferentiated from the world around them, and enjoying a blissful sense of wholeness 
and satisfaction; in particular, they do not have a sense of differentiation between their 
body, as they experience it, and the body of their mother.
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This changes gradually, from about the age of 18 months, as the infant begins to see 
themselves in the mirror. This needn’t be a physical mirror per se but can also be the 
regard of their mother, as she reacts to them. Transfixed by what they see in the mirror, 
they gradually begin to recognise this image as themselves. But this entry into the 
Symbolic is marked by a loss of the joy and plenitude of the Real and a sense of the 
subject’s self as split and misrecognising. To recognise oneself in the mirror is always 
what Lacan terms a meconnaissance, literally a misknowing, or as it’s more usually 
translated, a misrecognition, because the image in the mirror is not the self. So a gradual 
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 Butler’s concept of the incorporation of the disallowed same-sex love object into the surface of the 
body of the heterosexual subject can also be seen as relevant here. This incorporation produces the 
melancholic heterosexual, and in these terms the double could be seen for the heterosexual subject as 
the unwelcome eruption of both loss and disallowed desire (Butler, 1990). 
60
 ‘Mother’ in the context which is being addressed in this chapter is also taken to mean any primary 
caregiver with whom the infant has a large amount of physical contact.  
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process of alienation begins. The subject enters into language (the realm of the 
Symbolic) at the mirror stage, and learns to say ‘I’. But the I that they learn to think 
they are requires a splitting of consciousness between the former confused sense of self 
(a collection of limbs and body parts over which they do not have mastery, but which 
was originally a site of enjoyment), and the finished, perfection of the mirror image, to 
which the subject aspires, but from which they are inevitably alienated. This does not 
mean that that the confused sense of self, the ‘body in bits and pieces’, is the real self. 
Rather, the subject’s concept of what self is, as the concept emerges for the first time, is 
inevitably shaped by doubt, confusion and mis-knowledge about their own subjecthood 
(Lacan, 1949, pp.94-81; Evans, 1996, pp.114-6). 
 
The subject’s very basis of existence, henceforth, is marked by the desire to become the 
image in the mirror, the imagined perfect self, rather than the chaotic and confused self 
that they experience themselves to be. But, though the mirror image is an illusion of 
wholeness, it lacks something vital. It lacks objet a. This is the element of the subject’s 
experience of existing which they lose on entry into language, and the element that they 
spend their lives trying, fruitlessly, to regain. The subject feels the loss of objet a 
acutely, feeling obscurely that it was once part of their sense of self, or at least their 
sense of being, and looking, in vain, in the mirror for it. They are convinced it must be 
there, but are never quite able to see it. For objet a is unrepresentable (Zizek, 1991, 
p.55). There is no signifier that stands in for it, and we only know of its existence 
because of the sense of lack that subjectivity brings with it. The subject is compelled to 
spend the rest of their life seeking their lost objet a (Homer, 2005, 87-8). On an 
everyday level this represents itself in sexual and/or love relationships, but it is also 
enacted in obsessive quests, be they for truth, fame, money, possessions or more 
obscure stand-in objects, such as chivalric quests for the Holy Grail or Van Helsing’s 
single-minded pursuit of Count Dracula.
61
 We feel the absence of objet a as a lack, 
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 Vampires, as Zizek points out, are composed entirely of object a, which is why they cannot see 
themselves in the mirror(1991, p. 55). While on the subject of the quest for object a, I would propose 
that the Medusa, the object of Perseus’ quest, has the terrible, fatal gaze of pure object a, but her 
downfall lies in the fact that she can be represented (as the phallic mother), as she can be seen in the 
mirror. Perseus’ capture of her mirror image (which does not contain object a) on his shield gives him 
the power to destroy her. 
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which we try to fill, but all these attempts at doing so are doomed to failure as objet a is 
essentially unobtainable, in a permanent way. 
 
I should mention, at this point that by going on to think about narcissism and the mirror 
stage in relation to academic homepages and blogs I’m not seeing these sites as 
presentations of pathological psychology, merely as articulations of everyday 
subjectivity. It’s important to make this clear as, blogging has, at least in the past, as 
commentators have observed, been criticised as a narcissistic practice (see, for example, 
Benton, 2006; Boklage, 2013; Walker Rettberg 2014b p. 17; Lovink, 2008, loc.1272), in 
the vernacular sense of the word, and that is not what I am intending here.  
 
4.6 Homepages as mirrors 
The creator of a homepage, when they use the mirror of the computer screen to stage the 
representation of their image, can create the perfect self. And, unlike Narcissus, the 
creator of a blog can also watch how others react to their screen self, as they watch 
comments being posted.  
 
But this image is inevitably selective. When the subject selects the aspects of 
themselves to include in their blog, they are aware, like Tara Brabazon, that this is a 
self-marketing tool, and that there are discursive conventions to which they must 
adhere. No one wrote entries in their blogs, at the point I performed these close 
readings, about their techniques for managing email overload or their strategies for 
dealing with difficult colleagues or students. Few people even mentioned marking. The 
everyday and the mundane are excluded from these homepages because discursive 
practice about online academic autobiography demanded that it is an idealised version 
of self that the subject is creating in their mirror. In a sense, having a homepage, at this 
point in history was also an enactment of being the kind of person who had a homepage 
- and who was therefore at the forefront of this use of the technologies for sharing ideas. 
 
What homepages conventionally highlight are research work and interests, and 
sometimes the more stimulating aspects of teaching. Ideas, reviews of conferences one 
has been to, reading lists, book reviews, links to interesting and relevant external pages 
are all marshalled to do the work of representing the self. What’s constructed is the 
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digital embodiment of an abstract concept of what academic life is all about, that is to 
say, finding out about ideas and theories, developing one’s own, and then sharing them 
and engaging in debate. This is, for most 21
st
-century UK academics, an extremely 
attractive, but nostalgic, idealisation of the role. 
 
This could mean that all academic homepages are glossy exercises in bland self-
marketing. But many homepages tell much more interesting stories than this. In fact, 
what they are, in a way, is the creator’s story about themselves, written within, against 
and around the constraints and the conventions of the medium and the milieu in which 
they are situated, that is to say the technocultural university, which is situated 
everywhere. 
 
In the example of Gary Hall’s homepage (Fig. 2) which I looked at earlier, it provides 
basic information about his employment role, his research interests and his publications 
and graphics of his book covers. This fits the conventions. What doesn’t fit the 
conventions, and the unexpected bright purple and orange design prepares us for this, is 
the text link that says ‘Most of Gary’s work is freely available in the OA archive and 
Csearch’ and takes the reader to these open-access repositories. This does two things. 
Firstly, it is a defiant undercutting of convention about publication and copyright issues 
and so subverts the norms of traditional academic publishing by making his work easily 
available to a reader of his homepage. Secondly, it is a staged performance of Gary’s 
open access philosophy, which stresses the political importance of making knowledge 
freely available as part of a digital gift economy (see Hall, 2008; 2012). By putting in 
the link he performs this countercultural belief. There is more than a hint of objet a 
about this linking – although, objet a is always a click, a link, another click away … 
 
In general, most academic blogs contain little information about the subject’s life 
outside their professional context. My next example of undercutting the norm is one 
which deviates from this. Richard Shipman is a Teaching Fellow in the School of 
Computer Science at Aberystwyth University and has an extensive personal academic 
site called Wolf’s Spoor, which contains a blog. 
 
Richard Shipman’s site is accessible from his standard staff profile page (Fig. 5). 
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http://www.aber.ac.uk/en/cs/staff-list/staff_profiles/?login=rcs 
Fig. 5 Richard Shipman’s personal homepage 
 
Clicking on the ‘Homepage > Personal’ option on this page takes me to the page 
allocated to academic staff in his institution, hosted on the Aberystwyth servers as 
shown below (Fig.6).  
 
http://users.aber.ac.uk/rcs/ 
Fig. 6 Richard Shipman’s personal website redirection page 
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Clicking on ‘Official contact details Here’ takes me back to Richard’s ‘official’ staff 
profile page; clicking on ‘The real website is Here’ takes me to his Wolf’s Spoor site. 
This I read as saying that the ‘me’ that the institutional site produces is inauthentic. 
There is a more authentic digital version of ‘me’ – and here it is. At this point I don’t 
know why the institutional ‘me’ is inauthentic. I have one clue, and that is that the 
‘inauthentic me’ is described as official. So I look to the Wolf’s Spoor site (Fig. 7) for 
further clues. 
 
The first clue I have is the fact that the site is hosted on the university servers, but not as 
part of the university site, which speaks to me of this created self as possessing a 
slightly maverick flavour. This perspective is further substantiated by the fact that 
different technologies are used in its construction than those used for the main 
university site. It is confirmed by the disclaimer on the blog sidebar that:  
 
opinions expressed here are my own delusions; my employers at best 
shake their heads and sigh, at worst repudiate the content with extreme 
prejudice, whenever it manages to appear on their radar.
62
  
 
 
http://pcbo.dcs.aber.ac.uk/blog/ 
Fig. 7 Richard Shipman’s Woolf’s Spoor site 
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 http://pcbo.dcs.aber.ac.uk/blog/ 
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The site contains a great deal of knowledgeable, humorous and engaging information 
about technical computing matters and related concerns, such as open source 
discussions, which are directly work focused. There are links to a range of relevant, 
sometimes ironic, computer science-related sites and blogs. The tone is often playful, 
but the subject matter is in keeping with Richard’s area of work. Additionally, there are 
also other, non-work, sets of interests explored. Technological ones, in the shape of 
telephones, signalling and trains; and cultural ones, in the shape of movies, photography 
and role-play gaming. As shown in Fig. 8 there are photographs on the site of this role-
play activity, which involves medieval dress, ‘swordsmanship, archery and other 
nuttery’63. 
 
So what Richard’s homesite creates is an image that is non-conforming, both in terms of 
views and technology choices, to the overarching management culture of the university. 
It resists both technological governmentality, officialdom and codified expectations 
about presenting the self. It is enthusiastically maverick in its presentation of a self who 
won’t be constrained by institutional control. 
 
 
http://richard.shipman.me.uk/gallery/album187/WhiteWolf 
Fig. 8 Accessed from Richard Shipman’s Woolf’s Spoor site – Summerfest photo 
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 http://pcbo.dcs.aber.ac.uk/blog/ 
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One way of thinking about what this means is to see the orthodox discourse of academic 
blogging, that is to say, the inclusion of specific information in a specific register and 
the exclusion of other information, as interpolating the subject, in an ideological sense. 
What the Richard is doing when he refuses to align with this (‘click here for the real 
me’) is creating a discursive resistance to this interpolation, and thus subverting 
ideology’s attempt to write him in the prescribed way, by re-inscribing himself on the 
digital in ways that are disallowed both in terms of technology and narrative. ‘Click 
here for the real me’ is a thus a performative utterance which resists interpellation, in 
Butler’s sense (Butler, 1997 pp.34-9). This ties into Butler’s ideas of legitimate and 
illegitimate subjects (see 1990, pp. 58-89), in that what is being resisted is the making 
of a self through a performance that is only an ‘academic’, discursively legitimate, self 
by inscribing an ‘illegitimate’ self – the real me. 64 
 
Stanley Kubrick’s film Spartacus contains a well-known scene where a Roman general 
tell the slaves, captured in the revolt headed by Spartacus, that if they identify Spartacus 
their own lives will be saved. As Spartacus stands up to give himself up, two other men 
stand up and say ‘I am Spartacus’, followed by countless others, until all the slaves are 
standing. This famous utterance constitutes an interpolative resistance because it 
muddies the water about Spartacus-as-subject and resists compliance with the 
enforcement of the (Roman slave-owners’) law. ‘Click here for the real me’ similarly 
elides the ability of authority to position the subject in the place where he appears to be. 
It differs from the Spartacus utterance in that Richard is pointing clearly to who and 
where he is, even if this isn’t who or where he ‘should’ be.  
 
There is another kind of performance that takes place on homepages, as it does in 
everyday embodied life, and that is the performance of gender. What I mean by this is 
that what we understand as gender is the result of repetitive gender acts where 
‘the tacit collective agreement to perform, produce, and sustain discrete and polar 
genders as cultural fictions is obscured by the credibility of those productions’ (Butler, 
1990, p.190). 
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 The irony of this, of course, is that it’s precisely this kind of ‘letting in’ of personality and ‘rounding 
out’ of subjectivity, characterised in later blog culture, that is, ultimately, desirable for an academic 
worker within cognitive capitalism. 
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On Richard’s website this performance is complex. Articulating an interest in trains, 
signalling and the more ‘purist’ aspects of computer science is an enaction of a hyper-
masculine identity which valorises machinic culture. However, the visual references to 
participation in the acting out of medieval battles both performs an extreme form of 
martial masculinity and simultaneously undercuts it by pointing explicitly to its 
theatrical status as ‘role-play’. Moreover, instances such as a link out from the site to a 
YouTube video of Richard performing the Rocky Horror Picture Show song ‘The Time 
Warp’65 complicate the issue of gender performance. The Rocky Horror Picture Show 
(1975) enjoys an enduring queer cult status and the gender de-stabilising of its drag 
performances has not gone unnoticed by queer studies scholars over the years (see for 
example Lamm, 2008; Aviram, 1992). Butler uses the idea of drag extensively in her 
work, proposing that ‘drag is an example that is meant to establish that “reality” is not 
as fixed as we generally assume it to be (1990, loc. 342). So Richard’s (song and dance) 
performance of ‘The Time Warp’ again serves to de-stabilise any easy categorisation of 
the self he enacts on his site. Thus, in these intertwining of disparate performances of 
gender, Richard both establishes an identity within the traditional masculinist cultures 
of computing and undercuts it in ways that are playful and humorous. 
 
The cluster of interests shown in Richard’s site do have a specific meaning in the 
cultural milieu of computer science, in that an interest in open source software and 
enthusiasm for live medieval role-play games form part of a particular flavour of hacker 
subculture. The Uncanny is technology’s repressed other side, its phantom double, and 
Richard’s site enthusiastically articulates that (Dolar, 1991, p.7). But as well as this 
enthusiasm for a slightly out-of-the-ordinary part of techie culture it also, in its eccentric 
approach, articulates allegiance to another constituency; it speaks about the traditional 
image of the eccentric academic fascinated by ideas and impatient of troublesome 
officialdom. Perhaps, in the bureaucratised fabric of the neoliberal university, the only 
space in which it is acceptable to perform this image digitally is outside the main 
university website. The ‘real site’ the ‘real me’, can only exist outside the borders.  
 
My next example of an academic homepage is also from the discipline of Computing. 
Pete Lee is a Professor of Computing at Newcastle and at the time of my survey was 
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 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q_oipdzzsaw 
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also Head of the School of Computing. Pete’s page (Fig. 9) contains general 
information about his work area and interests, linking to his own and other pages with 
enormously detailed, comprehensive and erudite accounts about one of his specialist 
areas, parallelism (Fig. 10).  
 
 
http://homepages.cs.ncl.ac.uk/p.a.lee/  
Fig. 9 Pete Lee’s personal homepage 
 
This information is presented in a matter-of-fact, rather modest way, without the 
slightest hint of marketing spin; as it mainly centres on Pete’s research interests, it 
produces an overall effect is of someone who wants to share the knowledge rather than 
promote themselves.  
 
Under a heading ‘Other Stuff’, Pete’s non-work interests are mentioned; these include 
growing vegetables, hill walking and flying radio-controlled model helicopters. He also 
posts several photos of his office (for example, Fig. 11), which show a room that looks 
like a very typical academic office and which for me produced a slight shock of the 
familiar; I’ve seen that office so many times before in so many different universities.  
 
104  
 
 
 
http://www.parallelism.cs.ncl.ac.uk/ 
Fig. 10 Pete Lee’s personal homepage – research interests diagram 
 
 
http://homepages.cs.ncl.ac.uk/p.a.lee/home.informal/MyOffice2005/CIMG0131.JPG 
Fig. 11 Pete Lee’s personal homepage – office photo  
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These elements, which seem slightly surprising within the context and causing slight 
disjuncture, seem to enact a desire to speak the everyday self which is invisible in the 
standard convention of academic homepages. The details shown on the photo in Fig 11 
become compelling: the pinboard with bits of paper stuck on it for reference, reminders, 
prompts, the holiday postcards displayed on it as they would be on a mantelpiece at 
home, their blue skies, seascapes and the way they are displayed speaking about valued 
human connection; the three pot plants; the piles of papers and books; the open 
spectacle case; and the whiteboard with ideas scrawled on it, a memory of discussion. 
They are a story about the everyday, about activities which are discursively disallowed 
in such sites. Meetings, administration, informal discussions. The institutional, 
impersonal carpet and curtains, desk, chairs and window blinds that frame the 
photograph serve to underline the absence that the photograph is about. Embodiment. 
An embodied human being wrote the notes on the board, was sent postcards by 
colleagues, valued them sufficiently to pin them on the wall, took the glasses from the 
case, is wearing them. Watered the plants. In the reflection on the whiteboard you can 
just about make out the outline of the person taking the photograph. The shadow 
academic. 
 
The ‘Other Stuff’ is important in the way it reinstates the facticity of embodied lived 
experience and the everyday within the digital Symbolic. It makes links with ideas of 
the natural – growing vegetables, hill walking. This is all the more interesting given that 
most of the site is devoted to the computational.  
 
Hyland, in his 2011 study of academic homepages suggests that such approaches are a 
way that ‘individuals … positioned by corporate discourses …manage to carve a sense 
of self’(2011, p.286). I contend that it is a way of resisting the corporate university and 
re-inscribing a more authentic sense of an academic self. Evgeniya Boklage, in writing 
about the importance of personal blogs sees them as an exercise in a civic and personal 
necessity, the Foucauldian ‘care of the self’, ‘which emphasizes the self-expression 
values but which also has a liberalizing effect on society at large’(Boklage, 2013, para. 
3). Much of what I have observed and analysed above suggests that these sites, by 
expressing selfhood, by resisting, also perform this civic role. 
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4.7 Armour for my phantoms 
By creating a homepage, the subject is inscribing a story about themselves upon the 
realm of the Symbolic, the domain of language. But a homepage is also an articulation 
of the imagined relationship between the subject-as-they-feel-themselves-to-be and the 
mirror image, the subject-as-represented-in-language, the ‘I’. So a personal homepage is 
a site of the Imaginary, a public acting out of the subject’s imagined relationship to 
themselves. It is a performance of meconnaissance, within and upon the looking glass 
stage.  
 
Lacan’s concept of the fragmented body, the ‘body in bits and pieces’ as felt by the 
infant subject, contrasting with the finished and polished mirror image, clad in the 
‘armour of an alienating identity’ (Lacan, 1949, p.78) offers a way in which to think 
about the personal homepage as a site of the Imaginary. Lacan sees the ‘I’ formation as 
being like a heavily armoured, fortified camp. And he views the relationship between 
the felt self, the fragmented body, and the finished, self-possessed statue in the mirror, 
as an imaginary one. In this imaginary relationship, the subject projects onto the statue 
the ‘phantoms that dominate’ them (Lacan, 1949, p.76-7). 
 
The image in the mirror is a mirage of wholeness. The subject’s projection onto that 
creates phantasms of the self, half-known and partially realised, what Lacan calls ‘the 
veiled faces of the imagos’ (Lacan, 1949, p.77). These return to us in dreams and 
hallucinations and become codified in the concept of the doppelganger, the troubling 
double. Thus a homepage may be, quite literally, heimlich, at the same time it is always 
unheimlich, because it is always the unsettling gaze of the double which meets the 
subject’s own gaze, when they look at it. 
 
Kittler sees Lacan’s Symbolic as the realm of codes and ciphers, which can be 
represented in the language of the computational machine; he contends that film 
occupies the realm of the Lacanian Imaginary, as it provides a place onto which we can 
project our mirror stage illusions (Kittler, 1986, p.15). Applying Kittler’s ideas to the 
concept of a homepage, I propose that it has a role in both the Symbolic and Imaginary 
orders, being composed, as it is, of language and code, fantasy and fiction. 
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Therefore, the subjectivity which is constituted by the blogs and homepages operates in 
a two-fold manner. It is the ‘armour’ of identity, in that it is a construction of a 
(fictionalised) mirror image within the linguistic and computational realm of the 
Symbolic. But it is also an articulation of the alienated subject’s ‘phantoms’ and an 
acting out of the Imaginary relationship between the two; it is the uneasy armouring of 
our phantoms.  
 
To illustrate this I return to my earlier example of Richard Shipman’s site. One of the 
things he is knowingly storying in the site narrative is both the donning of the cultural 
armour of a computer scientist and the expression of his more – quite literally – 
‘phantom-like’ uncanny, sub-cultural concerns with fantasy and gaming. Because there 
is cultural ‘fit’ here, as well as cultural dissonance, he speaks not only about an 
Imaginary relationship to the rationalist imago he has created, but also about 
technology’s relationship with the Uncanny.  
 
Another way that this is articulated is in the example of Steve Wheeler’s blog and 
personal pages, Learning with ‘e’s. Steve Wheeler is an Associate Professor for 
Learning Technology at Plymouth University, and his blog provides lots of information 
and links about his subject area. He provides the standard information about himself and 
his publications, including membership of journal editorial boards, his membership and 
chairing of various committees. He also includes in his narrative a photograph of his 
wife and children and some information about his family’s membership of a local 
Christian fellowship (Fig. 12). 
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http://steve-wheeler.blogspot.co.uk/ 
Fig 12 Steve Wheeler’s Learning with ‘e’s site 
 
 
So there is a narrative, here, that Steve has created, which speaks about the responsible 
citizenship aspect of being an academic (committee and editorial board membership) 
and about a conformity to dominant conservative notions of masculinity, where he 
presents himself as a heterosexual, Christian, family man. There is, however another 
narrative of self which weaves through this. The double pun in the title of the blog is the 
first clue to this. Learning with ‘e’s means ‘learning with electronics’ and ‘learning with 
ease’ both of which fit the respectable, responsible citizen narrative. But it also, refers to 
the recreational drug ecstasy, or ‘e’, and so means ‘learning with ecstasy’, a reference 
that’s unlikely to be lost on students. In line with this more edgy alternative narrative, 
Steve links to blogs such as edupunk and techno warrior, and lists Bladerunner and 
Minority Report as favourite films; many of the photographs on Steve’s blog are pure 
cyberpunk (see Fig. 13).  
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http://steve-wheeler.blogspot.co.uk/ 
Fig. 13 Steve Wheeler’s Learning with ‘e’s site – e-learning 3 photo 
 
So Steve sets up two intertwining versions of a self-storying, one clothed in the armour 
of respectability that shields another, phantom-like, self that has echoes of the fictional 
technocultural world of William Gibson or Philip K. Dick and the films they inspire.  
 
In her work on the academic self and the commodification of intellectual activity, 
Ursula Huws asks, in relation to the pressure of the neoliberal workplace: ‘what kind of 
armour plating do we require to survive this repeated battering of our self-esteem?’ 
(Huws, 2006, p.3). My argument is that psychic survival in such circumstances depends 
on the ability of the subject’s Imaginary to create this type of fantasy armour; the 
alternative, as Andrew Sparkes suggests in his work ‘Embodiment, academics and the 
audit culture’, is a form of psychological meltdown (Sparkes, 2007, pp.535-7). 
 
4.8 Exhibitionism and voyeurism 
Considering the homepage as a metaphor for the reflected image in Lacan’s mirror stage 
brings to the fore the concept of the gaze. The narcissistic context of the mirror stage 
hinges around the subject’s gaze, but this is only part of the story. In addition to the 
gaze of the subject and their image, there is also the gaze of the Other; homepages are 
designed to be read and in the case of blogs, commented on, by readers. Consequently, 
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the role of voyeurism and exhibitionism in relation to electronic subjectivity becomes 
important, as gazes are exchanged and meanings forged.  
 
In ‘The Partial Drive and its Circuit’ (1973), Lacan discusses Freud’s Schaulust, that is, 
the drive to see and be seen, or scopic drive. One of the four Freudian objects or 
drives
66, Freud presents the concept of the scopic drive in ‘Three essays on the theory of 
sexuality, where he contends that the sexual desire to see or be seen is encouraged by 
‘the progressive concealment of the body which goes along with civilization’ (Freud, 
1905, p.69). All the drives, which are expressions of libido, close on objects, which act 
as stand-ins for the lost object, objet a. And all drives are destined never to be satisfied, 
as they are ultimately all drives towards what was lost, never to be returned. The 
operation of the scopic object, or gaze, in relation to the Other, is key to understanding 
the role played by voyeurism and exhibitionism in blogs (Lacan, 1973, pp.174-86).  
 
Lacan stresses the point that the activities and positionings of voyeurism and 
exhibitionism is not an either/or, that is to say there is not a direct dyadic relationship 
between the two. That is to say, what the exhibitionist experiences is not the inverse of 
what the voyeur experiences, and vice versa. Rather, they have completely different 
experiences, and can change places, depending on who is in possession of the gaze and 
consequently how objet a rotates between the them on its circuit (Miller, 2007). 
 
What the exhibitionist does, in the exhibitionist act of exposing themselves, is to make 
appear the gaze in the Other. For the Other, the voyeur, the exhibitionist then appears to 
possess objet a, and so be whole. But, of course, objet a is not so easy to obtain. The 
objet a the exhibitionist appears to have is always out of reach, it is slippery and it slips 
away from the gaze of the voyeur. The voyeur is entranced by the lure of the gaze, but 
what the voyeur sees is what they want to see. They see the ‘shadow behind a curtain’ 
(Lacan 1973, p.182), and project onto it, with the arrow of their gaze, an objet a-ness 
that it does not quite possess, that is not quite visible to them, but which they feel 
somehow must be there. And so, in the gaze, the voyeur does not actually obtain 
enjoyment or jouissance
67
. It is a seductive lure, but is unsatisfying. At the same time it 
                                                          
66
 The other three objects are the voice or vocal object, the anal object and the oral object. 
67
 The French term ‘jouissance’ means ‘enjoyment’ but it also has a sexual dimension to it, implying 
orgasm, so is usually left untranslated as there is no exact English equivalent. Jouissance transcends the 
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carries within it the promise of a satisfaction that is never, somehow, realised. This 
leaves the voyeur in a position where they would say to the exhibitionist, like Lacan, in 
his example of the lover looking at the beloved ‘what I look at is never what I wish to 
see’ (1973, p.103). 
 
Ewins, writing about the role of blogs in academic identity, gives an example of the 
enacting of this drama when he discusses how academic bloggers are sometimes 
contacted by readers, who complain that they are not what they wish them to be: ‘It’s as 
if readers make up their minds about an author’s identity and are annoyed to see it shift 
before their eyes’ (Ewins, 2005, p.374). 
 
The voyeur can only obtain jouissance by being discovered in their voyeuristic act of 
watching. The shame of being surprised in the act and the pleasure of the moment of 
discovery are simultaneous. And when the voyeur is discovered, they in turn become 
the object of the gaze, so they move into the place of the exhibitionist, in the way that 
Sartre’s Peeping Tom, surprised at the keyhole, suddenly becomes aware of himself as 
object of the gaze of the other. Thus objet a moves around its circuit, and by being 
discovered in this act of voyeurism the voyeur makes the gaze appear in the other, that 
is to say, they make the other into the voyeur. The exhibitionist’s enjoyment, and their 
secret desire, is for the voyeur to exhibit themselves (Nathenson, 1981). The 
exhibitionist’s access to jouissance occurs, then, when the voyeur is discovered, and so 
become the object of the gaze – either that of the former exhibitionist or of a third 
person. 
 
In blogging and personal websites, the exhibitionist drive to exhibit oneself to the world 
is quite explicit; to a great extent, we publish homepages in order to be seen. Blogging 
also means that readers of the blog can post comments; thus the reader, or voyeur, can 
change place with the exhibitionist, as the blog author reads the comment and publicly 
answers it. In blogging, then, the ability for objet a to make its circuit so that the places 
of voyeur and exhibitionist can change, is made explicit, as blogging, quite literally, 
invites a response from the Other, by virtue of the comment facility.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
boundary of pleasure to, paradoxically, include suffering. This is the suffering the subject (in the case 
above, the voyeur) obtains from their satisfaction (Evans, 1996, pp.91-2). 
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Barbara Freedman makes the point that the way in which cinema has negotiated the 
operation of the gaze is by having a convention by which actors in a film pretend not to 
know that the film is, or they are, being watched by an audience (Freedman, 1991, pp.1-
3). So cinema itself occupies this convention of pretending that it is oblivious to the 
gaze of the viewer, when in fact a film’s reason for existing is to be gazed at by the 
viewer. It is possible to draw some parallels here between Freedman’s observation 
about cinema and what happens in the practice of blogging. A blog is simultaneously a 
diary, with a sense of immense privacy and self-revelation that this implies, but it is also 
an exercise in exhibitionism.
68
 Unlike cinema, however, the potential for 
exhibitionist/voyeurist dramas to be played out within it is at the very heart of what it 
actually is. The enabling of performance and display, as well as covert or overt viewing 
is openly built into the functionality of the software and the raison d’etre of the blog. 
 
Laura Mulvey, in her seminal Lacanian analysis on the pleasures of the scopic drive in 
cinema sees the viewing positions as fixed by the symbolic order; a male gendered 
viewpoint, as ‘bearer of the look’ (1975, p.11) voyeuristically desiring the objectified 
female in the film, while the feminine viewer can only aspire to identify with the 
eroticised female object of the gaze. Mulvey provoked significant discussion on the 
gender plasticity and queering of the gaze, but bringing her perspective to blogs again 
points up the difference between the pleasure of cinema and technoculture. In blogging, 
subjects are inevitably voyeurs and exhibitionists, obtaining a jouissance that Andre 
Nusselder, in his 2009 account of internet psychology specifies as always ‘a 
pathological enjoyment’(loc. 1856) rooted in the need to constantly repeat (the posting, 
the response, the update) created by the instability of the Symbolic order, a concept I’ll 
discuss in some detail in the next chapter.  
 
Of course, many voyeurs of a blog choose to ‘lurk’69 in the position of voyeur  
                                                          
68
 This collision of the intensely private with the supremely public is what can make blog voyeurism so 
powerful and compelling, as Victor Burgin (2000) explores in his analysis of Jennifer Ringley’s famous 
streamed videoblog, JenniCam.  
69
 It is significant that lurking, which used to be a pejorative term for those who entered an area in IRC 
chatrooms but only read, rather than wrote, contributions, is now a completely acceptable activity on 
interactive websites, such as blogs. They are called readers, rather than lurkers, and their role is 
measured in hits and widely appreciated. Web culture now accepts that there can be no exhibitionist 
role without the role of voyeur. 
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and, in a sense, many academic blogs are actually about voyeurism. It is common for 
academic bloggers to post reviews of books and conference presentations, which are, 
effectively, narratives about voyeurism. My next example, Grainne Conole’s 
e4innovation blog, has many detailed and authoritative accounts of books and 
conferences. Grainne is Professor of e-learning in the Institute of Educational 
Technology at the Open University. As shown in Fig. 14 Grainne’s blog gives an 
account of all the keynote speeches at the 2008 Ascilite
70
 conference in Melbourne, 
including links out to books, papers, software, reports and projects, and photos of the 
presenters. This kind of detailed conference account is both a voyeuristic account and an 
invitation to watch others, but there is also exhibitionism in the performance of the 
invitation.  
 
The performance speaks about breadth and depth of knowledge in the area, as Grainne 
performs the ability to précis the expert input, comment on it, and suggest links to 
related information. So this approach, which is a widely used one on academic blogs, 
performs expertise and authority, and invites the viewer to watch with the subject – 
whose embodied self is having the experience of watching, listening, speaking and 
being watched at the conference – in a ‘Watch with Mother’ fashion, as well as 
watching the subject and their mastery of the field. 
 
When speaking of homepages, Sherry Turkle says that ‘one’s identity emerges from 
whom one knows, one’s associations and connections’(1995, p.258). This is even truer 
for blogs as they permit the performance not only of expertise, but also of a networked 
connectedness with the rest of the academic community and other relevant groups and 
individuals. So, for example, Fig. 15 shows the page of Grainne’s blog which describes 
going to the headquarters of the educational software organisation Moodle to meet with 
their Director, Martin Dougiamas, and this is illustrated by a photograph of the two of 
them standing under the company banner.  
 
                                                          
70
 Australian Society for Computers in Learning in Tertiary Education, one of the oldest and most 
established international educational technology societies. 
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http://e4innovation.com/ 
Fig. 14 Grainne Conole’s e4innovation site 
 
 
 
http://e4innovation.com/ 
Fig. 15 Grainne Conole’s e4innovation site – moodle photo 
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A blogger always knows or imagines that they are being watched. But they don’t know 
by whom until the voyeur reveals themselves by posting a response on the blog. This is 
at once a very intimate and yet enormously distant act. 
 
When the voyeur reveals themselves, by a posting, they are discovered and change 
places by becoming the exhibitionist. But, ironically, the only way that the voyeur can 
know they are discovered is for the exhibitionist to read their contribution and 
acknowledge or comment on it – by which act they go round the full circuit and become 
the exhibitionist once more. So for the voyeur, jouissance exists only in the nanosecond 
where they see, by the existence of the comment on their posting, that they are 
discovered, or by their imagining of the exhibitionist’s experience of discovering 
themselves being watched by the voyeur. The voyeur always returns, by the very act of 
knowing their discovery, to the position of becoming once more the voyeur, and so 
returns to their original place in the drama.  
 
An example of this is in Ruth Page’s Digital Narratives Blog. Ruth is a Senior Lecturer 
in English at Birmingham City University and uses her blog to discuss research ideas.  
Ruth posts a long piece (Fig. 16) which follows on from her other ideas about digital 
narratives and Facebook and about whether Facebook updates can be considered to be a 
kind of episodic story. As shown in the next screen image a reader using the name 
‘Damon Lord’ takes the stage by commenting that Ruth should consider using Twitter 
instead of Facebook for her research. The point is largely irrelevant to Ruth’s carefully 
laid out ideas, which leads me to assume that the reader here is motivated by the drive 
to be seen, to become the exhibitionist. Ruth quickly takes back the exhibitionist role by 
a post which politely explains that this isn’t what she has set out to do at all and the 
voyeur returns to the position of watching. What changes, now, is that the exhibitionist 
always knows that they are being watched, and the voyeur, having drawn attention once 
to their presence at the keyhole, knows that the exhibitionist will always know they are 
there. Their one exhibitionist act leaves a permanent imprint on their relationship to the 
exhibitionist, and they are now, forever, always part exhibitionist themselves, by dint of 
being a visible voyeur. Which is why postings make us anxious – and why we 
obsessively use them. 
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http://digitalnarratives.blogspot.com 
Fig. 16 Ruth Page’s Digital Narratives site 
 
 
The voyeur can become an actor in the drama, and can have an effect on the narrative, 
much like the Stasi surveillance captain, Weisler, in Von Donnersmarck’s film The 
Lives of Others (2006), where the intervention of the professional voyeur in the dramas 
of the exhibitionist artists changes a course of events. Only a voyeur can do this because 
only a voyeur has the information borne of a close reading of the situation. So a 
comment can change what the blogger’s next post is about, as happens frequently in 
blogs. 
 
The lure of a blog for the voyeur is that they will see objet a. But of course they never 
do. It’s always another link, another mouseclick away, but somehow it slips away from 
them. Voyeurs of blogs can spend hours click through links, driven to search for the 
next, or the next link which will deliver their desire. 
 
The entire exhibitionist/voyeur scenario within blogs only becomes charged when there 
is a sense of presence. When one looks at a blog where the last entry was eight months 
ago and the most recent response was four months ago, it seems stale and flat because it 
117  
 
 
is not current – and maybe nobody is watching. Derrida says of the metaphysical desire 
for presence, for immediacy, that it is inevitably structured as a kind of misapprehension 
or snare (Derrida, 1967, p.142-3). It is always doomed to failure. ‘This desire carries in 
itself the destiny of non-satisfaction’ (Derrida, 1967, p.143). But readers of a blog 
which appears to have a sense of presence will still continue to chase this desire for 
presence, just as they continue to pursue objet a. The sense of almost having presence 
when engaging with a blog is similar to that of almost having objet a. The voyeur 
continues to feel that they may get both, even if they know, rationally, that this is not 
possible, and that feeling leads them to continue to pursue their relentless quest. 
 
4.9 Death and aggressive disintegration 
Viewed within the Lacanian dynamics that I am using, inevitably, the mirror image of a 
personal page is threatening to the subject who has created it. It challenges the subject 
because of the contrast between the wholeness of the image and the sense of 
fragmentation and disunity that the subject experiences in themselves. This threatens the 
subject with a sense of disintegration; in contrast with the perfect image in the 
homepage/mirror, their sense of fragmentation and lack of control becomes more 
marked. The sites honed perfection mocks their chaotic incompleteness.  
 
This leads to the subject’s aggressive desire to smash the mirror and destroy the double. 
Ewins writes about the strong desire to tear down the blog and the destroy the archive:  
So they go on hiatus or holiday, redesign their site, tear down their archive 
and start afresh, or simply stop. I’ve seen bloggers do all these things. Apart 
from tearing down my archives and stopping altogether, I’ve done all these 
things. 
(Ewins, 2005, p.374)  
 
Thus the desire to destroy the digital double may sometimes be acted upon. But this is 
not without dangers. As in the Buribunkian world, for a 21
st
-century academic subject to 
have no electronic presence is tantamount to being invisible, inaudible – and, in fact, 
ceasing to exist. 
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Paradoxically, creating a blog, is, in a literal sense, an electronic archive of the self. This 
archiving of the self is both an admission of mortality and an attempt to overcome 
death. In this way it differs from the ‘official’ institutional homepage, a double created 
by the university which lacks the authentic ‘backing’ of the embodied subject. In this 
type of page there was nobody ‘at home’ in the first place, so nobody to not be at home 
in the event of the subject’s death. To put it another way, the institutional page never 
lived; it’s a natural born zombie. 
 
The electronic self, the self that is constituted by digital inscription, is and is not the 
subject. But it cannot die, or, at least not easily. The subject can die, in the sense of the 
embodied self expiring, but the digital double lives on. Because digital texts are subject 
to archiving in their very creation, in a way that is completely outside the control of 
their original author, they become immortal (or at least as immortal as digital fragility 
permits). This archiving forces the subject to live forever, making impossible, or barely 
possible, the option of death. As Kittler points out ‘in our mediascape, immortals have 
come to exist’ (1986, p.13).  
 
But the immortal, revenant self, is and is not the subject; it is a self constituted entirely 
by a specific arena of digital discourse, a self simultaneously outside the control of the 
subject, but eerily and intimately their digital spectre. The existence of the archived 
electronic self, in itself, is a reminder of death, even as its creation, the creation of an 
immortal self, is an attempt to cheat death. 
 
Ewins talks about academic blogging as a way of watching your own death, because of 
the ‘post-self environment’ (p374) in which bloggers immerse themselves. He 
concludes that: 
The promise of blogging for academics is great ... but it brings with it the risk of 
the ‘ever present death’, an awareness of the fleeting and fickle nature of the self, 
which can undermine the very attempt to establish one’s own academic self 
online, or even off.  
(Ewins, 2005, p.375). 
 
Perhaps the experience of watching one’s own homesite has a resonance of grasping of 
this ultimate horror. There are echoes here of the experience of the victims of the 
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Peeping Tom, in Michael Powell’s eponymous movie (1960), who, as they are dying, 
are forced to watch their own reflections in a mirror. Like them, the subject’s watching 
of their own electronic mirror is akin to watching their own death. 
 
***** 
 
In acting as a surveiller of individual’s blogs and a commentator on these blogs, I am 
conscious that my analysis and commentary in itself constitutes a performative act, and 
that whilst critiquing the archives of my subjects I am attempting to take the stately 
position of the archon, creating my own archive in this electronic document.  
 
Perhaps I am also acting like a facilitator in the Buribunkian society, by reading and 
considering, and then engaging theoretically with the blogs of others, and producing a 
chapter on them. I am also the secret (or not so secret now that I’ve written this and 
fessed up to it) voyeur of all the academic home sites mentioned, as well as the voyeur 
of the many other homepages that I read and did not include (and being read and 
rejected is a much worse fate than being voyeuristically exhibited). I am also occupying 
the role of exhibitionist in speaking of my voyeurism. 
 
Poster speaks about the need to find a ‘happier inscription of identity’ (2007, p.138) in 
the way in which the internet re-negotiates the relationship of human bodies to their 
subjectivity. But perhaps the pursuit of this is in itself impossible, if impossible not to 
pursue. As I have tried to demonstrate, academic homepages, whilst appearing to offer a 
straightforward means of inscribing oneself on the digital universe, actually bring the 
subject into an arena of a variety of ways of expressing the neuroses of self-love, self-
misrecognition, self-dramatisation, self-doubt, and, ultimately, self-destruction. Perhaps, 
then, our home sites are an inevitable part of the discourse of the hysteric and are 
ultimately, themselves a quest for an understanding of self. Or, as Lacan puts it: ‘what I 
seek in speech is a response from the Other. What constitutes me as a subject is my 
question’ (1966, p.247). 
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5 Chapter 5 – I beset me: doubles, ghosts and other troubling 
electronic selves 
 
Without any intention of mine I had been defined by the action reflected in the 
mirror. I beset me. I was the subject of the sentence written on the mirror.  
(Angela Carter, Flesh and the Mirror, 1974, p.70). 
 
5.1 Preface 
The search for and selection of sites for this chapter was performed in 2010, which is 
when the chapter was first drafted. It is a product of this historical moment in the sense 
that a Google search on my own name would produce different doubles now, in late 
2014, but not in the sense that institutional and corporate personal pages are now very 
different in their makeup. This is an interesting contrast to the rapid cultural change, 
over almost the same period, in academics’ own representations of self in personal 
blogs, which I mentioned in the previous chapter. 
 
5.2 Approach 
Hysterics, Freud and Breuer tells us, suffer mainly from reminiscences (Breuer and 
Freud,1993, p.58). In this chapter I will consider how the academic subject suffers from 
the reminiscences of others. This manifests in varied, multiple, digital versions of the 
subject; ghostly tales of their life which proliferate in the countless databanks feeding 
the Internet.  
 
Whereas the last chapter considered the online ‘self’ that the subject creates in their blog 
or personal homepage as a performance and staging of mediated subjectivity, this 
chapter addresses digital representations of the subject created by individuals and 
agencies external to them. Although these narratives are about the subject, they are not 
under the subject’s direct control; indeed, the subject may not actually know such 
versions of themselves exist. Freud’s concept of the double offers a fruitful way of 
considering how these unasked-for electronic selves contribute to the negotiation of 
academic subjectivity (as well adding to the sum of what the academic has to negotiate 
in the constitution of their subjectivity) and as I will be using this idea extensively, I 
begin by a discussion of the meaning of double. I then go on to consider theoretical 
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approaches to the way in which technoculture materialises the academic subject’s 
double, and how the operations of ideology play a role in this, before examining the 
doubles uncovered by a Google search on my own name, in the light of these ideas. 
Next I look at the university profile page of one of the academics whose homepage I 
analysed in the last chapter, and consider how readings of the two sites can inform each 
other. Finally, I move away from specific examples of doubles to consider the way in 
which university audit culture plays a role in the production of doubles. 
 
The academic double may be created by a range of individuals, groups or organisations: 
by the subject’s employing university, past and present; by groups or projects with 
which the subject has been involved; by students; by other individuals associated with 
the subject’s place of work; by commercial organisations and by state agencies. In 
general I will be looking at the professional representations of the subject in their work 
role, although, as I will show, the breakdown of the public/private divide produced by 
mediated technoculture means that professional life is no longer easily sealed off from 
the personal realm (as we have already seen in the discussion of private home pages in 
the previous chapter). How the price of operating within networked computer culture is 
the abandonment of privacy and how the distinction between work and non-work has 
been elided in a technocultural universe are – and have been over the past five years or 
so – key contemporary issues (Andrejevic, 2007, pp. 6-9; Ross, 2013, p.20). The way in 
which they contribute to an analysis of the university surveillance culture universities is 
something I will explore further in later chapters on embodiment and on academic 
labour. For the present, I confine myself to considering the implications of the 
phenomenon whereby everything we say or do (or are reported as saying or doing) on 
the internet leaves a trace which is stored, replicated, mutated and which can be 
aggregated to form a double.  
 
5.3 The double 
The use of the term ‘double’ or ‘doppelgänger’ originates in Otto Rank’s The Double: a 
Psychoanalytic Study (1914), which Freud helped edit and which he draws on in The 
Uncanny (1919). The double is a radically unheimlich device in literature or film and is 
produced when an individual appears who looks and sounds identical to the subject. 
Sometimes they even have the same name. Rank sees the double as being associated 
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with shadows, portraits and particularly mirrors, as in Guy de Maupassant’s tale of The 
Horla (Rank, 1914, pp.20-2). He also considers its relationship with ghosts, with 
guardian spirits and demons (ibid., p.51-2), and highlights the ambivalent nature of the 
double (ibid., p.54). Freud builds on this, viewing this ‘doubling, dividing and 
interchanging of the self,’ as a way in which the ego denies death, but which, 
conversely, also reminds the subject of their own mortality (Freud,1919, p.356). So the 
double exercises an eerie appeal for the subject, but its appearance inevitably causes 
them great anxiety. When the double materialises, things usually begin to go wrong for 
the subject. A cause of both revulsion and fascination for the subject, it acts against 
them, thwarting their desires and misrepresenting them to the world. Understandably, 
the subject traditionally desires to kill the double, as in the famous examples of Edgar 
Allan Poe’s William Wilson (1839) and Oscar Wilde’s Dorian Gray (1891). But by 
killing the double, they inevitably kill themselves, as they are interdependent.
71
  
 
As well as being a manifestation of the ego, Freud also sees the double as having 
qualities of the superego, as its activities can include ‘observing and criticizing the self 
and … exercising a censorship’ (Freud, 1919, p.357). To us, in the 21st century, 
influenced both by the legacy of Freud’s work and the way in which the double has 
been interpreted within culture, particularly in film, the most obvious aspect of Freud’s 
triad that we might associate the double with is the id. Typically, it behaves in ways 
morally repugnant to the subject and relentlessly pursues its own debauched (and the 
subject’s repressed) desires, as one of the most famous doubles, Robert Louis 
Stevenson’s Mr Hyde (1886) and his many filmic counterparts demonstrates.  
 
Mladen Dolar, in a Lacanian reading of the double, mobilises the concept of the Real in 
thinking about what the double means for subjectivity (Dolar, 1997). As I touched on in 
the previous chapter when discussing the mirror stage, for Lacan the Real is the realm 
we inhabit as infants before our entry into language produces us as subjects. Post-
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 There is a – very recent – trend in science fiction where doubles are not killed but allowed to live as 
‘others’ or ‘divergences’. This is usually a fictionalisation of scientific theories of multiple dimensions, as 
in Jasper Fforde’s The Woman Who Died a Lot (2012) or cloning, as in the film Moon (Jones, 2009). 
Although the presence of the double is still eerie and challenging for the subject, the apparent scientific 
explicability of their existence makes them more a representation of threat (of the Other) rather than an 
actual threat in themselves. 
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subjectification, we see the Real as both seductive and terrifying, and simultaneously 
desire and dread to return to it.  
 
Dolar argues that double in the mirror image only manifests on entry into the Symbolic, 
and the price paid for this by the subject is the loss of the Real. So the split, 
misrecognising self knows it is not really the ‘I’ it claims to be because it is cut off from 
jouissance, that is to say it has lost that part of itself Lacan designates as objet a. We 
can never see objet a when we look in the mirror. But what the double represents is the 
mirror image plus objet a. It is a collision of the Real with the Imaginary and this 
creates extreme anxiety for the subject when the doppelgänger appears; the double is 
more self than the self. (Dolar, 1995, pp.12-13). Slavoj Zizek uses Michel Silvestre’s 
naming of the double as Père-Jouissance to consider how it goes beyond a ‘reduction of 
the double to the imaginary mirror relationship’ (Zizek, 1991, p.54-5). He attributes the 
uncanny effect of the double not just to the irruption of the Real manifested by the 
double, but to the subject’s realisation, on being faced with the (unspecularisable) gaze 
of the double, that the Real is present within the subject themselves: ‘the double 
embodies the phantom-like Thing in me’ (Zizek 1991, p.55).  
 
Both Rank and Karl Miller trace the emergence of the double from its proliferation in 
Romantic texts and Miller goes on to associate doubles with orphans, spies and 
detectives in 19
th
-century fiction (Miller, 1985, p.49-51). Kittler, meanwhile, sees the 
double of 19
th
-century Romanticism as a product of literary texts, whereas the double of 
the 20
th
 century he views as a product of mechanisation, in particular, of film. Kittler 
also suggests that in order for the double to appear before the subject ‘the cunning 
strategies by which others produced it must be thoroughly masked’ (Kittler, 1997, p.88). 
Extrapolating Kittler's thinking on older media systems into the present day (that is to 
say, that we are determined by media that have become yet more powerful) I propose 
that while literary and filmic doubles are still very much with us, the double has also 
moved out of a fictional space to colonise the everyday, locating its home in mediated 
technology. Once, only Dorian Gray and Dr Jekyll had doubles; the agency of 
computational capitalism means that now we all have them. My task in this chapter is to 
go some way towards unmasking the ‘cunning strategies’ by which they are produced. 
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5.4 The collapse of the master signifier 
The technocultural double also produces anxiety in the subject because of the way it 
links in with what can be termed a failure of Symbolic efficiency brought about by the 
collapse of the master signifier. A master signifier is one which gives other signifiers 
their meaning; Lacan talks about it as anchoring signification chains as a point de 
capiton, empty in itself, but providing a way for meaning to stabilise. Thus ‘God’ or 
‘the monarchy’ or ‘freedom’ all function as point de capitons in this way (Butler, 2004; 
Bracher, 1994, p.119). Zizek sees late modernism as being marked by a collapse of the 
master signifier: ‘“nobody is in charge” … [because] today’s society is thoroughly 
reflexive … there is no Nature or Tradition providing a firm foundation on which one 
can rely’(Zizek, 1999, p.336). He discusses how the suspension of the master signifier 
within the technocultural symbolic operates and what effect it has. The master signifier 
holds together chains of meaning in the symbolic order; as it collapses, or loses its 
efficiency, so does meaning.  
 
The suspension of the master signifier works in a number of ways. Firstly, the hysteric 
subject (and Zizek argues that the internet produces us as hystericised subjects) is 
always unsure about what they are for the Other, so if we have an even shakier idea of 
what the Other is, because of the collapse of meaning, then we really don’t know what 
we are for the Other. That increased anxiety underlines our position as hysteric. 
Secondly, the failure of the Symbolic means that the Real becomes inaccessible because 
the gaps between the Real and the Symbolic are filled in; paradoxically, at the same 
time irruptions of the Real make its desire (that is to say what we imagine to be the 
desire of the Other) horribly present. One of the ways in which the Real intrudes is in 
the form of the double, the sinister Pére-Jouissance. Thirdly, the relationship of the 
Imaginary to the Symbolic becomes challenged. Because the Symbolic no longer 
adequately produces meaning, the Imaginary appears to be more important than it was, 
and its affective intensity is heightened by the inadequacy of a Symbolic anchor. That is 
to say, because there are not clear and stable meanings produced by language, the realm 
of fantasy takes over and becomes more emotionally charged. Conversely, the 
Imaginary is also grounded in uncertainty, because of the collapse of the Symbolic, and 
this, too, contributes to the production of an hysterical subject, seeking to know what 
they are for the Other , but thrown into spasms of anxiety by the intrusion of the Other’s 
desire, in the form of the double (Zizek, 1997, pp. 193-213).  
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The subject’s digital double is, then, read through this lens, an ‘obscene ethereal 
presence’ that repels and entrances the subject (Zizek, 1997, p.201).72 It both is and is 
not the subject, it is out of the control of the subject yet its features and behaviour 
reflect back on the subject and speak about them to the world.  
5.5 The dividual 
Gilles Deleuze’s concept of the ‘dividual’ is key to understanding how the double, 
particularly the double as simulacrum, operates. Deleuze sees subjectivity, in the move 
to what he terms the Society of Control, as leaving behind the binary conceptualisation 
of individual/mass which marks Foucault’s Discipline Society, in favour of the dividual 
– ‘Individuals have become “dividuals” and masses, samples, data, markets or “banks”’ 
(Deleuze, 1992, p.5). Computers are the material engines of control in Deleuze’s 
landscape and, as dividuals, we are largely composed of data and our physical selves. 
This data can be harvested from us, broken down further and further into a molecular 
level and recombined by engines external to us (Williams, 2005). These recombinations 
can be carried out by human agents or, increasingly, by software agents, as Niederer and 
van Dijck demonstrate in their analysis of Wikipedia content-editing bots which obey 
rules and coded protocols assigned to them (2010, pp.1377-83). Such recombinations 
become our spectral, proliferating doubles, built from digital traces of ourselves – traces 
which Mark Poster, refers to as the ‘secret self’ (Poster, 2007, p. 118). Roger Burrow’s 
work on ‘metric assemblages’(Burrows, 2012, p.356) argues that there are over 100 
different nested metrics the neoliberal university uses to measure academic staff which 
are ‘enacted by code software and algorithmic forms of power’ (ibid., p.358) to form 
‘metric assemblages’. Such assemblages – doubles – are reified and performative, in 
that it is they who are promoted, made redundant, are awarded grants, and are entered 
(or not entered) for research assessments (Burrows, 2012, pp. 357-61). 
 
 
 
                                                          
72
 This important theorising of the digital self – or selves – that Zizek carries out in his 1997 work The 
plague of fantasies is very different from readings of the digital self current at the time. These saw it as 
offering a freedom to experiment with identity, and implied that either the digital self, or the subject, or 
both had a sense of control over this – a set of viewpoints with which Zizek directly takes issue (p.166-8). 
Also see Robins (1995) for a sustained and robust critique of these perspectives. 
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5.6 Ideology and networked computers 
Mediated technologies make us all (or our doubles) part of a spectacle. Internet 
entrepreneur Michael Wolff proclaims that ‘publicity is the currency of our time’ and 
Jodi Dean uses this headline concept as a way of thinking critically about how the 
economy of computational capitalism operates to produce us as self-publicising subjects 
(Dean, 2002, p.6). As I discussed in the previous chapter, the academic subject is 
inevitably implicated in this when they become the spectacularised academic. As Dean 
suggests, we all experience ourselves as mediated subjects and this has particular 
relevance to the creation of our doubles. Our secrets – and our doubles – are out there 
on the internet, and if they weren’t then we’d feel that we didn’t exist at all (Dean, 2002, 
p.13). In fact, even if we have (or think we have) no secrets out there, the existence of 
our internet doubles is a kind of publicised secret in itself – secret from us (as we don’t 
tend to search for ourselves), but available to others. In order to understand the socio-
political and psychocultural mechanisms of how this works, I propose first to consider 
the relationship between ideology and networked computers. 
 
I start by taking Zizek’s 1997 re-interpretation of Louis Althusser’s concept of ideology 
and applying it to computer culture. Althusser, in Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses (1970) sees the Capitalist State as comprising two distinct parts. The 
Repressive State Apparatus (RSA) is made up of elements such as the army, police, 
courts and prisons – any part of the system that functions, ultimately, by violence. The 
Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) comprise a range of dispersed institutions, such as 
the educational ISA which is made up of schools and universities and the 
communications ISA, made up of press, television, radio and other communicative 
means (in which we would now include the various forms of communication afforded 
by the internet and mobile technologies). ISAs perpetuate capitalism by legitimising and 
naturalising its assumptions and practices. They do this, not by direct coercion, but by 
ideological means (Althusser, 1970, pp.95-100). 
 
Ideology, for Althusser, is the way in which we, as subjects within a capitalist 
formation, imagine ourselves to relate to the world. It is essentially illusory, ‘a pure 
dream’ (Althusser, 1970, p.108) although it is something in which we ‘live, move and 
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have our being’73 (ibid, p.116). Ideology is an imaginary set of relations which justify 
the dominant mode of production and its associated worldviews (ibid., p109-10). 
Althusser sees ideology as interpolating or ‘hailing’ the individual as subject. To 
illustrate how this works, Althusser uses his famous metaphor of a police officer 
shouting out to an individual in the street ‘Hey, you there!’ The individual turns around, 
knowing they are the one who is being hailed. Ideology operates in the same way, as it 
calls the individual to subjectivity (ibid., p118). For Althusser, we are all subjects of 
ideology and can never be outside it.  
 
ISAs have both a material and ideological existence. A university exists in its material 
manifestation, for example as practices of lectures and tutorials within lecture theatres 
and offices; rituals of validating programmes of study; or the more obviously ritualised 
practice of graduation, with its solemn procession of academics and graduates in 
codified, archaic dress. Its ideological role is manifold but most obviously lies in 
inducting or hailing students into the appropriate set of cultural norms and expectations 
for their future work roles within the social formation.
74
 
 
Althusser has been criticised for being overly mechanistic and reductionist in his 
analysis, overlooking the agency of subjects and reducing society to a ‘theatre without 
players’ (Mattelart and Mattelart, 1978, p.82). But these type of criticisms fail to take 
into account that, for Althusser, whilst ideology has its material existence in apparatus 
and practices, it relies on the imaginative energies of the subject to make it live.
75
 The 
creative actions of the players enable the theatre. 
 
Seeing Althusser’s proposition in this light is a step towards understanding Zizek’s re-
interpretation of how ideology works on the subject, which I now go on to address. This 
posits the idea of a knowing subject who understands how ideology works; but who 
colludes with it anyway, even though they don’t want to (Zizek, 1989, p.28-30 ). 
 
                                                          
73
 Althusser attributes this quote to St. Paul, (Acts 17:28). 
74
 A point that early 21
st
-century neoliberal concerns (see, for example, the 2011 CBI report) that 
graduates aren’t ‘job-ready’ when leaving university and the enthusiasm for putting ‘employability’ on 
the HE curriculum simultaneously misses and hits on the head with a large mallet. 
75
 There’s a link here with the way Althusser’s contemporary, Pierre Bourdieu, highlighted how subjects, 
as social agents, enact symbolic orders through social structures (Grenfell, 2012). 
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In his work on ideology Althusser leverages the work of 17
th
-century scientist and 
theologian Blaise Pascal, who proposes that participating in religious activity 
encourages a subject to have religious beliefs; he quotes Pascal: ‘kneel down, move 
your lips in prayer, and you will believe’ (Althusser, 1970, p.114). Zizek sees the 
‘hailing’ of the subject by ideology as not quite sufficient to understand why we become 
so willing to collude with it – why don’t we just ignore the policeman when he hails us? 
He goes back to Pascal to find an explanation of this (Myers, p.68). Zizek then reads the 
ISAs as a collection of belief machines which have three parts:  
1. they manifest as Ritual; 
2. they materialise as Belief; 
3. they propose as Doctrine. 
Zizek describes how a belief machine operates, using the example of the Tibetan prayer 
wheel. Here the devout writes out the prayer and puts it in the prayer wheel, then spins 
it. As the wheel spins, they don’t need to be praying or even thinking about the prayer, 
for the machine to have its effect. The machine prays for you (Zizek, 1989, p.34). 
 
Present-day mediated technologies are fundamental part of the communications ISA, 
being not just ideological space within which the subject is interpellated, but also as 
having a materiality (beyond the materiality of bits and bytes and hardware) co-evolved 
between the hardware materials of computational and the body of the subject. In fact, I 
propose that they form a technocultural belief machine: 
 
1. We go through the daily Ritual of connecting and re-connecting ourselves into 
the online media world. This may be powering up – or picking up – a machine, 
opening a browser or an app, checking and posting status updates, catching up 
with emails, messages, posts, making contacts – or many of the other activities 
(so chillingly satirised in Dave Egger’s near-future surveillance dystopia, The 
Circle, (2013)). We all have our (apparently personal, actually identical) rituals; 
mobile and always-on technologies encourage us to repeat these rituals, 
obsessively, at any time of the day or night. 
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2. The technologies materialise sets of Belief. This could be – or could perhaps in 
the early years of my study have been – that the ‘information wants to be free’76 
and will set us free; more recently that we don’t exist if we’re not visible online; 
that social media, the gift economy and (later) crowdsourcing produce liberating 
new communities and access to individual and collective knowledge; that all that 
we need is more information to solve our problems, large or small – or other, 
similar approaches. These may support or be opposed to capitalism, but 
inevitably they collude with it, at some level. 
3. Doctrine has emerged around technoculture. Again there are differing flavours 
of this, in the same way as there are different types of, say, Christianity; 
however, as all Christian doctrine includes a godhead and redemptive sacrifice, 
so all technocultural doctrine, whether of the anarcho-hacker school or of a self-
consciously neo-liberal turn, includes shared elements. The computer, the 
network, stands in for the godhead, so what flows from this is the article of faith 
that says, for example, wider, better and faster connectivity and a laptop for 
every child constitutes a universal social good.
77
 Mediated technologies, as 
others have observed, have become the religion of our time. Jameson, in fact 
first began to speak of a ‘technological sublime’ over 20 years ago. Since then 
various commentators have theorised the way in which technoculture has 
become a form of religion, most notably Margaret Wertheim, who argues in The 
pearly gates of cyberspace that the ‘immaterial’ space of the internet returns us 
to an almost medieval position of conceptualising it as a spiritually charged, 
transcendent space of the soul. (Wertheim, 1999).
78
 
 
So networked computers can be seen as a kind of belief machine that enables our 
interpolation into ideology. The belief machine of networked computing prays, 
publicises, befriends, and importantly, believes for us. Even if we attempt to resist 
ideology, our integration into the belief machine sucks us back in.  
                                                          
76
 This phrase became a hacker ‘war cry’ in the earlier days of digital culture. The original quote is 
attributed to Steward Brand: ‘[O]n the one hand information wants to be expensive, because it’s so valuable 
… On the other hand, information wants to be free, because the cost of getting it out is getting lower and lower 
all the time. So you have these two fighting against each other’ (Brand, 1984, quoted in Levy, 2014). 
77
 When the American Government unveiled its plans to have broadband universally available to all 
Americans by 2020, the Federal Communication Commission stated that ‘broadband is a foundation for 
economic growth, job creation, global competitiveness and a better way of life’ (my italics), BBC (2010). 
78
 I expand on the religiosity of technoculture and on the work of these and other commentators on it in 
the next chapter in my discussion of the space of academic embodiment. 
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Dean leverages the Lacanian concept of the sujet supposé savoir, the ‘subject supposed 
to know’, which Lacan introduces in Book XI of the seminars. Lacan uses it in relation 
to transference in psychoanalytic practice, where the analysand (wrongly) assumes the 
analyst to have a level of knowledge verging on omniscience; for the analysand the 
analyst then becomes the subject supposed to know (Lacan, 1973, pp.230-43).  
 
In her account of ideology and networked computers, Dean, who draws on Zizek’s 
work, discusses how mediated technologies mean that we don’t have to believe any 
more that there is a subject supposed to know out there; ‘the technologies believe for us’ 
(Dean, 2002, p.118). My reading of this is that whilst we realise that we, personally, are 
not the subject supposed to know, that realisation implies that there is one – out there. A 
situation in which we may not believe, but one which, as the technologies believe for 
us, we have to permanently resist. The implication of this for the spectacularised 
academic subject is that they can be hailed by ideology as the ‘expert,’ for example, the 
specialist who is interviewed on radio or TV news programmes and expected to provide 
the answers to topical problems such as global warming or the banking crisis; they are 
uncomfortably situated as the subject supposed to know who can pronounce to solve the 
world’s problems. At the same time, they are never sufficiently the subject supposed to 
know enough because they know that there is always someone out there who knows 
more, has more recent data, has considered the issues from a new perspective, is more 
experienced or has a more youthful, contemporary – and so mediatisible – viewpoint, or 
who just works at a more prestigious institution. The subject, for themselves, can never 
(unless they have some kind of grandiose personality disorder) be the subject supposed 
to know. It is their double who becomes, uncomfortably, the representation of them as 
subject supposed to know, as it smirks from their web-pages with smug authority. 
 
Linked in with this is the presentation of the academic’s double by their employing 
university as a knowledge commodity designed to enhance the reputation of the 
organisation. Andrew Ross discusses how, as an agent in computational culture, ‘if 
you’re not the customer you’re the product being sold’(Andrew Lewis, quoted in Ross, 
2013, p.18), and this certainly applies to the digital academic double. It’s illuminating to 
go back to Marx (an avid reader of Uncanny literature) who argues that, for the worker, 
his labour:  
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becomes an object, an external existence … that exists outside him, 
independently as something alien to him, and that it becomes a power on its own 
confronting him. It means the life he has conferred on the object confronts him 
as something hostile and alien. 
(Marx,1844, p. 29) 
 
He could be describing how their the shiny, marketised double might appear to an 
academic on the corporate university website. 
 
So we, as subjects, are active within the world of mediated technologies as agents who 
contribute to imagining the evolving ideology and to our own subjectivity within it. 
This connects back to the failure of the Symbolic discussed earlier. Ideology, Zizek 
argues, in The sublime object of ideology and in accord with Marx, fetishises 
commodities, not just in that it obscures their origins, but that it gives them a spiritual 
value. And that spectral supplement is objet a (Zizek, 1989, p.49-51). So I may desire a 
sports car because I imagine it gives me access to objet a. Another person may not 
invest the sports car with objet a, but may see it in a pair of shoes or a handbag. But our 
desires are for the same thing and we are both the subjects of ideology in the same way. 
As I write in early 2013 the commodities most saturated with objet a for UK consumers 
has moved from iPhones (last year’s fetish) to iPads and 3D ‘smart’ televisions. The 
smart machines that will give us our ‘i/I’, our ‘eye’ or even our ‘aye’. We don’t need to 
think, see or consent, the machines will do that for us – as they will believe for us, as 
they will lend us the ‘i’ we struggle to create for ourselves. 
 
The final theoretical perspective I wish to leverage in my discussions of the academic 
double, before going on to look at some examples of doubles, is the mapping of Lacan’s 
triad onto mediated technologies. 
 
5.7 Lacan’s triad and networked computers 
Freidrich Kittler proposes that ‘the medium of the symbolic is called the computer’ 
(Kittler 1997, p.138); Zizek uses the Real as a metaphor for machine code (Zizek, 1997, 
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p.212); and N. Katherine Hayles, in ‘Traumas of code’, discusses how machine 
language
79
 can be viewed as a kind of unconscious: ‘in our computationally 
intensive culture, code is the unconscious of language’ (Hayles, 2006, p.137). Building 
on these ideas, I now want to demonstrate how Lacan’s Real-Symbolic-Imaginary triad 
can be used as a metaphor
80
 for understanding our relationship with machinic 
technologies, or as Hayles puts it: ‘the interpolation of the user into the machinic system 
… disciplined by the machine to become a certain kind of subject’ (2005, p.61).  
 
Zizek sees the Real as a metaphor for the code that we cannot normally see, the machine 
language underpinning the increasingly opaque interface of the contemporary laptop or 
tablet. So ‘under the bonnet’ of a computer, unknowably to us, language (code, the 
language of the Real) actually performs – it isn’t just used for performative statements, 
like symbolic language. Machine code is not language or code as abstraction; it doesn’t 
just make performative statements, it ‘initiates action in the world’ (Hayles, 2005, 
p.124), that is to say, it actually acts to print the file, fly the drone, launch the missile. 
As Hayles says, code can be seen a metaphor for the unconscious and the unconscious 
is the realm of the Real. Interleaved this way, Zizek and Hayles’ perspectives produce a 
sense that the Real is there, lurking in our computer, talking to itself and performing 
actions – we know not what. I propose that the irruption of code (when one makes an 
error or the machine malfunctions), onto the computer screen always has an uncanny 
effect, causing anxiety – ‘where has my Window to the world gone? What is all this 
gobbledygook about registers and bins?’81  
 
                                                          
79
 Machine language is the lowest level of programme code a that actually makes the operations of a 
computer happen. Over this there are higher levels of language that take the input of a human finger 
selecting an icon and translate it, thorough the levels, into the binary language the computer itself 
understands. 
 
80
Nusselder in a different kind of mapping of Lacanian ‘cyberspace’ describes a slightly different 
computational triad, comprising: ‘the matrix, as the "noumenal" dimension of codified objects consisting 
of zeros and ones (the database); cyberspace, as the "phenomenal" mental spaceof the 
conceptualization or representation of code objects; and the interface, as their crucial medium’ (2009, 
locs.61-2) . Nusselder doesn’t make the same link between this and Lacan’s triad, as I have here; his 
central thesis is that the screen is a place where the Real, the Imaginary and the Symbolic interface (ibid, 
loc.81).  
 
81
 The ‘Glitch’ aesthetic, where artworks are based on the effect of bugs and malfunctions in software, 
operates along the same lines by exploiting the glitch in the software to see the ‘Real’ (see Menkman, 
2011, for an analysis of Glitch culture). 
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Derrida’s conception, in Archive Fever, of what lies inside his laptop supports this 
notion of an uncanny computational turn, when he characterises it as some kind of 
‘hidden god’, saying ‘I don’t know how the internal demon of the apparatus operates, 
what rules it obeys’ (2001, p.23). Now that the code of a computer has become, for 
most users, inaccessible
82
 it is not just the machine code which metaphorically 
constitutes the Real, it is all the levels of code underlying the graphical user interface – 
particularly as computers begin to fade away into the background as we move to more 
pervasive technologies. Because the computer language the vast majority of us now 
understand is that of the Symbolic, the semiotics of the language of the screen – which 
Galloway sees as both being and not being a computer language, providing a ‘threshold’ 
which produces ontological transformation for the user when they cross it (Galloway, 
2012, p.vii).  
 
The computational Symbolic comprises the hardware, text, graphics, functionality, 
contextual usage, and the signification conventions that have emerged around them. 
Laptops, tablets, smartphones and watches; email, messaging, blogging and 
microblogging, skyping, social networking, reviews, rating and commenting, gaming, 
accessing and uploading video, music and photos; liking, trolling, friending, flaming, 
googling, sharing and stalking – are a non-exhaustive list of elements that form the 
machinic Symbolic. Kittler, in viewing computers as the machine of the Lacanian 
Symbolic, makes the point that Lacan conceived of the Mirror Stage in the same year, 
1936, as Alan Turing created the Universal Machine. He quotes Lacan as having drawn 
a similar connection in 1955. 
It is enough to note that by means of your 0 and 1, that is, the 
connotation of presence-absence we are capable of representing 
                                                          
82
 Of course we can learn what is in the Real of the computer, in the sense that it is within the wit of 
humans to understand what goes on ‘under the bonnet’ of a PC, laptop or tablet, but a vast and 
increasing majority of us do not have, or desire to have, this capability. There is a sense in which writing 
in the lowest level of code (effectively Assembler language) is now regarded as an eccentric, arcane 
practice, beloved of those who like to manipulate the levels and pulleys behind the magic show. Hayles 
points out that within the way code is written exists ‘the embedded assumptions, resistant practices and 
hegemonic reinscriptions associated with [capitalism]’ (2005,p.51); so even the Assembler coders are 
subject to the ideology inscribed into the language and syntax of code. As Zizek so often tells us, 
ideology is working on us most effectively at the moment when we think we have distanced ourselves 
from it and shrugged off its grip.  
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everything which presents itself, everything which has been brought 
about by a determinate historical process. 
(Kittler, 1997, p.137-8)  
 
It is within this realm of the machinic Symbolic that our doubles present themselves, 
and where they negotiate meaning – even though their home is in the Real (as they are 
comprised entirely of code and objet a). 
 
This leaves the realm of the computational Imaginary, which neither Zizek, Kittler or 
Hayles investigate. I propose that the Imaginary can be seen as the subject’s imagined 
relationship to, and imagined self within or in relation to, the online world.
83
 It consists 
of the subject’s projections – what they visualise on/through/in their window, and how 
and who they are in relation to that. It is the self I project onto the screen, the self I 
understand or fantasise myself as being. It is the space where I see my own reflection on 
the screen of the machine, as I discussed in the previous chapter. The intrusion of the 
double into this imaginary causes the fantasised position of the subject within the online 
world to break down. I am not who I think I am, I am what the Other fantasises me to 
be. Maybe that is who I actually am? But the proliferation of doubles contributes to my 
not even knowing what the Other wants me to be, and brings about a fracturing and 
fragmenting of self – a self that I may make a (doomed) attempt to shore up by buying 
that sports car or those shoes.
84
  
 
As I discussed earlier, because of the decline of the master signifier, the Symbolic 
seems no longer reliable or trustworthy to the subject. So in the computational Symbolic 
we do not trust anyone to be what they seem to be, and any viewpoints, however 
authoritative, is seen as being ‘just opinions’, as Jodi Dean discusses in her analysis of 
blogs (2010, p.3). There is no given authority in the computational Symbolic, just 
undifferentiated attempts to grab authority – although there are underlying ways in 
which authority materialises in the virtual, as for example, local censorship or 
surveillance (Garside, 2014) which functions as part of Althusser’s repressive state 
                                                          
83
 The computational imaginary has been used to mean the shared imaginary of ‘computer culture’. My 
usage differs from this as it takes a specifically psychoanalytic approach to the negotiation of subjectivity 
within, or in relation to technoculture. 
84
 Which online retailers are happy to help me with at the point of my fragmentation – indeed they are 
probably advertising them in a little box on my screen at that very moment. 
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apparatus. The collapse of the big Other causes the computational Imaginary to become 
a domain loaded with anxiety, as I discussed earlier, where we don’t know who we are 
at all, much less who we are for the Other. All we have is a plethora of symbolic 
doubles to fantasise our subjectivity from – and none of them are trustworthy. The 
irruption of the double into the Symbolic carries with it the stain of jouissance (the 
enjoyment of the Other) and the Imaginary cannot escape from the horror and anxiety 
this creates. The collapse of meaning also causes the affective intensities of the 
Imaginary to become more potent, at the same time as the sense of closure may mean 
that it is stifled by the banality of a Symbolic order where everything is equal in 
authority and so undifferentiated, a cocktail Jameson refers to as ‘a whole new type of 
emotional ground tone’ (1991, p.6). And, in this, the borders between the computational 
Symbolic and Imaginary are always challenged. 
 
5.8 The academic subject 
In order to see how these perspectives work in practice, I will now go on to explore my 
own internet doubles. In doing this I’m reminded of Miller’s point about doubles being 
connected with the detective (Miller, 1985, p.49), as I pursue my own doubles across 
the internet, track them down to their origins and force out of them an account of their 
motives.
85
 
 
I have been employed mainly in academic, but also in managing and directing distance 
learning research and development (R and D) project roles, in several universities for 
about 20 years; I have also worked in the NHS and Trades Union Education. Like many 
academic staff of my generation in post-92 universities, I wasn’t a career academic from 
the start of my working life, having spent some time as a systems analyst before moving 
to teach in HE. Most of my professional work has been in teaching and learning 
innovation for adult, part-time learners in higher education, mainly using distance and 
online learning approaches. When carrying out the activity of rounding up some of my 
                                                          
85
 The practice of googling oneself not just to find dopplegangers, but also ‘Googlegangers’, other 
individuals who share the same name, has had a certain popularity for some years. Film-maker Angela 
Shelton tracked down 40 other Angela Sheltons to make a film about her Googlegangers, a process she 
records in her book Finding Angela Shelton (2008). There are also Facebook groups for people who 
share the same name and a number of name-tally websites (Rosenbloom, 2008). 
 
136  
 
 
doubles, I was anticipating that they might reflect some of the variety of my career. But 
the doubles brought up by a Google search on my name told a different tale. 
 
 
http://www.kingston.ac.uk/services-for-business/contact-us 
Fig. 17 Kingston University - my bio 
 
At the time of carrying out this search, I worked at Kingston University. So, as may be 
expected, one of the sites which came up first on a Google search for my name, was my 
details on the Kingston site (Fig. 17). Five lines of text, which were written by me, 
describing myself are displayed next to a corporate photograph (the third one down in 
Fig. 17, above) and my job title, KUBIS Project Director. The overall heading (not 
visible in Fig. 17) under which I find my biography is, to me, somewhat alarmingly 
entitled Services for Business. Although I wrote my own bio, the dis-embedding of my 
utterances changes their meaning. The context in which they are situated suggests that 
the kind of teaching and learning innovation I work in is intended solely as an HE 
service for business, rather, than, for example, as way of improving access to higher 
education among working-class adults. 
 
The funding body for the project I was leading at the time, HEFCE, produces another 
double high up my Google list (Fig. 18). My project was funded as part of its Employer 
Engagement initiative, so this forms the main thrust of the Funding Council’s emphasis. 
A stock photo of two people in white lab coats situates the locus of the work, somewhat 
misleadingly, in the hi-tech industrial factory.  
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http://www.hefce.ac.uk/econsoc/employer/projects/show.asp?id=11 
Fig. 18 HEFCE Kingston University KUBIS project 
 
 
 
http://www.altc2008.alt.ac.uk/profiles/search?query=Thomas&go=search 
Fig. 19 ALT-C 2008 presenter profiles 
 
A third double (Fig. 19) lurks on the Association of Learning Technology Conference 
site. My bio and accompanying photo show up first, and when clicked produce an 
abstract of a paper I gave about the use of social networking technologies for learning. 
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A number of similar doubles also situate me as someone working in the field of 
technology-enhanced learning. 
 
These three doubles and a number of others like them, which showed up in the first 20 
Google results for my name, present me as engaged both with new technologies for 
teaching and learning and with ‘business-facing’, employer-focused HE initiatives. 
Whilst this is not actually untrue, quite recent work I have carried out with employers 
such as the NHS and the Gambian Medical Research Council, and work with Trades 
Union project partners is completely invisible. The contemporary educational ISA is 
saturated by a neoliberal doctrine, which assumes that higher education should reflect 
business needs and which valorises technology-enhanced learning above more 
traditional modes – and it has claimed me. Ideology is interpolating me, the belief 
machine is at work and is hailing me as a follower. Other potential narratives about 
myself, narratives which would provide a counter-cultural challenge to neoliberalism, 
are suppressed. I may see myself in a rather different light, but it’s a struggle to resist 
the narrative my doubles are creating. Because of the operation of belief machine the 
technologies are believing for me.  
 
Guy Debord, in Comments on the Society of the Spectacle, describes two of the aspects 
of liberal capitalism as being ‘incessant technological renewal’ and slander without 
reply (1998, thesis V). The electronic double is created by the first of these and often 
carries out the other. In the case of my next double, almost explicitly. 
 
The existence of this double came as a surprise to me. I discovered it on a website called 
Evalu8: academic research evaluation specialists (Fig. 20). This Evalu8 group offers 
the service of ‘reviewing, evaluating and evidencing the impact of university knowledge 
transfer, enterprise and employer-engagement related activity.’ And, inexplicably, of the 
four evaluation experts whose names, photos and bios and CVs are listed, one of them 
appeared to be me.
86
 
 
                                                          
86
 I learned after encountering this double that this site was an attempt to attract consultancy contracts. 
Whilst I did provide a bio and CV which was described as being ‘for the website’ I had no idea that it was 
to be used in this way. I have since had this particular double dismantled – and, so far, lived to tell the 
tale. 
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http://www.eval.org/evaluation-team 
Fig. 20 Evalu8 site 
 
This unexpected double, claims, by her position on the site, expertise in evaluating 
knowledge transfer – which I, absolutely, do not have. Most of the other members of 
this group are business-facing administration or finance managers, so my double is 
present as the subject-supposed-to-know (about education). So that others can believe in 
this group, the creation of my double hails me as the subject-supposed-to-know (about 
education in a knowledge transfer context). The technologies interpellate me as this; 
without them it would not have been possible for the creator of the site to create this 
double. The collapse of the master signifier means that claims of the site make sense. Of 
course it’s valid for university administrators to be experts in evaluating academic 
research! It’s just another set of opinions, isn’t it? And of course it’s okay to co-opt a 
distance learning specialist as a member of the group without telling them. A 
university’s a knowledge network, right? 
 
The overall sense that some of my digital doubles are presented more in terms of 
business and new technology than my work-role at the time, or the overall sum of the 
work I have done in my career, might otherwise invite, has an additional consequence. 
It affects the way other doubles – ones that I might otherwise be comfortable with – 
might be read.  
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For example, the Beyond Distance Research Alliance site (not shown) contains the title 
and short abstract of a conference paper I gave at their conference, entitled ‘The 
Electronic Academic: Subversion, Surveillance, Disruption’. Whilst the paper was 
about the way in which academic staff are surveilled by employers in the move to 
universities operating as control institutions, the positioning of that paper among all the 
business/ IT /evaluation narratives does not connote this, but rather suggests that it 
might contain advice about how to better control disruptive, subversive academics. 
Whilst I might be, in this example, attempting to resist the ISA, this turn around co-
option interpellates my double as a willing, indeed policing, subject of neoliberalism. 
 
 
 
http://kn.open.ac.uk/public/person.cfm?userid=9707 
Fig. 21 OU knowledge network 
 
Another unexpected aspect of my technologically engaged doubles also arose from my 
Google search. Over ten years ago I was involved with two projects which included 
strands of work on access and authentication for journal publisher portals and on the use 
of metadata for identifying educational materials. These are areas normally of interest 
largely to technically minded librarians. But I have a disproportionate number of 
doubles popping up that identify me with this work (Fig. 21 is one example) because, as 
one might expect, metadata communities have expertise in search engine optimisation. 
People may find themselves haunted on the internet by many ghosts of their previous 
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lives – their over-exuberant partying shared in Facebook photos, or their dubious 
political past surfacing from the archive. But my extremely persistent ghost appears to 
be that of the technical librarian I never was. This illustrates how belief becomes 
organised technologically; our subjectivity is not only ‘spoken for’ by mediated 
technologies, but also ‘coded for’. 
 
A third, slightly eerie, surprise was to find my Amazon Wishlist displayed on the 
123People aggregator site (not shown). Whilst I manage this list of Christmas and 
birthday gift suggestions for my family and friends with the awareness that it’s a public 
document, it was still an odd experience to have a list of Star Trek
87
 DVD boxed sets 
and books on 19
th
-century spiritualism irrupt in the middle of narratives about 
professional work. In this context it seems to speak about deeply held private desires – 
what indeed, I have actively and materially wished for, the items I currently fetishise 
and invest with objet a. They are desires, not possessions – where I secretly want to go, 
not where I’ve been. The computational Real has slipped into the technocultural 
Symbolic and here are my private objects of desire, laden with the stain of jouissance, 
on show to the world. Whilst I wouldn’t be ashamed to be seen reading a book on 
Victorian spiritualism in a public place, the wish to possess such a book breaking 
through as a message from the Real in this way makes it appear as a shameful desire – 
that can only be the darker side of the technical librarian. 
 
The overall effect for me, as a subject, of these doubles appearing in the computational 
Symbolic is twofold. Firstly, many of the doubles that are out there are the most 
pedestrian and banal that my working self could be reduced to. A suffocating closure in 
the fabric of meaning is at work, which disallows more radical versions of self; it is I, 
not the double who is orphaned
88
 – from my own political history and cultural 
engagement. The double who looks back at me not only misrepresents the values and 
opinions that I, as a subject, hold - but they are also boring.  
 
Secondly, this leads me to forget and mistrust memories that I have of work that was 
focused on cultural inclusion and social justice. After all, they aren’t there on the screen 
                                                          
87
 Ironically, if I actually did inhabit the world of ICT to the extent that my doubles suggest, admitting 
that there are Star Trek episodes that I don’t already own would be tantamount to professional suicide.  
88
 As I mentioned earlier, in his work on the double, Miller associates doubles with literal and 
metaphorical orphans and orphaning (1985, pp.47-50). 
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– so did they really happen? Maybe they’re just another set of reminiscences. My 
Imaginary is impacted by this – both my computational Imaginary but my wider 
Imaginary as a subject. Maybe the years I have spent working on social inclusion 
initiatives aren’t important? They aren’t important within the educational ISA because 
my mediated HE self disowns them. They certainly aren’t what I am for the Other. The 
whole effect is deeply unsettling to my sense of subjectivity.  
 
Overall, in the pursuit of my ghostly doubles, I’m reminded of Freud’s account of how 
Jentsch attributes the Uncanny effect as being strongest and producing the greatest panic 
in the subject when ‘there is an intellectual uncertainty whether an object is alive or not, 
and when an inanimate object become too much like an animate one’ (Freud, 1919, p. 
354). This is the uncanny valley I feel myself to be in with my compound technocultural 
double – is it, in all its multi-faceted forms, the real, animated version of my history – or 
am I? Although I may be the only one of us who is actually, biologically alive, I prefer 
not to think about which of the two of us is more resilient. 
 
Naturally I can’t know the doubles that another person would find, searching on my 
name from a different IP address in a different location on a computer with a different 
browsing history and with different cookies and beacons associated with its browser. As 
Pariser shows, the results we get when we search are selected for us by sets of protocols 
outside our knowledge and control, ostensibly to produce results that will be of greater 
interest to us (Pariser, 2011, pp. 61-75). A fact which only compounds the horror of my 
own doubles for me, as I can only know what they are for me and have no way of 
finding out how they appear to others. That is to say, Google protocols ensure that I 
really don’t know what I am for the Other. 
 
5.9 Semiotics, narrative and meaning in university staff profile pages 
The necessary self-publicity of personal home pages and blogs might be hedged around 
with all kinds of constraint and exhortation, as I discussed in the previous chapter, but 
the subject has some agency in their construction. In university staff profiles, they have 
much less.  
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Such profiles are usually a standard page that includes data gathered from the subject. 
The data is often extracted from the subject via a proforma asking them specific 
questions about their professional background, teaching and research interests, research 
projects and publications. It’s unlikely that there are many universities where the option 
not to fill in these profiles exists for members of staff; anyone failing to fill them in is 
likely to have them filled in by someone else, using the university’s metric assemblage 
of them. How these questions are framed and how meaning is constituted in the 
resulting profile page is largely outside the subject’s control – staff are obliged to write 
themselves onto the electronic fabric of the Haunted University but have very little 
agency about how they do this and certainly no input into the overall design. As Hyland 
observes, ‘the individual is disempowered and discursively constructed as an employee 
by institutional design teams’ (2012, p.311). Consequently, the page which results from 
this is framed by the dominant discourse of the university itself and so speaks about its 
over-riding concerns – as with my own university bio which I mentioned earlier, 
presented, in my case, as a ‘Service for Business’. 
 
The common use of the term ‘staff profile pages’ must also be unpacked. It is the 
subject’s role as a member of ‘staff’, that is to say, paid employee of the institution, that 
is important here – not their personal vocational roles which might include teacher, 
writer, researcher, thinker, mentor, scientist, artist or inventor. Originating in the 
military, the use of the word ‘staff’ within institutions connotes the exercise of control 
and discipline; staff profiles are an area where Foucault’s discipline society narrative 
overlays that of Deleuze’s control society. It is the language of regimentation, 
observation, docile bodies and the individual/mass divide – in fact the term staff is a 
mass term that, in formal usage, has no singular.  
 
The word ‘profile’ is significant also, moving the compound phrase towards connoting 
control as well as discipline. The relatively new, widespread (it’s used to describe user 
identities in social media) usage of the word in this context collapses together two of its 
previous meanings, and wraps it up with a third, emergent technical use of the word, as 
follows. The two legacy dictionary definitions of the word profile are ‘outline of the 
characteristic features’ and ‘one’s manner, attitude or behaviour with regard to the 
extent to which it attracts attention to oneself and one’s activities’ (Chambers 
Dictionary, 1986). The third, more recent, meaning is from the area of computing, 
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where the word ‘profile’ has come to mean a data record associated with a particular 
user. So, in this context, the new, composite use of the word ‘profile’ means: data 
associated with the subject, which provides a snapshot of them, but which is also a 
measure of how much attention they may attract. It is surveillance, summary and 
publicity, all in one neat package; adding ‘staff’ to this expands the meaning to also 
include regimentation and the disciplining of the docile body. 
 
I’m now going to move on from investigating my own doubles to considering the 
academic profile page double, together with the personal homepage of one of the 
academics, Pete Lee, whose personal homepages I highlighted in the previous chapter. I 
have chosen Pete’s page because it neatly encapsulates the gap between the self-created 
page and the double, in a corporate university context, in a way that is not untypical of 
academic profile pages. 
 
Below (Fig. 22) is Pete’s personal university homepage and underneath (Fig. 23), by 
way of contrast, it is his Newcastle University profile page. 
89
 The differences seem 
slight on the surface, but are significant. The profile page is headed by the university 
logo and department name, with a picture of the University building to the top left of the 
page. Such corporate branding and linkage with the material university (of bricks and 
mortar, rather than of ideas) situates Pete firmly under the Newcastle flag. That the 
design of this page is identical to every other Newcastle academic profile page also 
produces a sense of uniformity and conformity.  
 
By contrast, on his personal page Pete’s name and title are the most eye-catching part of 
the page, as they are in much larger font than any other text. Pete has described his 
teaching and research interests largely in short paragraphs starting with the word ‘I’ – ‘I 
am a professor in … I teach … undergraduate modules in … I am co-author of …’. In 
the university profile there is no ‘I’; it comprises a potted bio written in the third person 
foregrounding the elements of activity most important to the corporate university: 
experience of having worked in industry, leadership of research groups, qualifications.  
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 This distinction was perfectly meaningful when I did the online fieldwork of finding, capturing and 
analysing personal homepages and profile pages in 2009. However, now, as virtually all universities have 
moved to the use of staff profile pages the prevalence of the personal academic homepage may have 
dwindled, particularly with the rise in popularity of blogging. 
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http://homepages.cs.ncl.ac.uk/p.a.lee/ 
Fig. 22 Pete Lee’s personal homepage 
 
 
http://www.cs.ncl.ac.uk/people/p.a.lee/ 
Fig. 23 Pete Lee’s university profile page 
 
In the profile there is no sense of a person fascinated by his own area of intellectual 
enquiry, and keen to share the interest with others; the profile double is all about high-
level personal achievement and successful industrial engagement. It highlights Pete’s 
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role as Head of School, something you have to hunt around quite a bit to find out from 
his homepage. 
 
Naturally, a ‘personal’ personal page, that is to say, one not explicitly about the work 
self, would be different again, even for those, like many academics, who have a 
vocation. 
90
 Kittler says of our film doubles that they ‘presentify’ rather than narrate and 
‘simulate’ rather than verify (ibid., p.98). I take this to mean that they present our lives 
in a way that’s based on surfaces and superficial ‘snapshots’ rather than on our own 
perceptions of self and any sense we may have of our own authentic tales. This speaks 
of the difference of perspective Caroline Bassett outlines of the idea of the death of 
narrative espoused by postmodernists and the everyday necessity of narrative which lies 
‘at the heart of the processes through which humans make sense of their experiences in 
everyday lives’ (Bassett, 2007, p.3).  
 
The difference between Pete’s own personal page and his corporate profile is that the 
latter presentifies and simulates him in a way that is more palatable to a market-driven 
culture where industry experience is valorised rather than intellectual enquiry, even (or 
perhaps especially) at a Russell Group institution like Newcastle. The profile page 
interpellates him within the educational ISA as a managerial industry expert, in contrast 
to his own narrative about himself, which resists this and asserts an identity as a 
scientist, researcher, teacher and human being who isn’t too bothered about hierarchy 
and status. 
 
What I’m describing here is not just a different story, but a difference between narrative 
and simulation. Despite being situated by technologies and conventions that might 
mitigate against this, Pete produces, on his own page, an authentic sense of an academic 
self; what the university produces is a self that is a better fit with the neoliberal model of 
what an academic should be and in this sense is inauthentic. The irony here is that the 
self the university actually needs to carry out its role as a university is the authentic 
academic. 
 
                                                          
90
 More recent trends in academic blogging sometimes involve a melding of work interests and personal 
life and interests; see for example Cuthural Theory academic Mark Fisher’s blog http://k-
punk.abstractdynamics.org/ 
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The gap between Pete’s version of himself and his corporate double hints at the way in 
which universities have begun to commodify academic staff, transforming them, in the 
university shop window, to a corporate simulacrum they might hardly recognise. 
However much we might want to resist the neoliberal university, our ghostly doubles 
collude for us. We might disagree with the corporate project, but our doubles believe for 
us.
91
  
 
I’m now going to move on from specific doubles to discuss the idea of audit created 
doubles. Earlier in this work I considered the way in which the neoliberal university is 
partly a function of an audit society, which I see as another aspect of Deleuze’s Society 
of Control (Deleuze, 1992). Similarly, there is an entire realm of audit-created academic 
doubles, whose elements are harvested from feedback and evaluation forms and stitched 
together to form the data doppelgängers that Burrows refers to as ‘metric assemblages’ 
(Burrows, 2012, p.356). Miller’s association of the double with spies and double agents 
(1985, p.49) is particularly pertinent in audit culture because the elements that make up 
the double are the product of surveillance I will now look at several examples of this in 
higher education. 
 
The Rate My Professors site invites HE students to evaluate, anonymously, the 
academic staff who teach them in the categories ‘easiness’, ‘helpfulness’ and ‘clarity’ 
(RateMyProfessors, 2010).
92
 It also, alarmingly, allows students to give them a rating 
according to ‘hotness’, and to leave comments. The commodification of the academic 
subject (not their teaching, but the person themselves) is explicit in one’s Rate My 
Professors double, which comes very close to Debord’s idea of slander without reply 
(1998, thesis V).  
 
                                                          
91 Whilst the university staff profile page may be an uncomfortable form of publicity for many academic 
staff, the alternative can be worse. In a previous role at Kingston University I worked in a faculty where, 
unlike the rest of the university, academic staff didn’t have online profiles; consequently the rest of the 
institution struggled to believe that we actually existed, as we had no visible presence within the 
institution’s computational Symbolic. 
 
92
 There are differing analyses of this site. An empirical study by Angela Legg and Janie Wilson (2012) 
found ‘conclusions drawn from RMP are suspect and indeed may offer a biased view of professors’ (Legg 
and Wilson, 2012, p.89) while one by James Otto et al. found that ‘online ratings in their current form 
may be useful, even though possible abuses could limit validity in specific instances’ (Otto et al., 2008). 
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But even finding a flattering double on this site is an eerie experience for the subject. 
We may not know what we are for the Other, and that causes us anxiety, but having 
what we are for the Other spelled out can be even worse. The site proposes itself as an 
evaluation of the subject’s effectiveness as the teacher – as the subject-supposed-to-
know. But the subject is aware that they aren’t the subject-supposed-to-know, so they 
feel doubly misjudged. They can only assume that the voice can’t really be the voice of 
the Other because the Other couldn’t be so deluded. So, although it’s disconcerting, 
they can only see the RateMyProfessors double as an exercise in mis-seeing that, 
orphaned from its context, exists only as a fantasy of student desire. One that, because it 
has the subject’s name on it, ends up grinning – or leering – at them from this site. But it 
may also have other implications. The Times Higher Education quotes a UK principal 
lecturer in Marketing, Stephan Dahl, as saying:  
any form of feedback is good – and RateMyProfessors is just another form of 
feedback. Just as any consumer rating website, it has its helpful reviews … I 
could see the potential for using information from some of the feedback on there 
to inform hiring and promotion. 
(THE, 2008b) 
 
Which leaves us to form the uncomfortable conclusion that even the most unreliable 
parts of the belief machine may be not just hailing us, but hiring us. 
 
The part of the audit culture that we are told is the most anonymous evaluation for 
academic subjects is the annual National Student Survey, or NSS. Here data is collected 
online from students about their experience of their course, their lecturers and their 
university. The scores are aggregated so that schools, faculties or departments and 
universities themselves are given a publicly available breakdown of their ratings in 
different areas. 
 
Despite the anonymity of this process, a widely reported incident during the 2008 NSS 
created some oddly situated doubles. Here, two Psychology lecturers were covertly 
recorded by a student encouraging their class to be ‘pragmatic’ about their approach to 
completing the survey and pointing out that if they criticised the university the resulting 
ratings would affect the students’ employment prospects. This recording was made 
available online and went viral (Newman, 2008). The lecturers, whose comments may 
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actually have been slightly humorous and discursive in the context of a lecture theatre, 
but disembedded and publicised appeared to be more sinister and manipulative, were 
vilified by the media. As the act of making public is always a positive one within 
mediated technoculture (‘the information wants to be free’) the doubles created for these 
two academics pitilessly interpellated them as guilty within the communications ISA – 
because that is what the technologies believe for us. 
 
When data is collected on the subject for purposes such as the NSS, the subject is 
disintegrated not into a dividual but into sub-dividuals. Tiziana Terranova identifies this 
as a ‘microsegmentation’ of ‘individuals into data clouds subject to automated 
integration and disintegration’ (2004, p.34). Added to that there is online data which is 
collected in order not to be anonymous, such as data for internal institutional selection 
for Research Excellence Framework (REF) submissions and then the exercise of the 
REF itself
93
, all of which constitutes a reduction of the subject and their research to 
numerical data and then finally to part of a score, which I will discuss in relation to 
reification in the next chapter. 
 
The collapse of the master signifier could provide the university with a discursive 
freedom to contest its place and function as part of the ideological state apparatus. But 
instead, what seems to be happening is not this, but two other strands of change. The 
first is that the spectral university of neoliberalism creates simulations of academic 
subjects. There are many ways in which the academic subject is harvested for data and 
that data aggregated to make different kinds of doubles, some of which will bear the 
subject’s name. Many of the doubles may be orphaned, like my Evalu8 double, or the 
ones created by RateMyProfessors, and some will network back via links and references 
and be only one face of a larger double. In the absence of any stabilising point de 
capiton, these doubles stand in for the subject. 
 
The second is that when academic subjects do contest the values of neoliberalism by 
their choices about their work or by their behaviour, the doubles simply close around 
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 REF data starts off as personal and then as it travels through the circuit becomes (theoretically) 
attached to institutions rather than persons, as the score is generated for subject areas rather than 
individuals – although, ultimately, everyone involved knows exactly where they and their colleagues 
stand in achieving the departmental REF ranking. 
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them and silence those resistances – as I have demonstrated in my own account of my 
doubles. 
 
This doesn’t mean to say that resistance is futile. As I demonstrated in the previous 
chapter, online interventions by subjects themselves can result in a way of re-inscribing 
their version of subjectivity back into the Symbolic. The collapse of meaning at some 
level, does give subjects a degree of agency to author their own inscription. 
Furthermore, what is lost in the university’s simulated account of the subject are the 
elements that make the subject valuable to the university an employer – their 
independence of thought, their intellectualism, their creativity, originality, their 
maverick outlook. All of the things that the subject’s own self storying can provide. So 
the key question that is raised for the university is this: to fulfil its project- what does 
the university really want – and need? The subject – or the double? 
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6 Chapter 6 - The body (not) in the library: space, time, 
embodiment and the digital myths that lie beneath 
 
6.1 Preface 
In the previous two chapters of this section I have considered how the academic subject 
inscribes themselves or is inscribed upon the digital. In this chapter I will address the 
issue of how the embodied subject is produced in the space and time of the Haunted 
University and how technologies change and enact this. In order to do this I will look 
initially in some detail at digital myth-making. This is an important background to 
notions of embodiment and disembodiment, space and time, because it underpins our 
whole conception of how we exist within technoculture and so how our temporal, 
spatial and bodily organisation is constituted in relation to the digital. In particular I’ll 
look at how notions of the sacred are animated in the service of digital myth-making. 
I’ll then go on to consider the time and space of the university, how they are given 
meaning by ritual, and how the embodied and disembodied subject is constituted within 
these constructs. I’ll also touch on the way in which risk and risk-avoidance are 
mobilised in the constitution of the subject and discuss how the psychoanalytic idea of 
transitional space operates in relation to the digital in the neoliberal university. Finally, 
I’ll end by considering the way in which the academic subject is required to enact both 
fragmentation and bodily reconciliation by their positioning within the time, space and 
rituals of the university. 
 
6.2 Alienated bodies 
As subjects, there are many ways in which we are alienated from our bodies. From a 
Lacanian perspective, splitting occurs at the moment of becoming subjects when we 
(literally or metaphorically) see ourselves in the mirror; Louis Althusser views the 
constitution of the subject within ideology as a form of estrangement which overlays an 
imagined subjectivity onto the material self (Althusser, 1970); Judith Butler sees 
subjectivity inscribed on the surface of the body, thus alienating us as it constitutes us 
(Butler, 1993); Friedrich Kittler, perhaps slightly mischievously, specifies a date at 
which the immaterial self started to become separated from the physiological self by 
technology – the late 1870s, with the mass production of the Remington typewriter 
(Kittler, 1986) . 
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We may be profoundly alienated from our bodies from all of these theoretical 
perspectives and in other parts of this work I consider what the implications of this may 
be for the academic subject. Yet bodily existence, and the material world with which we 
engage through embodied practices, conditions our subjectivity. 
 
6.3 Technology and myth 
Information and communications technologies form a critically important part of this 
material world and the way in which our subjectivity is conditioned by this is also 
affected by social myths which proliferate about technologies. By this I mean not 
necessarily collective falsehoods (although such myths are often shackled to hegemonic 
ends) but, in line with Mary Midgely’s concept of myth, a form of cultural imagining 
which helps us to make sense of our world (Midgely, 2004). It’s vital that we become 
aware of the myths we inhabit (or which inhabit us) because ‘If we ignore them we 
travel blindly inside myths and visions … provided by other people’ (Midgely,1992, 
loc.303-4). 
 
It’s possible to trace a ‘mythic period’ when new technologies are heralded as having 
revolutionary, world-changing impact which is romanticised as a force for good or 
demonised as damagingly disruptive, depending on the standpoint of the commentator 
(Mosco, 2004, pp.1-3; Dourish and Bell, 2011, loc.60). Electricity, the telephone, radio 
and television have all, in turn, gone through a mythic phase before becoming 
embedded in the everyday. Computers and the internet have been going through this 
form of mythologising for several decades; generally speaking, it posits ‘digital 
revolution’ as inevitable and desirable (or inevitable and inevitably undesirable in the 
dystopian mirror of the utopian myth) employing rhetorical strategies which foreclose 
dissent and position it as irrational technophobia (Morozov, 2013, pp.35-9; Mosco, 
2004, pp.17-21; Dourish and Bell, 2011, loc.67-77). Furthermore, the new phase is 
provided with names which contribute to the reconceptualisation of the social formation 
we inhabit, so that, for example, in an earlier part of the ‘digital revolution’ we found 
ourselves in a world of ‘digital natives’ and ‘digital immigrants’ living in a ‘global 
village’ located in an ‘information society’ whereas in 2014 we’re told that our 
environment is becoming increasingly ‘smart’ and ‘intelligent’ and our lives 
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‘networked’ – in a way that’s ‘woven into the fabric of the planet’ (Dormehl, 2014). 
The main point of these re-christenings is to ‘construct the changes connected to new 
media as radical novelties’ (Fuchs, 2009, p.399) and so announce (the myth) that the 
new form of social organisation breaks with traditional capitalism and that the old rules 
no longer apply (Jameson, 1991, p.3).  
 
Computing keeps going through periods of re-mythologising where the current sub-
phase becomes embedded everyday practice and culture and the next sub-phase is seen 
as the ‘revolutionary’ era that will change everything. Thus, as I write this, an Observer 
article quotes tech entrepreneur Mike Grothaus on the Internet of Things (IoT). ‘It's a 
revolution … It won't be as flash or obvious as the smartphone revolution, but it will be 
more profound because it connects everything together’ (Dormehl, 2014). The myth 
becomes part of the marketing strategy for computational devices and consequently 
techno-euphoric myth and marketing spiel each feed off each other. The Observer 
invites Grothaus and other ‘smart object’ entrepreneurs to spin their myths about IoT – 
because they are knowledgeable about their industry – but they are also selling us their 
smart devices (in Grothaus’ case, kitchen scales which have opinions about what you 
should eat). Which isn’t to say there isn’t dissent – in fact the article in question quotes 
a prominent techno-euphoria dissenter, Evgeny Morozov; yet somehow dissent morphs 
into a negative opinion about the ‘revolution’ rather than a negation that there is a 
revolution.  
 
Economist Ernest Mandel models three phases in the development of technology: the 
steam era, which lasted until the mid-19
th
 century; the electrical and internal combustion 
era; and the subsequent nuclear and electronic era (Mandel, 1978, cited by Jameson, 
1991, p.43). These three technological phases roughly coincide with the three political 
and economic stages of capitalism: market capitalism; the imperialist or monopoly 
phase; and our current stage, which Frederic Jameson refers to as ‘multinational 
capitalism’ (1991, p.43)94. I mention this in my discussion of technology because 
Mandel views each of these key phases as a significant expansion on the previous; and 
in our own era it is technoculture which enables ‘a prodigious expansion of capital into 
hitherto uncommodified areas’ (Jameson, 1991, p.44). As Caroline Bassett, drawing on 
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 Mandel’s last phase, multinational capitalism, might variously be considered to be subsumed in or be 
regarded as distinct from emerging formations, such as informational capitalism. 
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Jameson’s critique, observes, one of these areas is the human body, which, in the 
cultural space of late capitalism ‘can no longer easily hold itself together, or indeed hold 
itself apart from what might previously have been presumed to be distinct from it’ 
(Bassett, 2009, para.13). This is an aspect of what Christian Fuchs describes as ‘the 
dialectic of continuity and discontinuity’ which ‘transnational informational capitalism’ 
produces (Fuchs, 2009, p.399). 
 
This relationship between physiology and computing is one to which I’ll return later in 
this chapter; for now, I want to try to grip the meanings of the electronic era and the 
way I will start to do this is to break it down, again, into phases.  
 
6.3.1 Phases of mythologising 
In the early 1990s, Mark Weiser, head of the Computer Science Laboratory at the Xerox 
Palo Alto Research Center (PARC), famously described three eras of computing: 
First were mainframes, each shared by lots of people. Now we are in the 
personal computing era, person and machine staring uneasily at each other 
across the desktop. Next comes ubiquitous computing, or the age of calm 
technology, when technology recedes into the background of our lives. 
(Weiser, 1991) 
 
Elaborating on, rather than deviating from, this, others have suggested that we are 
currently coming to the end of a device era and are at the beginning of a data era 
(Grossman, 2012) where ‘convergence of mobile, cloud computing, social platforms 
and Big Data’ (Holley, 2013) marks the present and near future. Another way of 
thinking about the same thing from the standpoint of the subject/user is to consider how 
the personal computer phase has moved from using discrete technologies to 
technologies which increasingly interoperate across devices and platforms. So we’ve 
moved from wired, desktop, single screens and standalone devices with local storage 
and services, to portable, mobile, wireless, always on, multiple screens and many 
devices, with cloud storage and services. Data is increasingly shared between devices 
and services without the manual intervention, or even the knowledge of the subject/user 
and media which previously operated in separate spheres – newspapers, magazines, 
film, TV and web are said to converge, that is to say they are all accessed through the 
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same devices via the internet or mobile telecommunications networks as well as being 
accessed simultaneously in websites that permit/enable easy aggregation of multiple 
sources and formats by users.  
 
The, not uncontested, terms web 1.0 to web 2.0 have been used to conceptualise the way 
in which the web has changed during this time. The idea of web 2.0, popularised by Tim 
O’Reilly in 2004, has come, ten years later, to describe applications and services that 
engage the active involvement of users in activities (somewhat euphemistically) 
described as ‘collaborating and sharing’ that is to say, social networking, posting user 
generated content such as blogging, uploading music, video and photos, reviewing 
consumer items and so on, all of which are also aggregated under the heading of ‘social 
media’. By extension web 1.0 – everything before 2004 – becomes seen retrospectively 
as the static web, where only expert users were able to publish and the type of media 
convergence I described above was not possible (see O’Reilly, 2005, for a more detailed 
account). This perspective can be a useful form of shorthand, but it has its detractors. 
The web’s inventor, Tim Berners-Lee, has always taken the view that ‘every person 
who used the web had the ability to write something’ (Berners-Lee, 2005), that it is just 
a case of web editors becoming easier to use and that the term web 2.0 is ‘a piece of 
jargon’ (Berners-Lee, 2006). Other critiques of the terminology have stressed, for 
example, the naivety of a notion of online communication which views it as politically 
neutral (Roberts, 2009) and have seen the changes in the political economy of the 
technologies as having a complex relation to cultures of production that ‘the banner of 
2.0’ seeks to simplify rather than address (Bassett et al., 2009).  
 
The semantic web, or – inevitably – ‘web 3.0’, is a concept coined by Berners-Lee to 
conceptualise how the web can be gradually altered to enable it to respond to users in a 
way that appears ‘intelligent’ (Berners-Lee, 2001). It enables computers to be more able 
to respond to complex commands and opens the way to developments in ubiquitous 
technology. 
 
Weiser’s predicted phase of ‘ubiquitous’ technology, also referred to as pervasive or 
ambient technology, or shortened to ‘ubicomp’ (Dourish and Bell, 2011, loc.210-19) 
appears to be something that is just beginning. In this, interconnected internet-enabled 
devices, located in the world around us, interface with each other and with us in ways 
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that we experience as effortless (BCS, 2013). The term ‘post-internet’ or ‘post-digital’ 
has been used to conceptualise this present and near-future moment, where the internet 
fades into the background of the everyday – becomes banal, because of its ubiquity – 
with our interest shifting, instead, to what it makes possible (McHugh, 2012). At the 
same time, the IoT, itself a term that has had niche or sub-cultural currency for a 
number of years (see, for example, technology writer and sci-fi author Bruce Sterling’s 
2007 Internet of Things speech at Google Tech Talks, based on his earlier book, 
Shaping Things (Sterling, 2007; Sterling, 2005)), has gained momentum as the most 
recent way of presenting this concept (Gill, 2013); in the UK, it claimed widespread 
public notice in 2014, when Prime Minister David Cameron announced development 
funding for the technologies, employing the kind of mythic rhetoric I referred earlier 
when he said: ‘I see the Internet of Things as a huge transformative development … We 
are on the brink of a new industrial revolution’ (The Guardian, 2014). 
 
6.3.2 Digital stories: science fiction and technology 
An arena where the myths we spin about technologies (and about what they might mean 
for the future of human subjectivity and embodiment) speak eloquently is the medium 
of science fiction. Our current conceptions of digital culture were birthed in storytelling 
and have continued to be shaped by it (Bell, 2007, p.2), so it is meaningful to consider a 
selection of literary and cinematic texts from these three decades. As Bell suggests, such 
stories ‘“package” cyberculture for us, providing a frame of meaning’ with the result 
that ‘we experience our interactions with new technologies as a folding together of 
material and symbolic tales’ (Bell, 2007, p.6).  
 
The predictive stories we tell about technology have an effect on the kind of 
technologies that a society produces – as another much quoted PARC researcher, Alan 
Kay, claimed: ‘the best way to predict the future is to invent it’95 (Dourish and Bell, 
2011, loc.171). Weiser’s advice on designing interactions between humans and 
technologies is to ‘start with the arts and humanities’ (ibid., loc.207). In a study of the 
way in which science fiction and technological innovation influence each other, Bassett 
et al. suggest that science fiction concepts are ‘appropriated, adapted or used as 
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 Kay may have meant inventing the future by writing it in code, given his background, although this 
quote has been taken to mean any type of invention. 
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inspiration’(Bassett et al., 2013, p.43) by technical audiences, and that the ‘interactions 
between the fictional and the real … produce a map of influence as a co-constituted and 
iterative process’ (ibid., p.41). 
 
In the 30 years since William Gibson invented the word ‘cyberspace’, popularised in his 
seminal 1984 cyberpunk novel, Neuromancer, this type of mythologising has morphed 
through different phases. The idea that the material body has become irrelevant, mere 
‘meat’, as Gibson’s console cowboys mockingly describe it, with the immaterial and 
limitless cyberspace self, by contrast, being valorised for its quicksilver mutability, 
gained ascendency throughout the late 1980s and 1990s; Bell proposes that the way in 
which Gibson imagined the future of the internet had a ‘profound influence upon its 
development’ (2007, p.3). This is arguable, but Gibson, Donna Haraway and the early 
and separate imaginings many others about the internet all began to influence the shape 
of what it would become. A comprehensive discussion of the many origins of internet 
culture is beyond the scope of this work, but it is worth also mentioning the trajectory, 
tracked by Fred Turner, of the print-based virtual community which grew up around the 
Californian Whole Earth Catalog in the late 1960s and 1970s onwards. From this, the 
early virtual electronic WELL community emerged, first documented in Howard 
Rheingold’s 1987 article on the emerging concept of virtual community. This was 
expanded into his seminal text The virtual community: homesteading on the electronic 
frontier in 1993 (Turner, 2005). 
 
In Gibson’s imagining of the internet he saw a new Wild West of a glittering data 
network colonised by spectral console desperados; the metaphor of the Wild (or Wired) 
West began to be used to speak of the unregulated nature of the internet and sometimes 
of its colonial ambitions
96
 (McClure, 2000; McGann, 2001). Taking a different 
perspective on the same idea, cyberfeminist approaches, such as Donna Haraway’s 
influential Cyborg Manifesto, seized the possibilities presented by the internet of 
moving beyond the gendered body. Haraway’s techno-human cyborg ‘is a creature in a 
post-gender world’(Haraway, 1985, p.150) who creates a ‘post-modernist identity out of 
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 See, for example Katie Hafner and John Markoffs’ Cyberpunk: Outlaws and Hackers on the Computer 
Frontier (1991) or Rheingold’s work. Helen McLure’s historical analysis of this phenomenon The Wild, 
Wild Web: The Mythic American West and the Electronic Frontier (2000) provides a useful overview. 
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otherness, difference, and specificity’ (ibid., p.123) as ‘a way out of the maze of 
dualisms in which we have explained our bodies … to ourselves’ (ibid., p.181).  
Sherry Turkle
97
 continued to explore this type of perspective from a psychoanalytic 
perspective into the 1990s, focusing on online virtual role-playing games and taking the 
viewpoint that ‘when we step through the screen into virtual communities, we 
reconstruct our identities on the other side of the looking glass’(Turkle, 1995, p.177).  
 
These perspectives of the online world as a liminal space, which renders identities 
plastic, continued to animate narratives about digital culture, as internet science fiction 
moved into virtual realities. Neal Stephenson’s 1992 novel, Snow Crash, articulated 
anxieties about the perceived all-powerful nature of a virtual reality (VR) ‘metaverse’ (a 
futurist internet) which corrupts the material bodies of users, an issue also explored in 
Pat Cadigan’s 1991 novel, Synners; as Slavoj Zizek argued in 1997, the more 
‘disembodied’ we think we are because of the ‘cyberspace promise of casting off our 
bodies’, the more attention we pay to exercising, enhancing, disciplining and adorning 
them (Zizek, 1997, p.166). For the 1999 films The Matrix and David Cronenberg’s 
eXistenz the central concern for the films’ subjects is the impossibility of knowing 
whether reality is ‘real’ or just another virtual state – a textbook uncanny anxiety 
(Freud, 1919, p.367) and one which implies an internet omniscience. Richard K. 
Morgan’s 2002 novel Altered Carbon takes the devaluing of material bodies to its 
logical conclusion, offering a dystopian fantasy where consciousness can be stored and 
downloaded into interchangeable bodies or ‘sleeves’; by the time a film like Jonathan 
Mostow's 2009 Surrogates, in which humans no longer leave their homes or have 
contact with others, except through their synthetic surrogate, emerges, the self is 
situated back in the imperfect body and the use of surrogates is presented as a form of 
collective neurosis about body fetishism and risk avoidance. Stories about the internet 
(insofar as there are stories about the internet any more
98
 – it no longer enjoys the centre 
stage position it had in The Matrix) begin to concentrate on ideas of security, risk and 
the gaze of the Other, as in the negotiation of webs of surveillance in Gibson’s 2010 
novel Zero History, with its camouflaged spy drones and CCTV-scrambling streetwear. 
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 Turkle’s analysis is perhaps most most notable and has proven most enduring, but there were others 
who employed psychoanalytic perspectives, such as Allucquère Rosanne Stone (see Stone, 1995). 
 
98
 Similarly visual arts are not ‘about’ the internet any more but more about how humans negotiate the 
omnipresent digital, so we have ‘post-digital’ art movements (see Alexenberg, 2011, or Mc Hugh, 2011).  
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As Robert Briggs suggests in his account of Gibson’s meta-fiction, Gibson also presents 
subjects who exist in a collapsed time, with a ‘futureless present’ as well as the titular 
absence of history (Briggs, 2012). 
 
6.3.3 Virtual realities and the Internet of Things 
Vincent Mosco, in his study of the political economy of the online world, argues that 
within internet mythologising the internet is elevated to the status of a force which 
renders the material world of bodies, place and time redundant (Mosco, 2004, p.4). As I 
have demonstrated above, narratives about the internet, at different historical moments, 
move between imagining it as an omniscient entity that can conjure into being an 
immaterial self and then wrench it loose from its physical moorings; to conceptualising 
it as a liminal area that can offer unimagined freedoms as well as dangers, when it 
compromises ontological certainty; to ideas that it is an omnipresent – and still 
omniscient – other, recording our every thought, feeling, utterance, action and location. 
But, although it is conceptualised differently at all these historical junctures, over all of 
them it remains narrated as something we absolutely couldn’t do without. 
 
Pointing out that these accounts are stories does not make these tales groundless – and 
at times in this thesis I explore the ground which underpins some of them – but 
nevertheless it is important not to lose sight of their fictive dimension. Furthermore, 
there are always competing viewpoints about which narratives we’re inhabiting at any 
time: ‘technological realities are always contested. No single idea holds about what 
technologies are and what they do’ (Dourish and Bell, 2011, loc.111). Take the example 
of the technologies of VR and pervasive computing, which Weiser saw – back then in 
1991 – as ‘diametrically opposed’; he describes the former as an approach ‘which 
attempts to make a world inside the computer’ and the latter as ‘the process of drawing 
computers out of their electronic shells’ (Weiser, 1991, pp. 94-8), implying that the 
latter will be more relevant and meaningful to us.  
 
Although VR captured our imagination in fiction, film and gaming (despite not 
capturing a market, as it didn’t achieve commercial success) for some years, pervasive 
computing, or what Weiser calls ‘embodied virtuality’ appears, as I mentioned earlier, 
to be the way our everyday technological world is tending. However, recent 
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developments in immersive 3D headsets, such as Occulus’ Rift which becomes 
available to games consumers in 2015, may mean that VR becomes part of the everyday 
digital, too (Greenwald, 2013). Perhaps, as in Philip K. Dick’s exploration of the 
biotechnical uncanny, Ubik (Dick, 1969), they might fuse, making normality a 
permanent state of ontological uncertainty, where we never know whether we’re in a 
virtual reality or a real one, augmented by ubiquitous technologies. Whether this creates 
permanent anxiety or whether we become habituated to, or even comforted by, it 
remains to be seen. In a mundane, device-driven and experiential way the elements of 
VR and IoT are already becoming, or are about to become, entangled. We look at our 
mobile screens to read the data from wearable body monitors and a similar approach 
may be used once the monitor becomes embedded within our bodies. In this way, the 
technology becomes not spectacular, but banal – though no less uncanny. 
 
This approach has meant that a ‘quantified self’ movement, whose slogan is ‘self 
knowledge through numbers’(QS, 2015)has come into being. Here participants use 
devices to track and share all their personal quantifiable data (Walker Rettberg, 2014b, 
p. 61) from exercise, to sleep, to productivity, in the desire, like Dave Egger’s doctor in 
his dystopian novel, The circle ‘to measure what we'd like to measure—which is 
everything’(2013, p. 153). As Walker Rettberg points out, the fantasy of ‘closure and 
containment, knowing rather than not knowing, are seductive possibilities to 
many’(2014b, p. 74). The current marketing of ubiquitous IoT devices offers them as a 
responsiblised antidote to risk, providing ‘security, peace of mind’ (Alex Hawkinson, 
quoted in Dormehl, 2014) whether from our own unruly bodies, which might be secretly 
brewing up diseases to kill us, or from potential home invaders, who might be secretly 
lurking in our basements. 
  
6.3.4 The religious turn of digital technologies 
The concept of a self divided into a despised material body and a superior immaterial 
element, which has gained ascendency in internet culture, is not, of course, a new one. 
A dualist split into matter and spirit has been part of western religio-philosophical 
traditions for at least three thousand years, as Margaret Wertheim demonstrates in her 
account of historical conceptions of space and the sacred (Wertheim, 1999, p.28). 
Modernity, however, has situated us within a culture that is ‘profoundly materialist and 
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physicalist’ (ibid., p.29). The re-emergence of the concept of an immaterial self as the 
more valuable and ‘authentic’ part of our being holds strong resonances of the pre-
modern, that is to say, of medieval Christianity’s idea of the soul (Hayles, 1993, p.173-
90; Wertheim 1999, p.251-80) or of concepts from other pre-modern religions (Davis , 
2004, p.232). Internet mythmaking uses directly religious language and imagery and 
sometimes even makes explicit connections. As influential VR designer, Jason Lanier, 
has said, ‘I see the internet as a syncretic version of Christian ritual, I really do’ (quoted 
in Wertheim, 1999, p.253). Thus there is a sanctification of the internet, conceptualising 
it as ‘an idealised realm “above” and “beyond” the problems of a troubled material 
world … a utopian arena of equality, friendship and power’ (ibid., p.18) and the selves 
we are within it as transcendent. Erik Davis calls this religious turn ‘Techgnosis’ 
(Davis, 2004).  
 
More recent post-internet sanctification, as fictionalised in Gibsons’s most recent novel 
The Peripheral (2014), sees the network as an omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent 
presence keeping us, as responsiblised individuals, free from risk in a world of threat – 
as long as we believe enough and pay enough. 
 
Jameson, drawing on the diverse ideas of Edmund Burke and Susan Sontag, sees late 
capitalist technoculture manifesting as a kind of hysterical sublime (Jameson, 1991, 
p.4); others have used the term ‘the digital sublime’ in a slightly different way (Taylor, 
1999; Mosco, 2004). For Burke, writing in the first machine age, the sublime was a 
product of ‘the strongest emotion’ (Burke, 1757, loc.486) that, as well as exciting 
pleasure, was connected with horror, and with that which was ‘dark, uncertain, 
confused, [and] terrible,’ (ibid., loc.787) – or, in short, uncanny.  
 
Mobilising Jameson’s related concept of contemporary cultural experiences being 
marked by euphoria and a kind of shallow intensity (Jameson, 1991, p.40) we can see 
this this uncanny sublime as saturated with shallow affect. Jodi Dean describes how our 
use of communications and social media creates affective networks where we are driven 
to seek the satisfactions available when ‘every little tweet or comment, every forwarded 
image or petition accrues a tiny affective nugget’ (Dean, 2010, p.95). Failures of the 
network to link, comment, forward or ‘like’ our contributions also contribute affective 
resonance, producing uncertainty and anxiety (ibid., p.96). This moves us into the 
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subject position of the hysteric, in that we don’t know what we are for the (online) 
Other (out there, maybe), and so we fall back on the immediate, shallow, binding effect 
of the communicative network in all its banality and, in an echo of Zizek's argument 
about disembodiment, we are moved into the classic hysterical position where we are 
enjoined to speak our anxieties through the medium of the body by obsessing over 
disciplining, adorning and augmenting it. Internet of Things technologies offer us a new 
(and uncanny) dimension of bodily obsession, where we can use networked devices to 
constantly monitor, quantify and share our ‘wellbeing’ by surveilling all our bodily 
processes, waking and sleeping, 24/7.  
 
Even if we, in a post-Snowden world,
99
 are cynical about the extent to which we wish to 
be personally surveilled, IoT technologies may still interpellate us as their subject. As I 
argued in Chapter 5, the machines believe for us. We may not want to actually be 
surveilled by the State but we shrug and let it happen because our desires have become 
bound up with it. There was a Facebook joke posting in the fortnight after the Snowden 
revelations that offered, instead of the usual sorts of privacy options for postings (i.e. 
public/ only friends/ only close friends/ only me) the options of public/ only friends and 
the CIA/only me and the CIA/ only the CIA.
100
 We read it, we laughed knowingly and 
we carried on using Facebook – because the machine believes for us.  
  
The overstatement of claims for the world-changing nature of networked computers, has 
varied in type, if not in magnitude over the last three decades. In the nineties Bill Gates’ 
proclaimed that ‘we stand at the brink of another revolution…just about everything will 
be done differently’(Gates, 1995, p.3; p.7). Time magazine, in 2006 declared that ‘you’ 
were Time ‘person of the year’, because web 2.0 was ‘about the many wresting power 
from the few and helping one another for nothing … it's really a revolution’ (Grossman, 
2006). In the present decade, Wired magazine pronounced in 2013 that ‘the past two 
decades have seen a nuclear explosion in the collection and storage of digital 
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 Edward Snowden was an analyst with the US National Security Agency. In 2013 he leaked revelatory 
documents to the press about the extent to which the US was carrying out an international surveillance 
campaign, particularly with the complicity of telecommunications companies and other governments 
(The Guardian, 2013). 
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 See, for example, http://paulbernal.wordpress.com/2013/06/17/prism-share-with-the-cia-and-
facebook/  
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information’ leading to an ‘information revolution: big data has arrived at an almost 
unimaginable scale’ (Perlstein, 2013).  
 
These type of ‘cyberbole’101 together with the leveraging of the sublime, contribute to 
the ability of techno-mythology to create what Barthes refers to as ‘euphoric clarity’ 
(Barthes, quoted in Mosco, 2004, p.30). In this, complexities, tensions and conflicts are 
denied and smoothed over – or in Levi Strauss’ terms, they enable us to deal with social 
contradictions that cannot easily be resolved (Mosco, 2004, p.28). For Althusser, we are 
always already engaged, as subjects, in spinning myths about our relationship to the 
material world around us (Althusser, 1970); mythologising of the internet and the post-
internet world offers us additional sets of ways to fantasise our subjectivity. In my 
examples across three decades, above, for instance, the myth articulated is firstly that 
our world is being transformed, which then morphs, over time, into the idea that internet 
subjects are empowered by these changes, which later segues again to the idea that 
we’re all (simultaneously willing and unwilling) subjects of big data. That these 
concepts are contradictory does not stop us inhabiting and defining ourselves against the 
palimpsest of digital culture that they create. 
  
All of these myths both reveal and conceal something about the society that creates 
them; one of the things they attempt to conceal is the importance of our lived experience 
of the contested area of time, physical space and our material bodies (Mosco, 2004, p. 
19). It is these areas to which I now turn my attention, in the context of the university. 
 
6.4 Time of the university 
Mosco posits the idea that the digital world operates ‘by transcending what we once 
knew about time’ (Mosco, 2004, p.4), that is to say, by confounding our existing notions 
about what time is and how it operates within our daily lives. Manuel Castells argues 
that the power relationships which shape a social formation are built into that society’s 
social construction of time (Castells, 2009, p.33-6). He sees networked capitalism as 
dissolving time ‘by disordering the sequence of events and making them simultaneous 
in the communication networks, thus installing society in structured ephemerality’ 
(Castells, 2009, p.35). Similarly, Jameson, back in 1991, observed the start of social and 
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cultural formations being ‘dominated by categories of space rather than by categories of 
time’ (Jameson, 1991, p.24). 
 
Any ‘internetisation’ of time, in a university context, is an overlay (and competitor to) a 
form of temporality that, itself, differs from the world outside educational institutions, 
as Elaine Showalter demonstrates in her discussion of academic time (Showalter, 2005, 
pp. 9-15). Showalter observes that academic time is ‘organized and compartmentalized 
according to various grids and calendars, vacations and rituals’( ibid., p.9), with the 
three terms being characterised, respectively by hope in the autumn, a winter of 
endurance and anticipation in the spring (ibid., p.12). Barcan argues that there are two 
sorts of academic time: scholarly time, which is characterised by long-term ‘big 
temporality’ (Barcan, 2013, locs. 2328) and requires a degree of seclusion from 
everyday time; and teaching time, which has its own rhythms and rituals. The temporal 
structure of Universities attempts to encompass both these forms of time (Barcan, 2013, 
locs. 2328-67).  
 
In Britain, university time differs from the Gregorian
102
 calendar year, which begins in 
January; the agricultural cycle, which starts with spring; and the financial year, which 
commences in April. Originally designed to fit in with the (pre-industrial) farming year, 
by beginning in autumn academic time starts when the harvest has been gathered in. At 
the same time as it accommodates, in literal terms, the physical, semi-natural, world of 
agricultural production, which Castells designates as ‘biological time’ (Castells, 2009, 
p.34) it also, in terms of what it stands for, exists in opposition both to that world and to 
other temporal structures. Offering another form of temporality to the ordinary, 
quotidian world, it is a structure of time that defines itself as being of the mind, of 
knowledge and of culture rather than being of the biological, the material, the everyday 
and the financial. Assisted by the remnants of an ecclesiastical past, which are 
demonstrated in the continued naming of terms as Lent, Trinity and Michaelmas in 
older institutions (Barcan, 2013, loc. 2367), academic time has an overlay of the sacred 
about it, as opposed to the profane ordinariness of the everyday. These sacred 
connotations are partially constituted and emphasised by the rituals and routines that 
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 The introduction of the Gregorian Calendar to Britain in 1752 provoked ‘Calendar riots’ on the streets 
(Poole, 1998); perhaps the rioting workers would have agreed with Castell’s perspective – that power 
relationships speak themselves through the social construction of time (Castells, 2009, p.33-6).  
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structure academic time, giving meaning to it and narrativity to academic experience. 
Bourdieu discusses how the rituals of educational organisations ‘consecrate those 
entrusted to them’ (Bourdieu, 2003, p.291, italics in original) and speak of ‘a whole set 
of rites of the academic tradition, which have the function and effect of giving the 
solemn sanction of the assembled collectivity’ (ibid.).  
 
6.4.1 Time and ritual 
Graduation ceremonies are one example of such rites. These are self-consciously 
elaborate, codified events, involving ‘the mace and the trumpets, the Latin and the 
sonorous orations, the elaborate costumes, the doffing of hats’ (Feldman, 2013); the 
academic body, draped with the robes of their respective alma maters, processes 
solemnly before a student body, newly wrapped in the colours of the university. 
 
Such rituals need to be seen in the context of neoliberal pressures to change the 
structure and rhythm of academic time. These influences seek to accelerate academic 
time and compartmentalise it differently, making it more like commercial time, with 
24/7 libraries and online learning environments, fourth-term ‘summer schools’ and fast-
tracked degrees (Giroux, 2007; Hartman and Darab, 2012, p.53-7). Rituals such as 
graduation represent both a resistance to commercialisation in that they underline how 
universities and university time are quite unlike the business world, and a capitulation to 
it, as they enact a commodified spectacle of student outcome for those providing the 
student income. 
 
6.4.2 Fast academia and new forms of ritual 
The socially constructed nature of time renders it plastic, as many have observed. 
Castells sees the ‘clock-time’(Castells, 2009, p.34), which we take for granted, as a 
creation of industrial capitalism enabling the disciplinary ordering of tasks (what can be 
measured can be managed) overlaying ‘biological time’ which represents ‘the life-
cycles of nature’ (ibid.). High modernism explicitly ‘makes strange’ received notions of 
time: 
Time, unfortunately, though it makes animals and vegetables bloom and 
fade with amazing punctuality, has no such simple effect upon the mind 
of man. The mind of man, moreover, works with equal strangeness upon 
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the body of time. An hour, once it lodges in the queer element of the 
human spirit, may be stretched to fifty or a hundred times its clock 
length; on the other hand, an hour may be accurately represented on the 
timepiece of the mind by one second. 
(Woolf, 1928, loc.923-6) 
 
The whole idea of time being re-imagined as ‘24/7’ in technocultural capitalism, what 
David Cameron enthusiastically refers to as the move to ‘a world on fast forward’ where 
we ‘will only succeed if we have a relentless drive for new ideas and innovations’(The 
Guardian, 2014) is in itself a denial of the existing temporal rhythms and behaviours of 
the world. As Castells suggests, in a late modern take on Marx’s modernist idea of the 
‘annihilation of space by time’ (Marx, 1857-8, p.539), this is a: 
relentless effort to annihilate time … by compressing time (as in split-second 
global financial transactions or the generalized practice of multitasking, 
squeezing more activity into a given time); on the other hand, by blurring the 
sequence of social practices, including past, present, and future in a random 
order, like in the electronic hypertext of Web 2.0.  
(Castells, 2009, p.35) 
 
This approach to time conceptualises a human subject who, machine-like, is ‘always 
on’, occupying an environment both barren and bland103. As Jonathan Crary, in a study 
of the neoliberal reinvention of time, says: 
A 24/ 7 world is a disenchanted one in its eradication of shadows and 
obscurity and of alternate temporalities. It is a world identical to itself, a 
world with the shallowest of pasts, and thus in principle without specters. 
(Crary, 2013, loc.474-5) 
 
Thus Crary’s permanent, past-less, future-less, present also collapses the boundaries 
between work and leisure and eradicates what is unimportant to it: ‘billions of dollars 
are spent every year researching how to reduce decision-making time, how to eliminate 
the useless time of reflection and contemplation’ (Crary, 2013, loc.236-7). As a 
                                                          
103
 Psychoanalyst, Darian Leader, in a Lacanian account of the significant increase in diagnosise of 
depression in the UK, suggests that it may be an inevitable result of this form of fast capitalism, as 
depression is a form of resistance to this enforced efficiency and effectivenes: ‘the refusal of current 
forms of mastery and domination’. (2008, p.13) 
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temporal construct, this could hardly be more oppositional to the needs of academic life 
as Yvonne Hartman and Sandy Darab demonstrate in their study of the application of 
fast time to the university. They call this approach as ‘speedy scholarship’(2012, p.49), 
and propose that it tends to close down ‘intellectual reflection, scholarly debate and 
engagement with ideas’ (2012, p.55) for students and staff on ‘speeded-up’ courses. 
Hartman and Darab argue instead for ‘slow scholarship’ which they see as 
‘distinguished by engaging with ideas through deep reflection, experiential learning, 
and reflexivity, ultimately resulting in critical insight, creativity, and innovation’(2012, 
p.58). 
 
Within the quotidian rituals of academic life, which may vary from one kind of 
institution to another, but will include such events as departmental and team meetings, 
away days, senate, lectures, seminars and tutorials, it is possible to detect an a struggle 
between competing temporal discourses as they battle to shape a collective meaning. In 
examining the role of such rituals in the production, or as Bourdieu might say, the 
‘expectation of consecration’ of the academic subject, anthropologist Robert Gibb 
describes how staff meetings operate as ‘rites of incorporation for newly appointed 
lecturers’ (Gibb, 2003, para.3). But incorporated into which culture is the question – a 
worldview that valorises the pursuit, exchange and discussion of knowledge or one 
which pursues rather different ends.  
 
To illustrate this I take the example of a form of university ritual which has been 
introduced in most higher education institutions since the massification phase – the 
validation of a new course or programme of study. Like many aspects of bureaucratic 
innovation in higher education, under a guise of ensuring transparency and rationality, 
this process smuggles in something quite different. Such a ritual involves the production 
of a document which describes, in detailed and strictly codified terms, every single 
imaginable aspect of a course, including a business case for its existence in the first 
place and imagined career routes for its eventual graduates.
104
 For example, in a part-
time course for adult learners, for which I led the validation process at a post-92 
university in 2008, we had to include: policy drivers that supported the existence of 
                                                          
104
 See, for example the University of Sussex guidelines for validating courses which summarises all this 
(and more) rather neatly: https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=validation-
overview-feb-2013.pdf&site=368. 
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such a course; evidence that there was a market for the course; and evidence that there 
would be an employment market for our graduates (despite the fact that they already 
had jobs) several years down the line. All of which we dutifully supplied and all of 
which, already imaginary, were rendered meaningless when the economy was driven 
into financial collapse the following year. Even the main policy driver for this initiative, 
namely the Leitch agenda
105
 on lifelong learning, moved from New Labour HE policy 
centre stage to the cupboard of forgotten government initiatives (Leitch, 2006; 
Henderson-Morrow, 2013). 
 
But, reality apart, in the validation process esoteric forms and formulae must be 
employed to create the sacred text, in a process that becomes about the document itself 
rather than anything external. Gnomic mantras about ‘learning outcomes’ and 
‘transferable skills’ must be repeated, reverently, in the appropriate boxes, 
benchmarking against national subject frameworks and universal qualification level 
descriptors must be ritually performed. For example, in the course validation I 
mentioned earlier, each module had to be represented by a list of: Aims, Learning 
Outcomes, Curriculum Content, Teaching and Learning Strategies, Assessment 
Strategies, Major Categories of Assessment, Achieving a Pass and then, finally 
Bibliography.
106
 Completing such set of tasks, several years before they are actually 
going to meet the students and teach the module, is a highly imaginative act on the part 
of the module leader. 
 
Many hours, days, weeks and months of academic time must be offered up to the 
completion of the sacred validation document. Once a course is validated, the reified 
validation document assumes the status of a holy text that must not be deviated from 
under any circumstances. What I am describing here is the sanctification of a 
bureaucratised ritual of audit and control, where activities formerly occupying the realm 
of the profane are elevated to the sacred, making notions of what is sacred or profane in 
academia a contested area. 
 
                                                          
105
 The Leitch Report, Review of skills: prosperity for all in the global economy - world class skills, 
stressed the social and economic need for higher education to be made available to working adults 
(Leitch, 2006). 
106
 A list that seems to me now so arbitrary that it brings to mind Jorge Luis Borges’ taxonomy Celestial 
Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge (Foucault, 1966, p.xv). 
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Another way of thinking about contested temporal cultures in universities is to consider 
academic diaries. In a literal sense, personal engagement diaries are the place where one 
determines how one’s time is spent; traditionally, paper-based diaries have been used 
for this, but the last 15 years or so have seen the introduction of shared access, 
electronic ‘open’ diaries into universities. In an open-diary system, others can determine 
an individual’s time, ‘inviting’ them to meetings where there is an event-free space in 
the person’s day; the layout and the way screen diaries are configured invite every 
fraction of every hour to be filled up with events.
107
 A paper-based diary may contain 
events that the user puts in them, but it implies other non-allocated time in between 
these. Many normal academic activities don’t easily map to screen diaries designed for 
the commercial world. Who would boldly state, in front of the unblinking gaze of the 
whole department, that they were planning to spend a whole afternoon reading, or an 
hour or two thinking? As Stefan Collini wryly points out when considering the issue of 
‘Don’s diaries’, ‘published scholarship quite often involves an elaborate exercise in 
covering one’s tracks’ (Collini, 2012, p.148). Even specifying a length of time for 
preparing lectures is uncomfortable – too long and it might be deduced that the person 
doesn’t know their subject – too short and it looks negligent. It may be that there is 
something about the academic role that is innately a little fugitive, as Collini implies, 
but the shared screen diary also represents a clear example of the imposition of 
neoliberal time onto university life and counter-practices, such as using a private diary, 
form a resistance to this. Or maybe an act of survival.  
 
6.4.3 Sanctifying quantification 
What such rituals of audit and control discussed above are ultimately sanctifying is 
quantification; the practice of bureaucracy which reduces all activity and thought to 
numerical code. What can be measured can be managed. In the rite of the validation the 
entire process of planning a structured opportunity for learning is reduced to set of tick 
boxes on a checklist. 
 
The elevation of quantification to an epistemic virtue is explored by boyd and 
Crawford, in relation to the currently ubiquitous concept of big data. They highlight: 
                                                          
107
 Weiser’s prediction that we will have ‘appointment diaries that write themselves’ may mean in 
practice that a range of others write our diaries and our various electronic devices aggregate 
information from a range of sources – as they are already beginning to do (Weiser, 1991, p.99).  
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the widespread belief that big data sets offer a higher form of intelligence and 
knowledge that can generate insights that were previously impossible, with the 
aura of truth, objectivity and accuracy.  
(boyd and Crawford, 2012, p.663) 
 
Consequently, the non-numerical is reduced to an epistemic vice and qualitative 
perspectives are seen in the same light as superstition because of the false validity, the 
sacredness with which the quantitative becomes imbued. 
 
6.5 The space of the university 
In the postscript to Section 2 of this thesis, I began to consider the idea of universities as 
physical spaces. I argued that both the effect of universities being situated in their 
locale, but not being ‘of’ it (as they are national and international) and the influence of 
much of the choice – or happenstance – of university architecture, taken together with a 
number of other factors, contribute to a sense of liminality and uncanniness about the 
physical space of universities. 
 
Space as a social construct, encodes values and meanings which influence the spatial 
practices of those who occupy it; the production of space also produces knowledge and 
meanings which are inevitably conflictual and contradictory (Lefebre,1974; Schmid, 
2008, pp.41-3). In a Times Higher discussion of the architecture of higher education, 
Matthew Reisz says ‘space touches on just about all the tension points within 
universities’ (Reisz, 2010, para.2). He goes on to suggest that whilst academics may be 
able to ignore some unpalatable aspects of their university’s business ‘in so far as 
buildings express corporate values, they are inescapable’(ibid.).  
 
In a study of the spatial models adopted in higher education, Pablo Calvo-Sotelo sees 
university architecture as a ‘confrontation between dream and reality, convergence and 
deviation, Utopia and disenchantment’(Calvo-Sotelo, 2001, p.184). It is also a collision 
between the sacred and profane. Changes to UK university buildings during the 
massification years speak about conflictual perspectives and the tussle for sanctity. 
From a managerial perspective, the marketing value of the external appearance is key. 
The Vice-Chancellor of Nottingham, David Greenaway, speaks about having created a 
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new campus that ‘says something powerful to our students and staff … about our values 
and commitment’(Reisz, 2010, para.28); Philip Ogden, Senior Vice-Principal of Queen 
Mary, speaks about his university’s development as being ‘architecturally innovative’ 
and stresses the ‘symbolisms of impressive new buildings’(ibid., para.32). Human 
geographer Nigel Thrift sees such developments as ‘in keeping with an architectural 
rhetoric about changing working which arose in the mid-1980s’ and has now 
established itself as orthodoxy’(Thrift , 2006, p.293). Discourse around these 
developments tend to emphasise the neoliberal shibboleths of ‘flexibility’, ‘adaptability’ 
and ‘efficiency’, qualities which help to produce a consumable world that has, within 
this mindset, a sense of ‘rightness’ – what Thrift terms ‘efficacy’ (Thrift , 2006, p.282). 
Educationalist Margaret A . Miller enthusiastically recommends that ‘campus space 
should be flexible … it should allow for changes’ (Miller, 2004, p.6), adding ‘we will 
need private financial support to develop our campuses in line with our visions’ (ibid., 
p.7). Thrift views these architectural developments as a means by which capitalism 
attempts to boost knowledge production and innovation by designing ‘new space time 
arrangements’ (Thrift , 2006, p.290), with university ‘buildings [that] are meant to 
manipulate time and space in order to produce intensified social interaction’ (Thrift, 
2006, p.292). Ogden places an emphasis on changes in working practices, saying ‘space 
matters a lot in influencing people’s behavior’; his ‘innovative’ campus includes an 
open-plan office, housing 300 academic staff (Reisz, 2010, para.32-33).  
 
6.5.1 The academic body and office space 
A move to communal academic office space marks many building initiatives of these 
years. Liverpool University’s building project involves creating open-plan academic 
offices which Steve Dickson, the director of facility management, sees as a move to 
‘make space more productive’ (ibid., para.48). Asked about academic staff views on this 
he says ‘there can be some initial reluctance, but … we can meet the goals of an 
efficient design alongside academic goals’ (ibid., para.50). These comments neatly 
encapsulate the irony of a neoliberal perspective – space is productive, and design is 
efficient – in contrast to the goals of academics. Which, by implication, are neither 
productive nor efficient, like their owners. And unlike the buildings around them.  
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http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/campushorizons/developments/hadynellis/ ©Cardiff University 
Fig. 24: Architect’s drawing of the Hadyn Ellis building at Cardiff 
 
 
In Malcom Bradbury’s novel of university life, The History Man, new campus buildings 
are constantly being planned at Watermouth University, to the extent that the VC ‘had 
the reputation for suffering from building mania, or, as it was put, an “Edifice 
complex”’ (Bradbury, 1975, p.47). The massification years have been filled with 
university building projects, to the extent that it’s become normal for there to always be 
the planned ‘new building’ at any UK university – one which may or may not come to 
pass. This fantasy building represented in spreadsheets and CGI drawings like the one 
in Fig. 24 is more than Bradbury’s ‘Edifice complex’; it’s an embodiment of 
management desire for sacred, soaring, glass and brick perfection, unsullied by 
troublesome, unruly bodies of staff or students. In the illustration above, pure, white 
space is substituted for the profane fleshliness of bodies.  
 
Reflecting on his own experience as a historian in both British and US universities, 
Bernard Wasserstein sees the ‘conditions for efficient scholarly productivity’ as 
consisting of ‘privacy, peace and quiet, and book and document storage space’ (ibid., 
para.10). In an ethnographic study of a change from cubicle offices to open-plan 
arrangements in a British university, Rachel Hurdley draws attention to the importance 
of the informal and pliable connective space of corridors; used by everyone, these 
spaces permit a range of social and communicative behaviours which are lost in a 
change to open-plan environments. Using the example of the medieval hall she 
demonstrates that the hierarchical divisions of space do not necessarily need walls and 
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concludes that ‘flexibility, accessibility and openness by design does not necessarily 
lead to these qualities in practice’ (Hurdley, 2010, p.60). 
  
Communal offices can have an atomising effect. ‘There is something isolating about 
forced togetherness,’ reflects Peter Lennox, drawing on his own experience of open-
plan working in the University of Derby (Lennox, 2010, para.6). ‘If the office is just the 
office, where is academia? Some other place, some other time’ (ibid., para.7). The effect 
of open-plan academic offices inevitably means that much work has to be done at home, 
decreasing the amount of time staff spend on campus. Kunz et al., in a case study of a 
faculty re-build, describe how such changes, far from improving communication, 
actually impacted negatively on the established faculty community of practice, 
particularly for early-career academics, partly because staff spent more time working 
from home and partly because they no longer had private space where informal 
conversations could be held (Kunz et al., 2012). 
 
A meta-study of the effects of open-plan offices for staff suggests that lack of privacy is 
‘an unsolved negative aspect’ but that employees and managers have differing views on 
this (Ding, 2008, p.401). I suggest that it is an unsolvable negative aspect because the 
erosion of privacy is actually part of the disciplinary philosophy behind open-plan 
offices, hence the discrepancy Ding finds between employee and management 
perspective. Open-plan offices operate as a form of what Mark Andrejevic calls a 
‘participatory panopticon’ (Andrejevic, 2012, p.239) replacing the single, authoritative 
watcher at the centre of Bentham’s model with distributed ‘others’. The introduction of 
this into academia as part of the neoliberal project effectively creates a form of peer 
surveillance where staff not only get used to ‘an emerging surveillance regime’ but also 
become ‘habituated to a culture in which we are all expected to monitor one another’ 
(Andrejevic, 2012, p.239, my italics).  
 
Whilst within technocultural mythmaking the presence of the body in any location is 
irrelevant, in the university workplace it becomes a site of conflict. If lack of quiet 
office space leads to an individual having to work from home, the peer surveillance 
machine means they can be stigmatised as lazy or disengaged. ‘Not being “around” two 
days in a row would result in pointed remarks from administrative staff and other 
colleagues,’ Gibb says, reflecting on his own experience in a new university (Gibb, 
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2003). However, what an open-plan strategy does is forcibly relocate the academic body 
to other environments to enable the subject to carry out essential work tasks. This is 
usually the home, but as is the case for many 21
st
-century knowledge workers, it can be 
a public space, such as the coffee shop; interestingly, as libraries become virtual, it is 
less likely to be the traditional scholarly haunt of the physical library.  
 
So the subject is here always placed in the position of bodily transgression with regard 
to regimes of discipline and control. The compliant body that observes injunctions to 
occupy its allocated office space when not teaching or in meetings produces a subject 
who conforms to expectations of physical presence; at the same time, it is more likely to 
produce a subject who fails to comply with other institutional expectations – 
particularly the research output demanded by the Research Excellence Framework. 
 
6.5.2 Transitional space and the digital workplace 
If the academic body is frequently and inevitably manoeuvred into a transgressive space 
then the disembodied academic must strive to negotiate their subjectivity in online 
space. In previous chapters I considered the metaphor of Lacan’s mirror stage as a way 
of exploring internet subjectivity. As Deborah Luepnitz suggests in her analysis of ‘the 
space between Winnicott and Lacan’ (Luepnitz, 2009, p.957), Lacan’s re-working of 
Freud focuses on a tragic reading, as I discussed in Chapter 4 and also harnesses 
Freud’s ironic approach as I explored in Chapter 5. It is an unheimlich, abstract and 
radical worldview, which concentrates on desire, alienation, language and absence 
(Luepnitz, 2009; Kirschner, 2010). An alternative way of employing psychoanalytic 
theory to think about the negotiation of the digital self is to leverage Donald Winnicott’s 
concept of transitional objects and transitional space. Winnicott’s version of Freud 
differs from Lacan’s in that it is humanist in approach, focusing on concrete relations, 
wholeness and presence. It embraces the comic and the social, foregrounding the self as 
social agent (Luepnitz, 2009; Kirschner, 2010).  
 
In Winnicott’s reading, the transitional object of early infanthood is an item such as a 
soft toy or a blanket that the infant begins to realise is separate from itself. The infant 
also realises that the object is separate from its mother. The object becomes a focus for 
forceful emotions, desires and fantasies that the baby had previously directed solely at 
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the mother. This gives the infant a sense of power as, unlike the mother, the object does 
not go away. Thus the object becomes a defence against anxiety for the infant as it 
insulates them from their own vulnerability. The infant becomes highly attached to the 
object, which it views as having magical properties. The object opens up a creative 
space where the infant learns to distinguish between ‘me’ and ‘not me’ to differentiate 
between fantasy and reality and to create meaning. This space, which is neither the 
internal world of the individual nor the shared social world is the third space – 
Winnicott’s transitional or potential space. It is through this space, which for children is 
a space of imagination and play, Winnicott argues, that we develop subjectivity 
(Winnicott, 1971). 
 
Roger Silverstone uses Winnicott’s concept of transitional objects and transitional space 
to model our relationship with media. In adults the transitional space becomes an area 
which continues to offer us ‘relief from the strains of inner and outer reality’ 
(Silverstone, 1994, p.12) which we fill with the adult version of imagination and play – 
cultural work and cultural objects. Silverstone argues that we rely on the media, 
particularly on television, to enable us to populate this area with objects and activities. 
He stresses the relevance of Winnicott’s point that there is both a ‘paradox and 
acceptance of the paradox’ (Winnicott, 1971, p.119, italics in original) because ‘we will 
never challenge the baby to elicit an answer to the question: did you create that or did 
you find it?’ (ibid.). That is to say, the viewers of TV will both find their screen objects, 
through watching TV, and create them. They create them because it is the viewer’s 
imaginative work which endows proto-objects with significance and meaning, 
projecting onto them an emotional intensity, as the viewer cathects – and creates – their 
object - as the cult of celebrities who are ‘famous for being famous’ would suggest. 
 
These ideas have also been applied to computational media. For example, Caroline 
Bainbridge and Candida Yates use Winnicott’s concept of the transitional object to 
develop a psycho-cultural approach to digital media. They see the ‘intertwining of 
emotional lives … with media objects (and more specifically as objects of our inner 
worlds)’ as ‘crucial in demonstrating the extent to which media have become integral to 
subjectivity’(Bainbridge and Yates, 2011, p.ii; see also Bainbridge and Yates, 2014). 
Sherry Turkle uses Winnicott’s notion of transitional space to think about children’s 
relationship to robot toys (2007); Jon Dovey and Helen Kennedy explore Silverstone’s 
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approach to play in relation in their work on game theory (Dovey and Kennedy, 2006) ; 
Rivka Ribak uses Winnicott to theorise the idea of mobile phones as transitional objects 
in teenage culture (Ribak 2009; 2013); and Matt Hills considers social media as a form 
of transitional space (Hills, 2014). 
 
 
Online environments, then, are a third space of cultural experience, cathected objects 
and imaginative illusion (Robins, 1995, p.804). Like other potential spaces, they are 
also zones of disillusion; the transitional objects of technoculture mediate the constant 
shift between illusion and disillusion which continue to produce our subjectivity, partly 
by our reality testing of ‘me’ and ‘not me’.  
 
Use of mobile media underlines the potential of computational objects to fulfil this role; 
like the ‘traditional’ transitional object of infanthood – the Linus blanket, the teddy bear 
– mobile media are something we are loath to let out of our hands or our sight and we 
become irrationally anxious and distressed if separated from them. In the technocultural 
transitional space, however, the objects we cathect in order to attain subjectivity are 
partly comprised of code. If we introject them and make them part of our psychic 
landscape what they offer us, then, is cyborg-like connectivity with the technics. In the 
workplace of the university this connection further conditions subjectivity. The 
acquisition by university ‘office’ devices - the smartphone, tablet, and/or laptop - of 
transitional object status means that not only can the subject carry their work 
everywhere, but that they feel a drive to do so. We don’t just take work home with us, 
we’re only at home if we’re working. 
 
Like Lacan’s mirror, the transitional space can function malignantly, as well as being 
able to help us to construct a socially viable sense of self (Zinkin, 1983). Bernard 
Steigler, adopting a Winnicottian view to develop an account of digital subjecthood, 
describes the transitional object as the place where desire is created (Steigler et al., 
2012, p.179) enabling a ‘relationship of love’ and the ‘feeling that “life is worth living”’ 
(Steigler 2013, p.2). In this, he draws on Derrida’s conception of the pharmakon as 
something that both has oppositional qualities and is the ‘différance of difference’ 
(Derrida, 1972, p.127) the place where meaning breaks down, and is rebuilt (or not). He 
sees the transitional object as the first pharmakon we find/create. It can, therefore, be 
internal /external and curative/toxic, playing a role in the creation of addictions, 
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depression or violence as well as enabling more socially acceptable creative behaviours 
(Steigler, 2013, p.3).  
 
In its role in the creation of the always on, technologised, cyborg subject of the 
neoliberal workplace I mentioned earlier, the object can thus be seen as playing a part 
in, from one perspective, the positive and productive, socially acceptable behaviour of 
the dedicated professional. At the same time, from a different perspective, it has a role 
in encouraging and distorting the subject’s desire so that it presents as the compulsive, 
addicted, obsessive behaviour of the person who is unable to stop working . As Ros Gill 
discusses ‘metaphors of addiction, obsession and failure’ are regularly used by 
academics to speak about their relationship to workplace technologies (Gill, 2014, 
p.22). The irony is that the technics encourage the subject (did you find that or did you 
create it?) to do this to themselves. Furthermore, the image of the first perspective, the 
dedicated, responsiblised professional leads them, in line with university culture, to 
validate the compulsive behaviour.  
 
The transitional object, as Winnicott suggests, can also be a space where religious 
impulses are created, a point which resonates with the ideas about the sanctification of 
technology I discussed earlier. Thus the introjection of the object becomes a form of 
(psychic and digital) religious communion weaving a heady element of the sublime into 
the addictive behaviour. 
 
Silverstone discusses how television operates, in a world which the subject finds 
stressful and threatening, to ameliorate the anxiety that it participates in producing. 
Networked culture occupies a similar area of ideological space, providing for us the 
focus of our daily rituals, which enable us to sustain a (false) sense of ontological 
security. In the university workplace, not only does the technical transitional object 
provide us with the stress and pressure of yet another email or appointment, it also 
provide us with the release of tapping onto other sites to soothe ourselves with banality 
– or even of the ‘escape into more’ of opening a different email. Importantly, it provides 
something that is always there and always on, in our negotiations of ‘me and ‘not me’, 
and is always ready with something new for us to love or hate. Or ‘like’. 
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6.6 Fragmentation, risk and (dis)embodiment 
In the workplace of the university, the spatial and temporal world of buildings, ritual, 
timetables and meetings is always presented as the authentic, physical, material, ‘real 
thing’, so the academic subject must be organised in relation to this. But the subject is 
also, always, the immaterial self – of knowledge and ideas, and also of mediated 
technoculture. Consequently, in relation to the disciplinary regime of the university, the 
subject is always being made to fragment. The rituals of bureaucracy purport to produce 
the risk-free university, managed through spectacle, newly sanctified rites, statistical 
ritual, and through continuous surveillance of staff. This is meant to provide a 
collective, institutional ontological security. This succeeds only partially in its own 
terms, and much has to be sacrificed for this partial success. 
 
There is a permanent conflict, for the academic subject, between this surreal idea of risk 
mitigation and a sense of personal, professional judgement. The judgement must always 
be suppressed, or consigned to fugitive ‘guerrilla’ activities; the pretence of operating in 
line with bureaucratic diktat must always be maintained. Discussing how embodiment 
operates in relation to the virtual, Bassett argues that at same time as the subject is 
forced to split, there is also the demand that they reconcile themselves into a coherent 
narrative (Bassett, 2009, para.41-3), particularly at ‘moments when … coercion is 
exercised (ibid., para.43) The split academic subject is forced to attempt the 
(impossible) reconciliative task of ‘giving an account of oneself’ precisely at such 
moments of control or coercion: in the promotion interview, the annual performance 
review meeting, or in front of the appointments panel. As I’ll discuss in more detail in 
Chapter 9, as academic identity becomes increasingly mediated, injunctions to give 
public ‘accounts of oneself’ also increase. Privacy may not yet be theft, as it is in 
Eggers world of The circle (2013, p.303), but it begins to border on the secretive and the 
uncivic; in the space and time of mediated disembodiment, the body becomes laden 
with new meanings, unfeasible expectations and improbable duties.  
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7 Chapter 7 – Teaching and technoculture: phantom objects on 
unhomely ground 
 
7.1 Preface 
This chapter was written in 2013-14. It leverages the literatures to map out and theorise 
the shifts in academic subjectivity implied by changing approaches to teaching and 
learning. It also draws on two small surveys of academic staff I carried out in 2006-7 
and 2008, using various theoretical perspectives to situate and understand the findings 
from these studies. 
7.2 Approach 
In this chapter I set out to explore how changes in the technologies used by academic 
staff in their teaching have impacted on their subjectivity. I will be looking back at more 
established technocultures which utilise embodied interaction and print technology and 
newer ones which use digital technologies and are often referred to as ‘e-learning’. As 
part of this I will use the findings of the two studies I carried out into academic response 
to digital teaching technologies. In order to place all this into a historical and cultural 
context, I’ll use the same historical periodising I employed in Section 2 when tracing 
the development of higher education, before coming back to look more closely at the 
current period. 
 
In theorising the subject positions which various approaches to teaching offer, I will 
leverage Lacan’s concept of the four discourses to develop a reading of how the subject 
is constituted by the discursive practices of the lecture, the seminar and other teaching 
forms (Lacan, 1969-70). Proposed by Lacan in his 1969-70 Seminars, published as The 
Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XV11, the four discourses are: the discourse of the 
master; the discourse of the university; the discourse of the analyst; and the discourse of 
the hysteric (Lacan, 1969-70). They are part of Lacan’s oeuvre that have not been 
widely used in literary or cultural studies (Homer, 2005, p.13). This is, perhaps, because 
they are thought of as relating rather more to clinical practice than to cultural theory, 
offering, as they do, differing subject positions for analyst and analysand during the 
process of psychoanalysis. However, as Lacan says ‘I mention analytic experience in 
this connection only because it gives this a precise designation’(Lacan, 1969-70, p.13). 
In Lacan’s text, as Mark Bracher argues, each discourse propose a different form of 
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intersubjectivity which is ‘constitutive of the social order’(Bracher, 1994, p.108) and so 
has meaning for other contexts where social bonds are negotiated through language. 
Bracher deploys the four discourses in his account of Lacanian intersubjectivity and the 
relevance of psychoanalysis to the social. In this chapter, in addition to my own reading 
of Lacan, I will draw on Bracher’s account, applying it specifically to the context of the 
intersubjectivity negotiated in teaching situations. 
 
In Lacan’s schemata each discourse has 4 positions: an agent who speaks the discourse; 
an other to whom the discourse is addressed; a product, which the discourse creates; 
and a form of truth, which it expresses. In each of the different discourses, the following 
signifiers occupy, in turn, each of those positions: the master signifier; knowledge; the 
subject; and object a. For example, in the discourse of the master, the master signifier is 
in the agent position and the subject is in the positon of truth, whereas in the discourse 
of the hysteric is the subject who is the agent and what is produced is knowledge 
(Lacan, 1969-70, pp. 9-68)
108
. 
I’ll come back to the meanings produced in different educational contexts as they 
become appropriate in this chapter. The discourses were formulated by Lacan following 
the student uprisings in May 1968 when ideas about the university, knowledge and 
authority were very much to the fore, nowhere more so than Paris, where Lacan gave 
his seminars. This makes them particularly pertinent to this chapter and the way in 
which teachers negotiate the positions available in the four discourses offer a fertile way 
of thinking about how pedagogic practice serves to produce the academic subject.  
 
In addition to psychoanalytic theory, later in the chapter when I begin to discuss online 
learning developments I will also mobilise the materialist concept of reification to 
theorise the relationship between the academic subject and the material they produce. 
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 Tracing the intersubjective meanings produced by the full placing of the signifiers in the schemata is 
outside the scope of this work, aside from where they are discussed in relation to educational context. 
However, for completeness, the full placing is as follows: In the master’s discourse, the master signifier 
is in theposition of agent, knowledge is in the position of the other, the subject occupies the position of 
truth and objet a is the product; in the university discourse, knowledge is in theposition of agent, objet a 
is in the position of the other, the master signifier occupies the position of truth and the subject is the 
product;in the hysteric’s discourse, the subject is in theposition of agent, the master signifier is in the 
position of the other, objet a occupies the position of truth and is the product is knowldege; and in the 
discourse of the analyst objet a is in theposition of agent, the subject is in the position of the other, 
knowledge occupies the position of truth and the master signifier is produced (Lacan, 1969-70, pp. 9-
68). 
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7.3 Elitist establishments – and small-group teaching 
Firstly I will consider small-group and one-to-one teaching practices. This method was 
established in Oxford as part of the 19
th
-century reforms (Anderson, 1992, p.8). It 
remains commonly used in the Oxford or Cambridge tutorial or supervision sessions, 
where groups of one to three students meet with an academic member of staff on a 
weekly basis to discuss a specific topic, with students giving papers on the topic and 
getting feedback (Ashwin, 2005, p.632). A small-group form of teaching allied to this, 
but with a larger number of students, is the model more widely used in higher 
education, where groups of around eight to 20 students meet with a member of 
academic staff on a weekly basis in a seminar or tutorial to discuss a topic related to the 
weekly lecture (Barcan, 2013, loc.3660). The one-to-one tutorial or supervision session 
is also a way of inducting students engaged with research projects into the practice of 
research, something that is important in terms of the Homboldtian model of a 
community of scholars (Anderson, 2006, loc.54). 
 
These approaches are based on the principle of Socratic or Platonic dialogue where 
learning takes place via discussion with a more knowledgeable individual (see Saren 
and Neisser, 2004, for a detailed account of this). The subject position offered to the 
academic, by these forms of small-group teaching, is that of authoritative guide or 
mentor.  
 
7.3.1 The discourse of the analyst 
From a Lacanian perspective, the discursive position into which the academic subject is 
interpellated by the small-group pedagogic approach is that of the analyst. In this the 
lecturer encourages the students to speak, attempting to frame an interchange which 
produces authentic knowledge – as opposed to the inauthentic or instrumental 
knowledge that the discourse of the university or the master would produce, as I’ll 
discuss later. As Bracher, proposes, this is knowledge in continual flight from closure, 
which does not offer ‘unequivocal meanings … or values’ (Bracher,1994, p.124-5). 
This discursive approach serves to induct students into the culture and practices of 
academe and as an embodied, shared event, it carries an affective charge.  
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That isn’t to say that a lecturer might not choose a different discursive position in a 
seminar or tutorial; they could choose one which is less disruptive of closed systems of 
knowledge and taken-for-granted attitudes, such as the discourse of the master, which is 
more inclined to offer unequivocal meanings; as Lacan says of teaching, ‘it is easy, after 
all, to spin off into a discourse of mastery’ (Lacan, 1969-70, p.69).  
 
7.4 Modernist metropolitan developments – and the lecture 
Lectures were, naturally, used in earlier universities, but were excluding in many ways; 
as well as the economic and class barriers to Oxbridge I discussed in earlier chapters, 
lectures were also closed in the sense that women weren’t admitted to them until the late 
19
th
 century (University of Cambridge, 2015; University of Oxford, 2014). These social 
and economic exclusions were compounded and reinforced by the tradition that the 
lectures were given in Latin – Matthew Arnold famously broke with this when he 
became Professor of Poetry in 1857 and gave the first Oxford lecture in English 
(University of Oxford, 2015). With the development of the metropolitan universities in 
the 19
th
 century, lectures came to represent the transmission of public knowledge and 
attain a centrality
109
 in higher education. Lectures continue to be used in UK 
universities as one of the principal methods of teaching. David Willetts, when minister 
for Higher Education, lamented the failure of digital learning technologies to prise 
university teachers away from what he (pejoratively) calls the ‘medieval’ model of the 
lecture (THE, 2014a, p.11). 
 
7.4.1 The discourse of the master 
In the embodied, shared event of the lecture the academic is positioned as the discourse 
of the master, which Lacan paradoxically declares, in one of his 1970 lectures, is always 
‘the starting point for teaching’, despite the fact that he sees the discourse of the analyst 
as having a more radical impact (Lacan, 1969-70, p.69). In the ritualised performance of 
the lecture what is being acted out is the mastery of knowledge; in pedagogic cliché the 
subject becomes the ‘sage on the stage’ (see King, 1993). In this staging of knowledge 
and authority, the subject speaks within a discourse where meaning is held in place by 
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 Which isn’t to say that seminars and tutorials aren’t widely used and aren’t, in some disciplines, the 
principal teaching method. However, lectures remain as an iconic practice for universities - academic 
posts are still commonly entitled ‘lecturer’ and most higher education institutions use the lecture at 
least as an organising tool. 
184  
 
 
the (illusion of the) master signifier and cannot be disrupted (Bracher, 1994, p.119). 
This fixing of things in their places is echoed by the body of the subject standing at the 
lectern, with the serried ranks of the student body facing them, rigidly anchored by 
lecture hall seating. Within the discourse of the master, all bodies, like all meanings, are 
secured by place.  
 
I’d like to consider, at this point, a well-known painting of a lecture: André Brouillet's 
1887 depiction of one of neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot’s lectures on hysteria. 
 
 
Fig. 25: Une leçon clinique à la Salpêtrière, 1897, by Pierre Brouillet. 
 
Freud studied under Charcot in 1885-6 and Charcot’s thinking was influential in 
Freud’s development of psychoanalytic theory (Morlock, 2007, p.137).110 In this 
painting (Fig.25) , Charcot is presented as enacting the master’s discourse. He is placed 
at the front of the class, upright, feet planted firmly apart, embodying the position of 
power, with (discursive) space separating him from the students. But, as Sue Thornham 
argues, the focal point of the painting, both for the students and the viewer, is the body 
of the hysteric (2003, p.79). Although the hysteric is presented as a (sexualised) 
specimen to be subjected to the male gaze, in fact the discourse of the hysteric, in its 
refusal of order, can undermine the master’s discourse. The unruly, transgressive 
hysteric in her refusal to be contained by the restrictions of clothing, body language or 
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 Freud had a lithographic reproduction of Brouillet’s painting in his consulting rooms in Vienna and 
later, famously, over the consulting couch at his house in London (Morlock, 2007, p. 131). 
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meaning embodies an authentic questioning search for knowledge. This is Butler’s 
illegitimate, disallowed body, contrasting starkly the legitimate body of the master, 
Charcot (see Butler, 1993, pp. 33-36). The master’s discourse values knowledge, insofar 
as it is useful, but it is inauthentic – despite the confusion and disorder of the hysteric’s 
search for knowledge, it has authenticity that the master’s discourse lacks (Fink 1995, 
p.133 ; Zizek, 1993, p.274).  
 
Positioned as the master within this discourse, the subject position produced for the 
lecturer is one where they must project the illusion of their own wholeness and 
coherency. They must hold meaning in its place and force the world to make sense – 
even if it doesn’t. The hysteric, in their search for knowledge can find jouissance, but 
this enjoyment is not available to the master – the loss of jouissance is the price they 
pay for mastery (Lacan, 1969-70,pp.107-8). 
 
As the seminar leader can occupy the discourse of the master, rather than the analyst, so 
the lecturer can, by their refusal of closure and fixity of meaning, choose to inhabit the 
discourse of the analyst. This they may do by what they speak about and how they 
speak about it. Zizek, for example, in his public lectures, has made the point that if a 
comet were hurling towards earth, philosophers, like himself, would not be able to 
provide a solution, which would come, instead, from scientists (Taylor, 2005). By this 
utterance he moves, temporarily, out of the discourse of the master, by admitting the 
limitations of his discipline. The mechanistic, reductionist discourse of the university, 
on the other hand, offers mechanistic, reductionist ways for the lecturer to vacate the 
role of the master – for example by getting students to use ‘clickers’ or response 
systems, sometimes called voting systems, in lectures. Under the guise of giving the 
learning subjects a voice and encouraging interactivity, what this actually does is allow 
them to point and click on ‘multiple choice’ questions when instructed to by the lecturer 
(see, for example, Sheffield University, 2014) . To dress up pointing and clicking as 
activity and voice is a classic trick of communicative capitalism which, as Dean 
proposes in Democracy and other neoliberal fantasies, fetishizes acts of participation, 
however shallow, empty and purposeless they may be (Dean, 2009). 
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Asking, at this point, ‘to whom does a lecture belong?’ would tend to evoke the obvious 
answer of ‘the lecturer’. This becomes a more complicated question once lectures 
become recorded in various ways, a point to which I will return later. 
 
The other form of teaching that the metropolitan universities moved to the fore was 
examinations, which position both teacher and student within Lacan’s discourse of the 
university. This discourse is concerned with the following of rules in the service of 
maintaining the established order; it appears to be rational, but in fact will leverage any 
approach in order to serve the master signifier (Fink, 1995, pp.132-3). As Bracher says, 
‘bureaucracy is perhaps the purest form of the discourse of the University’ (Bracher, 
1994, p. 115). In this sense it is about subjecting the student to a dominant, totalising 
system of knowledge, making judgements about the extent to which they succeed or fail 
in the acquisition of this knowledge and then credentialing them for roles within the 
system of capitalism production. The lecturer, as a subject within this examination 
system, is in the service of the master signifier and the totalising system of the discourse 
of the university. It reduces them to a disciplining agent of the bureaucracy. 
 
7.5 Post-war welfare state growth, 1945-79 – and the ‘active’ learner 
A significant post-war development which implies a change for academic subjectivity is 
the movement in ideas about pedagogy. A range of theories about how children learn 
began to be used in schools in the 1960s and 1970s which ‘can loosely be defined as the 
move towards … child-centred education with an emphasis on individualisation and 
learning by discovery’(Gillard, 2011, Chapter 6). These ideas drew on the work of a 
range of psychologists including Jean Piaget’s and Lev Vygotsky’s constructivist 
approaches (see Piaget and Inhelder, 1969; Vygotsky, 1962) and the broadly humanist 
work of Carl Rogers (see Rogers 1969), among others. These type of approaches, which 
began to be used to theorise the education of adults in the latter decades of the 20th 
century (see, for example Jenny Rogers’ much re-printed 1971 handbook, Adults 
Learning) represent a broad range of theoretical perspectives (a discussion of which is 
outwith the remit of this work, but see Pritchard, 2013 for a more detailed account) but 
what they have in common is the belief that the student learns by ‘doing’. That is to say, 
that students need to engage in activities such as case studies, role plays, problem-based 
learning, discussions, written exercises, games and so on in order to learn. These 
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approaches have gradually acquired purchase in orthodoxies about higher education 
learning. Sheffield University’s ‘toolkit’ for making large-group teaching more 
‘interactive’(University of Sheffield, 2014) is a good working example of this, as is 
educational theorist Diana Laurillard’s influential book Re-thinking university teaching 
(Laurillard, 2002) or educationalist James Atherton’s contention, expressed on his 
National Teaching Fellowship award-winning website for educators, that ‘the lecture is 
basically the social technology of the Middle Ages’ (Atherton 2013). Although 
approaches to teacher training may have moved from theoretical modelling to evidence-
based ‘what works’ models (Biesta, 2007pp. 1-3; Pritchard, 2013, p.3) active learning 
approaches still remain as an orthodoxy in advice to teachers in higher education (see, 
for example, Crawford, 2015).  
 
This changes the role of the academic subject to what Alison King, in 1993, referred to 
as ‘from sage on the stage to guide on the side’. This phrase has been so often repeated 
in the intervening years that it has become a cliché within higher education pedagogy, 
particularly in online learning (as Michael Berman, 2013, notes).  
 
There are three ways of considering the consequences of this for the academic subject. 
The first is that they can be positioned more within the discourse of the analyst, who 
vacates the seat of mastery, accepts the unstable nature of meaning and subjectivity, and 
attempts to encourage the student to find the truth. The second is that, as the ‘rules’ are 
set up by the teacher, unless the group actively rejects the ‘rules’ (the hysteric position), 
choices are all made within the frameworks previously established by the constructor of 
the exercise – the teacher. This is one of neoliberalism’s stock methods of deception, 
which hoodwinks the student, enabling the learning process to stay within the discourse 
of the master whilst having the appearance of occupying the more radical discourse of 
the analyst. A third way of thinking about the consequences of this change is that as 
these ideas about the efficacy of ‘learning by doing’ become a form of orthodoxy, other 
approaches to learning in classroom situations, such as creating opportunities for 
listening and thinking, which may appear to an observer be passive behaviours (and 
which certainly evade audit), become less acceptable as pedagogic practice (see, for 
example, my earlier example of Willetts on lectures and learning technology, THE, 
2014a, p.11). The academic subject thus becomes the Deleuzian subject of ‘perpetual 
188  
 
 
training’(Deleuze, 1992, p.5), enjoined to change their teaching practices by learning 
how to employ ever-changing, new techniques (see, for example, the HEA, 2014). 
 
The most notable large-scale development of alternative teaching models in the post-
war era is the Open University, which, created in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
leveraged these new approaches to teaching and learning within a distance learning 
context (Rowntree, 1992, p. 7-19). It implies potential new subject positions for the 
academics who create courses and materials and for tutors who teach on them. From the 
1990s, the development of ‘e-learning’ as a form of distance learning has been used by 
many universities and has meant that these subject positions became more widely 
influential. 
 
The OU premise was that students were (and in an updated way, still are) taught 
through a combination of video and audio materials; books and papers; and ‘workbook’ 
type print material, which forms the main part of most courses and guides the student 
through the topics. Written by the course team this, typically, tried to replicate tutorial 
dialogue, providing questions students are meant to consider and space for them to jot 
down their answers. It referred outwards to set texts, often instructing students to read 
specific sections and then asking questions about them. Science courses sometimes 
additionally used home lab kits. More recently, OU courses have used online elements 
(see Mason, 2000). 
 
The subject positions offered for the academic who created distance-learning material 
were those of expert, owner, enthusiast and leader. Like lectures, the creation of 
materials positioned them within the discourse of the master. For BBC television 
lectures the subject position offered was the same as for as the lecture, with two 
additional dimensions. The first is that the teacher became mediatised in a way which 
foreshadows (albeit at 3am) the idea of ‘celebrity’ academics, which I address in more 
detail in Chapter 9. The second is that the lecture became a commodity, so if we were to 
ask the question ‘to whom does a lecture (or a set of course materials) belong?’111 in 
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 The OU does, in fact, hold copyright of all course materials produced by academic staff, with the 
individual staff members holding a perpetual licence to use the content for their own purposes.  
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this context, the expected answer might be the OU
112
 – or even the BBC. This began to 
prise the lecture loose from the discourse of the master, as the discourse of the 
university began to take over. For the subject this involved a loss of agency as they 
move from a position of authority (albeit inauthentic authority), to a position whereby 
they, as ‘knowledge workers’ are subject to the discourse of capitalist knowledge 
production. 
 
7.6 Massification and the knowledge economy, 1979-1997 – technology, 
regulation and audit 
7.6.1 Digital technology initiatives 
During this period governmental moves to introduce digital technologies into 
universities for teaching, research and administration gradually began, gaining 
momentum in the 1990s. I mentioned earlier that it was the introduction of the Janet 
network in1984 that provided the basic infrastructure for universities to become 
technologised; the group that established Janet became part of the new Joint 
Information Systems Committee (JISC, later changed to Jisc) in 1993. This organisation 
was state funded, largely through the Higher Education Funding Councils, until 2012 
when it became a registered charity with subscription funding (Jisc, 2014a). Jisc set out 
to ‘champion the use of digital technologies’ (Jisc, 2014b) in the sector, a mission it still 
pursues.  
 
Prior to the establishment of Jisc, a number of initiatives aimed at increasing the use of 
new technologies for teaching in higher education were created by the Conservative 
administration with financial support from the funding councils. In 1984 the Computers 
in Teaching Initiative (CTI), which had the mission ‘to increase the effectiveness of 
teaching through the application of appropriate learning technologies’ (Martin, 1996, 
my italics), was established and continued to fund projects and centres in universities 
for 15 years (Fraser, 1998). In 1992 the Teaching and Learning Technology Programme 
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 The central OU is, effectively, a publishing company, where centrally employed academic staff do not 
necessarily have contact with students (other than full-time doctoral students). Geographical regions 
then operate a little like franchises, carrying out the face-to-face teaching of courses that are designed 
and determined elsewhere (Milton Keynes, to be precise) (Burt, 2006, pp.9-10). This model is sometimes 
referred to by neoliberal discourse when considering the re-organising and partial privatising of British 
higher education in the 21
st
 century (see Blunkett, 2000; Barbar, 2013), but it usually neglects to 
consider the massive 20
th
 century state investment in the OU. 
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(TLTP), with the stated aim to 'make teaching and learning more productive and 
efficient by harnessing modern technology’ (Haywood et al., 1998, p.3, my italics), was 
launched. The importance that government, through the funding bodies, ascribed to the 
role of technologies for teaching in higher education is demonstrated by the size of this 
initiative. It was funded by £75 million over its 15-year lifespan, which was reported in 
1996 as being ‘the largest technology-based initiative of its kind across the world within 
higher education’ (Tiley, 1996). The investment by the Conservative government during 
this period is significant, particularly given its overall commitment to decreasing state 
spending and the specific cuts it made to higher education funding. 
 
There are two main reasons for this governmental push to increase the use of digital 
technologies in universities. Letters of guidance from the Secretary of State for 
Education, Ken Clarke, to the heads of the funding councils in 1991-2 prioritised, in the 
future governance of higher education, ‘continued expansion of undergraduate 
provision, quality audit of institutions, [and] the quality assessment of teaching (TQA)’ 
(Haywood et al., 1998, p.8, my italics). Both the culture and practice of governance 
implied by overall institutional audit and, specifically, teaching audit have been enabled 
and amplified by the use of information technologies for both administration and 
teaching. The use of technologies across these two areas became operationally, 
strategically and culturally entwined across the next decades, with, for example, student 
enrolment data being fed from management information software to learning 
environments, and grades being exported in the other direction.
113
 This, therefore, 
formed one reason for the drive to encourage universities to use technologies. The other 
priority mentioned by Clarke, the move to a mass higher education system, and its 
implementation against a decreasing unit of resource, formed the second reason 
(Haywood et al., 1998, p.8). Learning technologies were seen as potentially ‘achieving 
productivity and efficiency gains whilst maintaining and improving quality in the 
provision of teaching and learning’ (Tiley, 1996). That is to say, they were seen as 
providing the magical silver bullet that would enable mass education, despite decreasing 
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 There was a popular concept in the early years of the 21
st
 century that it would soon be possible for 
one great, integrated information system, the ‘MLE’, to be seamlessly used for every single aspect of 
administration and learning in universities – from finance, to room allocations to online teaching and 
research support to marketing, possibly across institutions (see Jisc, 2002 for an example and Jisc, 2010b 
for more detail). This ambitious utopian or dystopian (depending on your perspective) modernist notion 
has not yet been realised and may prove to have been a totalising fantasy of senior administrators 
steeped in the discourse of the university. 
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per capita funding levels and the added demands, created by students entering HE at 
lower academic level, of intensive teaching and support.  
 
I mentioned earlier that ‘active learning’ approaches began to permeate education in the 
latter part of the century and it was this perspective that was leveraged by advocates of 
learning technology (see, for example, Khan, 1997). In the 1990s, the use of digital 
technologies and the internet were also becoming widespread both locally and globally, 
at least among wealthier nations. This change, added to the exhortation from 
government, which I discussed in Section II, that HE should become more vocational, 
led to a perspective which took the view that the UK needs to have a technologised 
workforce in order to compete, globally, with other nations and that it is a function of 
universities to produce this technologised workforce. I will discuss this viewpoint in 
more detail later in this chapter, as it becomes the 21
st
-century clarion call for the use of 
technology within higher education. 
 
7.6.2 The discourse of the university 
For the academic subject, the main change in this period was the increased regulation of 
teaching and the growth in student numbers as I discussed in detail in Section II. 
Imposition of regulatory frameworks on courses and teaching practice resulted in the 
loss of agency for the subject as their programmes of study were obliged to conform to 
externally imposed codified sets of criteria and subjected to continual evaluation. So 
academics became subject, in their teaching, to a bureaucratic regime of control – 
Lacan’s discourse of the university, which Zizek, writing on the four discourses, sees 
operating as by ‘nonauthentic, compulsive … false knowledge (Zizek, 1993, p.274). 
The huge increase in student numbers during this period led to an overall decline in 
student/staff ratios particularly for less well-funded subjects and institutions (Court, 
2012, pp.2-3). So solutions were sought that enable mass teaching; educational 
technologies were touted as one answer to this, but strategies such as increasing the size 
of lectures and the substitution of tutorial or seminar discussion by ‘active learning’ 
group work, carried out outside the classroom with minimal supervision, also became 
used (Clegg et al., 2010). In their work on the way in which neoliberalism attempts to 
hi-jack emergent pedagogies and technologies for learning, Clegg et al. demonstrate 
how active-learner or student-centred approaches continue to be ‘denuded of critical 
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content as a result of the intensification of academic labour’ (2010, p.48) and how 
technologies may be used as forms of crowd control for such activities as computer 
marked assessments (Clegg et al., 2010). So, from the massification of the 1990s, newer 
forms of teaching become pressed more forcefully into the service of the discourse of 
the university. 
 
7.7 Personalisation and privatisation, 1997-present  
7.7.1 Attitudes to the technics 
With much of the initial technical infrastructure for the use of digital technologies 
having been put in place, this period marks the most intensive increase in the use of 
such technologies to date. It is important to stress that, as an HEA report suggests, use 
of technologies is not evenly spread across the sector either within institutions or even 
within departments, schools and faculties (Sharpe et al., 2006). Or as a HEFCE-
commissioned report puts it, the adoption of technologies ‘is best perceived not as a 
linear narrative but as a complex tapestry’ (Haywood et al., 1998, p.6). To complicate 
the tapestry even further it’s possible (if difficult to prove) that because there have been 
injunctions by funding bodies and by institutions to adopt educational technologies, 
there is a tendency at the level of individual lecturers, courses, schools and institutions – 
and consequently funding bodies themselves – to over-report both their usage and the 
positive outcomes they yield. So although I will be describing general trends in the use 
of technologies for teaching, it is in the knowledge that these may only partially 
represent the actuality in individual institutions.  
 
I started this thesis by referring to ideas about technophilia and technophobia, an idea 
I’ll come back to later in this chapter. These two pathologising approaches, however, 
represent two potential traps that exist in analysing the role played by digital 
technologies in higher education. On the one hand, a danger lies in the possibility of 
acting a flag-waving enthusiast for the technics per se without taking into account their 
role in enabling the project of university marketisation. On the other lies the danger of 
taking an overly reductionist stance that sees only the potential for technology to make 
education ‘cheap and replicable’ fitting seamlessly with ‘largely bankrupt pedagogical 
ideas’ and threatening the employment of lecturers (Bartlett, 2002, p.4).  
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Educationalists Sean Sturm and Stephen Turner acknowledge and avoid both these 
traps, observing that the technics can be used ‘against the grain’ of both commercial 
technology providers and of the corporate university, when they say of learning 
technology that:  
its outcomes, whatever its objectives, are neither calculable nor preset…its 
remediation by academics and students can redesign – or redirect the 
design drive of – the neoliberal university.  
(Sturm and Turner, 2012, p.65) 
 
7.7.2 The e-university 
For the Blair government, which came to power in 1997, e-learning technologies 
formed an important part of the vision for education. The £62 million ‘e-University’ 
was announced by the Secretary of State for Education, David Blunkett, in his 2000 
‘Greenwich Speech’(Blunkett, 2000). In this he discursively linked the new project with 
Harold Wilson’s radical 1960s OU project, which by 2000 was respectable and 
flourishing (Weinbren, 2014). Blunkett attempted to make this link despite the fact that, 
unlike the OU, the e-university was a private-sector corporation funded from the public 
purse which aimed to turn a profit by selling online courses to overseas students. In the 
Greenwich speech he leveraged the claim that globalisation meant that ‘learning has 
become big business’ and ‘virtual learning is an industry that is striding forward all 
around us’, and he linked this with the idea of a knowledge economy (Blunkett, 2000). 
But, as Clegg et al., among others, argue, globalisation as a totalising concept is both 
unproven at the level of political economy and unconvincing as a social theory. 
Furthermore, presenting it as the unassailable meta-narrative of our time and linking it 
to the technological determinism of the ‘information technology revolution’ myth 
(Castells, 2000) as narratives like Blunkett’s do, excludes alternative analyses and 
‘reduce[s] the space for resistance’ (Clegg et al., 2003 p. 45; see also Rosenberg, 2000 
and Callinicos, 2001).  
 
Much of this century’s public discourse about higher education and technology has 
leveraged the same mythic approach of technological determinism and pressing 
international competition. As Clegg et al. argue: ‘the effect is to create an anxiety … 
194  
 
 
[where] organisations are likely to feel under pressure and to speculate and take risks, 
sometimes resulting in spectacular failures’ (2003, p.46).  
 
The e-University became one of the nation’s ‘spectacular failures’ when it attracted 
neither the international learners nor the private finance its creators had envisaged 
(House of Commons Select Committee in Education and Skills, 2005; MacCleod, 
2004a; Garrett, 2004). The existence of two similar publicly funded, semi-corporate 
‘spectacular failures’ in e-learning, the £1 billion University for Industry launched in 
1998 (MacLeod, 2004b) and the £50 million NHS University launched in 2003 (Flood, 
2005), serve to support Clegg at al.’s point. Interestingly, these three initiatives seem to 
have been quickly and quietly forgotten.  
 
The collapse of the e-University in particular led the government to change tack on e-
learning; HEFCE announced that the future organisation of e-learning would ‘put a 
greater emphasis on public good rather than commercial objectives’ (Harrison, 2004). In 
2005 HEFCE published its ten-year strategy for online education which articulated a 
shift in higher educational policy discourse about e-learning. The earlier presentation of 
governmental policy on e-learning in the Greenwich speech was a ‘third way’ rhetorical 
splicing of a centralised, state-planned, modernist project with a corporate venture, 
articulated by claims such as: ‘business–university collaborations are driving forward 
the communication technologies which will support virtual learning’ (Blunkett, 2000, 
para.21). HEFCE’s 2005 presentation of e-learning, however, added the personal 
privatisation of the social aspect of education to economic privatisation. What was 
stressed in the HEFCE policy is ‘individualised support’ and ‘flexibility of 
provision’(HEFCE, 2005, p.4). The drivers which were presented in this document are 
not so much global economic pressures, but the desires of students, who:  
use the internet and new technologies every day – for finding information, 
communicating, and seeking entertainment, goods and services. Learners are 
bringing new expectations of the power of technology into higher education  
(HEFCE, 2005, p.5). 
 
This consumerisation of the student as learning subject and the fantasy of agency and 
control that is sold to them, as it is sold to all consumers, attempted to position the 
teaching subject as a cross between a producer of consumer goods in a knowledge 
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factory and a personal shopper; but this is a false positioning. Students are both subject 
to the discourse of the master, which produces them as speechless and powerless, and 
the discourse of the university which produces them as data objects (Bracher, 1994, 
p.121). Only the discourse of the analyst produces them as speaking subjects and this 
discourse is increasingly made unavailable by pressure on student/staff ratios. 
 
7.7.3 Digital teachers 
For academic staff in this period, there is an injunction that they must learn how to use 
digital technologies in their teaching. When the 1997 Dearing Report looked forward to 
the (imagined) potential savings in cost and gains in quality of e-learning in higher 
education, it also said: 
communications and information technology are far from being 
embedded in the day-to-day practice of learning and teaching in most 
higher education institutions … the main reason is that many academics 
have had no training and little experience in the use of communications 
and information technology as an educational tool.  
(Dearing, 1997, p.36) 
 
Throughout this period, there was pressure at a national, institutional and departmental 
level for academic staff to use e-learning technologies. Laying out the 2003 
governmental position in Towards a Unified e-Learning Strategy, Secretary of State for 
Education and Skills, Charles Clarke, said ‘I want all … lecturers, all trainers and 
mentors, to experience the fantastic excitement of these new ways of learning and 
teaching’ (2003). Liz Beaty, HEFCE Director of Learning and Teaching, took the view 
that ‘the curiosity and innovation of those in higher education is driving them to explore 
new approaches to learning supported by technologies’ (HEFCE, 2005, p.1). On the 
other hand, in a paper on the psychological impact of learning environments Morgan et 
al. discussed evidence of ‘technostress’ where ‘computerisation makes work more 
difficult, increases stress levels’ (2000, p.74). In fact, during this period academic 
engagement with technology was frequently discussed in terms of affect, as in the three 
examples quoted, where the emotional responses of ‘excitement’, ‘curiosity’ or 
‘technostress’ are cited. This ideas of the technics exciting emotionality was pushed 
further, to the extent that engagement became often discussed in terms of 
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psychopathology and frequently stereotyped as technophobia or technophilia (Salmon 
and Jones, 2004; Orsmond and Stiles, 2002) and the pejorative use of the term 
‘Luddite’114has slipped into common usage in universities (Baggaley, 2011).  
 
During this period the types of learning technologies used can be split into two phases. 
Phase one covers first-generation technologies and stretches from around the late 1990s 
to about 2007-8, when second-generation technologies began to be used in UK 
universities, alongside first-generation software. Although the terms web 1.0 and web 
2.0 are not unproblematic, as I discussed in the previous chapter, they are useful and 
fairly apposite terms to use for discussing educational software. In first-generation or 
web 1.0 learning environments, for example, academic staff post information for 
students to read and determine how students are organised into groups for online 
discussions. Students take part in online discussions – or not – and submit their 
assignments. In second-generation or web 2.0 environments, students can create their 
own material, choose with whom they share it and create groups for discussion with 
whomsoever they wish. This implies a distinct shift in practices and assumptions in 
online teaching and learning. 
 
In the two studies I carried out, which I mentioned at the start of the chapter, the first 
was of academics who had used a first generation environment and the second was of 
staff who had used a first generation environment and who took part in the trialling of a 
second generation environment. In the next two sections I will discuss these studies and 
my findings, as part of my analyses of first and second generation teaching and learning 
technologies. 
 
7.7.4 First-generation learning technologies 
The main technology used in this phase was Virtual Learning Environments (VLEs), 
which became widely adopted after their introduction to UK universities in the late 
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 Robins and Webster, using the term ‘Luddite’ in non-perjorative, more historically accurate sense 
(see my Footnote 1 for clarification), writing about IT in the 1980s in Information technology: A Luddite 
analysis, call for a neo-Luddite, anti-capitalist political strategy (Robins and Webster, 1986); in 1999 they 
revisit this approach, concluding that many of the varied ecological movements of the late 1990s 
constitute a ‘new spirit of Luddism’ (p.59) albeit one that uses social media to mobilise (Robins and 
Webster, 1999, p.39-60). 
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1990s (Selwyn, 2007, p.84). By 2010, they were ‘an essential part of almost every 
higher educational institution’ (Jisc, 2010c).  
 
The most widespread VLEs in the UK were the US Blackboard and Canadian WebCT, 
until Blackboard Inc. acquired its main rival in 2006 making it the online learning 
environment most used by UK universities
115
 (Education Week, 2006). Some 
alternatives, based on open source technologies, such as Moodle, have also been used 
(Simonson, 2007, p. 8-9). 
 
VLEs have been, typically, used as a place where academic staff can make course 
details, student handbooks, reading lists and resource links – and in many institutions, 
lecture notes and lecture PowerPoint slides – available to students. In some institutions, 
particularly post-92 universities, it became mandatory for staff to make some or all of 
these things available to students via the VLE. I’ll introduce my own 2007 study of 
academic staff using a VLE a little later, but some of the reasons my interviewees 
described for adopting the technology were because it was a ‘central university 
directive’, ‘compulsory’ and in ‘compliance with faculty policy’. In an earlier study at a 
post-92 institution, Roger Bennett found that the statement ‘the university's 
management has forced me to adopt new teaching technologies and methods’ was the 
second most popular reason for academic staff using ICTs in their teaching (Bennett, 
2001). 
7.7.4.1 Learning objects and reification 
During the first-generation phase the area that was high on university learning and 
teaching research and R&D agendas, as well as attracting private-sector interest was the 
concept of the ‘learning object’ (Rehak and Mason, 2003). This was the idea that online 
learning materials could be broken down into constituent sections and each section 
could be identified by a metadata label or ‘tag’.116 This tag would contain structured 
information about the material thus making it possible to search for it – and then, 
potentially, purchase it. An online lecture transcript, for example, would form such a 
                                                          
115
 Technically, VLEs are largely content management systems, with add-on features such as discussion 
boards. Typically, for commercial VLEs an annual licence for a black box system is purchased (for a non-
trivial fee, in terms of university budgets) from a educational software company thus effectively 
outsourcing this aspect of education to the private sector.  
116
 This is the concept behind the semantic web which is an important part of the Internet of Things. 
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learning object. Whether meta-tagged or not, what happened when the transcript of a 
lecture was placed in the institutional VLE is that it was transformed into a commodity. 
 
So, for the academic subject the VLE brought about two changes compared to face-to-
face teaching. Firstly, it separated the subject from the product of their labour, both in a 
literal sense, as it harvested the digital product from the material subject, and in an 
associative sense as the lecture transcript, once in the environment, had an existence 
apart from the subject so the subject was not automatically associated with it in the 
same way. Secondly, the creation of ‘learning objects’ commodified both the practice of 
teaching and that which was produced to enable that practice (i.e. the lecture transcript). 
Both of these contribute to a process of reification.  
 
This is a concept from Marx, specifically from the theories of commodity fetishism and 
alienation, which Georg Lukacs further develops to form the theory of reification or 
‘thingification’. In this:  
a man’s activity becomes estranged from himself, it turns into a 
commodity which … must go its own way independently of man, just 
like any consumer article. 
(Lukacs, 1923, Section 1, para.11)  
 
Robbins and Webster, in Times of the technoculture, applied this analysis to digital 
technology, using the term 'technology fetish' in order ‘to understand the way in which 
capitalist technology assumes the form of a discrete and reified entity, with its own 
autonomy and momentum’(Robins and Webster, 1999, p.50). 
 
Read through this optic, a lecture transcript, once online in the institutional VLE, 
became a commodity, estranged from the subject. This commodification inverted 
relationships between people causing ‘the social relations of individuals to appear in the 
perverted form of a social relation between things’ (Marx, 1859, p.4-5). So the 
relationship between lecturer and student became transformed into a relationship 
between the commodity of the lecture transcript and the student; to take this to its 
logical conclusion, it became a relationship between the commodity of the estranged 
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learning object and that of the educational credential that the student seeks to acquire. 
So this ‘mediation of things’ meant, as sociologist Val Burris describes it, that:  
the social character of each producer's labor becomes obscured and 
human relationships are veiled behind the relations among things 
and apprehended as relations among things  
(Burris, 1988).  
 
These things took on a quality that Lukacs, quoting Marx, refers to as ‘phantom’ or 
‘ghostly objectivity’ (Lukacs, 1923, section 1, para.1), in that although not alive they 
have a relationship both with each other and with living beings and are imbued with a 
special and undefinable value. From a Lacanian perspective, what they become imbued 
with is objet a,
117
 making them (phantom) objects of the learners’ desire. In Lacan’s 
discourse of the university what is produced is surplus jouissance, a promise of objet a 
(Lacan, 1969-70, p.39). 
 
It is not only the relationship between individual lecturer and student which became 
affected by this process of reification; the whole social relations of teaching and 
learning in the university become reified. Academic subjectivity has been profoundly 
affected by this. As the ‘learning objects’ have become animated with subjectivity, so 
the estranged academic subject has become objectivised. As Lukacs proposes, 
reification:  
stamps its imprint upon the whole consciousness of man; his qualities and 
abilities are no longer an organic part of his personality, they are things. 
(Lukacs, 1923, Section 2, para.24)  
 
7.7.4.2 Communities of practice and ‘people people’ 
I now turn to the first of the two studies of academics views and experiences of online 
learning. In 2006-7 I interviewed all 12 programme leaders
118
 in a large healthcare 
faculty about their own experiences and those of colleagues teaching on their courses, of 
using first-generation online learning in their field. These were semi-structured 
                                                          
117
 object a is Lacan’s interpretation of what Freud calls Das Ding - ‘the thing’. That ‘thingification’ is a 
psychosocial process producing Das Ding is, then, unsurprising. 
118
 i.e. academic staff with overall responsibility for specific fields of study. This healthcare faculty was 
jointly based at a post-92 university and an older medical school. 
200  
 
 
interviews. Broadly, the relevant areas which were explored were, firstly, a general 
overview of e-learning within their remit and secondly the perceptions of e-learning of 
the interviewee(s) and the reported perceptions of their teams. The validity of the data 
collected was confirmed by a verbal summary at the end of the interview and by asking 
participants to review transcribed interviews for accuracy (see Appendix C for more 
information). 
 
Whilst there was some enthusiasm for using these digital technologies, the interviewees 
also has reservations. One interviewee pointed out that in her school
119
, academic staff 
‘are “people people” and who value empathy and physical communication’. She saw 
these qualities as an important, enriching dimension of the student/tutor and 
student/student relationship and, as this was a culture into which it is critical healthcare 
students are inducted, she viewed this aspect of professional education as being 
degraded by a move to online learning.  
 
Other interviewees talked about having formed ‘communities of practice’ to offer co-
mentoring practical and psychological support in e-learning to academic staff within 
their schools, with one adding that a ‘transition from conventional [teaching] to e-
learning … requires the establishment of relationships – technological and pedagogic’, 
an approach also found by Bennett (2001, p.50).  
 
Another said ‘some staff are frightened’ and described how colleagues had tried to help 
each other over the ‘fear’. All of this implies that some of the academic staff surveyed 
perceived one effect of e-learning as being that ‘human relationships are veiled behind 
the relations among things,’ as Burris says of reification (1988). This was unappealing 
to them and may have led them to ‘not value the technology’ as another interviewee put 
it. But it also suggests that a positive resistance strategy to this reification of e-learning 
material and its consequential objectification of academics was for academics to add 
more of a human, affective dimension. They did this by forming and cementing 
interpersonal relationships between themselves when using the technics. Clegg and 
Rowland, in theorising of the role of kindness in university teaching suggest something 
similar. They identify the personal quality of kindness, as distinguished from the public 
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 The faculty was divided into a number of smaller schools. 
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duty of care; the latter they view as being easily reduced to a performance indicator, 
while the former is disruptive of managerialist approaches to education (Clegg and 
Rowland, 2010, p.724-6). 
 
It is justified to suggest that the academic and professional disciplines which comprise 
healthcare valorise both the physical dimension of the human body and the importance 
of affect in human communication. This is a consequence of their own disciplinary 
interests. The foreclosure of bodies enacted by e-learning takes away what is for them 
(as it may be, perhaps to a lesser extent, for academic staff from other disciplines) a 
means by which meaning is produced. By making bodies absent it robs bodies of their 
capacity to be unruly, making them illegitimate and disallowed by their absence whilst 
at the same time rendering actual bodies compliantly tethered to screen and keyboard
120
 
(see Butler, 1993, pp. 33-36) and the academic subject forced to move from positions of 
either the discourse of the analyst or master, where human relationships are valued, if 
not equal, to the discourse of the university, where the ‘totalizing, tyrannical power’ 
(Bracher, 1994, p.116) of the discourse is leveraged in the service of commoditised 
relations.  
 
7.7.4.3 The ghost of an event 
Returning to the question I asked earlier – ‘to whom does a lecture belong?’ – produces 
no simple answer once we start to consider the lecture transcript, or even the video of a 
lecture online in an institutional VLE. The lecturer? Or their employer? It’s taken for 
granted that traditionally published work such as a book or journal article belongs to the 
subject – they own the copyright – although in writing it they are performing part of 
their duties for their employing university. The UCU, however, points out that:  
in higher education, it is common for the individual institution to be 
the first owner of the intellectual property and its associated rights 
generated by any employee, although many waive their rights to the 
copyright of standard academic publications. 
(UCU, 2014). 
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 At the time of my study bodies were tethered to screen and keyboard, and most of them to desks. By 
2014 bodies are tethered to tablets and phones, disciplining objects which move around with them 
through geographical space. 
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Yet the whole structure of the RAE and the REF has actively encouraged this idea of 
ownership. When the individual academic moves institutions they ‘take’ their 
publications with them (in the sense that they are entered for the research assessment of 
the university where the person works on the RAE/REF submission date, not the one 
they worked in when they were published) unlike any ‘impact’ element their research 
may have, which, stays with the original employing institution as I will discuss in 
Chapter 10. The whole vexed question of intellectual property ownership of online 
teaching materials is intimately tied up with concept of reification. Interestingly, legal 
guidance to universities on this from Jisc advises that the copyright of a transcript of a 
lecture written by the lecturer within the course of their employment with a university is 
generally owned by their employer; the performance of it, however, is owned by the 
lecturer (Jisc, 2010d). Because of the complexity of the area, the UCU, in 2014, set up a 
service to offer members support and advice on intellectual property issues (UCU, 
2014). 
 
This period marks the start of it becoming, in UK universities, not uncommon for 
lectures to be recorded in some form – video, audio or transcripts – and made available 
for students. There remain questions over the extent to which these are actually used by 
students (see, for example, Kamad, 2013). There is a sense in which the reified object 
takes over and becomes an end in and of itself, to the extent that what we get is the 
lecture that is recorded in order never to be heard. Students may desire to have it (it is, 
after all, imbued with objet a) but do not necessarily act on that desire. Perhaps by not 
being ‘in the moment’ the recorded lecture lacks co-presence and affective charge, so is 
not an ‘event’. It is the ghost of an event. 
 
7.7.4.4 Technologised subjects 
The neoliberal project of regulation and audit has been also further enabled by the use 
of VLEs. Most systems permit academic staff to easily access data about students’ 
online activities. They can see how often each student has logged on, how much time 
they have spent online, which pages and sections they have visited. In the Blackboard 
VLE, for example, this data is presented as a colourful pie chart which compares the 
differing amounts of ‘activity’ for all the students on the course. Thus academic staff are 
encouraged by the functionality of the software to surveille students’ use of the VLE 
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and use simplistic metrics to make judgements about their commitment to their course. 
What staff members may not be aware of is that the course leader (or anyone with the 
necessary level of administrative access) can use the same function to monitor how 
academic staff use the environment.  
 
Teaching materials that academic staff upload into the environment are also ‘under 
much higher levels of scrutiny by students and peers’, as one of my interviewees put it, 
than the teaching of a face-to-face course. So the teaching materials themselves (and by 
association, their creator) can also be surveilled by anyone with appropriate permissions 
– or at least, that possibility exists which means, in a classically Foucauldian way, that 
all material is felt, by those responsible for it, to be subject to scrutiny - because any of 
it could be, at any time. The potential to use VLEs as a Taylorist management tool to 
monitor the behaviour and output of academic staff is present in the software; often in 
institutions the permissions, which determine who can see what, are not set at the local 
level of a course or programme, but at the level of the department or, more usually, 
because the technology is centrally managed, of the institution. Land and Bayne, in their 
work on e-learning and surveillance, used the term ‘the glass university’ to consider 
how VLEs of this period acted as a version of Bentham’s panopticon, making all 
activities and interchanges potentially visible to those in control of the institution (Land 
and Bayne, 2004, p.165).  
 
Deleuze’s concept of the ‘dividual’ which I explored in my discussion of the academic 
double can be used to explore the digital constitution of the teacher of the glass 
university (Deleuze, 1992). A ‘dividualised’ teacher is split into their data self – online 
interactions with student and reified teaching materials – and their shadowy physical 
self, which lurks in some other place. And never, as I suggested in Chapter 6, in the 
‘right’ place, as the academic body is always displaced. The digital dividual 
increasingly becomes not only subject to the regulatory processes of the glass university 
but must also become a regulator of those processes, insofar as they begin to operate in 
the type of dispersed, modulated ‘participatory panopticon’ (Andrejevic, 2012, p.239) 
that more recent technologies encourage, as I discussed in the previous chapter in 
relation to the dividuated academic body. 
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Both the use of VLEs and the generalised use of the internet by students during this 
period created, and continues to create, a requirement for lecturers to have a degree of 
technical engagement and represents a ‘technologising’ of the academic subject. One of 
my interviewees in my healthcare study described how academic staff have to ‘unlearn 
their existing ways of working’; another said that colleagues ‘found it difficult’ and felt 
‘that it would increase work level, more to learn, new skills required’. Another said that 
‘the use of e-learning requires lecturers to acquire a different set of skills’. Others 
described ‘anxiety’, ‘resistance’ and ‘lack of motivation’ and felt that language used 
about online learning was excluding and alienating. One interviewee reflected on how 
originally, when teaching, she had produced transparencies for lectures herself, using 
technology she understood; she was pleased to have developed expertise in 
manipulating the technologies involved. But using a VLE she felt that the loss of control 
of the ‘nuts and bolts’ of the technology of teaching created anxiety and a sense of loss 
of agency both for herself and others. In fact, for Marx, losing control of the process of 
production is part of the way in which a worker becomes alienated (Marx, 1844, p.31). 
The ‘resistance’ of which my interviewees spoke, itself, can be seen as a response to 
this alienation and to the reification that builds on it. 
 
7.7.5 Second-generation learning technologies 
Second-generation learning technologies began to be used in British universities from 
around 2008, largely in addition to institutional VLEs (Conole and Alevizou, 2010, 
pp.9-11). Most second-generation technologies are freely available, forming part of the 
‘web 2.0’ wave of software and approaches to software. While, as I have discussed 
earlier, the concept of web 2.0 is not without detractors, it has been embraced from 
some education perspectives where the term ‘learning 2.0’ or ‘edupunk’ has been used 
as a shorthand for the use of these technologies in teaching (Ala-Mutka et al, 2009).  
 
Second-generation technologies include social networking, such as Facebook, blogs 
such as WordPress, wikis such as MediaWiki, video sites such as YouTube, photo and 
music sharing such as Flickr and Spotify, microblogs such as Twitter and the dynamic 
integration of all of these together within various kinds of web pages. The emphasis has 
been on the facilitation of online community, both within courses and with contacts 
outside the university; and also on the ability for both lecturer and student to create and 
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share content. So a ‘learning 2.0’ perspective would see the technologies it employs as 
much less pedagogically rigid than the traditional type of VLE, which it would view as 
having inbuilt educational approaches. It would tend to see these newer technologies as 
being more amenable to the general active learning or constructivist approaches I 
mentioned earlier (see, for example, Richardson, 2010, p.171; Conole and Alevizou, 
2010, pp.9-11). Additionally, it would see the technics as amenable to more radical 
versions of these approaches, often based on the work of educationalists such as Ivan 
Illich (1971) and Paul Freire (see Giroux 2013b), as in, for example, Canadian 
educationalist, Stephen Downes’ work (Downes, 2012). 
 
7.7.5.1 Negotiating mapless mastery 
In my own 2008 study of using a web 2.0 learning environment (see Appendix D) I 
found that there were many things that academic staff felt were positive about it, but 
that the anxieties they articulated differed from those in my earlier study where staff 
were using a more traditional VLE. 
 
In this study I invited staff from all 7 faculties in a post-92 university to participate. The 
learning technology used was open-source software customised for a higher education 
context, that is to say it was something like Facebook in structure with integrated blog 
and wiki technologies (see Appendix D for more details). My participants were a group 
of 18 volunteers from a wide range of differing subject areas. They took part in an 
initial face-to-face workshop, then used the environment in a structured way for a pilot 
period of a month. They were then asked to complete questionnaires about their 
experience of the environment and were also offered the option of articulating their 
views within the body of the environment itself, during the trial, in blogs, wikis, 
discussion forums, messaging, posts on colleagues’ comment walls and other spaces.  
 
All participants used the environment. 13 participants returned completed 
questionnaires and 5 commented about their experience in the body of the environment, 
2 of whom had also returned questionnaires; thus 16 participants responded. 
 
My participants generally regarded the environment as being easier than traditional 
VLEs for students to use. They felt it would be familiar to students from their everyday 
206  
 
 
experience, as its structure and interface appeared similar to social networking services 
such as Facebook or MySpace. ‘This kind of site is what teenagers use all the time,’ one 
respondent said. They had the sense that students would feel automatically ‘at home’ in 
such an online world, and have an intuitive grasp of how it worked.  
 
In describing their own experiences, the concerns that participants reported clustered 
around two different issues. The first of these was a sense of anxiety about the 
‘foreignness’ of the structure of the environment. A number of them articulated a sense 
that they had explored the space tentatively, and had, certainly at first, felt nervous, lost 
and unsure. Many of them used geographic metaphors for describing their environment, 
talking about feeling ‘in the foothills’ of being able to negotiate it, wanting to have a 
‘clear map’ of where everything is, and having the (unheimlich) feeling that they 
weren’t on home ground – although, in fact, they were all successful in using the 
environment and reported finding it easy to manipulate. Several participants ascribed 
their sense of geographic confusion to their age: ‘I felt somehow lost between blogs and 
wikis, but it probably shows my age’. Several spoke about these type of environments 
and the behaviours associated with them as though they were the territory of younger 
people. In fact, Prensky’s (much contested) 121 concept of younger people being digital 
natives, who are fully at home in a multi-tasking online space, whilst older people are 
digital immigrants who struggle to understand the new online world in which they find 
themselves, was explicitly raised in one of the online discussions (Prensky, 2001). In 
particular they noted that the standard language used to describe tools and activities 
itself was alienating and excluding for them. This might suggest that it wasn’t 
necessarily their skill level in manipulating the software, but the assumptions and 
                                                          
121
 Although Prensky’s concept is still in popular usage it is much contested in the literature. For 
example, Helsper and Eynon’s 2009 study found that for the the use of technology ‘in the UK… 
generation is only one of the predictors... Breadth of use, experience, gender and educational levels are 
also important, indeed in some cases more important (2010, p.503). Bennett, Maton and Kervin 
challenge the whole basis of Prensky’s ‘grand claims’ particularly ‘the urgent necessity for educational 
reform in response’, arguing that Prenskey’s concept ‘can be likened to an academic form of a “moral 
panic”’ (2008, p.775). 
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culture surrounding the technologies that generated such feelings of not being on ‘home 
ground’.  
 
The sense that the digital geography belongs to a younger generation relates to a point 
Crary makes in his work on the ‘speeding up’ of time, Late Capitalism and the Ends of 
Sleep. He describes how most people are always, or feel themselves to be always, 
‘behind’ with digital technologies because these technologies are always being 
developed and re-developed in a way that is impossible for most people to ‘keep up’ 
with. So we are always already wrong-footed by the technologies (2013, loc.532). 
Similarly, Bassett argues that although, as everyday life theorists, such as Pierre 
Blanchot propose, lagging behind is normality as the everyday is ‘what lags and falls 
behind’(Blanchot, quoted in Bassett, 2009, p. 57), for the responsiblised, self-improved 
subject of neoliberalism ‘the lag-free life has become a desirable goal’ (Bassett, 2009, p. 
57). This is particularly pertinent for university lecturers who are mainly teaching 
students in their late teens and early twenties. These students form a constituency who 
are commonly (if erroneously) perceived, from the Prensky-aligned perspective, as 
having a more current grasp of widely used online technologies than those older than 
them (see, for example Palfrey and Gasser 2013, p.1-2). Not only are academics, like 
most people, wrong-footed by the technologies, but they may see their students, rightly 
or wrongly, as possessing a greater expertise in current practice than they have 
themselves - at least in relation to the tools that are being adopted in this wave of 
educational usage (Palfrey and Gasser 2013, p.2-5). This leads me onto the second 
concern that my study participants articulated, which was about authority and structure. 
 
Many of the participants articulated clear and unified views about the way in which they 
anticipated the learning experience for students would be different in an environment 
like this, as opposed to a more hierarchically structured VLE, or to more traditional 
face-to-face teaching environments. They spoke about students having more control and 
ownership, both of their learning and of the online space itself and about learners being 
less ‘managed and controlled by the tutors’. They felt that this would lead to more 
independent learning behaviours, where students acted as collaborative authors of 
online content, which they could then share with their peers and which would lead them 
to create networks and communities within and without courses.  
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Most of the group were conscious of the possibility that using this kind of environment 
might change the role of the teacher. Participants shared ideas about how teaching in 
this type of environment would involve encouraging students to learn through 
interaction rather than by teachers providing online content and that there would be a 
greater emphasis on facilitation than on directed teaching. But there were concerns. One 
said that there need to be ‘ground rules’ set by the teacher and that these need to be 
‘explicit’; another said, ‘you have to be clear about boundaries’ with students in this 
kind of environment. For example, they felt there was the need to have clear guidelines 
about how long it might take a tutor to respond to a post or a message, as the culture of 
web 2.0 encourages learners to assume that tutors will respond more quickly than is 
feasible. Some participants said that the need to set rules for students about behaviour 
was an issue because the environment was so similar to online spaces which students 
use for socialising. One respondent suggested that there should be markedly different 
types of profile for students and tutors so online student and staff users would be clearly 
‘badged’ by their offline status. Another felt that rules should be set about the use of 
language, so that students didn’t confuse the nature of the space and use informal ‘text-
speak’. 
 
Whilst all these concerns are not without validity, taken together what they appear to 
articulate is anxiety about the elision of authority in online spaces. Other anxieties about 
structure are related to this. Nearly all of the participants felt frustrated that they didn’t 
have a visual plan or map of exactly where everything was – even though some of them 
acknowledged that this was impossible and counter to the structuring principles of the 
software and its attendant culture. They felt the need to be able to place everything into 
a clearly defined structure, psychologically speaking, and the sprawling, non-
hierarchical nature of the territory, navigable partly by searching on tags, made them 
feel ‘lost’. 
 
Both the views about the need for academic staff to maintain a disciplinary rule-
structure in the environment and the anxiety about the loosely structured architecture of 
this kind of software speak about a concern to maintain authority structures within an 
environment whose innate cultural and technological structuring principles are 
essentially non-hierarchical. My participants are not alone in these views. Writer and 
entrepreneur Andrew Keen argues, in The Cult of the Amateur, that the affordances 
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created by web 2.0 – that everyone, no matter what their expertise or credentials, can 
publish their views about any area – means that the uninformed viewpoints of amateurs 
carry as much weight as expert analyses (2007); and technology writer Nicholas Carr 
suggests that the fragmentation of knowledge and the way in which the information we 
view online is stripped of meaningful context, contributes to the downgrading of 
structures of intellectual authority (2010). As Jürgen Habermas puts it, in relation to 
news, 
the price we pay for the growth in egalitarianism offered by the Internet is the 
decentralized access to unedited stories. In this medium, contributions by 
intellectuals lose their power to create a focus. 
(Habermas, acceptance speech for Bruno Kreisky Prize, 2006, reproduced in 
Scholtz, 2006) 
 
Jodi Dean uses the term ‘whatever’ culture in her work on blogging, to describe the way 
in which all opinions, no matter how valid, relevant or (un)informed are reduced to 
equal status by communicative capitalism. She argues that this closes down the space 
for meaningful debate because all perspectives, whether based on evidence or 
ignorance, are ‘just your opinion’ (2010, p.6). Dean links this ‘whatever’ culture into 
the Lacanian notion of the implosion of the master signifier brought about by the 
collapse of high modernism, which I discussed earlier. (Dean, 2010, pp.1-9 and 85-90).  
 
The anxiety expressed by participants in my study may, then, tap into wider concerns 
about intellectual authority. Academic authority in the classroom has been queried for 
some time by the whole culture of the teaching quality audit, as I have previously 
discussed; now it becomes threatened by the affordances offered and assumptions 
underlying the technologies used for teaching and learning. As a recent Guardian report 
on the use of learning technologies puts it, quoting an education consultant from PA 
Consulting Group:  
It certainly involves big changes in styles and skills from academics, who are 
less the authoritative providers of knowledge and must become more like 
learning coaches and mentors for their students. 
The Guardian, 2014. 
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The fact that a broadsheet quotes management consultants when writing about higher 
education pedagogy – rather than, say, a Professor of Education – does rather 
demonstrate the truth of the idea that intellectual authority is threatened. From a 
psychoanalytic perspective, the concerns of my participants of losing authority and 
about feeling lost in a loose structure can be seen as about losing the grip of the 
discourse of the master, which, as Lacan says, frames the university, and moving into 
the discourse of the hysteric, which Zizek sees as the default position of users of the 
internet. It is an uncomfortable position for a teacher, marked by confusion and 
instability, but it is the only discourse where the subject seeks after true knowledge 
(Bracher, 1994, p.122; Zizek, 1993, p.274; Fink, 1995, p.133-4). 
 
7.7.5.2 The year of the MOOC 
The most recent aspect of the use of second-generation technologies is the growth of 
Massive Open Online Courses, or MOOCs. These have had much media coverage, with 
the New York Times declaring 2012 ‘the year of the MOOC’ (THE, 2013c). MOOCs are 
online distance-learning courses which are (or at least were, originally) freely available 
and which are run on open platforms such as Coursera, Canvas or FutureLearn. The 
large numbers of participants create a community which enables peer-to-peer teaching 
and learning. For example, a popular, high profile MOOC in recent years is Stanford 
University’s ‘Machine Learning’ course122 which was launched in 2011 with 100,000 
participants (Stanford University, 2013). 
 
Academics Stephen Downes and George Siemens, who created the first MOOC in 2008 
(THE, 2013c), have reservations about the MOOC ‘explosion’. Downes sees a move 
from ‘interactive and dynamic’ learning methods to ‘static and passive’ approaches, 
saying that: 
Moocs as they were originally conceived … were the locus of learning 
activities and interaction, but as deployed by commercial providers they 
resemble television shows or digital textbooks with – at best – an online 
quiz component. 
(THE, 2013c) 
 
                                                          
122
 See https://www.coursera.org/course/ml 
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Downes sees the change as being a result of MOOCs moving from the public or not-for-
profit sector to the corporate sector where ‘the bottom line often takes precedence over 
student needs’ (THE, 2013c). 
 
Educational policy analyst and former VC, Peter Scott, is critical of MOOCs from a 
different perspective. He points out that ‘government cuts, high fees, league-table 
snobbism – all point to a reinforcement of elite forms of higher education … So Moocs 
provide the perfect cover story – "higher education for the masses" when real-world 
opportunities to go to university are being cut’(Scott, 2013). 
  
7.7.5.3 Unbundling or empowering? 
In Pearson executive Michael Barbar’s 2013 report An Avalanche is Coming, which I 
discussed in Chapter 3, he envisages the future of British universities as an exercise in 
‘unbundling’ higher education. By this he means that higher education will be split into 
mass institutions, which will use MOOCs and other online elements to teach courses 
designed and created at higher status universities; and elite institutions, with 
significantly different student/staff ratios, for those who can afford the weighty fees. He 
places a great deal of emphasis on what he (referring to the footballer Christiano 
Ronaldo) calls the ‘Ronaldo effect’ where superstar academics will deliver lectures 
online, thus diminishing the need for normal academics – because as David Kernohan123 
sums up, satirically ‘the connected internet age apparently means that people want to 
learn only from celebrities, without actually being able to communicate with them’ 
(Kernohan, 2013). In the light of such neoliberal attempts to leverage technologies in 
the undermining of public education, the concerns of the participants in my studies 
seem fairly prescient. Which isn’t to say that technologies can’t be used in other ways 
for teaching and learning; as Clegg et al. suggest, ‘spaces may be found’ for 
developments that are driven by ‘critical pedagogy ‘and ‘counter-hegemonic’ practices 
(2003, p.51). The original idea behind MOOCs was to enable freely accessible 
education, and although the idea has been appropriated by other kinds of providers, this 
approach which ‘gets people together, gets them talking, gets them thinking in new 
ways… empowering people to develop and create their own learning, their own 
                                                          
123
 Of Jisc, but blogging in a private capacity. 
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education’ (Downes, 2012) persists as an active resistance to neoliberal approaches to 
education. 
 
I began this thesis, in both a chronological and a narrative sense, by considering what 
meanings digital teaching technologies hold for the academic subject. In order to 
understand this, my research has led me to explore the question of what a university is, 
or should be. It seems particularly ironic to me, therefore, that if technology is pressed 
into the service of neoliberalism in the way Barbar predicts, then the whole teaching and 
learning project of public higher education that we built up in the 20
th
 and 21
st
 centuries 
effectively collapses. Perhaps, ultimately, as Terry Eagleton claims in a 2010 Guardian 
article ‘universities and advanced capitalism are fundamentally incompatible. And the 
political implications of that run far deeper than the question of student fees’. Or 
MOOCs. Or VLES. 
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8 Chapter 8 – The purloined email 
 
‘I sent a letter to my love, but on the way I dropped it 
Someone must have picked it up and put it in their pocket’ 
Rhyme from a children’s playground game 
 
‘…we cannot say of the purloined letter that, like other objects, it must be, or not be, in 
a particular place, but unlike them it will be and not be where it is, wherever it goes.’  
Seminar on ‘The Purloined Letter’, Jacques Lacan 
 
8.1 Preface 
This chapter was first drafted in 2007 using emails written in the same year. However, 
interestingly, much of the analysis of the way emails are used is still current, 7 years 
later.  
8.2 Emails without end 
The use of email is, and has been for some time, a central part of the daily business of 
work for academic staff in universities. As long ago as 2006 the Times Higher 
Education ran an article guiding academics on the best way to use it effectively, so that 
communication would not be in any way confused or confounded and so that academics 
could represent themselves clearly (Swain, 2006). 
 
In this chapter I will consider the notion that email exchanges constitute part of an 
endless circulation of unfixed knowledge, where the impossibility of truth, let alone 
clear communication, becomes foregrounded. Within this, I propose that the academic 
subject is constituted in a number of ways: through the permanent nature of the 
electronic archive; through the transformation of distinctions between public and 
private; through email chains of signification; and through the multiple and 
interconnected gazes of the readers. 
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In particular, I will use the metaphor of the way in which the movement of the 
Purloined Letter in Edgar Alan Poe’s short story124 traces a symbolic circuit (Poe, 
1844), as well Lacan’s analysis of this. I will draw on this metaphor to explore how the 
concepts used by Lacan (and subsequent works by others analysing Lacan’s 1956 
Seminar on the Purloined Letter) can be leveraged to consider the way in which the 
academic subject is partly conditioned by the circulation of email letters within the 
context of the contemporary university. In this I will be using a combination of 
anonymised actual university emails, and typical, illustrative scenario emails. 
 
8.3 The subject of emails 
The academic subject has always been constituted by the sum of their utterances, 
whether in oral form in the lecture hall, seminar, tutorial and conference presentation or 
in written form by inscription in books, articles and scholarly journals, as I discuss in 
other parts of this thesis. The increasing disembodiment of the subject means that the 
electronic self which they construct through digital inscription, be it that of email, 
comments to students in virtual classrooms, homepages and so on, comes to constitute 
the day-to-day changing presence of the subject, and begins to define them. Although 
there is still embodied contact with colleagues and students, this embodied presence 
becomes re-configured by the self created in the digital university environments, as in 
the following extrapolation from Zizek’s conception of the impact of the digital realm 
on the embodied world.  
 
                                                          
124
 In the narrative of ‘The Purloined Letter’ the Chief of Police, G, visits the narrator and his friend Dupin 
and asks for Dupin’s help with retrieving the titular letter. The letter in question was an illicit 
(presumably an amorous) missive, which was being read by the Queen when the King entered the room. 
She placed it face down, and the King did not notice it. Minister D__, however, on entering the room 
perceives the letter and the meaning of it, and substitutes for it another letter. The Queen sees this but 
is unable to act without alerting the King to the existence of the letter. Possession of the letter, for the 
Minister, means political power as he gains influence over the Queen. The Queen asks G for his help in 
retrieving the letter, but G’s meticulous searching of the Minister’s apartments in his absence yields no 
result. Dupin, however, taking up G’s request for help, visits the Minister, perceives the letter, its 
appearance altered by being inverted and overwritten in open view on a card rack, and on a subsequent 
visit substitutes for it another pre-prepared identical letter. In the body of the letter he has written a 
quotation by means of which the Minister will understand that it is by Dupin he has been duped, thus 
settling an old score Dupin has with Minister D__ (Poe, 1844). 
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Zizek talks about the way in which sex with a flesh-and-blood partner is impacted on by 
the experience of virtual
125
 sex, where a fantasy about the other substitutes for physical 
contact (Zizek, 1998). He argues that this means that when one is engaged in embodied 
sexual practice there are three people involved, oneself, one’s lover and the fantasy one 
has about one’s lover, as the virtual knowledge makes more explicit the fantasy that has 
always existed covertly. This could be further extrapolated to include the fantasy one’s 
lover has about oneself, and, to include a narcissistic perspective, the projected fantasy 
of the self one has, and the projected fantasy the lover has of themselves – making six 
entities in total. This is the ‘phantasmic support’ (Zizek, 1998, para.9) that is needed, in 
terms of Zizek’s analysis, to sustain the sexual act. 
 
To apply this thinking to the everyday work situation of the academic subject, it’s 
possible to say the following: when Dr X meets with Professor Y she is not just meeting 
with the Y she experiences in front of her, but with the Y that has been constructed 
through online representation and her fantasised (through online exchange, memory and 
the filling in of gaps between) Y. Similarly she brings her own virtual and projected 
selves to the room, so that the meeting of two people becomes haunted by their other 
selves; so the online world rewrites embodied life. 
 
Another way of thinking about the same idea is to use Hayles’ (2005) concept of 
intermediation. Hayles uses this term to consider how different kinds of media interact 
with each other and encourage us to read different forms of media in a way that we 
would have not done, had we not encountered other forms of media. So, for example, 
the reading of a novel is profoundly affected by the fact that the reader has been 
exposed to the medium of film. They might visualise settings, transitions and imaginary 
camera angles very differently than someone who has never encountered the medium of 
film. Extrapolating from this concept, I would propose that the email texts I have read 
from, or copied to, the academic subject, Dr X, encourage me to view and, indeed, 
constitute, the flesh and blood Dr X differently, when she is sitting in a room with me.  
8.4 Death and the archive 
In their anatomy or map of Lacan’s Seminar on the Purloined Letter, Muller and 
Richardson (1988) describe the letter as having ‘the property of nowhereness’, being ‘a 
                                                          
125
 The term ‘virtual’ for Zizek, in this context may reasonably be taken to mean ‘online’. 
216  
 
 
symbol of absence [which] is and is not, wherever it may be’ (p.79) and remaining even 
when destroyed. The resonance with email is significant – an electronic mail is and is 
not and is always elusive whilst being ever replicable and omnipresent. But it is its 
ability to remain when destroyed which concerns this part of our discussion, in its 
relationship with, or representation of, the archive.  
 
As soon as an email is sent, it exists in a number of places. It may be in the ‘sent items’ 
section of the sender’s software; it may exist on the server of the senders email service; 
it will exist on the server of the receiver’s email service; and it will be in the inbox of 
the receiver’s email software, which may mean it has been automatically downloaded to 
the hard drive(s) on the receiver’s computer(s). In addition to this, the email servers will 
be backed up in some way, so an additional copy of the mail will be held on both the 
sender’s and recipient’s service providers’ back-up servers. If either the sent or received 
email, or both, are downloaded to the sender and/or recipient’s hard drives by their 
email client software, a copy may exist which cannot easily be deleted (computer files 
on hard drives are not actually erased when the user ‘deletes’ them, but renamed, and 
then not easily accessible to the ordinary user). So, once sent, it can exist in up to eight 
(or more) places, seven of which are largely out of the reach or control of the sender. 
Once the email has been replied to or forwarded, the whole process of copies 
proliferating begins again. These multiple and distributed copies form an archive, in a 
literal sense. Additionally, the archive exists in a more metaphorical sense of a kind of 
total cultural inscription of all utterances. 
 
The relationship between archiving, the uncanny and the death drive is a complex and 
intimate one. In considering Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), the text 
where Freud first introduces the notion of the death drive, and The Uncanny (1919), 
Nicholas Royle points out that both texts speak about the same issues at times, but are 
loud in their silence about each other, despite being written in the same period (Royle, 
2003, p.86). Freud developed the model of the death instinct or drive in an attempt to 
explain why the mind might wish to compulsively repeat painful experiences in dreams. 
For Freud, the death drive tries to return the organism to its inorganic state and is 
characterised by repetition phenomena and by destructiveness.  
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The repetition aspect is central to the uncanny. It is about the return of the repressed; it 
presents as something that has been banished but repeatedly comes back, as exemplified 
by the archetypal horror film monster, who repeatedly returns no matter how many 
times s/he is dispatched. The uncanny is ‘a compulsion to repeat’ (Freud, 1919, p.360) 
and ‘a constant recurrence of the same thing’ (ibid., p.356). It is, however, as both 
Derrida (1987) and Hertz (1985) have suggested, as noted by Royle (2003), not the 
actual thing that is being repeated which create the uncanny effect, but the act of the 
repetition itself. 
 
In Archive Fever, Derrida discusses the intimate nature of the relationship between the 
death drive and the archive (Derrida, 1995). Because of its destructive properties, the 
death instinct incites the annihilation of memory and consequently produces the need to 
archive. The death drive, because it creates the compulsion to repeat, creates the archive 
– the archive being essentially a symptom of repetition compulsion. But the death 
instinct, being a principle of annihilation, seeks to destroy the archive. Therefore as 
Derrida points out, ‘The archive always works, and a priori, against itself’ (1995, p.12). 
Its heart is death. 
 
As discussed later in this chapter, the existence of the email archive affects the subject’s 
behaviour in a range of ways, but there is a specific and direct effect when archiving. 
The possibility of loss which the notion of the archive opens up creates great anxiety in 
the subject; to lose the contents of one’s inbox in a work environment is to lose one’s 
way, one’s history and one’s self; on the other hand, the fact of the existence of the 
archive brings about anxiety in a variety of ways. This contradiction is neatly illustrated 
by the autoarchive function which many popular email handling software utilises. At 
regular intervals, of perhaps a month, the archive speaks to us and says something like 
‘would you like to auto-archive your old items now?’ Of course the items are already 
archived elsewhere, so what it is really saying is ‘would you like the archive to which 
you have access to re-organise itself?’ But this message creates anxiety in the two ways 
already mentioned. On the one hand we experience fear that the archive will hide parts 
of itself in a secret location which we will never be able to access. We will never again 
be able to know our own archive – and so our own self – again or have control over it. 
We connect with the loss of self which the death drive implies. But on the other hand, 
this explicit reminder of the archive tells us we will be forced to live forever, but in a 
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form over which we have no control. Thus the explicit reminder of archiving confronts 
us with the contradictions of the death drive and the implications for us as subjects 
constituted by the archive.  
 
To put this another way, when the ‘would you like to archive your old items now?’ 
message pops up on our screen, what it is really saying to us is ‘you’re going to die. 
And not only are you going to die, but I am going to make puppet representations of 
you live on, and the world will believe them to be you.’ Unsurprising, then, that many 
of us, albeit guiltily, serially refuse the option to archive.
126
 
 
A significant aspect of the archive, discussed by Derrida, which has direct bearing on 
the role of email, is the way in which the existence of the archive does not just preserve 
the past but by doing so, impacts on the present. The existence of an archive of our 
email correspondence affects our behaviour and thoughts both when we write or reply 
to email and also in other arenas. And in doing this, it changes the future. So the 
existence of the email archive does not just record, it produces. 
 
How does this affect the academic subject? Partially constituted by the inscription of all 
the emails they have ever written and all the emails which have been written or copied 
to them, all of which remain forever in locations over which they have no control, they 
are also constituted on a present and future basis by the existence of this archive of the 
self. A sophisticated user of email self-edits continually when writing mail, knowing 
that they have no control over its publication. As discussed later, users will masquerade 
and act parts in their awareness of the gaze, but this is compounded by the permanency 
of the self that is created in the archive, which is there to be viewed at times, in places 
and by people unknowable for the subject. In email exchanges we can never actually see 
the Other’s gaze, so we are conscious that we never know what we are for the Other and 
must fantasise what the Other’s gaze may be. How much more is this insecure position 
compounded when we have knowledge of the existence of the archive and the 
consequent awareness of the completely unknowable nature of the Other. For the 
subject, then, this knowledge of the archive increases the undermining of the imagined 
stable self, producing greater levels of uncertainty and instability.  
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 An article called ‘Increasing Outlook user acceptance’ in Windows IT Pro identifies this reluctance on 
the part of email users to archive, suggesting technical solutions to the issue (Neuberger, 2005). 
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The email archive also speaks to us directly, creating an uncanny effect that echoes 
Derrida’s discussion of the disembodied voice on an answerphone message which asks 
us to speak to it (1995, p.62). When the addressee of an email has set up an automatic 
response which tells the sender that they are, perhaps, on holiday and will not respond 
immediately, the sender is spoken to by the phantom machinic voice of the archive. 
‘Your letter has been processed,’ it says; ‘your utterance is now inscribed indelibly 
upon the archive and you will never be able to erase it’. But it is not the addressee 
speaking, it is the archive itself. And in a sense all of the subject’s letters are addressed 
to the archive, not to the apparent addressee, because the subject is conscious of creating 
their public self in their utterances. So, in a sense, all of our utterances are addressed to 
death, or to the desire for immortality that the existence of death creates. 
 
There is another sense in which the archive is a metaphor for the unconscious. Here, in 
the archive, all the utterances of the subject and all the chains of meaning that they have 
been caught up in, and spoken by, are held. But elements are repressed into the 
unconscious for a reason – to protect the sanity of the subject. The idea that the 
unconscious is open and accessible is a horrifying notion and one guaranteed to produce 
profound anxiety in the subject. 
 
There is a strange echo here of Pamela Thurschwell’s discussion of the way in which, in 
the late 19
th
 century, new communication technologies such as the telephone, telegraph, 
phonograph and typewriter were conflated with the medium of spiritualism, with the 
possibility of communicating with the dead (Thurschwell, 2001). Thurschwell discusses 
how it was expected that communications technologies would enable us to retrieve the 
absolutely lost, that is to say, the dead. The relationship between death and the archive 
as described above goes some way towards making this hope come true – albeit in a 
twisted, horrifying fashion, much like the granting of the first two wishes in W. W. 
Jacob’s supernatural tale The Monkey’s Paw (1902). 
 
The relationship of the archive both to the death drive and the unconscious is 
compounded by the silent nature of the email archive. In its creation it is, like the death 
drive and the unconscious, absolutely silent. It’s easy to imagine, when being physically 
on a university campus, the thousands of silent messages crossing and re-crossing in the 
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ether, an entire, silent set of discourses, sent by soundlessly chattering servers, 
congealing as soon as created into the archive. This paranoiac, but also fascinating, eerie 
and uncanny image of silent conversing leads directly into the next topic of this chapter: 
the idea of the collapse of the concept of a separation between public and private, in 
which email plays a significant, and in Derrida’s view, a ‘privileged’ (1995, p. 17) role. 
 
8.5 The letter 
To return the metaphor of Poe’s letter, it is significant that the letter is not stolen, but 
purloined. That which does not have a clear owner – and Lacan’s question of ‘to whom 
does the letter belong’ (1959, p.41) is always in play – cannot be stolen, merely 
purloined. How much more so than the letter does an email have dubious ownership, 
particularly an email written or received in a work context. Not only is there the 
complication of whether the sender or receiver is the ‘owner’, but the issue of who owns 
an item created by a member of staff in the course of their paid employment is also 
brought to bear – perhaps the employer is the owner? And if the employer is part of the 
public sector, then, perhaps, the State is ultimately the owner. This is further 
complicated in the context of a university, where academic staff will sometimes own the 
intellectual property of their work.  
 
It becomes pertinent, then, within a university, to ask the question, ‘to whom does an 
email belong?’, illustrated in Email (Scenario) One127 below: 
 
Email (Scenario) One 
 
Dr X sends an email to a colleague, Professor Y. Y sends a response, which includes the 
text of the original. X then forwards the letter to W, for information, copying in Y. W 
replies to both X and Y, copying in A, B and C, who proceed to reply to all, adding their 
own comments. 
 
 
                                                          
127
 Typical scenarios of emails sent in a university are designated ‘Email (Scenario)’ and anonymised 
versions of actual emails sent in university settings are designated ‘Email (Actual)’. 
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This ordinary, everyday example of university communication foregrounds some issues 
to do with the nature of ownership of emails. When Dr X sends the mail to Professor Y, 
does this mail belong to the sender or the recipient? Similarly with Y’s response to X. In 
‘showing’ the compound mail to W has X offended Y’s ownership rights in any way, by 
publishing the mail to W on his behalf? And has W, in showing the letters to three 
additional readers, offended X and Y’s rights? Do A, B and C have the right to 
comment publicly on utterances which were never spoken to them in the first place? If 
Y’s email contained an original idea which subsequently showed up in a paper by C, 
would C be plagiarising Y, or would he be building on a discussion in which he, Y and 
their other colleagues had all played a part? Or is all of this a practical performance of 
‘de-authorisation’, started by Barthes’ announcement of the death of the author 
(Barthes, 1967), continued by Foucault’s notion of the author effect, and by the general 
thrust of post-Saussurean theory, further dissected by postmodernism and brought into 
the realm of the digital by Poster (2003)? Poster argues that the notion of authorship is 
problematised in a very evident way by the democratised, shared publishing space 
provided by the internet. In a public, digital space it is often impossible to know who is 
the author of a text, and there are always issues around the authenticity of any claimed 
identity. The ease with which digital online documents can be replicated and changed 
leads further to the undermining of author-ity, and this, enhanced by increasingly 
available technologies for sharing texts of often (seemingly) anonymous authorship, 
further undermines the traditional autonomous authority of the author.  
 
The only clarity in all of this is that the complex chain of utterances has no clear owner. 
This leaves the subject in a position where they are obliged to operate on the principle 
that email exchange is always underpinned by a radical uncertainty as to whom they are 
addressing, and to assume that all emails are subject to being purloined. Indeed, given 
that university mail may or may not be the property of the employer or even the State, 
the emails may be, by their nature, purloined as soon as they are created.  
 
But whilst the subject may be aware of this (and in the highly ‘political’ environment of 
the contemporary university is, no doubt, likely to have reached this awareness the hard 
way, by having a mail that ought to have remained hidden come inappropriately to 
light) there are nevertheless forces at work which make us feel that we are operating in a 
private world when we engage with email.  
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When we delve into our inboxes to read, write or respond to an email, we are in an 
environment where we experience a powerful sensation of being on our own. We are 
often operating in the intensely personal space of our own personal computer, laptop or 
other mobile device. We may be sitting at our own desk, in some type of private office 
space. We compose an email silently, in complete privacy. In the seemingly secure box 
of our computer, the email software is another secure box, within which we write our 
specific mail in the specific, defined box of the screen. All of this provides us with an 
intense sense of privacy and security. The toolset which most of us use is 
unsophisticated and does not encourage editing, the ‘send’ button is always, invitingly, 
present, and the cultural norms which have arisen around the register used for email text 
invite informality. So, the overall effect for the subject is a sense of sending a private, 
informal note to a specific person – as a colleague summed up the experience, ‘it makes 
you feel as though you’re writing a note to your Mum, but in fact you’re writing to the 
world’. 
 
So the subject is situated in the impossible, contradictory position of half believing their 
utterances to be private but knowing them to be public and having to inscribe 
themselves on the electronic world accordingly. As Derrida puts it, ‘email transforms 
the entire public private space of humanity’ (1995, p.17). And in transforming, the 
space transforms us. 
 
Despite the felt intimacy of email inscription, there is an aspect of the remoteness, 
impersonality, speed and simplicity of use that encourages staff and students in 
university settings to send emails to people to whom they would not send printed letters, 
or would not telephone if email was unavailable. The technology invites this. It makes 
the email addresses of all staff internally easily available to everyone in a university; it 
enables the sending of a mail to be quick and simple; and it encourages copying in, 
replying, forwarding, blind copying and replying to all, by making these options 
available as suggestions, to be performed at the click of a button. Students will email 
their lecturers quite casually, and senior university staff receive email communication 
from students and staff members who do not know them and would not normally speak 
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to them if this channel were not available.
128
 Whether this is democracy in action or a 
damned nuisance is a question of perspective, but its effect is that it increases 
significantly the number of occurrences and contexts in which the subject is invited to 
speak. And, as discussed below, email invitations to speak are not without a directive 
element. 
 
An email is forced on the recipient, be they the formal addressee, the one-step-removed 
addressee to whom a mail is forwarded, or either of the two varieties of tangential 
addressee, the public bystander who is copied in, or the secret bystander who is blind 
copied in. The subject, receiving the mail, is publicly forced to know of its contents, as 
the existence of the archive means there is always an audit trail which the sender – or 
future, unknown others – can easily make public with a mouseclick or screen tap. If the 
subject is the formal addressee, the sender is publicly forcing a response from them; the 
subject is forced to speak, and to write themselves in an exchange which may not be on 
their terms. Remaining silent is not an option, however unimportant the subject may 
regard the received mail, as, in the culture of the modern university, such silence is seen 
as a dereliction of duty. Additionally, the timescale within which knowledge of and/or a 
response is expected is short – in the region of a day or two. Interestingly, all of us who 
work in universities can think of examples of colleagues who never answer, and, 
presumably, never read, their emails, and are publicly known to do this – whose 
subjecthood is therefore constructed by silence – a radical and brave position, indeed.  
 
As the speed, ease of use, and culture of email usage invites this multiplication of 
utterances, an additional anxiety is created for the subject in that the volume of email 
increases and they cannot easily manage to read or respond to their mail. So the anxiety 
of not knowing, and being seen to be silent when they should speak, is added to the 
picture. Ros Gill, in her work on academics and critical labour studies, considers how 
ordinary it is to ‘go off to teach and come back to find 50 new emails have arrived’ 
(Gill, 2014, p.21) or to find over 500 emails in one’s inbox after a day spent sitting on 
appointment panels (ibid.). She stresses how comparing the impossible number of 
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 David Melville, in a talk at The enhancement of learning and assessment using web 2.0 technologies 
Pro Vice-Chancellors’ SIG, 24 November 2008, made the point that during his time as V-C at Kent, 
students would email him quite casually with general feedback mail that began ‘Hi Dave’. Melville 
contrasted that with his own experience of being a student, where he and his peers barely knew there 
was a V-C, let alone what their name was. 
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emails they receive has become ‘a tawdry academic sport, characterised by a mixture of 
desperation and resignation’, in the face of cultural denial of the impossible, 
unsustainable nature of the problem (Gill, 2014, p.21-2). 
 
The overall effect on the subject of this imperative to know and to speak is that they are 
publicly policed, have aspects of their work time and tasks determined by a random 
selection of others, which represents an erosion of their autonomy, and are forced to 
inscribe themselves on the digital university in contexts not of their choosing. It 
conjures up another version of the interactive, internalised, version of Bentham’s 
panopticon, where all the participants who are being policed simultaneously encourage 
this policing by participating according to the established law, that Andrejevic refers to 
as ‘lateral surveillance’ (Andrejevic, 2004, p.479) or the ‘participatory panopticon’ 
(Andrejevic, 2012, p.239) . It both encompasses and moves beyond Foucault’s re-
conjuring of the panopticon in his analysis of disciplinary societies (Foucault, 1975). It 
has the hallmarks of Deleuze’s (1992) concept of the society of control, in that 
computers are the machine technology employed, and a control speaks itself though a 
strange kind of corporate post-hierarchical levelling. Interestingly, it is not university 
managers who play the most active part in this entire dance, but those in universities 
whose roles permit them time to send frequent emails, namely students and 
administrative staff. As these are two constituencies in relation to whom the academic 
subject has traditionally occupied a position of relative power, this represents an 
intriguing shift in internal power relations brought about by the use of digital 
communication technology. 
 
Moving on to consider the way in which email circulation creates chains of signification 
and a strange, sometimes circular movement of unfixed knowledge and meaning, leads 
again back to Lacan’s reading of The Purloined Letter. Derrida’s (1979) concept that all 
texts contain a set of mechanisms or ‘heads’ for reading, with which we read other texts, 
is demonstrably true for the texts which constitute an email chain. The frequent effect of 
an answering text in the chain followed by a response or another answer from a 
different view, gives us a compound text apparently written by a range of unreliable 
narrators, where the reading of any component section of the text makes us view any 
other component section in a different light. At the same time, an email is positioned in 
the same way as the purloined letter, in that its movement around the various actors in 
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the drama establish relationships, and create meaning, which is more than just the text 
within the letter; this creation of a symbolic circuit itself repositions the meaning of the 
texts within the letter. 
 
Taking a two more examples of a typical university email exchanges, we can begin to 
unpick exactly how this might work. Email chains (Actual) Two and Three below 
illustrate the first issue, demonstrating the way in which texts re-read each other in 
email chains, and Email (Scenario) Four demonstrates how meaning can be created by 
the way in which the email is received by the actors in the drama establish relationships 
and create meaning. 
 
The structure of the university in Emails Two and Three is one which is divided into 
schools, as academic sections, and then subdivided into academic departments within 
this. 
 
Email (Actual) Two 
An email was circulated across a UK university inviting bids from the schools to central 
funds. The first email was circulated within one school, the same day as the original 
invitation was received, by a head of department with the bid invitation appended. 
 
 
From: Frances K 
Sent: Tuesday 
To: Academic Staff in the School 
Subject: Institutional Grant 
Dear all 
Are you all ok if I apply for this for our current [course X] development in [my 
department] as it is interdisciplinary, including several subjects from [named discipline 
areas in other Departments]? I have checked with [the fundholder] and he is ok about 
that.  
Can you let me know by Thursday if that is a problem 
regards  
Frances 
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What this email says to the receivers is ‘there are institutional funds available for new 
developments and I am prepared to put the work in on our behalf to acquire some of this 
pot for our school. This benefits us all as it is an interdisciplinary course’. It is a 
performance of how collegiate and proactive Frances K. is being in this regard. 
 
However, a second email, replying to Frances K. but copying in all the other recipients 
of Frances’s mail, was sent from the head of a different department in the school: 
 
 
 
From: Kerry A 
Sent: Wednesday 
To: Frances K 
Cc: Academic staff in the School 
Subject: Institutional Grant 
Frances 
I was going to apply for this for English as a second language students. But I have no 
problems if you go for it and I will use my bid elsewhere. 
Regards 
 
Kerry A 
 
 
 
What this second email invites us to do is to read the earlier one in a different light. 
Whilst ostensibly saying that the sender is happy for Frances K. to go ahead, it is 
actually saying: ‘I have actually prepared a bid for this, which would benefit 
disadvantaged learners. But, although I have put this work in and my cause is worthy, 
I’ll nobly step back and let you apply for the money’. It performs both the proactivity 
(she has already written a bid) and the selfless nobility of Kerry A. 
 
Why would Kerry A. do this? One thing that most of the recipients of the email will 
know is that Frances K. is a friend of the fundholder for this grant. This lends a very 
particular kind of edge to Kerry A.’s email. For if the reader does have this piece of 
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knowledge, what Kerry A. is also saying in her mail is ‘my hard work on behalf of our 
disadvantaged learners is destined to come to naught, as I cannot compete with your 
“old-boy network”. So I concede.’ 
 
This makes us read Frances K.’s mail in a completely different light. Rather than seeing 
her as valiantly working on behalf of the school, we see her as selfishly drawing on her 
connections to secure funding for her own ends. This is a very different reading from 
our original one. 
 
A second email exchange, as below, also has the effect of making us re-read the original 
in a less than positive light.  
 
Email (Actual) Three 
Information was circulated to all departmental staff about voting for individuals for a 
particular national award. The following email was sent out by the head of department. 
 
 
From: Janice P 
To: All Departmental staff 
Subject: UK Award – voting 
  
Please vote for Richard – I believe he is the only nomination from our Institution 
 
 
 
On the face of it, this sounds straightforward. Everyone knows Richard, he is well liked, 
no-one doubts that he is very able and he’s one of our own. Staff are likely to take the 
email at face value, follow Janice P.’s advice and go to the website to vote for him. 
 
However, the following email was sent hard on its heels: 
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From: Eammon J 
To: All Departmental staff 
Subject: UK Award – voting 
 
Janice, thanks for this.  
 
Can I flag up that Clive Burton has also been nominated for this award. Clive is the 
Project Manager for [a project Eammon J is involved with outside the University], and 
has done a fabulous job at developing and promoting [the Project] brand, network, and 
programme of events over the last 2 years. Please help us to recognise his efforts and 
achievements. 
  
Voting closes tomorrow, Friday. There is nothing stopping you from voting for two 
people.  
Eammon 
 
 
What this email is saying to recipients is ‘there is another, more able candidate, whom 
some of us work with. Perhaps you would like to consider voting for him? Or would 
you rather be told, by your manager, who to vote for?’  
 
It makes recipients re-read the original as an instruction to vote for a colleague, and 
makes it sound rather shifty and undemocratic. Why should the excellent Clive suffer, 
because of parochial nepotism? However, when the reader re-reads Janice P.’s original 
one-liner and comes back to the second mail, Eammon K.’s mail sounds even more 
partisan by comparison, because of its effusive praise for Clive’s abilities. The final 
sentence say that ‘there is nothing stopping you from voting for two people’ makes a 
mockery of both exhortations to vote. Why not vote for three, then, or four? Thus the re-
reading of the second email, after re-reading the first, suggests that the whole voting 
process as an unrepresentative sham. So both mails undermine each other by re-writing 
each other. 
 
The next email exchange example subtly changes relationships between the characters 
in the drama according to where the email is, that is to say, who has ‘possession’ of it.  
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Email (Scenario) Four 
Dr X sends an email to Professor Y subtly pointing out some mistake he has made or 
mentioning, in a coded manner, something he has omitted to do. She kindly adds that 
this does not matter because she, Dr X, has helped him by putting right his error or 
carrying out his neglected task. Dr X ccs the mail to Dean Z. 
 
 
This email exchange echoes Felman’s diagrammatic illustration of the purloined letter 
triads (Felman, 1980, p.146) which is interpreted according to this context in Fig. 26, 
below. This refers to the point in Poe’s story when the Minister substitutes the Queen’s 
secret letter for one of his own, in front of the King and Queen. Professor Y’s gaze is 
that of the Queen who sees that D__ (or X, in this case) sees, but is powerless to act 
against X; Dean Z’s gaze is that of the King which takes the letter at face value, and 
sees nothing, (i.e. no duplicity). And X’s gaze is that which sees Y is powerless and Z 
blind, and takes advantage of this to further her own self-interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr X 
(The ego) 
Prof Y 
(The id/unconscious) 
Dean Z  
(The law/the superego) 
Fig. 26: The Purloined Email (adapted from Felman, p.146) 
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In this scenario, the addressee is never the true destined receiver. The mail is intended 
for Z, and sending it to Y is merely a device for performing the statement to one in a 
position of power ‘Y is negligent and I, diligently, bail him out’ in a way that allows the 
meaning to unfold without having to baldly state it. Like Felman’s translations of the 
letter, the email represents the unconscious, with Z occupying the position of the 
superego, the Law of the Father, like Poe’s ‘law’ which sees nothing, X occupying the 
position of the ego who can look at the other’s look and look at oneself in others eyes, 
and Y occupying the position of the unconscious or the id, where substitutions can be 
made or acts can be carried out without thought for the consequences. 
 
 
The way in which the subject is constructed by the insistence of the signifying chain 
achieves greater levels of complexity with each reply, forwarding or copying of an 
email. With a very everyday example such as that in Email Scenario One, as outlined 
earlier, the way in which our subject, Dr X, constructs herself by her email utterances is 
not under her control once she presses the send button. After this, the mail is archived 
and therefore its destination and readers are completely beyond her power. More 
immediately, it is in the hands of Y whose response and ccing to W may significantly 
alter the way her text is viewed by those who see it. Additionally, the forwarding to A, 
B and C, and their comments will all affect the way her original text is read. Thus 
Derrida’s point about texts re-reading each other can also be applied directly to Scenario 
One. 
 
When X’s Scenario One email is read, from whatever vantage point, it is seen within the 
chain of texts, and the subject, X, is constituted by their text(s). There are concrete 
echoes in this of Derrida’s (1995) point that the experience of reading conjures a ghost 
and the ghostly subject conjured is perhaps an interesting metaphor for what the 
academic subject is becoming in the Haunted University.  
 
Where the email actually ‘is’ or ‘is not’ is also of significance in the creation of 
meaning in/by the signifying chain. In simple terms, the fact that X’s Scenario Four 
mail to Y is in the Dean’s inbox changes the whole meaning of the mail from a friendly 
one to a hostile, manipulative one. If Y fails to notice to whom the mail is copied, thus 
believing the mail to be in a place other than where it is, he will behave in a way vis a 
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vis X and Z which may be damaging to him, much in the way that Minister D___ 
commits political suicide by continuing to act in the same way towards the Queen, 
because he assumes the letter is one place (his letter rack), when in fact it is in another 
(the hands of the Queen). In more complex terms, the email is simultaneously nowhere, 
having no corporeal substance, and everywhere, forever, as it is in the archive. To 
paraphrase slightly Lacan’s comment on Poe’s letter, ‘we cannot say of the purloined 
[email] … that, like other objects, it must be, or not be, in a particular place, but unlike 
them it will be and not be where it is, wherever it goes’. 
 
Whether an email, like the purloined letter, can be concealed by having its place 
confused is an interesting area for speculation. It may seem that, with the existence of 
the archive, any attempt at concealment is doomed to failure. Poe’s letter is concealed 
by leaving it exposed, but not in its place. One way to conceal an email would be to 
send the same addressee numerous emails at the same time, with the extraneous mail 
being ‘masking’ mail. The intention, then would be that the receiver will be unable to 
read the meaningful email with great attention, and therefore will not actually ‘see’ it. 
Given the number of emails that academics receive on a daily basis, as I discussed 
earlier, it would appear easy to hide an important message in this avalanche. 
Alternatively an email could be sent with a header which does not represent the body of 
the text, thus concealing it by displacing it. So emails can be partially concealed from 
the gaze both by manipulation of the recipient’s attention and by displacement. 
However, unlike the purloined letter, their unmasking depends not on the recipient’s 
intellect and ability to think creatively, like Dupin, but on their diligence, attention to 
detail, and dedication of time to the matter – like the police.  
 
One way in which email decidedly echoes Lacan’s purloined letter is in his point that 
‘the sender, we tell you receives from the receiver his own message in reverse form … a 
letter always arrives at its destination’ (1959, p.53). The subject of the purloined email 
quite literally receives, from the receiver, ‘their’ letter in reverse form, in an email chain 
where it’s meaning has been altered or ‘reversed’. And, in a slightly different sense, the 
destination of any email, because of its role in constructing the subject, is, indeed, the 
sender or subject themselves. The destination of an email is always death, the archive 
and the subject. 
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Considering the symbolic circuit of the email and the way in which it changes 
relationships between the actors in ‘possession’ of it, and constitutes the subject 
accordingly, leads on to the way in which the gaze of the readers operates. 
 
8.6 Performing for the gaze 
Email is, in a sense, a drama about being seen, about masquerading, evading and 
performing for the imagined gaze of the Other. The subject is constituted by the gaze of 
the reader, and as the emails continue on their symbolic circuit, the gaze becomes 
increasingly complex, multiple and partial, as well as always unknowable. This 
contrasts interestingly with more traditional performance by academic subjects on the 
lecture stage, in the debate and discussion of the seminar, or in scholarly inscription in 
journals, where the gaze of the other may be operating within parameters which the 
subject experiences or imagines as known, familiar and predictable. So the subject 
moves from a position of knowing (or imagining they know) what they are for the Other 
to a situation where they cannot know who the Other is or what they are for them. 
 
The partial gaze of the other, which constitutes our academic subject, is significant in its 
fragmentary nature. What the other sees, or indeed fails to see, with ‘the blindness of the 
seeing eye’ (Freud, 1985, p.181) is always unstable, always subject to change, and 
always self-reflexive. Bayne’s (2006) discussion of how visual practice in higher 
education encourages particular types of gaze and occludes others, quotes Foster’s 
statement, with relevance here, that ‘how we see, how we are able, allowed or made to 
see and how we see this seeing and the unseeing therein’ is always in play (Foster, 
1988, p.ix). 
 
Email is also an exchange of glances – open, covert and semi-public – and, like the 
glances, it operates in silence. It is a means by which relationships are established 
covertly, and the existence of secret, silent relationships has an effect the email 
construction of subjecthood.  
 
In order to understand the way in which the subject performs for the imagined gaze in 
email exchanges, this chapter will now go on to look at a range of behaviours 
encouraged by email technology and their meaning as performance. These behaviours 
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are carbon copying, blind carbon copying, flaming, self-editing, the use of receipt 
requests and the recall function. 
 
The way in which a sender is encouraged by the software to ‘carbon copy’ or ‘cc’ 
recipients into an email (because this option is always available as a ‘suggestion’ for the 
sender) was mentioned earlier in the context of the receiver being invited to speak. Here 
it will be looked at in the context of what the subject is performing by carrying out this 
action. Cc’ing anyone into an email always has the effect of turning a letter to the 
addressee into a performance for the bystander. This can be deployed in differing ways 
in our online university. 
  
Email (Actual) Five 
In the drama played out below, Lucy P. is a course director of a course which has 
recently instigated a fast-track option, Simon Q. is a lecturer practitioner
129
 on the 
course and Anya K. is their line manager. The email chain of four messages needs to be 
read in sequence. 
 
----- Original Message -----  
From: Simon Q  
Subject: Fast Tracking  
To: Lucy P  
 
Hi Lucy 
I have had a number of enqueries [sic], as to whether some of the additional modules 
can be picked up during the summer breaks, rather than running 2 modules at the same 
time.  
Would this be possible?  
Regards  
Simon 
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 In some areas of healthcare and medical education, ‘lecturer practitioners’ are staff who have a full-
time job outside the university but teach for a number of hours a week within their specific expertise. 
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From: Lucy P 
To: Simon Q 
Subject: Re: Fast Tracking 
 
Dear Simon  
The students asked me this on the face to face day in October and I made it clear that 
the modules can only run as indicated in the fast track student handbook i.e. modules 
won’t run over the summer. So there shouldn’t be any confusion about this. 
Hope that is of help 
Lucy 
 
 
 
From: Simon Q  
To: Lucy P 
Subject: RE: Fast Tracking 
 
Hi Lucy 
Thanks for your response. The question came from Ismail, as he is keen to fast-track but 
is equally concerned with the doubling up of the work-load. He thought that if he could 
take some of the extra modules in the summer, it would make it more do able. Perhaps 
we can discuss on Friday. 
Regards 
Simon 
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From: Lucy P 
To: Simon Q 
Cc: Anya K 
Subject: RE: Fast Tracking 
 
Dear Simon  
There is no way round doubling up the work load. The summer recess will remain as it 
provides an opportunity for students to submit time extended assignments and resubmit 
failed assignments. In addition, the structure and administration of the academic year 
and the way the modules are constructed and run means they cannot be delivered 
effectively over the summer break. 
I am sure we can talk through the options we have offered on Friday as there are some 
alternative options for the 2006 cohort students which means they could finish slightly 
later but would help with their workload.  
Regards 
Lucy 
 
 
The final email from Lucy P., which is cc’d to the line manager, effectively says 
‘observe, in this chain of discussion, how frustrating this person is! I have explained 
how the course is organised and he is still trying to get me to organise it differently. I 
am invoking you as the law, so that his annoying and maverick behaviour is observed 
by you’. The whole drama of the conversation is laid out for Anya K., with Lucy’s 
polite explanations to Simon purposely failing (in the gaze Lucy is constructing for 
Anya K. by her performance) to hide her frustration, as a build-up to a future drama (the 
meeting on Friday) that is set up to be Act II of this play. The final act which performs 
Lucy’s frustration, in Act I, is the pressing of the cc button to Anya. 
 
Additionally the insistence of the email chain in the drama above means that although 
Simon and Lucy’s earlier exchange were in private, the final cc’ing to the line manager 
makes them public. This is also performance for the gaze of Simon Q. Anya K. may 
never do more than glance at this whole email chain. It is the performance to Simon Q. 
that the law has been invoked and that he should stop questioning the authority of the 
course director because she is an agent of the Law of the Father, as personified in Anya 
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K. So Lucy P. uses one set of texts to perform two separate plays for two different 
gazes. 
 
This above drama describes what happens when a line manager is cc’d. In cc’ing to 
colleagues, however, the performance is a little different. The sender is saying ‘I want 
everyone to see what I’m doing.’ Cc’ing always means that the gaze of the recipient is 
not enough. In a sense it says ‘your opinion of me isn’t sufficiently important, I need to 
impress myself on other people, too’. Or to put it another way, in a Lacanian sense, the 
sender isn’t just performing ordinarily for the gaze and saying ‘Look at me, Mummy!’ 
when they cc an email, they are saying to the receiver ‘you’re not the person whose 
reaction I value, the cc’d person is. They’re the one I’m trying to impress, not you’; or 
‘you’re not my real Mother or Father.’ 
 
On the other hand, being the cc’d receiver of an email is not, for the subject, a neutral 
position. As discussed earlier, being the addressee forces the subject to speak and to 
know, but within the realm of the gaze it is the fact that the subject is seen to know 
which affects them. Much like Yerushalmi’s (1991) letter to Freud where he includes 
the self-avowedly liberal, scientific, religiously de-cultured Freud as part of the Jewish 
brethren by the phrase ‘I shall say we’ (p.81), when the sender of an email copies the 
subject in, they are implicating the subject in their discourse and are making them 
subject to judgement by exposing them to the gaze of the addressee-as-other. They are 
saying ‘I shall say we’. In the case of Yerushalmi’s inclusion of Freud, Freud is unable 
to refute this ‘we’ – by nature of being dead; whilst the implicated subject is not 
positioned quite like this, their ghostly status makes such inclusion difficult to refute, as 
their selfhood is always being dynamically constituted by such email utterances. The 
sender is appealing to them to watch them and collude with them, when they say ‘Look 
at me!’. For the cc’d subject, the gaze of the (known and unknown) other means they 
can’t refute the ‘we’ without seeming churlish towards the sender, as they would be 
undermining the position of (parental) authority set up for them by the sender – as far as 
the partial, semi-blind gaze of the unknowable Other is able to see. Naïve people – like 
the Law in Poe’s story – only see one side of an email, after all. 
 
In the following email chain it is essentially the cc’d recipients of the mail to whom the 
sender of the second email is speaking and the apparent recipient is offered the role of 
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(amused or embarrassed) bystander. The cc’d recipients are invited by Richard F. to 
collude with him, and when one of them attempts to refute the ‘we’, she meets with 
limited success. 
 
Email (Actual) Six 
Lisa L., PA to the director of administration, had sent round emails organising a slightly 
mysterious (and possibly ominous) group meeting between heads of department in a 
school and the director of administration to discuss ‘student number planning/budget’. 
The group then received the email below: 
 
 
 
From: Lisa L 
Subject: Student Number Planning/Budget 
To: Heads of dept 
 
Dear All, 
 
I do apologise for getting the meeting’s objective wrong. [the director of admin] is 
looking to hold a one to one meeting with all of you to discuss student number planning 
and budget and not a group meeting. I will be re-scheduling this individually with 
people on the phone this time. Once again, I apologise. 
 
Please discard all previous correspondence on the matter. 
 
Regards 
Lisa 
 
 
The effusiveness of the apology suggests that Lisa L. had got the meeting very wrong 
and had been told so in no uncertain terms by the administration director! This 
suggestion is teased out in the response from one of the heads, below. 
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From: Richard F  
Subject: Student Number Planning/Budget 
To: Lisa L 
Cc: Heads of dept; Admin Director 
 
Divide and rule eh.... 
R 
 
 
 
This email is actually intended for the recipients. It invites the other heads of 
department to collude in the suggestion that they are being asked to meet individually, 
rather than collectively, in order to weaken their position. It is also cc’d to the person 
whom Richard F. suggests is attempting to ‘divide and rule’ a group of individuals who 
are at least on a par, but for the most part higher up, in the school hierarchy. This is 
partly to say ‘we know what you’re up to,’ and partly because he knows that his email 
may end up in the admin director’s inbox anyway and it would make Richard F. look 
underhand if he hadn’t sent it to the director. The humorous tone of the email permits 
Richard F. to thumb his nose at the director of administration with no ill effects and 
successfully brings his fellow heads into a position of collusion with him, lining them 
up against the director of administration, in a situation where the locus of power is 
somewhat negotiable. The position thus constituted for the cc’d heads is conspiratorial 
rather than parental, but the response to Richard F.’s email, from a fellow head, below, 
is nevertheless significant. 
 
 
From: Karen B  
Subject: Student Number Planning/Budget 
To: Richard F 
Cc: Heads of dept; Admin Director; Lisa L 
 
Richard!!!! 
 
Karen 
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What Karen B. is doing here assuming the parental position permitted, but not directly 
encouraged, by Richard F.’s email, and ‘telling him off’, in a humorous, motherly way, 
as one might chide a naughty child. She is attempting to disassociate herself from his 
conspiracy by refuting Richard F.’s ‘I shall say we’. This is a difficult to do in an email 
chain and unfortunately for Karen B. it does not quite come off. It is an attempt to 
demonstrate that she is not prepared to collude with Richard F. in his undermining of 
the authority position assumed by the director of administration. However, it rather 
backfires on her, suggesting that she is either insufficiently brave to stand up to the 
assumed authority of the director, or that she is too ingenuous to understand the political 
machinations (and, indeed the layered meanings of the email chain). Either way, Karen 
B.’s attempt at re-constituting her position ends up in a position as a naive supporter of 
the law, who can only see one side of an email. So the implicated subject cannot easily 
refute the sender’s inclusion.  
 
Blind carbon copying (bcc’ing) adds a new dimension to this drama. In bcc’ing, the 
receiver does not know that the mail has been copied to the bcc’d recipient. In this way 
the sender does not let the receiver know that they do not consider them to be of central 
importance. When bcc’ing, the sender is saying to the recipient ‘I am speaking privately 
and intimately to you, you, whose attention I want and whose authority I respect’. But 
what they are saying to the bcc’d person is, in the manner of the traditional pantomime 
aside, ‘oh no I’m not!’. They are saying ‘I’m pretending to the sender that I’m 
performing for them, but really I’m performing for you. Collude with me on this, 
because you are so important to me. I am trusting you not to expose me, so you must 
collude with me. Let us watch what they do in their foolish ignorance’. It’s a highly 
conspiratorial form of secret, underhand, whispering where the sender is inviting the 
bcc’d person to participate in a kind of secret sadism. On the other hand, the sender is 
making themselves extremely vulnerable, as, if it ever come to light that they have 
behaved in such a manner (and this could easily happen accidentally, by the bcc’d email 
becoming part of a chain) they may be viewed as dishonest and underhand by unknown 
others. But this is part of the pact in which they are implicating the bcc’d person when 
they send them the mail – they are trusting them with their reputation within the 
university, and so their partial public constitution as a subject. 
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The practice of email ‘flaming’, or sending inflammatory emails, is one which bears 
consideration in this context. What the sender is performing here, for the recipient of the 
mail, is dramatised anger and hostility towards them. Whether the sender is expecting 
the receiver to punish them by replying in a similar vein, or to just accept their hostility, 
what they are performing is the statement that ‘I have a right to behave towards you in 
this aggressive and hostile manner’. It has been suggested that email, in common with 
other online communication tools, encourages a level of emotional behaviour that 
would not occur in face-to-face discussion, because of the absence of non-verbal cues 
(Kruger et al., 2005). One implication of this is that the medium of email encourages a 
performance of sadism; which, given the earlier analysis of its relationship with the 
archive, repetition phenomena and the death drive, is unsurprising, as Freud, in Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle, links sadomasochism firmly with the latter two elements (Freud, 
1920, pp.327-9).  
 
In the composition of an email senders are always counselled, by ‘netiquette’ 
guidelines, to proceed with caution. In order not to send an inflammatory mail, users are 
advised to wait before pressing the send button and perhaps to re-word a mail that may 
sound provocative.
130
 So, if the subject is self-editing their email in order to refine their 
performance for the gaze of the Other, a slightly odd activity is occurring. In Riviere’s 
concept of the masquerade (Riviere, 1929), femininity is a set of behaviours which the 
female subject consciously and deliberately performs as actor. In a way, something 
similar is going on with this email masquerade. In writing a mail, the subject, whilst 
feeling angry, is editing out their anger and attempting to appear reasonable. There is no 
particular gender performance going on here – suppressing anger may be seen as 
performing the feminine, but attempting to appear rational rather than emotional is 
rather a performance of the masculine. The point is that the subject is quite consciously 
self-inventing and masquerading when they re-write themselves in their email. Perhaps 
a need exists in email technology for some assistance with this necessary masquerade – 
a piece of software called, let’s say, the ‘masquerader’ which, when the subject 
responds to an irksome email by pouring onto the screen their own sadistic rage, 
converts it to polite, unemotional sentences – much as the ego contains the id. 
 
                                                          
130
 See http://www.dynamoo.com/technical/etiquette.htm for netiquette advice to avoid arguing, 
shouting, flaming and emailing in anger. 
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Another form of performance in the sending of emails is the use of receipt requests. 
Some email software enables the sender to request a receipt when the email has been 
delivered and/or opened. What the sender is saying here is, ‘I don’t trust you not to 
ignore me. I will make you look at me, and I will invoke the Law-of-the-Father to back 
me up, so that you know you have to pay me attention’. It is a clear enactment of the 
Law, where the sender forces an audit trail upon the receiver. However, the receiver, in 
some email configurations, may be given the option to permit or not permit the sending 
of a receipt which says they have read/opened a mail. And it is with great pleasure that 
the receiver, in their turn, replies to a mail for which they have not permitted a receipt to 
be sent. They are saying, ‘your invoking of the Law doesn’t work with me! I can get 
round your attempts at surveillance and control. Watch me.’ It is a perfect opportunity 
for the id to play, to duck and dive around the Law, much like Dupin’s final flourish in 
the Purloined Letter, when by a gesture in the letter returned to the Minister, he lets him 
know that he, Dupin, has by his cleverness triumphed over his opponent. 
 
In order to prevent a mail from being read, if it has been sent out in error, some email 
software has a ‘recall’ function which prevents recalled mail from being read, 
effectively deleting it from the recipient’s in-tray, but leaving a trace that it was there. 
However, there is usually a time lag between the receiver getting notice of a recalled 
mail and it being unreadable to them; and, as Freud would have been able to tell the 
sender, the best way to get anyone to read a mail is not to invoke the Law, but the id. As 
soon as a mail is recalled it becomes disallowed knowledge, and, therefore, the most 
attractive message in anyone’s inbox. 
 
In summary, then, the way in which email conditions the academic subject is to 
contribute to their selfhood becoming unfixed, destabilised, split, uncertain and 
constituted by the readings, utterances and gaze of others. They have little control over 
the construction of their selves, but they cannot die, although they commune with death 
and the self. They are conscious of the existence of their spectral double, and also 
conscious that they are that double. Their power is eroded by other constituencies 
within the university and they are forced to speak and know in contexts not of their 
choosing. It is, essentially, a spectral position that email offers to the digital academic.  
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In the Times Higher Education article I mentioned at the start of this chapter, academics 
are warned that an email can raise a ghost by becoming ‘a hastily written missive that 
may come back to haunt you’ (Swain, 2006). Similarly, when that early adopter of 
institutional electronic surveillance, Muriel Spark’s Abbess of Crewe, announces, in 
relation to displacing traditional church governance and replacing it with her own 
surveillance-based authority ‘The age of the Father and the Son are past. We have 
entered the age of the Holy Ghost,’ (Spark, 1974, p.10), she might be speaking of the 
contemporary university. With the end of traditional authority for academe, it, too, has 
entered the age of a ghost less holy; the spectral presence of our other selves within the 
Haunted University. 
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9 Chapter 9 – The irradiation of the soul: research, public 
engagement and the mediated academic 
 
 
9.1 Preface 
In 2013 the Open University (OU) and partner institutions ran a course billed as ‘an 
exciting opportunity for doctoral candidates and early career researchers’(OU, 2013a). 
Its title was Becoming a Public Intellectual. An Arts and Humanities Research Council 
(AHRC) funded ‘skills training programme’(ibid.), it covered such issues as: how to 
perform on broadcast media: ‘Keep it simple – one idea per sentence and avoid … long 
words’(OU, 2013b); publicising oneself as intellectual through social networking: ‘To 
tweet or not to tweet?’(OU, 2013c); and asked participants, ‘what elements of yourself 
do you particularly want to develop?’(OU, 2013d).131 
 
Someone with no knowledge of the changes in research funding methodology might be 
puzzled by the existence of this course. They might wonder what had happened to make 
academics equate success with increased public profile, how compatible avoiding long 
words and learning to tweet will be with a life spent in the pursuit and sharing of 
knowledge, or whether PhD students should be in any doubt about the ‘elements’ of 
themselves they ‘particularly want to develop’. The programme for this course provides 
a clue to the background rationale for this seemingly unlikely development, however, 
when it highlights ‘the current emphasis placed on “research impact” and academic 
“public engagement” by HEFCE and other funding bodies’ (OU, 2013d). Or to put it 
another way, as, the course leader, Paul Lawrence, says in his opening talk ‘impact, 
public engagement, knowledge transfer – these are things that academics get bombarded 
with all the time’ (Lawrence, 2013). 
 
Thomas Harrison, REF coordinator and professor at Liverpool, calls himself an 
‘apologist’ for the RAE but in reflecting on his long-term involvement in the assessment 
                                                          
131 In fairness to the OU academics running this course, it’s clear from the videos of their talks that they 
approach it with enthusiasm and flair for mentoring PhD students but also with a degree of irony in 
terms of the subject matter and the prevailing environment. For example, one of the lecturers, the OU’s 
Champion for Public Engagement, Rick Holliman, describes his title as ‘slightly ludicrous’ (Holliman, 
2013).  
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of research, he begins to wonder whether the whole process represents an ‘irradiation of 
the soul’ of academic research practice, in the way it creates irreversible change. In 
particular, he refers to ‘a sense of dislocation between the daily business of research’ 
and the way academics are obligated to define and represent it in the quasi-market of 
HE (Harrison, 2014). This kind of ‘doubling’ of the quantified REF self and the 
embodied self that actually produces the research is another manifestation of 
fragmentation and the academic double I discussed in earlier chapters. 
 
9.2 Approach 
This chapter concentrates on research and the academic subject; in it I will re-consider 
the contemporary notion of the research, measuration and the mediatised academic, 
particularly in the in the light of changes in the stipulations by funding bodies. I’ll start 
with considering the recent Research Excellence Framework exercise and look at some 
perspectives on this. I will then take a look back at research in UK universities to see 
how ideas about what research is, who should do it and where, have developed.  
 
I will then theorise the way the cultural and organisational changes around research are 
enacted by UK research assessment processes, using situated psychoanalysis to consider 
how the issues of abjection, disavowal and foreclosure within the social body operate 
within these mechanisms and what the resulting effect is for the institution and the 
subject. 
 
I opened with the idea of the ‘public intellectual’ because the culture of publicity that 
this implies speaks about the re-engineering of ideas of what it is to be an academic – or 
at least ideas of what early career academics’ mindset about publicity should be. First of 
all I want to explore the concept of the ‘public intellectual’ in a little detail in order to 
tease out the meanings encapsulated in it and to enable its relationship to some of the 
terms I discuss later to be clearer.  
 
9.3 The public intellectual 
The Oxford English Dictionary(OED) definition of the term is: 
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public intellectual n. an intellectual who expresses views (esp. on popular 
topics) intended to be accessible to a general audience 
(OED, 2014).  
 
This is a good place to start, but the term has clearly begun to develop more nuanced 
meaning in recent times. This was recognised by educationalists John Issitt and Duncan 
Jackson who, in order to interrogate this concept, carried out structured discussions with 
academic colleagues from a range of disciplines at the University of York. They 
concluded that there was a tension inherent in the idea. On the one hand, the role was 
seen as being one of ‘critical dissent’ (Issitt and Jackson, 2013, p.8). This accords with 
Steve Fuller’s view that the public intellectual should actively seek to disrupt hegemony 
(Fuller, 2009, loc.1741-2) or writer Christopher Hitchens view that the role involves 
fighting a ‘battle of ideas’ in a way that is inherently subversive (Hitchens, 2008, para. 4 
and 10 ). Issitt and Duncan found that in line with this perspective ‘the word ‘integrity’ 
… encapsulated the one shared aspiration of most of [their]…contributors’ but that 
there was a ‘position of inherent tension’ between this and university culture which 
sought to ‘undermine individual intellectual freedoms in the interests of corporate 
success’(Issitt and Jackson, 2013, p.8). I propose that this is the tension between the 
critically dissenting subject who values integrity but who is increasingly produced by 
the corporate, neoliberal culture of publicity. 
 
I discussed earlier in this work Dean’s concept of how the economy of computational 
capitalism operates to produce us as self-publicising subjects. Dean goes on to argue 
that it is publicity that naturalises the whole culture of communicative capitalism. As we 
increasingly become ‘publicized subjects’(Dean, 2002, p.13) it follows that the more 
people who know who we are – the larger our public – the more we are somebody. 
While we may know this to be nonsense, because publicity can be manipulated and is 
unconnected with value, we feel it to be true and are inevitably impressed by the 
publicity of others, Dean argues (Dean, 2002, pp.6-13). 
 
The contemporary idea of the public intellectual, and the way that the machinery of the 
corporate university seeks to encourage the pursuit of publicity amongst academics 
must be read against this culture of publicity. Although concepts of ‘impact’ and ‘public 
engagement’ are technically separate from this, there is an overarching narrative of a 
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mediatised drive to publicity to which the economic and social drivers of research 
funding, reputations and careers are firmly attached
132
. All these codified practices of 
publicity are entwined together and all ‘bombard’ and ‘irradiate’ academic subjectivity. 
9.4 The REF 
The REF was introduced in 2009 as the most recent attempt to measure the quality of 
the academic research output of subject areas in each university, a measurement that is 
used to determine the amount of mainstream ‘quality related’ (QR) research funding 
that is allocated to each institution by the funding councils.
133
 30% of research funding 
received by universities in 2010-11 was from QR funding, but such research exercises 
have a direct effect on the other 70% of funding (Brown and Carasso, 2013, loc.1204). 
This is because they award a rating to each subject area in each university and high 
ratings are critical in enabling researchers to attract grants from such bodies as the UK 
Research Councils (RCUK), the Royal Societies, the Royal Academy, charitable 
foundations and the EU, which make up the additional 70% (Brown and Carasso, 2013, 
loc.1204).  
 
9.4.1 Public engagement 
RCUK funding is also tied into a measure called ‘public engagement’. This began in 
2008 when the National Coordinating Centre for Public Engagement (NCCPE) was set 
up by the funding councils and the research councils with additional funding from the 
private-sector Wellcome Trust (NCCPE, 2014a). Its aim was to encourage researchers 
to include interaction with individuals and groups outside universities as part of their 
research planning and execution. Subsequently, public engagement is one of the key 
areas that bidders have to demonstrate when applying for research councils funding, as 
the RCUK have a strategy to ‘embed public engagement throughout core RCUK 
business’ (RCUK, 2010). As the NCCPE make clear, ‘public engagement is explicitly 
encouraged as a “route to impact” and as a result, is increasingly entering mainstream 
research practice’ because of the REF’s ‘impact’ criteria (NCCPE, 2014b). 
                                                          
132
 It also raises important questions, too diffuse to be explored here, about who the audiences are that 
are being produced by this process and how they/we are being interpellated. 
 
133
 See HEFCE (2014) for a summary of how this works in England; the Welsh, Scottish and Northern Irish 
funding councils also distribute QR monies using the same formula, as the REF, like the RAE, is a UK-wide 
exercise.  
247  
 
 
There is, of course, nothing inherently wrong with the idea of public engagement. It 
speaks about the importance of academic voices in public debate and about the 
importance of academic ideas in the fabric of the cultural and social world; it can 
provide a positive way for universities interact with other organisations and individuals. 
Indeed, some of the academics I quote in this thesis are speaking ‘in public’ in the sense 
of contributing articles to the broadsheets, the Times Higher or other publications.  
 
Furthermore, the availability of funding for research projects which involve public 
engagement and impact as part of their core rationale can have the effect of encouraging 
work which is academically and socially significant, but which may have been 
disadvantaged by more traditional academic expectations. A good example of this is the 
Reaching out online study, funded by the RCUK Digital Economy Communities and 
Culture Network+ initiative. This project leveraged academic expertise in both digital 
media and sexuality/queer studies at Sussex University, to work with the HIV 
prevention charity, the Terrence Higgins Trust, on the use of social media for sexual 
health interventions in hard to reach communities (Mowlabocus, 2014). Projects like 
this form a politically radical, creative and socially inclusive interpretation of the whole 
thrust of the public engagement agenda which runs counter to the overall project of 
neoliberalism. 
 
However, reading the concept of public engagement against both the background of UK 
higher education changes wrought by successive governments over the last 30 years 
(outlined in detail in earlier chapters),with their successive injunctions for universities 
to become more ‘relevant’ and against the generalised culture of a shallow, affectively 
compelling, publicity (see Dean, 2010, p.2-4), does alter the meaning of the concept. 
The kind of public engagement that is implied when, for example, a climate change 
researcher publicises her work because she is keen to get her message out, or a drama 
scholar writes theatre reviews is different from that implied when early career 
researchers are enjoined to tweet amusing pictures every day, to raise their profiles 
(Else, 2015). This differentiation also applies to the concept of impact. 
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9.4.2 Impact 
The REF replaces the previous serial Research Assessments Exercises (RAEs). The 
most significant way in which it differs from these is in its emphasis on the importance 
of measuring ‘impact’, which was planned to constitute a quarter of the overall 
weighting, but was temporarily reduced to 20% for the 2014 REF (HEFCE et al., 
2011a).
134
 The funding councils ascribe the following definition to impact: 
For the purposes of the REF, impact is defined as an effect on, change 
or benefit to the economy, society, culture, public policy or services, 
health, the environment or quality of life, beyond academia.  
(HEFCE et al., 2011b, p.48) 
 
This concept of researchers being judged by these measures of impact – impact solely 
outside academia – has been the subject of much discussion since it was mooted in 
2009-10. Professor of Science and Technology Policy Studies Ben Martin takes the 
view that whilst having a socially valuable effect is a reasonable request for society to 
make of publicly funded research, to evaluate it in this way is either crude or impossibly 
time consuming (Martin, 2011). Healthcare researchers Smith, Ward and House 
similarly see benefits in their area of embedding ‘impact considerations among the 
routine reflexive tools of university researchers’(2011, p.1369) but doubt whether REF 
case studies can actually measure this. Both Spaapen and Van Drooge (2011), from a 
general research evaluation perspective, and Molas-Gallart and Tang (2011), from a 
Business Studies and Sustainability standpoint, see ‘reciprocal engagement between 
researchers and stakeholders as the key to creating research that has socially valuable 
outcomes’ (Donovan, 2011, p.177) rather than any more simplistic form of measuration.  
 
Jonathon Adams, director of research evaluation at Thomas Reuters, says that the 
concept of impact: 
is very complex, but the government wants a very simple indicator. 
Research takes a long time to translate into new products and processes, 
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 The funding bodies give the rationale behind this as: 
A weighting of 25 per cent for impact would give due recognition to the economic and social 
benefits of excellent research. However, given that the impact assessment in the 2014 REF will 
still be developmental, the weighting of impact in the first exercise will be reduced to 20 per 
cent, with the intention of increasing this in subsequent exercises.  
(HEFCE et al., 2011, 10c p.4).  
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so the lag between investment and change is extended, variable and 
uncertain.  
(Shepherd, 2009) 
 
The consequence of this is that the REF ‘may have the effect of disincentivising 
research that does not translate into immediate measurable impact for public policy or 
industry in the UK,’ as Matthias Uecker, head of the German department at the 
University of Nottingham, points out (Shepherd, 2009). Gareth Roberts’ 2003 warning, 
in his funding councils-commissioned report on the RAE (generally known as the 
Roberts Review), that ‘I urge the funding councils to remember that all evaluation 
mechanisms distort the processes they purport to evaluate,’ seems to have gone largely 
unheeded (Roberts, 2003, p.3), this distortion translating into Harrison’s more 
permanent research ‘irradiation’, as I mentioned earlier (Harrison, 2014). 
 
Other commentators have criticised the underlying implications of the notion of impact. 
Collini sees it as muddying the idea of what is actually being assessed. Although 
specific and separate percentages of the overall assessment are allocated to publications 
and other forms of research production 
135
(or in the Taylorist language of the exercise, 
‘outputs’) and impact, in the final summation the two become conflated; it wouldn’t be 
possible for a department or group to get a top rating without a good impact score. 
Collini argues that as a result of this conflation, ‘research plus marketing is not just 
better than research without marketing: it is better research’ (Collini, 2012a, p.175). Of 
course, we have to read Collini’s perspective more as an envisaged direction of travel 
than as a current actuality, as for the 2014 REF whilst departments or groups had to 
prove that they had an impact audience, within this individual academics whose work 
was submitted were not necessarily obliged to contribute to departmental impact.  
 
Collini also, when querying the idea of impact, questions the basic premise of the 
academy as an entity sealed off from the rest of our socio-cultural landscape, when he 
points out the false dichotomy of the idea of an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ to academia, 
seeing it as a ‘misleading spatial metaphor’ because ‘none of us are wholly inside or 
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 Research is commonly presented as written artefacts (ie books, journal articles etc.) but for some 
subject areas can also be presented in other forms, such as design, performance and exhibition.  This is 
acknowledged by the REF – see HEFCE et al, 2015, p.4. 
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outside any of the institutions which partially constitute who we are’ (Collini, 2012a, 
p.176). 
 
9.4.3 Material impact 
And ‘who we are’ may be materially affected by the REF. A UCU survey of the 7000 
academic staff from 153 higher education institutions (HEIs) reports that nearly a 
quarter were concerned that they would lose their jobs and more than a fifth that they 
would be transferred to a teaching-focused contract ‘if they did not perform to 
institutional REF expectations’ (UCU, 2013, p.4). A further ‘45% thought it likely that 
they would not be supported to undertake research in the future if they were not 
included in the REF submission’ (UCU, 2013, p.4). Times Higher Education reports 
provide evidence from both Swansea and Leicester Universities of managerial 
intentions to do just this (Jump, 2013; Jump, 2014). 
 
So what can be seen here is a potential change of role for some academic staff whereby 
they may be moved to ‘teaching-only’ contracts in order to improve their department’s 
Research Assessment status, or the status of a submitting unit. This type of pressure 
seems to have begun, in some institutions, with the successive RAEs but became more 
apparent in the run-up to the REF. The percentage of staff on teaching-only contracts 
has risen in the ten years from 2002-3 to 2012-3 from 12% to at least 25%.
136
 (HESA, 
2004; AUT, 2005; Oxford, 2008; Grove, 2014; HESA, 2014). Despite the protestations 
in the 2003 Government White Paper, The Future of Higher Education which 
attempted to break the link between research and teaching in HE saying ‘it is not 
necessary to be active in cutting-edge research to be an excellent teacher’ (p.54) and 
promising ‘we will also celebrate and reward teaching excellence’ (p.46), research is 
still a higher-status activity in universities and remains the accepted route to career 
progression (Fazackerly, 2013). Middlesex V-C, Michael Driscoll points out that, 
despite the REF obsession with impact outside the academy, the effect on students – the 
                                                          
136
 I describe this as ‘at least’ because in addition to the 46,795 staff on teaching-only contracts there 
were another 74,075 academic staff on what HESA terms ‘atypical’ contracts, that is to say staff whose 
‘working arrangements are not permanent, involve complex employment relationships and … may be 
characterized by a high degree of flexibility’ and which ‘may involve an absence of mutual obligation 
between the work provider and working person’ (HESA, 2012). In other words this is largely the 
casualised academic labour force (see Gill, 2010) most of whom will be teaching.  
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allegedly important clients in the new marketplace of higher education – is ignored. In 
an interview with The Guardian Driscoll says that for the REF: 
There's no mention of the link between research and teaching. By doing 
research in universities, it supports the curriculum, but we need to have 
researchers engaged in teaching. Researchers are less and less involved in 
teaching and the experience of their students suffers. 
(Shepherd, 2009, para.19) 
 
The issues that crystallise around the REF are, in a sense, twofold. Firstly, like previous 
attempts to weigh and measure research work – and so researchers – it constitutes a 
bureaucratic fulfilment of destiny where the academic subject is dividuated, in the 
Deleuzean sense (Deleuze, 1992), becoming a data item tagged with a particular code of 
1, 2, 3, or 4 stars, which defines them, or stamped with the stigma of being ‘un-
REFable’. This is the kind of dislocation and doubling Harrison refers to, where the 
starred or stamped REF self bears little relation to the day-to-day research self 
(Harrison, 2014). Secondly, and contributing to this, is the set of concerns specifically 
around impact – ideas about publicity, the marketisation of the self and the changed 
sense of the public intellectual that this implies. I’ll return to these issues later in this 
chapter, but first I want take a look back and to consider how some of our ideas of what 
constitutes university research have developed. 
 
9.5 A backwards look at research 
9.5.1 Definitions 
I’ll begin with some definitions of research. The REF defines research activity as: ‘a 
process of investigation leading to new insights, effectively shared’ (HEFCE et al., 
2011, p.48). The Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC), on the other hand, 
places an emphasis on the activity of the research itself, specifying that 
‘research activities should primarily be concerned with research processes, rather than 
outputs’ (AHRC, 2014). The European Commission (EC) takes a similar perspective, 
employing the Frascati definition of research: ‘Professionals engaged in the conception 
or creation of new knowledge, products, processes, methods and systems, and in the 
management of the projects concerned’ (EC, 2014, p.28). And the 2008 RAE defined 
research as ‘original investigation undertaken in order to gain knowledge and 
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understanding’ (HEFCE et al., 2005). So foregrounding the ‘effectively shared’ element 
of research, particularly when it comes with the rider that emerges with the impact 
assessment of ‘outside academia’ can be seen as a significant historical change in the 
understanding of what University research actually is.  
 
9.5.2 Research before the 20th century 
Although, in the 21
st
 century, we’ve become accustomed to thinking of the academic 
role as one that involves both teaching and research, in fact until the mid- to late 19
th
 
century research in both Arts and Sciences was carried out largely outside university 
walls, by ‘gentleman scholars’. The term ‘the Invisible College’ was used by Robert 
Boyle and others from the 17
th
 century to describe the loose association of gentleman 
(i.e. self-funded) scientists that later became folded into the Royal Society (Purver, 
1967, Chapter 3). Throughout the mid-19
th
 century research became professionalised, 
with scholarly journals, professional organisations and conferences gradually 
crystallising into normative academic practice (Anderson, 2006, loc.1947). The milieu 
of the time was one in which there was a contestation of the status of knowledge, with 
scientific empiricism presenting epistemological challenges to the thinking in 
traditionally clerical, Classicist universities (Turner, 2004, Chapters 5 and 7). 
Increasingly, the model of wissenschaft, championed by Prussian Minister of Education, 
Wilhelm von Humbolt, began to be adopted by British universities. This involved the 
academic role encompassing unity of teaching and research, with discovery being part 
of the learning process for students, who had an research apprentice role in relation to 
their teachers. Its impact on British higher education was significant and it persists as 
the underpinning educational model today, at least conceptually (Collini, 2012a, pp.23-
5). 
 
In terms of how research was financed, its private and benefactory funding in and 
before the 19
th
 century gradually gave way to the public funding of research during the 
20
th
 century (Anderson, 2006, loc.2053-61). From 1918 the UGC, which administered 
funding to universities, did so by block grants to each institution. Each university spent 
this grant on teaching and research, as it, as a self-governing community of scholars, 
saw fit. The code of guidance which provided the foundation of this approach to 
funding research was the Haldane Principle. Established in 1918, this specified that 
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public research funding should be allocated according to academic criteria rather than 
political influence. This principle ‘has been regarded, both in the academic world and 
more widely, as a key tenet upon which to ensure the integrity of academic endeavour’ 
(Brown and Carasso, 2013, loc.1248-9). 
 
9.5.3 The creation of the RAE 
In line with the radical conservatism of the post-1979 Thatcher administration, the UGC 
in 1984 announced: ‘we propose to adopt a more selective approach in the allocation of 
research support among universities in order to ensure that resources for research are 
used to best advantage’(UGC, 1984, para.1.9). This resulted in the creation of the REF’s 
forerunner, the RAE, the first of which was carried out in 1986, followed by five others 
at roughly five-year intervals, the last one being in 2008. These were increasingly 
complex exercises whereby universities were invited to submit research outputs of each 
subject area to national subject panels; each subject area of each submitting university 
was then awarded a ranking, and funding was allocated accordingly – the better the 
research was judged to be, the greater the amount of public funding. Rankings were 
published, forming an early part of the drive to produce the university league tables I 
discussed in Chapter 3. So within universities, academic staff who wished to be 
considered for inclusion in the RAE submitted a bibliography of their work published in 
the timeframe and internal panels in universities made judgements about which staff 
should be included – and which, to the detriment of their careers, and ‘the immense 
damage done to individuals’ morale’, not to mention the ‘cohesiveness of a department’ 
(Harrison, 2014), should be excluded. Once the exercise was carried out, individual 
university subject areas and so the staff within them became labelled with their ranking. 
 
The creation of the RAE fostered two culture-changing ideas for universities, firstly that 
research can and should be measured, and secondly that teaching and research are 
discrete activities. For the academic subject the production of specific ‘outputs’ every 
five years means longer pieces of work are more ‘risky’, and speculative work is less 
likely to be undertaken. This is another way in which academic time is compressed and 
becomes more like commercial time, with the external pressure to produce the requisite 
pieces in the imposed timeframe competing with the personal desire to carry out high-
quality, or simply less initially clearly defined, work. Academic staff are badged 
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‘research active’ or not and divided into two groups which begins to lay the ground for 
the ‘teaching-only’ role. The notion of ‘scholarly activity’, that is to say, the practice of 
keeping up with the debates and developments in one’s area, which is essential for 
effective teaching in higher education (as well as for carrying out research), is called 
into question, as it has no measurable outputs – as the UCU argue (UCUb, 2008).  
 
The tension about different types of academic role becomes exacerbated by the 
assessment exercise. As Jo Bostock finds in her book about gender and academic 
careers at Cambridge, there is a contradiction between the idea of the academic as one 
who performs the role of ‘good public citizen’, in carrying out such activities as 
university committee work and pastoral care of students, and the reality of those ‘who 
don’t collaborate, focus totally on their own research and make it to professor before 
they’re 40’ (Shima Barakat, quoted in Bostock, 2014, p.14). The latter approach 
represents an appropriation, by neoliberalism, of the drive and self-motivation that it 
takes an individual to do research, re-directing to a kind of personal career success in 
terms the world outside universities imposes. Classics professor Mary Beard, reflecting 
on this, looks fondly back to an era when she says ‘there wasn’t much promotion in the 
university. Occasionally people were plucked out for advancement but it wasn’t part of 
a career plan … success was something embedded in the community rather than the 
individual’ (THE, 2014b). This may have varied in different disciplines and different 
kinds of university; as Bostock suggests, the ‘good citizenship’ approach is viewed as 
feminine territory and so tends not to be rewarded in the same way as other activities 
(Bostock, 2014). But the role conflict is exacerbated by the imposition of a quasi-market 
in research by the RAE/REF, where the idea of academia as good citizenship is further 
undermined by the privatisation, not only of universities, but of what it is to be an 
academic.  
 
The shift here is towards aligning universities with the project of knowledge capitalism 
– an approach that insists that ‘universities should be the open-cast mines of the 
knowledge economy’ (Leadbeater, 2000, p.14). This imposes on universities the 
responsibility to lead the way with research that will regenerate the economy, providing 
‘opportunities for UK business to sharpen its competitive edge’ (Lambert, 2003, p.15) 
by association with universities. Simultaneously and paradoxically, it is an approach 
that valorises private enterprise above the public sphere and imposes a culture on higher 
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education that makes it more like a private company – albeit a badly funded one 
(Callinicos, 2006, loc.273).  
 
9.5.4 Replacing the RAE 
One of the key stated rationales for replacing the RAE with a different system of 
measuration was that it consumed too much time and effort and was therefore costly 
(HEFCE, 2007, p.4); the 2003 Roberts Review of the RAE, commissioned by the 
funding councils, put the cost of the 2001 exercise at £5-6 million (Roberts, 2003, p.16). 
Originally a system based on bibliometrics and citation indices – that is to say, the 
counting of references – was to be implemented as part of the RAE replacement 
exercise (HEFCE, 2007, p. 4). However, after further consultation and piloting the use 
of metrics was downgraded to ‘informing’ expert review for the 2014 REF (HEFCE 
2009, p. 3; Bridges, 2009, p.502). So, with the wholesale shift to judgement by 
quantitative data on citation avoided (or perhaps postponed
137
), the main difference 
produced by the switch from the RAE-ed academic to the REF-ed academic, is the 
injunction that their research, (or at least their department’s research) should have 
‘impact’ outside the academy.  
9.6 Mediatisation 
The compound effect on the academic subject of the neoliberal reinvention of higher 
education research in general, with its Taylorist approach to outputs, and the injunction 
to create impact in particular, is that the subject is subject to surveillance in their 
production of the requisite ‘output’138, (a process, as Harrison suggests, that becomes 
internalised) and also in the commercialisation and publicising of themselves and their 
work. The academic subject is thus mediatised and commercialised. In terms of the 
former, this is a significant change, as academic presence in the media until recently 
tends to have fallen into one of the following categories: the ‘expert’ asked for a 
soundbite on topical matters; the type of research that makes an appealing media story, 
such as ‘owning a cat can reduce the risk of heart attacks and strokes by more than a 
third, researchers have found’(Daily Telegraph, 2008); research being ridiculed for its 
                                                          
137
 HEFCE’s view was that that ‘bibliometrics are not sufficiently robust at this stage to be used 
formulaically or to replace expert review in the REF’ (my italics) would seem to imply that they may 
regard them as being acceptable for future assessments (HEFCE, 2009, p.3). 
138
 It’s interesting to note that for the REF there was an undertaking, for the first time, to read and 
assess – and so surveille – every single ‘output’. 
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esoteric or self-evident nature – ‘potty university research that just tells us what we 
already know’, as the Daily Star puts it (Daily Star, 2008); the traditional ‘kipper tie’ 
OU TV programmes; and, to some extent, older presentations of the ‘public 
intellectual’. 
 
The change from this to a situation where all academics are enjoined to aim for the 
space of publicity, to the extent that individual universities have their own PR sections 
which select and package academic ‘stories’, retaining corporate control of their 
narrative, is significant.  
 
The whole idea of the public intellectual becomes shaped by mediatisation, by the 
influence of TV and the press, and, more recently, also of social media presence. 
Blogging, in particular, creates its own academic blogging circuits. There are many 
different ways to blog and varied approaches that can be used by academic bloggers.  
Jill Walker, in ‘Blogging from inside the ivory tower’ described three different types of 
academic blog: the public intellectual, the research log and the (usually pseudonymous) 
account of academic life (Walker, 2006, p.4-5). More recently, academic blogs have 
developed that are a combination of the first and second (sometimes with a little of the 
third thrown in). In this approach research ideas are developed on blogs, out in the open, 
as I mentioned in the preface to Chapter 4,when I referred to Lucy Williams’ writing 
about her own PhD research blog, where she developed and publicised some of her 
ideas (Williams, 2013).  
 
Research blogging circles are also developing, where blogs consist of dialogues 
between groups of academics who blog and comment on each other’s blogs. The object 
oriented ontology (OOO) group, a subset of Speculative Realism, is a good example of 
this. OOO is a philosophical approach that privileges the importance of non-human 
objects (Bogost, 2009). A small group including relatively early to mid-career 
academics, Graham Harman, Levi Bryant, Ian Bogost and Timothy Morton make up the 
OOO circuit. This form of creating knowledge though public debate can be a positive 
one creating what Kirkup describes as ‘a new genre of scholarly writing’. However, 
there are potential issues for the way circles like this can potentially verify and uphold 
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group ideas. All the member of the group I mentioned have blogs
139
 where they develop 
ideas in the full glare of the 24/7 spotlight and comment on each other’s posts, in ways 
that re-affirm the importance of their area of work and the methods by which they are 
pursuing it. This practice creates a kind of academic ‘microcelebrity’ within 
participants’ own blogging circle. 
 
There are two aspects of this practice that are pertinent to the developing concept of the 
mediatised, publicised academic. The first is that participating in this type of research 
practice produces the researcher on the public stage. This constitutes the academic self – 
the research self – as performance in a way that is quite oppositional to more traditional 
approaches to developing research ideas in the seclusion that provides space to think. 
The second is that this immensely media-aware form of doing research becomes a 
circuit of the drive, in the psychoanalytic terms Dean applies to social media. By this I 
mean that it is bound up in the way the technologies ‘capture their users in intensive and 
extensive networks of enjoyment [and] production’ (Dean, 2010, p.4). But this is not the 
hysteric’s position of postponing fulfilment and constantly questioning their position 
(Dean, 2002, p.117) – the more traditional way of conducting research. Satisfaction 
comes quickly in this mode as response and counter-response are only ever a click away 
in these networks of enjoyment. The academic blogger here becomes the subject of the 
drive where ‘the gestures taken towards the goal become themselves the goal’(Dean, 
2002, p.117). This is a perverse position, but perversion is not entirely unexpected in the 
contemporary academy, as I will explore later in this chapter. 
 
This creates a kind of circularity in the group – in a sense it forms its own closed circuit. 
It’s ironic that whilst this group are from the US and so not subject to the REF, the REF 
in the UK encourages exactly this type of valorisation of the culture of celebrity in the 
academy. The area of OOO is one that, as an article in the Speculative Realism online 
journal, Speculations, suggests, owes its growth to the explosion of blogs and blogging 
about this type of philosophical idea (Gironi, 2010, p.21). Gironi views this as a positive 
trend and goes on to claim that the development of ideas in public, which he sees as a 
‘revolution’, is a ‘phenomenon which completely restructures … the very formation and 
                                                          
139
 Graham Harman’s blog can be found at http://doctorzamalek2.wordpress.com/about/; Levi Bryant 
blogs at http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/; Ian Bogost’s blog is at http://bogost.com/; and Timothy 
Morton’s is at http://ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.co.uk/. 
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organisation of ideas’. As I discussed in Chapter 6, this type of claim for the way that 
technology ‘revolutionises’ our world – in this instance for its effects on epistemology – 
is a kind of mythologising. In this case the mythic dimension is that publicity can 
become a stand-in for traditional ‘solid’ scholarship. 
 
This happens as an aspect of the generalised contemporary culture of publicity. The 
debate that arose from columnist A. A. Gill’s personal comments about Mary Beard’s 
work as a TV historian in 2012 is instructive in this matter. Gill described Beard as ‘too 
ugly for television’, asserting that she ‘should be kept away from cameras altogether’ 
(Daily Telegraph, 2012). Beard responded robustly and the very public altercation 
which followed served to improve her already substantial media profile, as well as to 
highlight A. A. Gill’s crass misogyny, but it does point up the idea that there’s now an 
expectation, unthinkable in the OU ‘kipper tie’ days, that a mediatised academic – the 
public intellectual – should conform to dominant notions of physical attractiveness, that 
is to say the disciplined, compliant body, high-maintenance grooming and the 
appearance of youthfulness. This is likely to be truer for women, of course, but it’s 
worth noting, for example, the distance travelled between TV astronomers Patrick 
Moore and Brian Cox. Moore appeared to be the epitome of the crusty, eccentric 
scientist in the programmes he presented in the 1960s and 1970s, and later, physicist 
Cox, who had a brief career as a pop star, projects boyish enthusiasm for his subject 
along with pop star good looks in a TV career that took off in 2010 and, with his wife, 
American popular science journalist Gia Milinovich, maintains a highly active social 
networking profile (see Cox and Milinovich, 2014). The contrast speaks tellingly of 
changing notions of what is expected of the mediatised intellectual.  
 
All of this shapes the subjectivity of people working in universities, particularly for 
early career researchers who are still at the stage of constructing their own academic 
identity. The idea of the ‘celebrity academic’ is one which Michael Barber, in his report 
on the future of higher education, hypes up as the ‘Ronaldo effect’ I discussed in 
Chapter 7. It’s useful to look more closely here at exactly what Barbar means by this: 
popular intellectuals who become brands in themselves ... these scholars have 
become so successful that they can set their own terms and take their brand and 
reputation to the highest bidder … We think of this as the Ronaldo Effect, 
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named after the … footballer whose talent is such that he can pick for himself 
which top club to play for.  
(Barber et al., 2013, p.27)  
 
The importance of this for the subject is that it suggests the most ideal career outcome 
that an early career academic might hitch their desire to is not to become the most 
knowledgeable and respected thinker in their field - but to be the most popular.  
 
9.7 Abjection and the RAE 
Another way of thinking about the whole area of research assessment, given that it has 
begun to define the core of what it is to be a scholar, is to consider it in the light of 
psychoanalytic theory. Applying Julia Kristeva’s concept of abjection to the 
bureaucratic process of the RAE offers a way of theorising it as a form of social hygiene 
ritual that separates out the ‘clean’ from the ‘unclean’ (Kristeva, 1980; Douglas, 1966). 
Kristeva sees abjection, on a social level, as the rejecting or casting out of a class of 
objects, persons, qualities, activities, ideas etc. in order that the rest of the social can 
become pure and coherent. The abject is that which ‘disturbs identity, system, order. 
What does not respect borders, positions, rules’ (Kristeva, 1980, p.4) and is expelled in 
in a way that renders it ‘radically excluded’ (ibid., p.2). 
 
The social body expels that which threatens its sense of self in order to shore up the 
borders which give it meaning and identity. As Anne McClintock suggests, the abject is 
also ‘a symptom of the failure of this ambition’, threatening the social body with 
‘perpetual danger’ by its very existence (McClintock, 1995,loc.1546); but the abject is 
also that which is uncannily familiar and becomes obscurely attractive (in a radically 
disallowed way) to the social body. So the operation of the RAE serves to make abject 
the area of teaching and non-measurable research. It positions teaching as a space of 
abjection and constitutes academic subjects accordingly. The fear expressed by staff at 
being pushed into a teaching only role reflect this. One of Ros Gill’s respondents in her 
study of ‘fast academia’, for example, says, ‘If I don’t get [this paper] into a good 
journal they won’t enter me into the RAE … and … teaching contract here I come! I 
feel like I’m clinging on by my fingernails’ (Gill, 2010, p.232). As C. S. Lewis observes 
of bereavement, ‘no one ever told me that grief felt so like fear’ (Lewis, 1961, loc.46); 
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for academic subjects pushed into the zone of abjection, the anxiety and fear do indeed 
speak of a grief at the loss of the desired object – and disavowing teaching in this way 
fetishises research as an object. This produces a melancholy subject with a profound but 
unnameable sense of loss (Freud, 1917; Butler, 1990). The melancholia persists even if 
– especially if – the subject had no particular keenness for research work in the first 
place, the activity of research coming with its own panoply of mental anguish (Gill, 
2010, p.234-5). Melancholia – or depression – has increased significantly for academic 
staff compared to other occupations between 2008 and 2013 (Kinman and Wray, 2013). 
And as psychoanalyst Darian Leader points out, depression in a neoliberal society is 
itself a form of resistance, a ‘refusal of current forms of mastery’(Leader, 2008, p.12-
13). 
 
What is traditionally abjected in Kristeva’s schema of subject creation is the mother; 
and it’s the ‘maternal’ element of the academic role, in the sense of the nurturing of the 
young, that is abjected here. Teachers are, of course, dangerous; they deal in ideas. 
Socrates was put to death for corrupting the young with his teaching (Hughes, 2010); 
Zizek was famously given an academic post in eastern bloc Yugoslavia on the basis he 
that mustn’t do any teaching in case he influenced students with his dissident views 
(Myers, 2003). Teachers are known to be disturbers of ‘identity, system, order. What 
does not respect borders, positions, rules.’ At the same time as some academics are 
moved into the abject zone of the teaching-only contract, research-active academics 
may be obliged to take on less teaching, because even if they enjoy it and do it well, too 
much of it will impede their career progression and their department’s research profile 
(see Hall, 2013, p.90). Successful compliance with the RAE thus becomes, for the 
subject, a neoliberal form of hemlock – at least in the matter of influencing the young. 
 
But non-compliant researchers are also abjected. Research which doesn’t fit the 
assessment framework, such as the ten-year book, work in interdisciplinary areas or 
theoretical science problems which don’t easily translate to papers or other permissible 
forms of production becomes disallowed activity because it does not contribute to a 
high assessment score. But this kind of inquiry – the pursuit of original ideas as an 
intrinsic aim – can be seen, as I discussed in Chapter 6, to be the more ‘sublime’ aspect 
of academic subjectivity. It is the area for which many academics feel a passionate 
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investment and refer to as ‘my own work’ (Gill, 2010, p.242). Thus the RAE performs 
the topsy-turvy function of rendering the sublime abject. 
 
9.8 Disavowal, perversion and the REF 
The idea of abjection can equally be applied to the REF but to understand the 
introduction of the impact element it’s useful to mobilise the psychoanalytic concept of 
disavowal. For Freud and for Lacan unacceptable reality becomes disavowed by the 
subject, who simultaneously acknowledges and denies it (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1978, 
p.118-9; Evans, 1996, p.44). The consequence of disavowal is perversion, where a 
fetish is put in the place of what has been disavowed. To apply this to the REF, what the 
impact element of the REF does is to disavow the importance of traditional scholarship, 
putting in its place the fetish-object of the evidence of impact. Neoliberalism must 
disavow the pursuit of certain approaches to and kinds of knowledge and thinking (at 
the same time as privileging others) which threaten its ideological stranglehold. This 
quest for the evidence or effect of impact is endlessly deferred, as real ‘proof’ of impact 
is difficult (or in some cases, impossible) to measure. What can be measured is the 
number of people who, for example, watched the spin-off TV programme, how and 
when they watched it and what sort of viewing profile the audience has, the number of 
people who commented on twitter, and so on. These values then become proxy 
measures for ‘actual’ impact so the fetish itself becomes fetishised (here in the Marxist 
sense of commodity fetishism I discussed in Chapter 7, as much as psychoanalytic 
fetishism). Furthermore, and ironically, the written narrative of the impact case study 
that must be produced for the REF then stands in for this proxy, impact: the word, ‘the 
letter’ stands in for the fetish-object (or the proxy of the fetish object). Thus, 
paradoxically, at the moment when writing as scholarship is abjected or disavowed, 
writing as ‘impact’ is rewarded. 
 
And that is why, although it would have been hard to find anyone in academia who 
thought, from its first announcement, that the REF impact agenda, within the terms set 
for it, was anything other than ludicrous and perverse, it persists. As a fetish object, its 
point is to be perverse – it’s perversion. And that is also why ‘impact’ is something that 
stays with the university if the academic who carried out the research on which it is 
262  
 
 
based leaves. As a form of perversion, it’s out of place by its very definition – its place 
is to be out of place. 
 
In the climate of publicity encouraged by the REF’s impact agenda, the TV and 
photographic image of the self can also become the fetish; the compliant image of this is 
the use of televisually appealing academics presenting popular science or history; A. A. 
Gill’s reaction to Mary Beard underscores this.  
 
The idea of ‘solid scholarship’ in a REF environment begins to change its meaning. It 
moves from being desirable to something that sounds thorough, but a little dull – which 
might no longer be sufficient for, say, an appointment or promotion or to attract 
funding: that would require ‘exciting’ scholarship. So solid scholarship melts into air or, 
as Bauman might put it, into a liquid, infinitely adaptable sense of what it is to do the 
work of academia (Bauman, 2010). Referring to Lacan’s four discourses which I used to 
interrogate the activity of teaching in Chapter 7, Fink says ‘in the university discourse, 
knowledge is not so much an end in itself as that which justifies the academic’s very 
existence and activity’ (Fink, 1995), an idea that the neoliberal university is motivated 
to enact. 
 
In the same way that impact and narratives about it come to stand in for research so too 
do numbers, in the form of scores. They become both fetishised and reified and stand in 
for the output, for the subject and for the department they describe. The transaction of 
the REF is a process that starts with ideas being codified into an acceptable publication, 
which then becomes a title on a list and ultimately, a score on a spreadsheet. This, 
effectively, replaces the research, which now only has meaning as a code of stars. As 
Alldred and Miller observe, this reified code outlives the memory of what participants, 
at the time, acknowledged to be the relative arbitrariness of the exercise: ‘we will … 
have ended up valuing what was measured in spite of ourselves’ (Alldred and Miller, 
2007). Thus academics are interpellated not only as subjects of the REF but also, in 
some way believing in it ‘in spite of ourselves’. Because the machinery of the REF 
believes for us. 
 
I have used Lacan’s concept of meconnaissance or misrecognition, in the sense that we 
enter into language at the mirror phase as split, misrecognising subjects, throughout this 
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thesis. But as I mentioned earlier, the term meconnaissance can be translated as ‘mis-
knowing’. It becomes possible to say, therefore, that the way in which neoliberalism 
attempts to alter the academic subject and condition the very way in which knowledge 
is produced, itself could be said to create a kind of social mis-knowledge, a 
meconnaissance of the public body. 
 
In disavowal, the psycho-social structure both denies and accepts the existence of the 
object being repudiated. I propose that while we are largely in this space of disavowal at 
present, we are moving into a space of foreclosure. In Lacan’s concept of foreclosure 
the unacceptable object is expelled from the Symbolic order completely.  
 
In Lacan’s work, what is foreclosed is the nom du pere,140 the name of the father or 
paternal authority. Expulsion creates a hole in the pyschic structure of consciousness 
and this produces a psychotic effect where that which is expelled returns to haunt the 
subject in ghostly hallucinations (Evans, 1996, p.44-6). Currently there is a move to the 
foreclosing of actual scholarliness, as the REF demonstrates. The process of becoming 
an academic subject
141
 is a process by which one becomes one’s surname (Gill, 2010, 
p.235) that is to say one’s nom du pere – and gains authority; it is that authority and 
‘solid scholarship’, the sense of the importance of knowledge, and the importance of the 
pursuit of it which is being foreclosed – expelled from the Symbolic order as a 
meaningful set of concepts.  
 
This form of expulsion creates a hole where this meaning once was and brings about a 
form of psychosis in the social structure – how can a society make sense of the world 
without knowledge or a concept of knowledge? This can only have a profound impact, 
both ontological and epistemological, on the fabric of the social. 
 
 In time this may become cemented in – and so the project of altering the academic 
subject is completed, ‘reconstructing academic work and those who do it, in ways that 
                                                          
140
 Lacan’s original French term for this concept plays on the literal sense of the name-of-the-father that 
is the bearer of naming and identity and the ‘non’, the ‘no’ of the father i.e. the assertion of authority. 
141 Of course, to gain academic subjectivity in the first place, the subject has been obliged to accept the 
foreclosure of other desires or ideas, as a pre-condition of subjecthood; the imposition of this new 
structure of social foreclosure, in additon to this, as well as having an effect on the social structure 
produces, in the subject, a sense of incoherence and loss (see Butler’s reading of Lacan, 1997, pp.6-9). 
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serve the prevailing model’ (Alldred and Miller, 2007) – even if they are permanently 
haunted by the (attractive and disallowed) ghost of purer research. The battle over 
subjectivity is won by neoliberalism, the döppelganger of metrics and impact has 
replaced the self and the soul of academia truly irradiated, if, in 20 years’ time 
academics pay less attention to the pursuit of new ideas and more to performing 
research that ticks the ‘right’ boxes, to self-publicity and narratives about their effect on 
the world – or whatever the fetish object is in 2034.  
 
9.9 Relentless weird thinking 
It’s fitting, in a climate of publicity, that the last words on what really makes an 
effective researcher should go to three very different academic researchers whose work 
has had considerable impact in their lifetimes.  
 
2013 Nobel Prize winner Peter Higgs, whose research eventually led to the discovery of 
the Higgs Bosen particle, says that that during his career he ‘published so few papers 
that he became an "embarrassment" to his department, and would never get a job in 
academia now’ and that in the current university climate ‘he would never have had 
enough the time or space to formulate his groundbreaking theory’(Aitkenhead, 2013). 
Despite his own significant public profile, cultural historian Paul Gilroy also counters 
current trends, saying that ‘the idea of being a responsible professional academic pulls 
you in the opposite direction to that of being a public intellectual ... Maybe it's a good 
thing in a way, because we don't need more celebrity academics – academics who know 
what they've got to say if they want to be in the bubble of visible celebrity’ (The 
Observer, 2011). Andrew Oswald, whose innovative work on human happiness as an 
index to the success of a society took many years to achieve its current popularity says 
that ‘university researchers who primarily wish to please people are not likely to 
contribute much to our world’ and that what universities – and society – need in 
researchers is ‘risk, failure, iconoclasm, more failure, genius, turbulence … eccentricity 
and relentless weird thinking’ (Oswald, 2014). 
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10 Chapter 10 – Conclusion: re-engineering the academy 
 
10.1 Preface 
In researching my question I developed a psychoanalytic materialist account of the 
newly developing academic subject. This is the person who emerges in the variously 
reconfigured places and spaces, culture and practices of the present-day university. My 
aim was to look at academic subjectivity as it is being reinvented or re-engineered by 
neoliberalism.  
 
10.2 Summary 
In answer to my research question of how the academic subject is constituted by the 
culture and practices of the neoliberal, computational, UK university, I found that there 
have been a series of developments and changes. These are tending to transform the 
academic subject to conform to a new model of what it is to be a lecturer and researcher, 
in various ways.  
 
There were three main planks in my analysis of this, which I have woven in and out of 
the chapters of this thesis.  
 
The first was the way in which the late modernist decline of the authority of grand 
narratives makes it difficult for universities to continue to justify themselves in high 
modernist terms as guardians of culture. This, in a Lacanian sense, decline of the big 
Other, de-stabilises language and meaning and produces us as hysterical subjects; it 
increases the importance of the realm of Imaginary, loading it with ‘heightened 
intensity, bearing a mysterious charge of affect’(Jameson,1991, pp.35-36). Two 
important things happen for academic subjectivity in this erosion of authority. Firstly 
the reinvention of universities as commercial organisations providing ‘a product with a 
price tag’ (QAA, 2013) becomes ideologically feasible because of the decline of the 
academy’s discursive authority, producing academics as builders and sellers of 
knowledge or knowledge products, subjected to regimes of control, rather than 
autonomous scholars in a self-governing community. Within this, the products of 
academic labour are prised loose from their creator and reified, a process which 
267  
 
 
attempts to drains the academics of subjectivity, reducing them to the status of object. 
The second thing that happens to academic subjectivity is that the intellectual authority 
of the scholar is challenged. In the shallow, affective, online and offline world of 
‘whatever’ culture, where all perspectives, whether based on evidence or ignorance are 
‘just your opinion’ (Dean, 2010, p.6), informed intellectual argument has little purchase. 
 
This latter point is related to the second plank of my analysis, which was that as we 
become interpellated as the subject of mediated technologies – however much we may 
want to challenge communicative capitalism or distance ourselves from it, it becomes 
near impossible because the machine believes for us. In the university, the machinery of 
audit and metrics believes, even though many academics may contest the value of 
governmental activities such as the NSS or the REF, the machine believes for them. 
Ultimately, despite themselves, as Pam Alldred and Tina Miller (2007) observe, 
everyone ends up believing the value ascribed to institutions, departments and 
individuals by such processes.  
 
The third plank of my analysis started with the concept that the discourse of the 
competitive, commercial enterprise, defined by the language of the market closes down 
the space for dissent. As Lorenz points out, this discourse cannot be debated, because it 
doesn’t accept truth as a concept, being ‘a game that neoliberalism has superimposed 
over scholarship in the universities’ (Lorenz, 2012, p.627). There is a disavowal of the 
values associated with academic life and of the importance of academics themselves. 
Thus bureaucratic desire creates a kind of institutional neurosis – made concrete in the 
managerial Imaginary as the planned futuristic university building (that never 
materialises) which produces nothing but an array of metrics demonstrating its 
‘excellence’142 and where the troublesome bodies and subjectivities of staff and students 
are elided. In this the actual core values and functions of a university, scholarship and 
academic endeavour, are disavowed (i.e. their existence is simultaneously 
acknowledged but denied) and this produces an institutional perversion, where fetishes 
                                                          
142
 Bill Readings interrogates the notion of ‘excellence’ as it is (over-)used in managerialist university 
discourse. Using the example of university car parking, he notes an award of excellence that Cornell 
Univerisity Parking Services won, for restricting parking spaces. Readings points out that this award 
could equally have been won for increasing parking spaces, because the concept of excellence as an 
evaluative criteria no longer has meaning. In neoliberal discourse the signifier ‘excellence’is emptied of 
content and then used as a stand-in for (unprovable, inarguable) quality (Readings, 1999, p.24). 
Readings uses the term ‘The University of Excellence’ (ibid, p. 11) to capture this idea. 
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such as ‘excellence’ and ‘efficiency’ are put in their place and worshipped. As the grip 
of neoliberalism becomes stronger, the disavowal shades into foreclosure, that is to say, 
the rejection and expulsion of the core values and activities from the Symbolic order. 
This produces psychosis, but in the case of neoliberal discourse, an institutional 
psychosis that masquerades as normality and is impervious to argument as its logic only 
operates inside its own hermetic referential argument. This produces a splitting or 
doubling of the academic subject, dividuated into their embodied self and the double of 
metrics, of publicity, of bureaucracy. Moreover, the mounting evidence of growing 
workplace stress among academics is also foreclosed and ‘strategies that individualize 
and pathologize those who complain’ (Barcan, 2014, loc.193) are mobilised. This 
ensures that, in the psychotic structure of the Haunted University, the experience of 
working under unacceptable (and unnecessary) pressure is not only denied, but turned 
back on the subject, blaming them for something that they are invited to internalise as 
their own shortcomings and adding a layer of shame, guilt and secrecy to the affect this 
produces (see Gill, 2014, pp.21-22; Barcan, 2013, loc. 315). 
 
I will now briefly summarise what each chapter contributed to this overall analysis. In 
Chapter 3, I identified three discourses in historical public debates about universities, 
which have played a part in shaping ideas about what the university is and what it 
should be. These are the discourse of privilege and elites; the discourse of progress and 
the public good; and the discourse of commodification and private advantage. I argued 
that these have been leveraged, at various points in history, to justify changes to UK 
higher education and I examined in greater detail the move to marketisation and 
personalisation over the last 30 years, as the third discourse gained purchase. I began to 
discuss the relationship between this and the concurrent technologisation of university 
life and I also began to introduce the idea of various counter-hegemonic approaches to 
this neoliberal commodification of the university; these I defined as an attempt to re-
inscribe the discourse of progress and the public good. 
 
In Chapter 4 I mobilised a Lacanian notion of the Mirror Stage to consider how 
academic homepages and blogs form an enactment of tensions between institutional 
conformity and a form of resistance to this, by offering a negotiation of academic 
subjecthood within the digital Symbolic. 
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I used the idea of the unheimlich Freudian double in Chapter 5 to consider how the 
digital doubles of academics, created by agencies outside the subject, impact on 
subjectivity. I demonstrated how networked computers operate as ideological belief 
machines and how the presence of the double within the digital Symbolic elides other 
narratives of self and impacts on the sense of selfhood the subject negotiates within the 
digital Imaginary. I also considered how the collapse of the master signifier operates in 
relation to this and enables the double to gain credibility.  
 
In Chapter 6 I considered how the rhythms and rituals of academic time have become 
overlaid with the competing temporalities and routines of commercial time and 
similarly how the space of universities is impacted by the neoliberal shibboleths of 
flexibility and efficiency. I discussed how the embodied subject must be organised in 
relation to these new space-time arrangements. However, as the academic subject is also 
constituted as the immaterial self ,of knowledge and ideas, as well as of mediated 
technoculture, this creates a disciplinary regime where the embodied academic subject 
is always displaced, always being made to fragment yet, conversely, also made to 
reconcile in moment where the exercise of power marks them most profoundly. 
 
I mobilised Lacan’s Four Discourses, in Chapter 7, to consider how issues of power, 
authority, knowledge and authenticity are negotiated within a range of teaching 
practices. As part of this I analysed the way in which neoliberalism attempts to press 
educational technologies into its service, partly by reifying digital educational content 
and practices. 
 
In Chapter 8 I proposed that emails sent and received by academic subjects are 
purloined as soon as they are created. I used the Lacanian concept of the gaze to analyse 
the way in which email produces the subject by the readings, utterances and the gaze of 
others. I also consider how being forced by email to publicly speak and know in 
contexts not of their making impacts on subjecthood. 
 
In Chapter 9 I analysed how attempts to weigh and measure research work - and so 
researchers – constitutes a bureaucratic fulfilment of destiny which attempts to reduce 
researchers to data items tagged with a code of stars - or to brand them as ‘unREFable’. 
I used the Lacanian and Kristevan concepts of abjection, disavowal and foreclosure to 
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consider how cultures of bureaucracy on the one hand and publicity on the other attempt 
to profoundly alter what it is to be an a researcher and to produce knowledge. I then 
went on argue that this alters the knowledge that is produced. 
 
Thus I have shown that for the neoliberal university, academic subjectivity is the real 
battleground. Changes to the structure and staffing and mission of institutions can be 
made and unmade, funding can be provided, cut, re-organised, but if what it is to 
actually be an academic is changed from the inside, then that ‘irradiation of the soul’ 
can’t be undone. Whether this is done stealthily, so that individual subjects barely notice 
the change, as Harrison (2014) reports, whether some academics embrace the new order 
willingly (see Sparkes 2007, p.532 and Lorenz, p.626) happily becoming perverse 
subjects of the metrical drive or whether new recruits to academia are deliberately 
inducted into becoming a different kind of academic,
143
 changing this changes the 
knowledge that a society produces which consequently changes that society. 
 
This is a pessimistic picture, but I have also found that there are resistances against this. 
Neoliberalism attempts to press technology into the service of its project. Partly it uses 
it to amplify it, partly it uses the computational as a kind of ‘invisibility cloak’144 to 
obscure the political nature of the changes it implements. But technology can be a site 
of resistance as well as means by which we are produced as subjects of ideology. As I 
have demonstrated, these range from the sometimes playful, often imaginative, 
intelligent and unruly approaches academics use in inscribing their own subjectivity 
onto the digital Symbolic – as blogs, pages, websites, online education and emails that 
are counter-hegemonic in small subtle ways, in larger, explicit ways, ways that can be 
performative, communicative or disruptive. 
 
Gary Rolfe posits the concept of ‘the ‘Paraversity’ as an invisible, subversive, virtual 
institution that exists alongside the … university’ (Rolfe, 2013, loc.253-4). By this he 
means not only the kinds of initiatives I discussed in Chapter 3 such as the Free 
University movement, the Workers’ Educational Association and other academic 
                                                          
143
 See, for example, the Times Higher Education account of an RCUK funded Skills in Action Festival for 
early career researchers (Else, 2015), or the RCUK funded OU Becoming a Public Intellectual course I 
mentioned in Chapter 10(OU, 2013a). 
144
 Maybe more in the way that a Romulan Warbird uses an invisibility cloak than the way Harry Potter 
does. 
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activity located outside universities, but also, as Deborah Withers and Alex Wardrop 
articulate, in their idea of the para-academic, both individuals
145
 and:  
potential collectivities of people and practices existing simultaneously 
inside, outside, and alongside the conventional academy. They often 
occupy their positions through force of circumstance, choice or an 
ambivalent mixture of both. 
(Withers and Wardrop, p. 8) 
 
The concept they present then, includes research performed outside the restrictions of 
the REF, as a respondent in Angela Thody’s study of retired academics146 indicates: 
‘I now do not have to participate in the target-obsessed numerical 
performance indicators…and I can devote myself full-time to research 
which I can control to my satisfaction and in directions I consider are most 
important’. 
(Thody, 2011, p.645). 
 
It also includes the development and practice of more radical pedagogies for higher 
education such as those I referred to in Chapter 7, which are driven by ‘critical 
pedagogy ‘and ‘counter-hegemonic’ practices (Clegg et al, 2003, p.51).  
 
10.3 Audience and effect 
These findings might to be of interest to anyone working in a university who 
experiences this uncanny cultural transformation on a day-to-day basis and wants to 
step back and think about what it means to them, personally, in their work role. 
Considering how the haunting of the everyday speaks about the engineering of 
significant social and political changes may offer them a way of theorising their own 
day-to-day experience. My findings may also be helpful to those working in the area of 
technology in higher education who wish to have a fuller understanding of what the 
                                                          
145
 See, for example, Bronwyn Davies’ Leaving the academy blog:  
It is two years since I left my secure job in a university to become an independent scholar. I left 
because I could no longer bear what neoliberalism was doing to academic work. I am, like many 
scholars, deeply wedded to my work, so leaving the institutional framework that had made my 
work possible, was not a decision I made lightly. The current micro-management of universities 
is driven by government, but played out by university managers -- on and through the bodies of 
academic workers.  
146
 See Harley (2012) for a review of studies on retired academics’ research activities. 
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implication of the technics are for academic staff. I also think they would be of benefit 
to university managers from academic backgrounds, as they may assist them to make 
sense of the ambivalent situation in which they are often placed (see Sparkes, 2007, 
p.524-8).  
 
As well as having answered my own question, carrying out this work has changed my 
view on some of the theoretical areas, particularly in terms of the importance of 
embodiment in relation to the virtual world of technoculture. It has also made me realise 
how tremendously demanding sustained research work is and has given me additional 
respect for those who grapple with it day in, day out. 
 
My study implies that further research could be conducted on resistance strategies that 
cause academic staff and students to create opportunities for learning and researching 
inside and outside the formal university structure, as Wardrop and Withers (2014) have 
begun to do. 
 
Although I have specifically considered, in this work, the way in which communicative 
capitalism operates on the subjectivity of academic staff in universities, the same 
approach could be meaningfully applied to other types of workplace. It would be 
productive, for example, to analyse the relationship between technology and the 
embodied self in the production of subjectivity for nurses in hospital environments or 
GPs in local practice. 
 
10.4 Another kind of haunting 
Finally, looking back on this thesis it strikes me that whilst I have talked about the 
fantasies of bureaucrats and auditors and even touched on the desires of students, I have 
been largely silent about academic pleasure and desire. This is saddening, but perhaps 
only to be expected in the current climate. There used to be a joke in universities, which 
hardly makes sense any more, that libido is just a form of sublimated academic research. 
Now that the (false) law of the father dictates that research must be done and done 
according to its rules, it becomes the province of the academic superego, rather than the 
id. As the Dublin-based Provisional University Collective put it: ‘the current 
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organisation of the university is excluding the very subjectivity, the very desire on 
which it relies’ (2014, p.85).  
 
As Mark Fisher points out, the way in which neoliberalism denies alternative discourses 
means that for us, in the early 21
st
 century, it’s easier to imagine the end of the world 
than it is to imagine the end of capitalism (Fisher, 2008, p.1-2). Similarly, it’s easier to 
imagine the end of higher education than it is to imagine a change to a new way of 
organising universities and producing academic subjectivity. The danger in critiquing 
the neoliberal production of academic subjectivity is that it’s tempting to offer the more 
traditional model of the ‘rational, liberal, humanist subject … motivated by a “desire for 
pre-eminence, authority and disciplinary power”’ (Hall, 2013, p.84)147 as an alternative. 
Even if this were a desirable or achievable goal the fact that ‘the good old days were 
good only for the happy few’ (Barcan, 2014, loc.279) makes it an unpalatable 
alternative and the challenge is to find new ways of organising the university and 
constituting a new form of authentic academic subjectivity.  
 
The institutional psychosis created by foreclosure brings another kind of haunting, as, 
for Lacan, the foreclosed returns as hallucinations and dreams. Perhaps the psychotic 
university of communicative capitalism, ultimately, becomes haunted, in turn, by the 
ghost of disallowed authentic academic subjectivity – as resistances begin to gather and 
take shape. In the ‘always on’ glare of the 24/7 university, you have to make your own 
shadows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
147
 Gary Hall’s quote within my quote is from literary critic, Stanley Fish. 
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Appendix A 
 
Sites used in Chapter 4 and date of accession 
Personal homepages and blogs 
Conole, G. e4Innovation. Available at: http://e4innovation.com/ (accessed 4 September 
2009). 
Hall, G. Homepage. Available at: http://www.garyhall.info/ (accessed 4 September 
2009). 
Lee, P. Homepage. Available at: http://homepages.cs.ncl.ac.uk/p.a.lee/ (accessed 4 
September 2009). 
Page, R. Digital Narratives. Available at: http://digitalnarratives.blogspot.com 
(accessed 4 September 2009) 
Shipman, R. Wolf’s Spoor. Available at: http://pcbo.dcs.aber.ac.uk/blog/ (accessed 4 
September 2009). 
Wheeler, S. Learning with ‘e’s. Available at: http://steve-wheeler.blogspot.co.uk/ 
(accessed 4 September 2009). 
 
Institutional homepages 
Hall, G. (2009) Profile page. Coventry University. Available at: 
http://www.coventry.ac.uk/cu/schoolofartanddesign/mediaandcommunication/staff/a/46
44 (accessed 4 September 2009). 
Lee, P. (2009) Profile page. Newcastle University. Available at: 
http://www.cs.ncl.ac.uk/people/p.a.lee/ (accessed 4 September 2009). 
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Appendix B 
 
Sites accessed in Chapter 5 and date of accession 
 
123People (2010) Available at: http://www.123people.co.uk/ (accessed 18 March 
2010). 
ALT-C (2008) Association of Learning technology Conference, 2008. Available at: 
http://www.altc2008.alt.ac.uk/profiles/search?query=Thomas&go=search (accessed 18 
March 2010). 
Evalu8 (2010) Evaluation team. Available at: http://www.eval.org/evaluation-team 
(accessed 18 March 2010). 
HEFCE (2010) Employer engagement projects. Available at: 
http://www.hefce.ac.uk/econsoc/employer/projects/show.asp?id=11 (accessed 18 March 
2010). 
Kingston University (2010) Services for business. Available at: 
http://www.kingston.ac.uk/services-for-business/contact-us (accessed 18 March 2010). 
Open University (2002) Knowledge Network 
http://kn.open.ac.uk/public/person.cfm?userid=9707 (accessed 18 March 2010). 
  
277  
 
 
Appendix C 
 
Interviews with course leaders in a Faculty of Health and Social Care 
Note 
This survey was carried out as part of my role as Director of E-learning in the faculty in 
question. It therefore had two sets of (substantially overlapping) outcomes, generation 
of data for this work and provision of information for a report I prepared on e-learning 
for the faculty. Therefore some of the questions in the interview schedule at the end of 
this appendix have a level of detail relevant to the second purpose but less so for the 
first purpose; they have been included for completeness. 
 
All interviewees were agreed to the interviews being used for both internal faculty 
purposes and for research purposes. They were assured that for the latter they would be 
anonymised.  
 
Background 
This large faculty (approximately 200 academic staff and 5000 students) was located 
jointly at across two universities; one of these is a post-92 institution and the other is an 
older medical school.  
 
The main e-learning experience of staff involved the use of the institutional VLE, 
Blackboard, including its discussion board. The attitudes, experiences and perceptions 
of staff in the area of e-learning were sought, based on their experience of using this 
technology. 
 
Methodology 
This exercise used interviews to collect data. Between December 2006 and February 
2007 twelve course directors from all schools within the faculty were invited, via email, 
to participate. Course directors were asked either to gather information from colleagues 
regarding e-learning or to invite appropriate staff to attend the interview. A suitable 
date, time and location were agreed. The interview schedule was semi-structured to 
ensure a degree of consistency. 
 
In broad terms the themes that were explored included: 
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 A general overview of e-learning within the course director’s remit (current 
usage, drivers to establish an e-learning component, process of setting up / 
monitoring activity); 
 Staff perceptions of e-learning based upon current use; 
 Perceived challenges for e-learning. 
 
Validity of the data collected was confirmed by a verbal summary at the end of the 
interview and by asking participants to review transcribed interviews for accuracy. 
 
 Interview Guidance Template 
Schedule: 
1. Introduce purpose and remit of the excercise  
2. Conduct interview 
3. Confirm accuracy of data collected  
Name:  
Course: 
Role: 
Date and time of interview: 
 
Section 1: The nature of the e-learning 
1.1 Given our overview of e-learning is there any e-learning in your course Y / N  
 
 
 
1.2 Can you describe what it is, exactly – [offer choices, probe, get them to describe]. 
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1.3 Is it optional or compulsory for students? [E.g. do students’ have to use e-sources 
for information relating to the course or module?] 
 
 
1.4 What prompted you to set it up? 
 
 
 
1.5 How did you go about it setting it up? [find out if they re-used anything] 
 
 
 
1.6 How do students access it ? [ VLE or WWW] 
 
 
 
1.7 Do you integrate it with f2f /print at all?  
 
 
 
1.8 Do you use any external e-resources such as Athens accessed library resources or 
external websites? 
 
 
Section 2:The experiences and attitudes of students and staff 
2.1 What do think were the views/experiences/attitudes of staff to :  
a) the process of creating the e-learning 
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b) the process of running e-learning on a course 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Is there anything that could help with the process of generating / running e-
learning? 
 
 
 
2.3 Do you have a sense of the views/experiences/attitudes of students to using e-
learning on the course? (find out how they get this info – is it part of the module 
evaluation) 
 
 
 
2.4 Are you planning any new e-learning in the future? (when, exactly, and what) 
 
 
 
2.5 Reflecting on the whole process, is there anything we could do as a Faculty or as 
Institutions to make the e-learning easier to create or to enable staff to create better 
e-learning opportunities? 
 
 
 
2.6 Are there any other points you’d like to make or issues you’d like to raise? 
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Appendix D 
 
Survey of academic staff trialling an Elgg and Drupal environment. 
 
Background 
As part of a HEFCE-funded R and D project in a post-92 university, a learning 
environment was developed using open-source Elgg and Drupal technologies. This was 
piloted with a group of volunteer academic staff from across the university in 2008. 
 
The previous staff experience of e-learning was based mainly on using the institutional 
VLE, Blackboard. Some had begun to use freely available social networking 
technologies such as Facebook and various wikis and blogs in their teaching practice 
but none had previously used a comprehensive second-generation environment 
specifically designed for teaching and learning. 
 
Technology 
The Elgg part of the environment provided the social networking elements, including 
profiles, wikis, blogs, forums, and the entire structure for linking with others; the Drupal 
software provided a space for tutors to produce course materials collaboratively.  
 
Methodology 
In the first instance, appropriate staff across the university in all faculties were 
contacted. These might be associate deans for learning and teaching, blended learning 
leaders or learning and teaching co-ordinators, depending on the structure of the faculty. 
They were asked if they or any of their colleagues would like to participate in the study. 
 
Eighteen university staff, from a wide range of differing subject areas, participated in 
the study which involved taking part in an initial face-to-face workshop, then used the 
environment in a structured way for a pilot over the period of a month. They were then 
asked to complete questionnaires (see overleaf) about their experience of the 
environment. They were also offered the option of articulating their views within the 
body of the environment itself, during the trial, in blogs, wikis, discussion forums, 
messaging, posts on colleagues’ comment walls and other spaces.  
282  
 
 
 
All participants used the environment. Thirteen participants returned completed 
questionnaires and five used the environment itself as the place to comment about their 
experience two of whom had also returned questionnaires; thus sixteen participants 
responded. 
 
The collection of data was used for two (overlapping) purposes. The first was for this 
study and the second was to meet a range of aims within the HEFCE R and D project. 
The questionnaires, therefore, contain some questions that are less relevant to the first 
aim, but are included for completeness. 
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KubiSpace Testing and Evaluation Feedback form 
 
Name (optional):      
Faculty/Department (optional): 
 
1. How easy/difficult did you find KubiSpace was to use? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Did you use KU-Tip (the help/reference files) at all? YES 
 
3. How did it compare to your experience of using other online education environments? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. How would you imagine using it for learning and teaching or for student support? (Please give 
examples) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. How did the experience of using the environment actually make you feel, when you were 
engaged with it? (for example, you might have felt frustrated or enjoyed the ‘play’ aspect of it or 
felt intrigued, etc, etc.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Did you feelings change as you became more familiar with KubiSpace? 
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7. Do you think using this kind of environment might incline you to use different kinds of teaching 
and learning approaches than you presently use? (Please give examples) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. How do you feel that the learner experience in KubiSpace would be different from face to face 
teaching? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. How do you feel that the teacher experience in KubiSpace would be different from face to face 
teaching? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10. Is there anything that you would like to see changed in KubiSpace? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11. Is there anything else you would like to add about your experience of using KubiSpace? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please complete and return by 10 April 2008 
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